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Abstract
Health insurance arrangements developed in various social settings as a means of pooling 
health risks and health resources in order to protect members' income against 
unpredictable health costs but also in order to guarantee their access to health care. 
Problems of unregulated health insurance markets, like adverse selection and risk 
selection, are frequently discussed in academic and political circles in the context of either 
inefficiency or inequity. Though interest in regulation as a health sector reform instrument 
is growing, empirical studies of unregulated health insurance markets are still rare, 
particularly, in low and middle-income country settings.
This thesis contributes to the body of research and literature that attempts to 
identify empirical evidence for adverse selection and risk selection. It aims to examine the 
following research question: Are unregulated health insurance markets characterised by 
adverse selection and/or risk selection and do they thereby create inefficiency or inequity? 
The objective is to demonstrate empirically whether or not these markets experience 
selection processes. First this thesis derives a group method for empirical investigations 
into adverse selection and risk selection from which testable hypotheses can be derived. 
Second, this method is applied to case study data from a middle-income country. 
Longitudinal panel data is analysed, describing South Africa's health insurance market of 
medical schemes in the context of its post-deregulation experience over the four-year 
period 1995-1998, after premia risk-rating was legalised.
The interpretation of the empirical results leads to three main findings. First, 
intense competition in the contested health insurance market causes favourable risk 
selection of low risks into and out of medical scheme plans. Second, unfavourable 
selection by medical scheme plans in the form of dumping high risks can be concluded. 
Third, there is no evidence for adverse selection and the typical adverse selection cycle 
cannot be observed. Exploring the policy relevance of the results, it is concluded that the 
effects of less health insurance regulation, in the context of middle-income country health 
sector reforms, conflicts with the common health policy objective of equity. More 
competition and efficiency comes at the price of less equity in health care access for the 
poor and sick, confirming the known efficiency-equity trade-off.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Thesis topic and scope
This thesis' topic is adverse selection and risk selection in health insurance markets. It will 
address gaps in the literature/ specifically in regard to empirical evidence for adverse 
selection and risk selection in low- and middle-income countries. Both selection processes 
are frequently discussed in academic and political circles in the context of either 
inefficiency or inequity. However/ these processes are usually not empirically assessed/ 
likely because they are hard to identify. This thesis is an attempt to rectify this omission.
More specifically the research has theoretical and practical aims. The theoretical 
aim is to derive a method for empirical investigations into adverse selection and risk 
selection that is easily applicable in low- and middle-income country settings. The 
practical aims are twofold. The first is to conduct an empirical analysis, which tests for 
adverse selection and risk selection. It will apply this method to data from South Africa's 
medical scheme market, thereby increasing understanding of the behaviour of health 
insurance market participants in the context of a middle-income country. The second 
practical aim is to provide policy-relevant information on how less regulation in middle- 
income country health sector reforms - in particular, unregulated health insurance 
arrangements - might impact the common health policy objectives of efficiency and 
equity.
The relaxation of regulation (or deregulation), as a type of privatisation and 
decentralisation in the context of health sector reforms, often aims to overcome the 
dilemma of poor public health care financing and provision (World Bank 1993). Health 
sector regulation became an area of interest as the role of the public health sector in low- 
and middle-income countries declined. At the same time the non-governmental sector,
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both non-profit and for-profit grew (Kumaranayake 1997). Regulation can be seen as a 
potential middle ground between "all or nothing approaches" of public versus private 
health care financing and provision. However, deregulation leaves these parts of the 
health care sector unregulated and de facto operating as private and for-profit One 
example is the unregulated South African health insurance market of medical scheme 
plans, which became subject to a series of deregulations by the South African government 
between 1989-1994.
While deregulation in Central Europe and the United States was a rather selective 
movement, leaving areas such as health unscathed or even more regulated (Peltzman 
1989), the picture was different for policies imposed on or recommended to low and 
middle-income countries. The structural adjustment programs of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank explicitly emphasised deregulation strategies that 
would increase the role of the private health care sector as compared to the public sector. 
However, practice shows that the benefits associated with these reform instruments do 
not always materialise (World Bank 1998).1 Nevertheless, critiques of this kind are largely 
based on anecdotal and not empirical evidence, which often makes them contested by 
opponents of more liberal viewpoints.
Despite the growing interest in deregulation as a health sector reform instrument, 
studies of unregulated markets are still rare. This gap is particularly noticeable for 
empirical investigations in the context of low- and middle-income countries. The reason 
for this is twofold. First, there is a general shortage of data for health insurance markets 
here. The data problem in these countries is more serious since data collection here is 
seldom a feasible priority. Second, although theory highlights adverse selection and risk 
selection as anticipated problems in unregulated health insurance markets, empirical 
evidence for selection processes is hard to obtain. This is because researchers face distinct 
methodological challenges of assigning observed behaviour outcomes to theoretically 
predicted motivations. Thus while there is a well-developed theory on these selection 
processes, it does not lend itself very well to empirical data testing.
1 The outcome of a critical internal assessment of this strategy by the World Bank (1988): Adjustment 
Lending: An Evaluation of Ten Years of Experience, illustrates that structural adjustment programs 
undertaken by 15 sub-Saharan African countries failed in many areas. However, a look into the actual design 
of recent structural adjustment programs shows a high resistance to this critique. These programs still 
emphasise a greater role for NGOs and the private sector in the provision of health care (IMF 1997); the 
privatization of public enterprises in the health sector (IMF 1998a), and promoting and strengthening of the 
private sector (IMF 1998b).
14
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This thesis will contribute to the body of research and literature that attempts to 
identify empirical evidence for adverse selection and risk selection in health insurance 
markets. The thesis will utilise a method for empirical investigations into adverse selection 
and risk selection from which testable hypotheses can be derived and will apply this 
method to data from South Africa's medical schemes for their post-deregulation period, 
1994-1998. In doing so the thesis will contribute to the discussion of the particular 
problems that low- and middle-income countries face after their health insurance markets 
become unregulated. The conclusion will be that there is need for more, not less, 
regulation in health insurance markets in order to achieve more equity. The thesis will 
also discuss policy recommendations for the South African case in light of the results 
obtained from the empirical analysis.
1.2 Framework of the thesis
This thesis will be embedded in a framework that contains three parts: the research 
question, the main research objective and research aims, and the main research hypothesis 
and research subhypotheses. The purpose of the following sections is to introduce each of 
the three parts of the framework. Section one will introduce the research question and the 
case study context. Section two will state this thesis' research objective and derive two 
specific research aims. Section three will formulate the main research hypothesis and 
specify the three subhypotheses for this thesis' empirical investigation.
1.2.1 Thesis research question and case study context
This thesis' research question asks whether unregulated health insurance markets are 
characterised by adverse selection and/or risk selection, thereby creating inefficiency or 
inequity. Unregulated health insurance markets either emerge from purely unregulated 
health insurance arrangements or they emerge from initially government or state 
regulated arrangements that become subject to various degrees of deregulation at some 
point in time. As a case study, this thesis will analyse die unregulated health insurance 
market of a middle-income country - South Africa's main health insurance market of 
medical schemes, in the context of its post-deregulation experience over the four-year 
period 1995-1998, after premia risk-rating was legalised. Inefficiency is defined within this 
thesis as the observation that when demand and supply for unregulated health insurance
15
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do not meet, the market equilibrium is inefficient/ and, in the extreme/ this market fails. 
Inequity is defined as inequitable access to unregulated health insurance. However/ for 
the South African case study it will be shown that this also implies inequity in access to 
good health care.
Health insurance arrangements developed in various social settings as a means to 
pool health risks and health resources in order to protect the income of its members 
against unpredictable health care costs but also in order to guarantee their access to health 
care. Early health insurance arrangements were typically organised as mutual funds with 
quite restricted enrolment. They were based on employment or on small manageable 
groups of geographically concentrated members who were charged community-based 
premia. Community-based premia are identical contributions for all insured members, 
regardless of their individual risk. Community-rating implies cross-subsidisation (where 
high-risk individuals receive a subsidy from low-risk individuals thereby increasing their 
access to health insurance coverage). However, on the fund level premium contributions 
and paid-out benefits need to be balanced. As non-profit organisations, these mutual 
insurers were often legally recognised and subject to state regulation.
As health insurers grew, other, for-profit health insurance organisations 
developed, often in competition with the earlier mutual arrangements. These for-profit 
insurers usually operated under unrestricted enrolment They were based on general 
population members, who wished to join and who were charged risk-based premia. Being 
competitive insurers, they did not only have to balance collected premium contributions 
and paid-out benefit, but had to generate profits. In order to maximise profits, these 
insurers charged risk-based premium contributions and competed for households with 
lower health benefits compared to their paid premium contribution, so called low risks.
Risk-based premia define different contributions for each insured member, 
depending on the individual risk. Households are referred to as low risks (as compared to 
high risks), if their paid-out health benefits lay below their premium contributions. High 
risks constitute households for whom benefits exceed contributions. Households might 
end up with benefits exceeding their premia for several reasons, for instance if elderly, if 
chronically sick or if having a large number of dependants they might be more likely to 
have episodes of ill-health that incur health related costs. Risk-based premiums and 
selected pooling of low risks imply less or no cross-subsidisation.2
2 Van de Ven et al. (2000) refers, in the context of competitive health insurance markets, to two principles of 
equivalence and solidarity (or fairness). According to their paper the equivalence principle implies that an
16
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Competitive insurers often practice risk selection in the form of 'cream skimming' 
and pull low risks out of mutual insurers' risk pools, while at the same time neglecting 
high risks by either dumping them out of their insurance or refusing their entry. As a 
result mutual insurers might not only experience a pull-out of low risks due to risk 
selection by the for-profit competitors, but might also experience a push-in of high risks 
into their more affordable community-rated coverage. The later trend can lead to adverse 
selection processes. The influx of more costly high risks leads to higher average premia 
that are unattractive for other, lower risks, initiating their exit. Goth described processes of 
adverse selection and risk selection dramatically worsen mutual insurers' risk pools and 
are likely to cause those pools to cease to exist Their ex-clientele of particularly high risks 
cannot afford private, risk-related health insurance coverage. Since there is demand for 
mutual insurance coverage, but it cannot be supplied under competitive market 
conditions, this market result is not efficient. Most of all this market failure raises equity 
concerns, since access to health insurance and health care for the poor and sick is blocked. 
Other arrangements, like public medical programs have to fill that gap at considerable 
social costs.
A similar market outcome occurs if legislators deregulate mutual insurers in order 
to create equal market conditions as compared to unregulated, for-profit insurers. 
Providing similar conditions through deregulation typically means allowing risk-rated 
premia and free enrolment Without the cross-subsidisation of community-rated premia, 
high-risk households most in need of insurance coverage would be no longer able to 
afford insurance and would have no health care access. Also, mutual insurers might 
become subject to adverse selection in the short-run if they fail to enter the competition for 
low risks by applying strict risk selection strategies. As a result of adverse selection 
mutual insurers might go bankrupt. Thus it can be argued that as a result of health 
insurance deregulation the envisioned positive effects of more competition and efficiency 
come at a price of more inequity.
This thesis' case study of the South African health insurance market of the early 
1990s is one example where a legislature deregulated previously regulated mutual 
insurers in order to improve their competitive position against existing for-profit insurers. 
The general problem of this type of health insurance deregulation and its particular 
application to die case of South Africa can be described as follows. In the 1990s two
insurer has to break even on each insurance contract, while the solidarity principle stresses cross­
subsidisation. Their focus of discussion is the incompatibility of the equivalence principle and the solidarity
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distinct health insurance arrangements, subject to different regulations, were operating 
side by side in South Africa. The health insurance market of concern for this thesis is the 
medical scheme market that has its historic origins in mutually organised, employment- 
based insurance arrangements. This part of the market was subject to strong government 
regulation since the 1960s that recognised them as non-profit entities and prevented any 
risk-related premia-rating (Medical Scheme Act 1967).3 Medical schemes cover 20% of the 
South African population, while the other, much smaller part of the South African health 
insurance market, for-profit health insurers, covers 4% of the population. Only members 
of medical schemes or other private health insurers have access to good quality health care 
provided in the private sector. This sheds light on another equity dimension of health 
insurance access in South Africa: the majority of South Africans have no access to good 
quality health care because they are uninsured. Also, if formerly insured South Africans 
become subject to unfavourable risk selection they will loose not only any access to good 
health care, but will also add an additional burden to the modest resources of the public 
sector for which the remaining two-thirds of South Africans compete.
For-profit health insurers emerged much later than the medical scheme market 
and were at no point subject to government regulation that would prevent premia risk- 
rating. By the late 1980s competition between the two health insurance arrangements grew 
and, at the same time, medical costs escalated. However, medical schemes could not 
effectively compete with for-profit insurers because medical schemes were required to 
apply community-rating while for-profit insurers could risk-rate premia.
The South African government deregulated the medical scheme market by the 
early 1990s (Health Systems Trust 1996,1998,2003). In the 1989 amendment to the Medical 
Scheme Act, rules disallowing risk-rating of premia and the stipulation of minimum 
reimbursement rates were removed from the statute books. A further deregulation in 1994 
did away with the regulation of reimbursement rates altogether, and allowed contracting 
and vertical integration between providers and medical schemes, paving the way for 
managed care arrangements. Risk-rating of premia was expected to create fairer market 
conditions for the competition between medical schemes and for-profit insurers.
Thus the prior to 1989 regulated medical schemes became unregulated because of 
deregulation by the South African government between 1989 and 1994 (Health Systems
principle in competitive health insurance markets.
The Act also established two bodies, the Council for Medical Schemes and the Registrar of Medical 
Schemes to fulfil the executive functions of the scheme, i.e. their regulation. Medical schemes have to submit 
statutory returns to the Registrar of the Medical Schemes on an annual basis (Rama and McLeod 2001).
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Trust 1996 and 1998, Soderlund and Hansl 2000).4 The data, which will be used in the 
thesis, covers the four-year period between 1995-1998. Some medical schemes might have 
adjusted to the deregulation of 1989 earlier than 1995 when the observed data starts, so the 
observations for this particular unregulated market cannot be proven to be results of the 
regulatory change.
However, this thesis' case study will describe a post-deregulation experience of a 
health insurance market. This is based on the observation that deregulation rules, which 
allowed risk-rating, were only fully implemented by the medical schemes in the mid- 
1990s. This conclusion is drawn from previous research (Soderlund and Hansl 1999), 
including interviews with the Registrar of Medical schemes, Danie Kolver, and his 
assistant Ryno van Zijl, and a document review of medical scheme files for the years 
between 1989 and 1998 at the Registrar's office in Pretoria. These sources verified that 
schemes did not start applying risk-adjustment strategies that included premia risk-rating 
until 1993-1995. In fact very few schemes started any risk-adjustment strategies by 1993, 
and most schemes took at least one or two more years before they established strategies 
that included premia risk-rating. Thus while a before-and-after deregulation scenario for 
the analysis of the thesis' case study cannot be performed with the available data starting 
in 1995, it can be established that the analysis of the unregulated South African medical 
scheme market accurately describes a post-deregulation experience.
1.2.2 Thesis research objective and aims
This thesis' research objective is to empirically analyse whether unregulated health 
insurance markets experience adverse selection and risk selection. There are few empirical 
studies that explore these selection processes in health insurance markets of low- or 
middle-income countries. The limited number of publications can be explained in part by 
the shortage of good data in low- and middle-income countries. But more importantly, 
distinct methodological challenges have likely inhibited this research, because the well- 
developed theory on these selection processes does not lend itself very well to empirical 
data testing. Thus in order to be able to conduct an empirical investigation into evidence
4 When referring to the regulation of the medical scheme market prior to 1989 this will refer to the mandatory 
rule of community-rated premia for medical schemes. Regulated medical schemes then are medical schemes 
under mandatory community-rating requirements. Deregulation of the medical scheme market will refer, in 
particular, to the legalisation that introduced risk-rated premia by the beginning of the 1990s. Due to this 
deregulation medical schemes became unregulated. The unregulated medical scheme market will refer to the 
medical schemes after they actually implemented risk-rated premia.
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for adverse selection and risk selection, the following two specific research aims have to be 
fulfilled:
1. Derive a method applicable to empirical investigations into adverse selection and risk 
selection with available quantitative techniques and easily accessible data.
2. Apply the method to an empirical analysis of case study data of an unregulated health 
insurance market in a middle-income country: panel data of insured households in 
South Africa's medical scheme plans, 1995-1998.
The case of the South African medical scheme plans provides a natural experiment 
for studying adverse selection and risk selection in unregulated health insurance markets.5 
Medical schemes are either self-administered (by their own staff) or professionally 
administered by for-profit companies (Soderlund and Hansl 1999 and Rama and McLeod 
2001). The data for the thesis' empirical analysis originated from a for-profit holding 
company in South Africa that manages the administration of several medical insurance 
schemes.6 The available medical scheme data contains records from insured households in 
the form of a panel.7 This panel consists of 1,011,735 observations of 353,458 insured 
households over a four-year observation period between 1995 and 1998. The described 
insured households are members of 29 medical schemes. Medical schemes might have 
several plan options; however, some have only one plan. Altogether the 29 schemes in this 
sample have 49 plan options. The 29 schemes represent about one fifth of South Africa's 
registered medical schemes between 1995-1998.8
Each of the insured households has observations for at least one year and for a 
maximum of four years. The observations contain information on household insurance 
status (i.e. on the beginning and, if applicable, end of coverage), on the principal members' 
socio-economic characteristics, such as age and income, and on households' chosen 
coverage and utilisation, such as the plan name, premium contribution and actual claims 
and benefits.
5 The document review of previous research at the Registrar’ of the Medical Schemes office showed that 
between 1993 and 1995 medical schemes implemented risk-management strategies in three forms. First, 
benefit ceilings, second, risk-related/age-related premia, and third options within the insurance schemes with 
different levels of coverage, contributions, co-payments and deductibles. Only a few schemes introduced the 
legalised managed care options and saving accounts. However, this does not establish empirical evidence for 
selection processes. Also, risk selection strategies can be much more sophisticated than explicit contractual 
discrimination (like age-rated premia).
6 The data was provided by this holding company proceeding a research project conducted by the author on 
regulatory aspects of the South African health insurance business in 1998.
7 Panel data are also called longitudinal data. They follow a given sample of subjects over time (providing 
multiple observations on each subject in the sample).
8 There were altogether 160-180 registered medical schemes between 1995-1998 (Soderlund and Hansl 2000, 
Rama and McLeod 2001).
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1.2.3 Thesis research hypotheses
The main research hypothesis for the thesis' empirical investigation is that South Africa's 
unregulated medical schemes encountered a lack of market-wide risk pooling and a lack 
of risk pooling within the market (between insurance plan options). This is based on the 
assumption that unregulated health insurance markets do not pool risks equally, since it is 
likely that adverse selection and risk selection occur (Soderlund and Hansl 2000). Adverse 
selection and risk selection might occur as a result of market competition and the supply 
of health insurance choices.
Health insurance choice with different insured individuals selecting different plans 
to meet different individual preferences. It is not only beneficial to have these preferences 
reflected in market outcomes; health insurance choice also promotes efficiency (Cutler and 
Zeckhauser 2000). However, the cost of different individuals typically varies substantially, 
depending on the insured's risk. As Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000:607) point ou t "Whom 
one pools with in the health insurance dramatically affects what one has to pay." If the 
market can efficiently sort high and low risks into either more generous or less generous 
plans, while charging individuals their expected costs, a separating equilibrium can exist 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). However, even if efficiency could be obtained -  here in 
form of a separating equilibrium -  charging high risks substantially more is widely seen 
as inequitable.
If plans can only charge average prices and/or cannot distinguish between 
different insured, risks adverse selection occurs. Typically the more generous insurance 
plans experience a disproportionate number of high risks, so that their risk pools worsen 
(Nyman 2003). Insurance plans also have an incentive to practice risk selection by plan 
manipulation, i.e. distorting plan provisions and benefits to attract low risks and repel 
high risks. Risk selection results in some insurance plans disproportionately enrolling low 
risks, while other are left with a disproportionate number of high risks (Newhouse 1997).
Thus adverse selection and risk selection can change the risk pools of individual 
insurance plans and/or the whole market risk pool. The main research hypothesis expects 
that one can observe a lack of risk pooling between high and low risk enrolees in South 
Africa's medical schemes. This does not exclude the possibility of a separating 
equilibrium, which might be indeed efficient but yet not equitable. Although the thesis's 
data and the empirical analysis design do not lend themselves to an explicit test for the 
existence of a separating equilibrium this interpretation of die results will be discussed.
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South Africa's deregulation, which allowed medical schemes to implement risk- 
management strategies, transformed formerly highly regulated non-profit medical 
schemes into quasi-private for-profit schemes. Since then several reports indicated 
unbalanced risk concentration in the risk pool of the medical schemes in general and in 
some particular medical scheme plans, which could be attributed to a variety of factors 
including adverse selection and risk selection (Health Systems Trust 1998, Soderlund and 
Hansl 1999, Hansl and Soderlund 1999, Soderlund and Hansl 2000).9 Three subhypotheses 
for this thesis' empirical investigations into South Africa's unregulated medical scheme 
market were formulated:
Hypothesis 1
There is competition for low risks between medical schemes and for-profit insurers. The 
previously regulated (observed) medical scheme market segment is contested, and 
experiences a disproportionate loss of low risks due to:
A. Risk selection by (external) for-profit insurers for low risks in the medical scheme 
market segment and (initiating)
B. Adverse selection with low risks exiting medical schemes, and, in particular, 
exiting high-risk plan options because insurance coverage is comparably expensive 
and they can find better coverage at lower costs elsewhere.
Hypothesis 2
In the competition medical schemes follow several risk-management strategies to protect 
their scheme and plan risk pools including:
A. Risk selection that discourages the entry of high-risk insurance applicants;
B. Risk selection that attracts the entry of low risks with self-selection low-risk plans;
C. Risk selection that prevents the exit of low risks by offering low risks to switch to 
attractive low-risk plan options;
D. Risk selection in the form of pressuring high risks to switch into high-risk plan 
options; and
E. Risk selection by discouraging high risks to continue medical scheme coverage, 
particularly if they belong to high-risk plans.
Hypothesis 3
High risks, who are either seeking medical scheme coverage or who are already insured in 
the previously regulated medical scheme market follow strategies of:
9 For example, increasing benefits and utilisation might be partially attributable to a changing demographic 
profile of medical scheme plan members but adverse selection seems a very likely explanation too.
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A. Adverse selection by choosing to enter medical scheme plan coverage, in particular 
expensive and comprehensive high-risk plan options; and
B. Adverse selection by choosing to switch into medical scheme plans with expensive 
and comprehensive coverage, typically high-risk plan options.
The formulation of these three research hypotheses is due to the peculiarities of the 
South African health insurance market, where, in addition to the medical schemes, a small 
number of for-profit insurers operated. These for-profit insurers were in competition with 
the medical schemes for attracting low risks. However, only after the deregulation 
legalised risk management strategies also for the medical schemes were they able to 
compete seriously with the for-profit insurers. The competition for profit-maximising low 
risks naturally comes in the form of risk selection. However, since community-rating is 
widely abolished, it might be more important for high risks to strategically select 
appropriate insurance coverage, as long as they can afford it. If medical scheme plans 
were successful in applying risk selection strategies one can expect to observe a better 
overall risk pool or some better individual plan risk pools. However, if the for-profit 
insurers proved to be better at attracting low risks, or if high risks could successfully 
adversely select themselves into medical scheme plans, one can expect to observe a worse 
overall medical scheme risk pool or some worse-off individual plan risk pools.
Table 1-1 on the following page summarises the framework of the thesis by listing the 
research question, research objective and aims and research hypotheses.
1.3 Organisation of the thesis
This thesis is divided into seven chapters (including this introduction). The next chapter 
reviews the analytical context and the theoretical concepts of adverse selection and risk 
selection. This will provide the rationale for this thesis' research question. First, the 
economic model of human behaviour will be presented as the analytical context of the 
thesis. It will then review the literature regarding adverse selection and risk selection in 
health insurance markets, highlighting key theoretical concepts. A critical review of 
empirical studies, which have attempted to conclude the existence of evidence for adverse 
selection and risk selection utilising various methodological approaches, will be 
conducted. In this review gaps in the literature will be identified, which this thesis aims to 
address. Finally, based on the identified gaps in the literature, chapter two will develop 
the thesis research question and research objective.
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Table 1-1: Thesis framework
RESEARCH QUESTION
Are unregulated health insurance markets characterised by adverse selection and/or risk selection
thereby creating inefficiency or inequity?
Case study: South Africa’s unregulated medical scheme plans in the context of their post-deregulation
experience after premium risk-rating was legalised._______________________________________________
_____________________ RESEARCH OBJECTIVE and AIMS_____________________
Empirical analysis of whether unregulated health insurance markets experience 
adverse selection and/or risk selection.
Aim 1: Derive a method applicable to empirical investigations into adverse selection and risk selection with 
available quantitative techniques and easily accessible data.
Aim 2: Apply this method to an empirical analysis of case study data of an unregulated health insurance 
market in a middle-income country: panel data from insured households in South Africa’s medical scheme
plans 1995-1998._________________________________________________________________________
________________________ RESEARCH HYPOTHESES________________________
Case study: South Africa’s unregulated medical schemes encountered a lack of market-wide risk 
pooling and a lack of risk pooling within the market (between insurance plan options).
Hypothesis 1: There is competition for low risks between medical schemes and for-profit insurers. The 
previously regulated (observed) medical scheme market segment is contested, and experiences a 
disproportionate loss of low risks due to:
A. Risk selection by (external) for-profit insurers for low risks in the medical scheme market segment, and (initiating)
B. Adverse selection with low risks exiting medical schemes, and, in particular, exiting their high-risk plan options because 
insurance coverage here is comparably expensive and they can find better coverage at lower costs elsewhere.
Hypothesis 2: In this competition medical schemes follow several risk-management strategies to protect their 
scheme and plan risk pools including:
A. Risk selection that discourages the entry of high-risk insurance applicants;
B. Risk selection that attracts the entry of low risks with self-selection low-risk plans;
C. Risk selection that prevents the exit of low risks by offering low risks to switch into attractive low-risk plan options;
D. Risk selection in the form of pressuring high risks to switch into high-risk plan options; and
E. Risk selection by discouraging high risks to continue their medical scheme coverage, particularly if they belong to high- 
risk plans.
Hypothesis 3: High risks, who are either seeking medical scheme coverage or who are already insured in the 
previously regulated medical scheme market follow strategies of:
A. Adverse selection by choosing to enter medical scheme plan coverage, particularly expensive and comprehensive 
high-risk plan options; and
B. Adverse selection by choosing to switch into medical scheme plans with expensive and comprehensive coverage. 
typically high-risk plan options__________________________________________________________________________
Chapter three is the first results chapter. It derives the method for this thesis's empirical 
investigations into selection processes in health insurance markets. There are three main 
sections in this chapter. In the first one the standard concepts of adverse selection and risk 
selection, usually explained using the time dimension, will be reformulated as grouping 
phenomena. Based on this a group method will be described from which empirically 
testable hypotheses can be derived. The second section will discuss the empirical strategy
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that applies the group approach in regard to applicable quantitative techniques and data 
requirements. The third section will develop the research hypotheses.
Chapter four describes the conducted empirical analysis of adverse selection and 
risk selection, applying the methodology derived in the earlier chapter to data from South 
Africa's unregulated medical scheme plans. First, the data and sample derivation will be 
described. The data, in the form of a panel, describes several hundred thousand 
households insured in 49 medical scheme plans between 1995-1998. It contains 
information on households' socio-economic characteristics, plan membership and 
contribution, and claim and benefit levels. Applying the derived method, the data are 
divided into subgroups, which are described. Second, the empirical analysis strategy with 
logit models for panel data will be presented. The logistic regression analysis will apply 
marginal or population averaged models. Applying a confirmatory model building 
strategy three logit models are specified. The main research hypothesis is formulated into 
several subhypotheses for the South African case study setting and variable expectations 
are derived. Finally, the four-step model building process is described.
Chapter five will present the results of the empirical investigation and will 
interpret these results in regard to evidence for adverse selection and risk selection. First 
the model estimation results for each of the three models will be presented successively. 
Second, the results for the model fit assessment comprising several standard diagnostic 
statistics and methods, will be discussed. The interpretation of the model estimation 
results will follow. Finally, the results will be summarised and reviewed, particularly in 
regard to the previously formulated hypotheses. This will make it possible to either verify 
or falsify the main research hypothesis.
Chapter six is the discussion chapter and will focus on die discussion of three 
aspects. The first part will discuss the thesis' first contribution, the derived method for 
empirical investigations of adverse selection and risk selection. The second part will 
discuss selected thesis limitations, which are mostly related to the data and the empirical 
analysis. Finally, the thesis' policy relevance will be discussed -  both in general terms and, 
in particular, for the South African case study. While the main focus here is on deriving 
policy implications horn the analysis results, the key findings are also discussed in order 
to answer the originally posed research question.
The final chapter, seven, will pull together the knowledge and experience gained 
from the previous chapters. It will summarise the principal findings of this diesis, its
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limitations and contributions to knowledge. A short outlook for future research will be 
presented.
Birgit Hansl Chapter 2: Analytical context & literature review
Chapter 2 
Analytical context & review of 
adverse selection and risk 
selection
2.1 Introduction
The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide the rationale for the thesis' research 
question. First, die chapter will define the analytical context of this thesis, with its 
underlying behavioural assumptions. Second, the literature regarding adverse selection 
and risk selection in health insurance markets will be reviewed. In the course of this 
review definitions and key concepts related to the research question, such as uncertainty, 
risk, and risk pooling in health insurance will be provided. This review will not only 
consider theoretical aspects of adverse selection and risk selection, but in particular, 
studies that have attempted empirical investigations into these selection processes. The 
goal is to identify gaps in the literature and to critically review different methodological 
approaches used in empirical studies. Finally, this chapter will develop this thesis' 
research question and research objectives based on the gaps identified in the literature.
After this introduction, part two will define the analytical context for this thesis, 
the economic model of human behaviour, which lends itself very well to the attempted 
analysis. In the literature adverse selection and risk selection are almost exclusively 
discussed under the behavioural assumption of the economic behaviour model. Thus the 
choice of it as the analytical context of this thesis' research is natural. The behavioural 
model is preferably used, because it can be applied consistently to all areas of human life,
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including individual participation in health insurance arrangements. It also recognises the 
information problem and does not require that individuals be always perfectly informed.
The third part will review the theory of, and empirical evidence for, adverse 
selection and risk selection in health insurance. The literature focuses on adverse selection 
and market efficiency problems rather than risk selection and market equity problems. 
Generally, existing literature can be categorised into three types. The first focuses on 
abstract equilibria modelling considering selection problems and other theoretical issues 
of selection. Equally extensive, another type of published literature discusses selection 
problems within specific markets while often focusing on policy implications. Finally, a 
comparably small proportion of publications is dedicated to the empirical identification of 
selection processes using case study data. This thesis' literature review will recognise the 
theoretical concepts and definitions of adverse selection and risk selection and will discuss 
the effects of selection processes on efficiency and equity. However, the focus will be on 
reviewing the literature in regard to applied methodological approaches for the empirical 
identification of adverse selection and risk selection. The literature review covers 
publications on selection processes in the health sector and, in particular, health insurance. 
Where available, literature on low- and middle-income countries is preferably considered. 
Gaps in the literature will be identified. These gaps include the lack of studies on the 
impact of selection processes in the context of low- and middle-income countries and the 
particular lack of empirical studies that identify selection processes.
Finally, the fourth part will develop the thesis' research question and research 
objective, based on the identified literature gaps. The research question will ask: Are 
unregulated health insurance markets characterised by adverse selection and/or risk 
selection, thereby creating inefficiency or inequity? The research objective will be to 
empirically analyse adverse selection and risk selection in one unregulated health 
insurance market.
2.2 Analytical context: the economic model of human behaviour
This thesis performs an economic analysis of adverse selection and risk selection in
unregulated health insurance markets. The economic model of human behaviour provides 
the analytical context for this analysis. The purpose of this section is to present the key 
assumption of the economic model of human behaviour. First, these behavioural
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assumptions will be presented. Second, the role of information in the economic model of 
behaviour will be discussed.
2.2.1 Assumptions of the economic model of human behaviour
The primary assumption of the economic model of human behaviour is that behaviour is
consistent in every function of human life and consists of rational self-interest.10 This does
not exclude other value-driven behaviour, but defines economically rational behaviour as
the most influential. Since Becker's (1976): Economic approach to human behavior one can
speak about a general economic model of behaviour with the following four assumptions
(Blankart 1998, Kirchgaessner 1991, Frey 1980):
(1) methodological individualism declares the individual to be the only important acting 
unit Every act is an individual act.11 From an economic perspective only individuals can 
have interests.
(2) self-interest assumption assumes that individuals decide and behave in favour of their 
own advantage. Altruistic as well as vicious behaviour is generally not excluded, but it is 
assumed that, on average, egoistic and utility maximising behaviour is dominant12 A 
representative and responsible human being acts self-interestedly.
(3) given preferences and the change of restrictions assumes that (in economic analysis) 
preferences are taken as given and that restrictions are variable. If individual behaviour is 
changing than the reason for this is a change in the restrictions and not a change in
10 This approach uses a consistent approach to human behaviour and does not split the human being into the 
homo oeconomicus, acting self-interested in an economic market context and a homo politicus acting 
according higher aims (for instance the ‘public interest’) in matters of the state. The homo politicus was a 
normative characterisation of human behaviour. Based on this characteristic, traditional economic and 
political science theories on regulation searched for the ‘optimal state’ by optimising a welfare function valid 
for all citizens. This reflects a normative system and a political system without personal decisions and 
responsibilities. Popper in his Open society and its enemies (1945) calls this a closed (tribal and collectivist) 
society with an organic or biological theory of the state. His concept of the open society describes people how 
they are and not as they should be. It confronts individuals with personal decisions and responsibility. This 
means a new individualism arises and the organic character of the ‘closed society’ (i.e. spiritual, physical or 
biological bonds in personal relationships) is weakened. The open society and its personal relations function 
more on abstract relations such as exchange and co-operation. “It is the analysis of these abstract relations 
with which modem social theory, such as economic theory, is mainly concerned.” (Popper 1945:175)
11 A state does not act as a whole or an organ, but on the strength of decisions of one or more individuals. 
With this assumption of methodological individualism the economic model of behaviour differs from any 
organic and functional view of the state, where the possibility of ‘the state acts* is given. Thus phrases like 
‘public interest’ have no room in this individualistic theory. However, they are a part of collectivist theories, 
which place the whole above the individual.
12 This does not mean that egoism is necessarily a desirable state, but that it is a happy (and realistic) medium 
between a human being acting only altruistically or only viciously.
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preferences.13 The individual rationally adapts to the circumstances and tries to use the 
whole range of possibilities in order to maximise utility (assumption 2).14 
(4) existence of relevant alternatives assumes that there are always enough alternatives 
between which an individual can choose. Substitution as a result of changing restrictions 
is possible. But substitution causes costs/ which, again, are taken into account by an 
individual's economic calculation (assumptions 2 and 3).15
2.2.2 Information in the economic behaviour model
Individual economic decisions are driven by information and are influenced by the 
availability of this information. The model of economic behaviour is not based on perfect 
information. However, imperfect information does not mean that an individual is acting 
irrationally or unpredictably. Rather, the assumption is that the accumulation of 
information is only possible with certain costs. Rational individuals will only collect 
additional information as long as their expected marginal utility is greater than or equal to 
their marginal costs of collection. But this information equilibrium rests at a different level 
for different participants in a market, and particularly for buyers and sellers. For this 
reason the phenomenon of asymmetric information occurs.
The classical example is that of the competitive market for health insurance 
without regulation. Here the buyer has more information about his/her health risk than 
the seller: the costs of information gathering are lower for the buyer than for the seller. At 
a given premium those who think that their own costs of illness will lie above the price of 
the premium will purchase insurance.16 Subsequently, the insurance company will realise
13 Individuals behave differently because their circumstances change and not because their preferences shift. 
Although the later case is possible, it is seen as an exception because preferences develop in the long run, 
during processes of socialisation, and are therefore more stable than circumstances. Circumstances are 
variable in the short run and often dependent on fashions.
14 Self-interested behaviour does not satisfy all wishes. Everybody maximises utility under the assumptions of 
supply, prices, income, rules and prohibitions etc.
15 In general it is assumed that costs of substitution are in the long run lower than in the short run. That is why 
substitution often takes long. This does not change the fact that substitution is in general possible.
Substitution has a stabilising effect on social processes: better alternatives are chosen, worse are given up.
This last assumption makes the theory of the economic rational behaviour distinct to other theories in social 
sciences, especially the Marxist view that denies possibilities of substitution and predicts exploding social 
processes.
6 Individuals decide to take out health insurance when they feel that they should hedge their income against 
the risk of health care costs. This decision is based on information of several kinds. First, it is related, within 
the broader context of uncertainty and risk, to the individuals* degree of risk aversion, which can range from 
not liking to take risks to enjoying taking risks. So far we have assumed that risk is unpredictable and illness 
is a stochastic event However, subjects can also assess to a certain degree their risk for ill-health based on 
information or knowledge about their general health state and histories of illnesses. Furthermore, risk for ill- 
health can, to a certain degree, be influenced by behaviour like eating habits, alcohol consumption, exercise
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that this given price is not covering costs. The insurance company will face adverse 
selection by high risks. The insurer will raise premiums with the result that the best risks 
will leave their contracts. For these individuals die price now lies above the risk costs. The 
high risks will stay and in the next round the costs will again exceed the revenues and the 
premiums will have to rise. This process may proceed until die market disappears.
In summary, one can derive three major conclusions from this example: first the 
model of economic behaviour is valid under conditions of imperfect information, 
including asymmetry in information. Incomplete information yields different predictions 
than complete information, but both yield testable hypotheses. Second, individual rational 
behaviour can produce collective irrationality: despite die fact that there might be 
insurance companies who would offer insurance contracts and that individuals might 
agree that insurance is valuable, a market would not emerge under pure market 
conditions. Third, because this situation is unsatisfactory for all participants, it is 
predictable that individuals have an incentive to protect the health insurance system with 
other institutions than die market, e.g. state regulation. The literature discusses adverse 
selection (and risk selection) almost exclusively under the behavioural assumption of the 
economic model of human behaviour. This literature will be discussed in the next section.
2.3 Review of adverse selection and risk selection in health insurance: 
theory and empirical evidence
This thesis' research question concerns adverse selection and risk selection in unregulated 
health insurance markets. The key assumption is that unregulated health insurance markets 
face problems, in particular adverse selection and risk selection, which might be resolved 
with government market intervention. The puipose of this section is to justify the research 
question that links health insurance with the problems of adverse selection and risk 
selection. This will be done by reviewing die theoretical and empirical literature on the 
two selection processes in health insurance markets. Gaps in the literature that are 
specifically related to the empirical evidence for adverse selection and risk selection in 
health insurance will be identified. This section will first discuss uncertainty and risk, 
which provide the rationale for risk pooling in health insurance. Second, problems in
etc. The last two types of information introduce a deterministic component into uncertainty and risk 
(aversion). However, assuming a risk neutral individual, one could then predict that this individual would buy 
an insurance policy, as long its corresponding price would be less or equal to the expected health risk, 
depending on the budget (i.e. income) constraint of the individual.
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unregulated health insurance markets/ namely/ adverse selection and risk selection will be 
discussed. Finally/ existing empirical evidence regarding adverse selection and risk 
selection will be assessed.
2.3.1 Health insurance: risk pooling as a response to uncertainty
Health insurance developed as a means to reduce uncertainty of ill-health and its impact
on a household's economic situation. Insurance can be seen as an effort to restrain the
scope of uncertainty and to define its range (Padoa 1984). The negative effects that arise
due to incalculable uncertainty might be restrained by the pooling of calculable risk. Thus
risk pooling in insurance arrangements/ not only health insurance arrangements/ is the
response to uncertainty.
Health insurance is based on statistical techniques that can calculate/ and thus 
foresee, the probability of events of ill-health, which are going to take place within a given 
insured population. Although this statistical truth is generally reliable, health insurers 
clearly cannot forecast the events of ill-health for one specific individual. However, risk 
calculations and risk assessments performed by insurers are a bridge between the 
collective statistical certainty and the individual uncertainty.
A. Uncertainty and risk
The understanding of uncertainty in economics varied widely over the last century and 
often the difference between uncertainty and risk was not distinguished. At the end of the 
nineteenth century issues of change, risk and uncertainty became an explicit object of 
economic theorising by writers in the field of profit theory. Since changes are facts in 
every entrepreneurial activity, scientists were interested in a satisfactory explanation of 
profit and loss and its relation to uncertainty and risk.
Clark's dynamic theory of profit focuses on the entrepreneurial incentive of 
potential profit brought by innovation-induced changes in production methods (Clark 
1893). He overlooks, in this way, the distinction between foreseeable and unforeseeable 
changes and that only the latter make profits possible (Wubben 1993). Hawley's theory of 
profit defines the assumption of risk or risk-taking as the distinguishing feature of an 
entrepreneur that will reward him with an uncertain amount of profit (Hawley 1901). He 
does not distinguish between indeterminate uncertainty and determinate risk and profit
Haynes (1895) tries to combine approaches of dynamic profit theory and risk by 
differentiating between static risks present in a society and dynamic risks occurring due to
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changes. He argues that statistic probability (under the assumption of homogeneity in 
outcomes) shows that perceived uncertainties and risks of an insurance holder are 
certainties for the insurer (Haynes 1895). Schumpeter's dynamic theory of profit divides 
risks into foreseeable and unforeseeable risks (Schumpeter 1921). Foreseeable risks are 
normally incorporated into economic plans by applying a range of methods for forseeable 
risk-spreading: incurring costs to guard against risks, risk avoidance, and cost accounting 
(including risk premia). However, his theory of economic development does not define 
uncertainty properly and does not distinguish it from risk (Wubben 1993).
Knight (1921) uncovered the negligence of uncertainty in economics and pointed 
out die confusion between risk and uncertainty: "Uncertainty must be taken in a sense 
radically distinct from the familiar notion of risk, from which it has never been properly 
separated."(Knight 1921:19). For Knight uncertainty is an aspect of die open future and an 
important characteristic of decision-making. Profit is the consequence of change, the effect 
of our imperfect knowledge of the future (Knight 1921), and the result of immeasurable 
risks. Thus, one can investigate the economic consequences of uncertainty but one cannot 
predict the underlying changes (Wubben 1993). According to Knight (1921) uncertainty 
reflects the immeasurability of outcomes in incomparable situations (violating the statistic 
probability assumption of homogeneity in outcomes). In economic life uncertainties are: 
(1) errors in predicting the future, and (2) adjustments made to future conditions (Knight 
1921).
Uncertainty can be the result of indeterminacy or ignorance. Ignorance refers to a 
concept of subjective uncertainty, whereas the terms indeterminacy and unpredictability 
refer to the very notion of objective uncertainty (that is for at least a given time period and 
not explicidy related to a person and their opinion). Tversky and Kahnemann (1982) 
qualified uncertainty further with the adjective external when uncertainty can be 
attributed to someone's environment Internal uncertainty may be attributed to someone's 
state of mind (Tversky and Kahnemann 1982). According to Wubben (1993) there exists 
additionally, the distinction between endogenous and exogenous uncertainty. Uncertainty is 
an inherent characteristic of the situation in the case of endogenous uncertainty only 
(Wubben 1993). Thus, coincidences can be classified as exogenous, external uncertainty, 
while ignorance is an example of exogenous, internal uncertainty. The purchase of health 
insurance coverage changes a subject's relation to a situation and also changes the 
situation itself. This would be a case if endogenous, internal uncertainty.
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Risk is separated from uncertainty by measurability. Risk is based either on a prion 
probability distributions or empirically based probability distributions. In a real economic 
context the calculation of situations according to general a priori principles or empirically 
based probabilities is highly unlikely (Knight 1921), because the underlying situations of 
uncertainty are unique. Thus, it might be risky to buy or to sell health insurance contracts, 
but it is genuinely uncertain whether a specific insured person will be seriously ill or 
whether a specific insurance company will still be operating in the market in ten years.17 
Table 2-1 summarises the crucial distinction between uncertainty and risk.
Table 2-1: Attributes o f uncertainty and risk
A ttributes Uncertainty Risk
Measurability No Yes
A priori probability distribution No Yes
Empirically based probabilities No Yes
B. Risk pooling in health insurance
Health insurance arrangements essentially pool members7 risk and resources in order to 
protect them from the uncertainty of unpredictable health costs that would limit their 
health care access (Soderlund and Hansl 2000).
The term risk pooling is used in various contexts within different research disciplines, 
depending on the risk that is to be pooled.18 It refers generally to the accumulation of 
entities of different risks in one cluster in order to spread risk over a wide sample of these 
entities of different risks. These entities can range from abstract entities, like strategies or 
behaviours, to concrete entities like households or specific actions. In the context of health 
insurance, risk pooling is used in two different ways (n /e /r /a  1993, n /e /r /a  1996):
(1) Risk pooling refers to the pool of financial resources, i.e. individual member premia, 
which insurance providers accumulate and set aside, according to the terms of 
contract. These pooled financial resources are used throughout the contract period to 
pay or reimburse the health care costs of insured members in cases of ill-health. The 
amount of money remaining in the risk pool at the end of the contract (year) remains 
with the insurance provider as a profit, is rolled over, invested, allocated to health care 
providers, or paid-out to insurance members, depending on the insurance agreement.
17 This leads to the conclusion that if  scientists incorporate uncertainty and changes in their theories as if 
following a known pattern, they do not talk about uncertainty but fully calculable risks: “ ...the existence o f a 
problem of knowledge depends on the future being different from the past, while the possibility o f  the 
solution o f the problem depends on the future being like the past.” (Knight 1921:313)
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(2) Risk pooling also refers to the pool of an expected insured population, usually within 
a defined geographic location. Socio-economic characteristics of this population and 
their retrospective or anticipated health care utilisation can be used to determine 
members' health risk, expected revenues & expenses and thus anticipated claims 
liability.
Risk pooling is often specifically used in the sense of risk-spreading, and cross­
subsidisation, implying that the high-risk individuals receive a subsidy from the low-risk 
individuals that increases their access to health insurance coverage (Van de Ven et aL 
2000).
In summary, the presence of uncertainty creates decision-making problems but 
also gives rise to institutions of economic importance, like insurance arrangements. Health 
insurance arrangements are risk pooling arrangements that can overcome the uncertainty 
of immeasurable outcomes in incomparable situations, by pooling measurable risks, based 
on probability distributions. The next section will link uncertainty and risk pooling to 
problems of selection processes in unregulated health insurance markets.
2.3.2 Problems in unregulated health insurance: adverse selection and risk 
selection
Problems of unregulated health insurance markets can be distinguished according to their 
impact on efficiency and equity. Problems discussed in the literature, like adverse 
selection, moral hazard and supplier-induced demand, are predominantly related to 
increasing inefficiency due to asymmetry of information. Adverse selection means that 
insurers experience a disproportionate number of enrolees with predisposed high risk 
(Nyman 2003). Moral hazard is defined as any increase in health care consumption simply 
because one has become insured (Nyman 2003). Supplier or physician-induced demand 
means that physicians can prescribe services when they are not needed, in order to 
increase their incomes (Nyman 2003). Although they are typically discussed in the context 
of efficiency, these problems ultimately also have an impact on equity. Another problem 
of unregulated health insurance markets, the problem of risk selection, creates inequity. 
Risk selection is defined as any biased selection where certain insurers disproportionately 
enrol healthy, low risks, while other insurers are left with disproportionately sick, high 
risks (Altman et al. 1998 and Newhouse 1996).
18 For example, Weng (1999) uses risk pooling in the context of demand uncertainty in regard to product 
distribution and Ramaswamy et al. (1998) uses risk pooling in the context of property ownership.
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It was pointed out that early mutual health insurance arrangements entail risk 
pooling with cross-subsidisation. Risk pooling with cross-subsidisation occurs if each 
insurer accepts predictable losses on the contracts of the high-risk individuals and 
compensates these losses through predictable profits on the contracts of the low-risk 
individuals. Thus high-risk individuals would receive a subsidy from the low-risk 
individuals in the risk pool that increases their access to health insurance coverage. 
However, risk pooling realities in competitive health insurance markets impose strong 
incentives for insurance seekers on the demand side and for insurers on the supply side 
that change risk pools.
These behavioural incentives are explainable within the framework of the 
economic model of human behaviour. First, if the insurer cannot distinguish different 
risks (and charges an average or community-rated risk premia to all customers) high-risk 
insurance seekers19 will have a stronger economic incentive to select themselves into 
insurance coverage. This adverse selection might result in unsustainable risk pooling and, 
in the extreme, the absence of health insurance markets. Second, if the insurer can 
distinguish between different risks (and charges individual risk-rated risk premia to his 
customers), is has an incentive to select and segment risks, and by doing so minimises the 
pooling of heterogeneous risks. This risk selection might result in narrow risk pooling and 
diminished chances for high-risk individuals to obtain or afford health insurance coverage 
(Holahan et al. 2003).
Further detail on the focus of this thesis, adverse selection and risk selection and 
their impact on efficiency and equity in unregulated health insurance markets, is 
presented below.
A. Adverse selection
Adverse selection in health insurance is often discussed with regard to different aspects of 
the information problem, mostly referring directly to asymmetry of information (e.g. 
Browne and Doerpinghaus 1993, Browne and Doerpinghaus 1994). The origin of this 
problem does not lie in incalculable uncertainty for incidents of ill-health20, because the 
occurrence of illness is a stochastic or unavoidable risk that insurers can calculate. 
However, insurance covers not only stochastic, unavoidable risks but also deterministic or 
avoidable risks. The later are, for example, related to individuals' medical histories and
19 High-risk individuals have a calculated risk (for claims) that is higher than the premium price would cover.
20 Uncertainty is less a problem for incidents of illness than, for example, the efficacy of treatment in the case 
of an illness (World Bank 1993).
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risk behaviours that influence their health status.21 Knowledge about these later risks/ in 
the context of asymmetry of information, is discussed as an information advantage of 
these market participants that creates inefficiency in insurance markets.
Arrow (1963) first introduced the concept of asymmetry of information to the 
specifics of the health sector and medical care market in his article Uncertainty and the 
welfare economics of medical care. In addition to uncertainty, information and knowledge about 
ill-health have to be considered when dealing with the commodities of health and health 
care. Arrow pointed out that: "When there is uncertainty, information or knowledge 
becomes a commodity." (1963:946). However, in health insurance this information or 
knowledge is often non-tradable and thus hard to assess or control by another party.22 
Uncertainty, asymmetry of information and the non-tradability of this information often 
lead to incentives incompatible with efficient market outcomes. The economic model of 
human behaviour can explain these incentives. For example, an individual's marginal 
utility can increase if the information advantage about ones' health risk is used. In health 
insurance markets, specific incentives for (individual) utility maximising behaviour lead 
to adverse selection, moral hazard23, and supplier-induced demand24.
Adverse selection appeared in its original definition in Akerlof (1970) as a seller's 
information advantage over a buyer. In the case of a (health) insurance market the 
opposite is assumed, that the insurance seeker has an information advantage over the 
insurance supplier. Adverse selection arises when insurance seekers do not act under 
uncertainty, but have a pretty accurate risk perception based on pre-existing medical
21 Thus while individual protection against the risk of ill-health is limited to appropriate risk behaviour, 
insurance against the costs of potential health care costs is possible.
22 In health insurance contracting information about a person’s health risk, particularly in regard to that 
person’s medical history and risk behaviour, is the exclusive and non-tradable knowledge of the (to be) 
insured person.
23 Moral hazard may occur if insured use their information advantage about their actual health status against 
the insurer’s interests and demand unnecessary or luxury health services they would not use if uninsured. 
Also, individuals may change their risk behaviour, i.e. insured individuals might behave in a riskier fashion 
simply because they are insured. Both types of individual utility maximising behaviour lead to higher levels 
of consumption. Insured people demand more insurance services than they would in a competitive 
equilibrium (under perfect information). Thus the supplying insurance company has higher costs than in a 
competitive equilibrium without moral hazard. With moral hazard a competitive market equilibrium (and 
welfare optimum) can be missed (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976).
24 Supplier-induced demand appears in health care provision, where information about whether a patient’s 
health is affected takes the form of detailed and specific knowledge provided by physicians. The information 
advantage of the health care providers over the insurer provides an economic incentive to practise supplier- 
induced demand and charge more services to the insurer. Thus physicians can prescribe services when they 
are not needed, in order to increase their incomes (Nyman 2003). Physicians may also prescribe services 
when not needed or more services than are needed because they lack information or understanding about the 
needed care. However, both cases lead to higher health care costs for the health insurer. The effects of this 
supplier-induced demand are similar to the ones of moral hazard.
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conditions. Thus these individuals have an information advantage over the insurer and 
can calculate their individual risk to a certain extent. If their calculated risk is higher than 
the premium price, they have a strong economic incentive to join insurance coverage. As a 
result of adverse selection insurers will experience a disproportionate number of enrolees 
with predisposed high risk (Nyman 2003).
Adverse selection is typically explained along the dimension of time, because it 
spans over several time-periods (see in particular Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo 1997 
but also general textbooks: Nyman 2003). Asymmetry in information generally leads to 
adverse selection in health insurance markets because participants have a different ability 
to acquire information before a contract is signed (Cremer and Kahlil 1992, Macho-Stadler 
and Perez-Castrillo 1997). Thus adverse selection arises in the time-period before 
participants enter a contract. At this point in time the buyer has an information advantage,
i.e. ex ante more knowledge about his/her risk than the seller - the insurance company - 
and can use this advantage to select the most favourable contract If, for example, 
insurance seekers have an information advantage over the insurer in regard to 
(preexisting health conditions or existing risk behaviour, they can impact an insurer's risk 
pool considerably. Figure 2-1 arranges the process of adverse selection along a time scale 
towards a market outcome that is inefficient and inequitable.
Figure 2-1: Adverse selection process in time dimension
time
Information advantage 
about risk is with 
insurance buyer 
before contract 
signing
Insurer
offers contract 
at average 
risk premium
Buyer with 
higher than 
average risk 
more attracted 
to select contract
Insurers calculated cost exceed 
revenue; price adaptation: pricet; 
lower risks drop out, high risks 
stay: costs exceed revenue again - 
spiral process until market dries out
The first article that analytically investigated the problem of adverse selection in the 
insurance market is that by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). By analyzing a simple model of 
a competitive insurance market they show that a competitive equilibrium may not exist or 
if it exists then only under restrictive conditions. Their model describes a market 
consisting of two kinds of costumers, low-risk and high-risk individuals. This market can 
only have either a pooling equilibrium (in which both groups buy the same contract) or a 
separating equilibrium (in which the two groups buy different contracts). Rothschild and
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Stiglitz (1976) show that a pooling equilibrium cannot exist because with one contract that 
is preferred by both risk types firms cannot break even and given a profitable contract 
bought by all risk types, low risks would actually prefer a different contract than the 
offered one. Their conclusion is that: "If there is an equilibrium, each type must purchase a 
separate contract" (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976:635). However, depending on the 
composition of the market (i.e. if the size of the high risk group is small as compared to 
the low risk group) there might be a single profitable contract preferred by both types 
over their separated choice, upsetting the potential separating equilibrium. In that case the 
competitive insurance market has no equilibrium.
Since Rothschild and Stiglitz the information problem and adverse selection are 
frequently discussed within the context of economic efficiency (e.g. Amott et al. 1994 and 
Lee 1991) and in regard to the impact on market equilibrium (e.g. Wilson 1977, Wilson 
1979, Allard, et al. 1998).25 In Cuyler's and Newhouse's (eds.) (2000) recent Handbook of 
health economics, chapter 11, Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) discuss very detailed efficiency 
and equilibria in health insurance markets with adverse selection. Several sources are 
concerned with selection effects on market equilibrium and welfare in health insurance 
markets (e.g. Dahlby 1991, Belli 2001, Hansen and Keiding 2002, Kifman 2002, Danzon 
2002 etc.).
Adverse selection processes create restrictions on supply and demand and the result is 
unsustainable risk pooling (also referred to as the "death spiral" for generous plans). If 
some suppliers are unable to function economically in the health insurance market they 
will disappear. Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000:608) point out that "The equilibrium with 
adverse selection may be inefficient; it may not even exist." Thus theory predicts that 
adverse selection increases inefficiency in health insurance markets and, in the extreme, 
leads to the absence of a market.26 However, with a variety of measures it could be 
attempted to work ones way back towards efficiency, potentially leading to a separating 
equilibrium. It should be noted that while these measures might help to induce a more 
efficient separating equilibrium they are not always equitable. Some of these measures are 
discussed below following the discussion of equity effects of adverse selection.
Adverse selection also raises equity problems:
25 Various theoretical papers analyse market equilibrium and welfare-optimum conditions in the presence of 
adverse selection (e.g. Grossman 1979, Wilson 1980 and Stewart 1994).
26 Despite the fact that there might be individuals who would like to be insured the supply of health insurance 
does not meet this demand. Thus the market outcome is inefficient, because it fails to successfully coordinate 
supply and demand.
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1. Uninsured high-risk and low-risk individuals who are willing to buy insurance cannot 
afford the high premiums. There is income-related inequity in access to health care. 
Public sector arrangements of health care financing and provision might fill this gap in 
order to provide health care for the poor and sick (if this inequity is perceived as a 
societal problem). People with low income and low risk are better off in an insurance 
system that risk-adjusts premia. Low-income high risks would be better off in a setting 
where risks are pooled within a mandatory, community-rated insurance system.
2. Uninsured average and low risks, who could afford insurance and who would like to 
be insured choose not to, because insurance is economically unattractive compared to 
their risk. However, in the event of unpredicted and cost intensive ill-health, they will 
be unable to pay for their medical costs and become a burden for the public sector, if 
available.27 This is an equity concern, since people who can afford insurance should 
take out insurance privately and not rely on resources that were allocated to the poor 
and needy. Average and low risks would be better off in a setting with risk-related 
premia.
Predicted insurance status outcomes under adverse selection for people with different 
incomes and health risks are summarised in table 2-2.
Table 2-2: Insurance patterns in a health insurance market with adverse selection
People
with
Low income High Income
Low risk Drop out because of unaffordabiiity and 
economically unattractive price -  add to burden of 
public sector if sick
Equity problem: income related inequality in health 
care access
Better off with risk-related premia
Drop out because of economically unattractive price 
-  may become burden of public sector in 
catastrophic, cost intensive Ul-health event 
Equity problem: use resources designated 
for the poor and needy 
Better off with risk-related premia
High risk Drop out because of unaffordabiiity -  become 
burden to public sector
Equity problem: income related inequality in health 
care access
Better off in mandatory, community-rated insurance 
system
Stay in the market until it disappears (then follow 
high income low risks)
Better off with risk-related premia or in mandatory 
insurance system.
There are four possible ways to achieve an efficient outcome, which separates the insured 
(high risks into generous plans and low risks into less generous plans): (1) charging risk 
related premia, (2) restricting consumer choice, (3) cross-subsidisation, and (4) risk 
selection in form of plan manipulation (see also Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000).
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First, adverse selection can be reduced with risk-rated premiums. This is usually 
made possible by lifting restrictions (i.e. regulations) on how premiums are set and by 
allowing insurers to use information relevant for individual risk-assessment However, 
this sacrifices risk spreading and forces chronically ill and high-risk people to pay higher 
premiums they might be unable to afford. Thus although this measure might lead to more 
efficiency this measure in particular sacrifices equitable access to health insurance and 
ultimately equitable access to health care.
Second, reducing adverse selection with restrictions in consumer choice by 
assigning people to different plans is possible. Insurers might offer only one insurance 
plan or it might be mandated that everyone within a given group of people can only buy a 
given plan. One example here is employment-based, mandatory insurance coverage. 
However, all these options reduce consumer choice and flexibility when different people 
prefer different plans. Additionally, restricting the timing of consumer choice by having 
waiting periods before someone can buy insurance or by excluding pre-existing 
conditions can also reduce adverse selection. However, in employment-based insurance 
systems this can cause people with chronic illness or high-risk dependants to be afraid to 
switch employers.
Third, with cross-subsidising generous plans by die less generous plans could lead 
to better separation of the insured. Less generous plans would be taxed with an additional 
per capita amount which is then used to offset the premium of the generous plan. Both 
insured types, low and high risks are better off with this subsidy (Cuder and Zeckhauser 
2000).
Finally, a separating equilibrium can be induced by risk selection in the form of 
plan manipulation or plan benefit distortion. For example, the difference between two 
plans can be increased by converting the less generous plan into an even stingier basic 
plan, so that high risks more likely choose the generous plan over pooling with the low 
risks. However, this type of plan manipulation has a drawback on efficiency, because low 
risks, now preferring to pool in the basic plan, would have had higher net benefits in the 
previous less generous plan (Cuder and Zeckhauser 2000). Plan manipulation in form of 
benefit distortion is widely used in practice. Most likely there will be plans that do not 
offer services with predictably high costs, like oncology services. It is also possible that so 
designed low-risk plans include discretionary services (and sometimes luxury services,
27 However, in many low and middle-income countries people may not fall back on the public sector for 
health services in the absence of private insurance. Here the reason for purchasing private insurance is often
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like paramedical services) that attract the otherwise healthy low risks. Risk selection of 
this type and its equity effects will be discussed in more detail in the following section on 
risk selection.
Since unregulated market equilibria do not always lead to Pareto-optimal 
outcomes, one strand of literature is extensively dedicated to policy analysis and the 
debate on how to regulate markets in order to prevent selection processes or how to design 
reforms in health care/insurance markets in order to overcome undesirable adverse 
selection (Enthoven and Singer 1995, Blumberg and Nichlos 1996). The landmark paper by 
Neudeck and Podzeck (1996), for example, analyzes the effects of different policy options 
that correct spontaneous health insurance market dynamics.28 They consider four cases of 
public provision of insurance or subsidies29 and three cases of regulation of the private 
insurance market.30
However, there is some literature arguing strongly against regulation to improve 
welfare in cases of adverse selection31 and several sources make government regulation 
itself responsible for market failure, the rise of adverse selection and welfare losses (e.g. 
Pauly 1986 on tax subsidies for health insurance). Altogether, this literature concentrates 
on either discussing potential policies that aim towards alternative forms of health 
insurance and health insurance regulation (e.g. for Latin America: Karplus and Betranou 
1999, for the European Union: Mossialos and Thomson 2002) or analysing political 
processes of health care reforms to overcome shortcomings of health insurance market 
dynamics (e.g. for Southern Europe: Guillen 2002).32 In any case, these discussions on 
policies for alternative health insurance systems are typically related to specific country- 
settings.
B. Risk selection
Risk selection in health insurance is discussed less frequently in theoretical terms as 
compared to adverse selection.33 This literature is mostly connected to practical, policy-
to guarantee access to private health services in the absence of public services.
28 They adopt Grossman's hypothesis (1979) about high-risk individuals' dissembling behavior, according to 
which insurers eventually turn down non-profitable contracts.
29 These are: (1) full public insurance, (2) partial compulsory public insurance, without or with the possibility 
of acquiring supplementary insurance from the private sector (topping up), (3) full public insurance with the 
possibility of opting out and (4) risk-adjusted premium subsidies.
0 These three cases are: (1) standard contract with full-coverage, (2) minimum insurance and (3) premium 
rate restrictions.
31 Lacker (1994) questions for instance the welfare-enhancing role of government intervention derived from 
Wilsons’ theoretical models.
32 One widely discussed case is the development of American health benefit programs.
33An exception is, for example, Feldman and Dowd (2000).
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oriented debates/ such as the discussions of the challenges of cream-skimming in 
competitive health insurance markets in Pauly (1984) and van de Ven and van Vliet (1992).
Cream-skimming (also called cherry-picking) happens when unusually low risk 
(and low-cost) people select an insurance plan. Insurers might know more about 
consumers' expected costs than the consumers themselves and uses marketing or plan 
design to enrol a healthier-than-usual population. For example, a plan that offers excellent 
obstetric care but poor oncology care will probably attract a healthier population than one 
that offers the opposite. A common criticism of low-cost health plans is that they keep 
their costs low by enrolling healthier people (or encouraging unhealthy people to leave 
the plan) rather than by treating their enrolees more efficiently (Newhouse et al. 1999). 
Usually this type of plan manipulation or plan benefit distortion is initiated to combat 
adverse selection and promote a more efficient separating equilibrium. This also includes 
price differentiation between generous, high-risk plans and less generous low-risk plans. 
The designed low-risk plans offer not only services for predominantly healthy people, i.e. 
low risks, they also offer them at a much lower premium price as compared to plans 
designed for high risks. Offering the low-risk plan for all prospective low risks at the same 
lower premium might do this or, more often, by combining plan manipulation with 
individual risk-assessment and charging individuals risk-rated premia. This form of price 
differentiation is also called preferred underwriting.
Preferred underwriting creates a preferred class of risks from a group of non-rated 
risks using a specific set of underwriting criteria. This group of preferred risks exhibits a 
lower risk than the population from which it is selected and allows the insurer to offer 
discounted premia. Insurance brokers using underwriting criteria like medical tests, 
personal and family medical history, and life style considerations mostly practice 
underwriting.
However, risk selection is most often referred to in the context of national health 
care systems that use capitation systems to pay health insurers or health care providers 
(Garros 2003, Van Bameveld et al. 2001). Equity concerns arise here because unregulated 
health insurers have an economic incentive to practice risk selection, by attracting low 
risks and avoiding high risks (Yu et al. 2003). Risk selection is essentially any biased 
selection action that exploits unpriced risk heterogeneity and breaks risk pooling 
arrangements, with the result that some consumers may not obtain the insurance coverage 
they desire (Newhouse 1996).
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Risk selection is practised by the insurance seller (in contrast to adverse selection, 
which is practised by the insurance buyer), either to improve its risk pool and to become 
more profitable or in order to combat adverse selection. Thus risk selection is a process 
that leads to a disproportionate number of insurance enrolees and members with 
predisposed low risk with whom profit maximisation is possible. Risk selection is very 
likely to occur in contested insurance markets where several insurers compete for the 
most profitable low risks. First, the insurer might use signals of easily identifiable risk 
factors (like age, sex, race etc.) and practice preferred underwriting of potential low risks. 
Second, the insurer might draw on the to-be-insured's information advantage and cream- 
skim the market for low risks. Third, the insurer might use information and signals about 
identifiable risk factors (like claim and benefit patterns) to identify high risks within its 
existing pool and dump these by terminating their coverage. This risk selection process 
continues until the risk pool in that health insurance market contains only fairly good and 
profitable risks.
Like adverse selection, risk selection can also be very well demonstrated using the 
time dimension, because it spans over several time-periods (see Macho-Stadler and Perez- 
Castrillo 1997). Risk selection appears before or after the participants enter a contract In the 
time-period before the contract signing the insurance seller uses signals or information 
about easily identifiable risk factors, like age, smoking habit, and weight of the insurance 
buyer to risk select.34 This is called 'signalling' in the economics of information (e.g. Riley 
1979). In this time-period the insurer also draws on the to-be-insured's information 
advantage by offering self-selecting plan options with risk-adjusted premiums that are 
particularly attractive to good risks (cream-skimming). Further risk selection is possible 
after the signing of the insurance contract. The insurer can then observe the claim and 
benefit patterns of its clients and terminate contracts that incur high costs, dumping these 
high risks. The following Figure 2-2 arranges the risk selection process events on a time 
scale towards a market outcome that is inequitable.
Risk selection and efficiency, especially in vertically integrated health insurance 
systems are connected. With increasing efficiency risk selection also rises (Newhouse 
1996). An insurance plan's premium is a function of the average risk in a heterogeneous 
risk pool of both profitable and unprofitable (member) risks. However, integrated plans, 
in particular, face price competition on the cost of medical care and thus have a stronger
34 If these risk factors are not observable, occur later in time or it is impossible to inquire about them (for 
instance due to legal regulation), then risk selection before the insurance contract is signed is limited.
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incentive to produce efficiently, as well as to cream-skim (profitable) low risks and dump 
(unprofitable) high risks (Newhouse 1996). Because of this selection some consumers may 
not obtain the insurance they desire.
Figure 2-2: Risk selection process in time dimension
time
Information advantage/ signals Buyer with Signals about
about risk of insurance buyer is used lower than risk of insured
by insurer before contract signing average risk after contract
with risk- adjusted self-selecting more attracted signing
insurance options (cream-skimming) to insurance
or preferred underwriting contract
Insurer excludes 
high risk from coverage by 
dumping them; proportion of good risks 
with of good risks in insurance 
pool rises - process continues 
until only low risks remain insured
Generally, different risk selection practices are applied in order to limit adverse selection 
and with it an inefficient equilibrium. Often, equilibrium may not even exist with adverse 
selection (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000). While risk selection strategies might increase 
efficiency and promote a separating equilibrium, this comes at the cost of risk spreading 
(Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000). Equity in access to health insurance and ultimately access 
to health care will be compromised. This is discussed in the next paragraph.
Risk selection raises considerable equity concerns:
1. Uninsured high-risk individuals with low incomes, willing to buy insurance, are either 
excluded by the insurers as 'uninsurable' or they cannot afford the risk-adjusted 
insurance coverage that is offered. These people cannot afford to pay for health care 
out of their pockets and will experience income-related inequity in access to health 
care. If this inequity is perceived as a societal problem, public sector arrangement of 
health care financing and provision might fill this gap in order to provide health care 
for the poor and sick. Low-income, high risks would be better off in a setting where 
risks are pooled within a mandatory, community-rated insurance system.
2. Uninsured high risks who could afford insurance and who would like to be insured 
are also excluded as uninsurable high risks. However, in the event of cost intensive ill- 
health, they too may be unable to pick up their bill and become a burden on the public 
sector. This is an equity concern, since people who can afford insurance should take 
out insurance privately, and should not have to rely on resources that are allocated to 
the poor. High risks, (even with high income) would be better off in a setting where 
risks are pooled within a mandatory, community-rated insurance system.
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Predicted insurance status outcomes under risk selection are summarised in table 2-3 for 
people with different incomes and health risks.
Table 2-3: Insurance pattern in a health insurance market with risk selection
People
with
Low income High Income
Low risk Stay in the market Stay in the market
High risk Drop out because of uninsurable high risk -  become 
burden of public sector
Equity problem: income related inequality in health 
care access
Better off in mandatory, community-rated insurance 
system
Drop out because of uninsurable high risk -may 
become burden of public sector in cost intensive 111- 
heaith event
Equity problem: use resources designated 
for the poor
Better off in mandatory, community-rated insurance 
system
In health insurance markets risk selection can be reduced in several ways by regulation. 
First, non-price regulation might improve the selection-efficiency trade-off. This first type 
of regulation would enforce non-discrimination in risk pooling that requires cross­
subsidisation, i.e. insurers have to accept high risks whose costs exceed their premia and 
offset those losses through profits on other insured low-risks. However, it is hard to 
enforce such a regulation or monitor its compliance in health insurance markets.
Risk selection also could be reduced in multiple plan choice settings by 
introducing (periodic) open enrolment and guaranteed renewal without medical 
underwriting.35 However, insurers might alter their product to influence choice by 
offering specific plans services that would attract low rather than high risks, or alter 
incentives to gatekeeper physicians, discouraging referrals for high risks (Newhouse 
1996). New plan choices are more appealing to low risks that are less likely to be 
established with specific physicians.
Second, there are risk adjustment strategies that consider variations in the health 
status of the insured in vertically integrated insurance plans in order to reduce biased 
selection (Newhouse 1997, Rice and Smith 2000 etc.). Risk adjustment is defined as the 
adjustment of premiums paid to health plans (or to insurance companies) based on a 
formula employing individual level diagnostic and/or demographic information (Keenan 
et al. 2001). Barros (2003) points out reform proposals of several national health insurance 
systems that have advocated variations of risk adjustment/capitation systems and face the 
serious obstacle of incentives to risk selection.
35 Here anyone could enrol in any plan or remain in a plan.
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Risk adjustment has been used in Belgium/ The Netherlands/ Israel/ the United 
Kingdom/ and Switzerland/ among other countries. Thus/ the literature is mostly related 
to specific (integrated) national health care and insurance systems (for example Israel: 
Shmueli 1998/ Belgium: Schokkaert, and van de Voorde 2000/ The Netherlands: van de 
Ven and van Vliet 1994, and the UK: Smith 1998). The discussions in these publications 
focus on adequate risk adjustment and pro-competitive regulation. However, insurers and 
providers can strategically play against given systems of risk-adjusted capitation 
payments and still risk select those consumers expected to be profitable or avoid high 
risks. Van de Ven et al. (1998) discuss the current difficulties in improving capitation 
formulas by estimating average risks and points out that the marginal improvements in 
the capitation formula are obtained at considerable research costs. This recent article also 
argues that avoidance of cream-skimming requires strong regulations and possibly some 
sort of mandatory high-risk pooling.36
2.3.3 Empirical evidence for adverse selection and risk selection in health 
insurance
There is a relatively limited number of studies that empirically investigate selection 
processes, and, of those, it is adverse selection that is predominately the centre of 
attention. Also, these empirical investigations are typically set in developed countries, like 
the US or Europe, and rarely in low- or middle-income countries. There are at least two 
factors that limit the number of empirical investigations into selection processes.
First, empirical studies face a lack of data. Insurance companies typically collect 
individual-based data for record keeping purposes. However, in low- and middle-income 
countries there are fewer established health insurance arrangements and data collection 
generally is often too costly here to be feasible. The American RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment is one example where data were generated from a randomised experiment in 
order to derive information regarding health insurance and medical care demand (and 
also isolate moral hazard effects) (Manning, et al. 1987, Newhouse and Archibald 1993, 
Manning and Marquis 1996). If insurance data is available it is not always suitable for this 
type of empirical investigations, because it was not collected for the purpose of identifying 
selection processes.
36 See also the article of van Bameveld et al. (1996). For a good summary of the major themes of the risk 
adjustment literature the interested reader is referred to Newhouse (1998), Van de Ven and Ellis (2000), and 
van de Ven et al. (2000).
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Second, empirical attempts face the difficult methodological task of identifying 
and isolating selection processes in practice. Measuring consequences of behaviour is a 
general problem in social science. Social scientists have to understand behaviour and take 
its motivations into account. However, they can observe only behaviour outcomes, not 
motivations. For instance, empirically observable effects of adverse selection are quite 
similar to moral hazard (higher health care utilisation). That makes it hard to distinguish 
them in data. The important distinction is that moral hazard appears if insured risks, high 
and low, have motivations to either top-up their health care utilisation or to behave more 
risky because they are insured. Adverse selection only concerns the sub-sample of high 
risks in insurance, which sought insurance motivated by predisposed high health risk and 
higher predictable utilisation.
The literature employs a range of different methods for the empirical identification 
of adverse selection and/or risk selection. It is the aim here to classify these approaches to 
empirical investigation into selection processes. Among the recent publications that 
conduct empirical investigations into selection processes in health insurance markets are: 
Sapelli and Torche (2001), Savage and Wright (2003), Soderlund and Hansl (2000) and van 
Vliet (2000). All four are examples of distinct methodological approaches. Table 2-4 
summarises this literature, breaking the applied methods into four categories: Method (1): 
Multiple plan choice approach without utilisation, Method (2): Multiple plan choice 
approach with utilisation, Method (3): Multiple plan analysis approach, and Method (4): 
Risk adjustment approach. The table will summarise the studies according to the data 
used, the methods applied and the main results found. Finally the evidence in regard to 
selection will be stated.
The pages following table 2-4 will describe die four method approaches in detail. 
For each approach a small number of key publications will be discussed in the text. 
However, the majority of studies can be found summarised in table 2-4. Within the second 
method approach, the multiple-plan choice approach with utilisation, the American 
RAND Health experiment will be discussed. This section will finally discuss selected 
problems of these approaches.
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Table 2-4: Evidence on selection in health insurance
Paper Data Empirical methods Highlights of results Selection
Method (1): Multiple plan choice approach w/out utilisation
Prop per et al. 
(2001)
Pseudo-panel cohort 
derived from repeated 
cross-sections of the 
annual UK Family 
Expenditure Survey 1978- 
1996
2 Weighted Least Square estimations 
for dynamics of supplementary private 
medical insurance purchase
Purchase of private health insurance rises with age but is less 
likely in older cohorts (and more likely in young). Income and 
quality of supplied private care are positively associated with 
purchase.
not explicitly 
concluded, 
however, likely
Besley (1999) Pooled cross-section time 
series data from the British 
Social Attitude Survey, a 
nationally representative 
annual survey (1986-87, 
1989, and 1990-91) of over 
3,000 individuals
Descriptive statistics, probit model and 
a two equation model for demand of 
supplementary private health insurance.
Purchase of private health insurance rises with age, tailing off 
for those over 65. Income, house ownership and occupational 
attainment are positively associated with purchase, household 
size negatively. Among the health care quality variables only 
the long-term waiting list variable is statistically significant.
not explicitly 
concluded, 
however, likely
Cutler and 
Reber(1998)
Data of Harvard University 
employees after introducing 
a voucher-type system, 
with two groups of 
employees (2/3 that 
adopted system in 1995 
and the remaining 1/3 that 
adopted it only in 1996)
Descriptive statistics and logistic 
regression estimates of insurance 
choice between plans of different 
generosity
Logistic model for enrolment response to the pricing reform as a 
function of the choice for a more or less generous plan: age, 
salary, being female, having faculty position and job tenure are 
positively associated with choosing a more generous plan.
Logit models for whether people who had insurance in one year 
dropped coverage in the next year as functions of the plans 
price change and the same socio-demographic characteristic: 
premia significantly affect the probability of dropping coverage. 
Among switchers between the plans younger people move 
disproportionately to the less generous plan, while older people 
pool disproportionately in the more generous plan.
Adverse selection destroyed the market for generous health 
insurance entirely.
adverse
Dowd and
Feldman
(1985)
Data from survey of twenty 
firms in the twin cities of 
Minneapolis and St. Pauls
Testing the means of several socio­
demographic and health status 
characteristics for different health plan 
populations (i.e. people who select high 
versus low option coverage)
Individuals who chose traditional fee-for-service (high option 
coverage) are significantly older and more likely to self-report 
serious medical conditions. They are also more likely to have 
relatives with serious medical conditions.
adverse
cont.
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Cardon and 
Hendei (1996)
Data from the National 
Medical Expenditure 
Survey
Tobit model of choosing insurance 
versus being uninsured
Individuals who are younger, male and self-report excellent 
health are significantly less likely to choose to become insured.
adverse
Browne
(1992)
Subsample of 2,515 group 
insured and 225 
individually insured 
households from the 
National Medical Care 
Expenditure Survey 1977- 
1978
From a structural equation model of 
demand for medical insurance and 
expenses a group market insurance 
prediction equation is derived, specified 
with socio-economic and health status 
variables. The parameters of the 
estimated insurance prediction equation 
are used to predict group health 
insurance purchases by families with 
individual health insurance. Analysing 
the differences between predicted and 
actual families a demand discrepancy 
decomposition equation is estimated. 
Mean contributions of different risk 
groups to insurers surplus is tested for 
differences.
The difference between actual and predicted group health 
insurance purchases is greater for low risks than for high risks. 
This is either a sign for reduced insurance consumption of low 
risks and thus adverse selection or means that low risks receive 
more insurance through group insurance than they desire. 
Results of the subsidisation test shows that low risks contribute 
significantly more to the insurer surplus than high risks.
The findings for both hypotheses together suggest that adverse 
selection is present in the individual health insurance market. 
This adverse selection leads to reduced insurance consumption 
by low risks and cross-subsidisation.
adverse
Bice (1975)* A random sample of East 
Baltimore public housing 
residents
Testing the means of health status 
variables by different Medicaid plan 
enrolment either in Medicaid fee-for- 
service or managed care plans
Poor reported health is positively correlated with enrolment in 
prepaid plans. Since the expected use of people with reported 
poor health is higher, there is also positive correlation with 
enrolment in prepaid plans.
favourable
Scitovskyet 
at. (1978)
Enrolment and survey data 
for Stanford University 
employees
Least-squares regression analysis of 
plan choice (managed care versus fee- 
for-service plans)
Employees who enrol in traditional fee-for-service plans are 
significantly older, more likely or be single or without young 
dependants.
adverse
Juba et al. 
(1980)
1976 Enrolment data and 
survey for Camegie-Mellon 
University employees
Maximum Likelihood logit estimation for 
determinants of plan choice for 
managed care plans or traditional fee- 
for-service plans
Families with lower self-reported health are significantly less 
likely to enrol in managed care plans
adverse
McGuire
(1981)
A random sample of the 
Yale University employees’ 
health plan enrolment
Logistic regression of health plan choice 
for either managed care plans or 
traditional fee-for-service plans
Being female is significantly associated with joining a prepaid 
health plan. Age has no significant effects.
adverse
Summary of evidence for method (1) adverse cont.
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Method (2): Multiple plan choice approach with utilisation
Propper
(1993)
Spring 1987 cross- 
sectional survey of 1,360 
individuals in England and 
Wales
Two probit models estimating the 
propensity of choice for supplementary 
private health insurance and the 
propensity of captivity (=lack of choice 
over all possible modes under analysis) 
to the public health insurance
Purchase of private health insurance is most strongly 
associated with ability to pay and health status (besides age 
and risk attitude). Purchase is not significantly associated with 
utilisation, but there is a positive relationship between GP and 
inpatient utilisation and purchase. Captivity is determined by 
political attitude and supply-side constraints rather than health 
status. For example, young (<35) and old (>65) are less likely to 
choose private insurance. Former might be due to lack of ’need’ 
and later due to supply-side constraints (policies not available 
for first time buyers in this age group and no coverage of 
chronic medical conditions).
adverse and
favourable
likely
Sapelli and 
Torche(2001)
Data from Chile’s annual 
National Socioeconomic 
Characterisation Survey 
between 1990-1996
A logistic regression model of private 
health insurance choice including socio­
economic and utilisation variables
Higher income increases the probability of being privately 
insured. High risks, i.e. older people and woman in the 
reproductive ages are less likely to be privately insured. This 
indicates adverse selection into the public sector or favourable 
risk selection into the private sector.
adverse and 
favourable
Sapelli and 
Vial (2003)
1996 data from Chile’s 
annual National 
Socioeconomic 
Characterisation Survey
Count data models estimate utilisation 
equations with independent variables of 
number of physician visits and days of 
hospitalisation consumed by 
households in three months prior to the 
survey and choice of insurance; models 
with independent and dependant 
workers are estimated
For independent workers insurance plans face adverse 
selection and moral hazard.
For dependent workers, only public insurance faces adverse 
selection (based on variables like age and number of 
dependants), private insurers not due to risk-adjusted premia. 
However, the results indicate that, for physician visits, moral 
hazard is present in both public and private insurance. There is 
no moral hazard in the case of hospitalisation, for either public 
insurance or private insurance.
adverse, 
favourable and 
moral hazard
Hansl and 
Sodertund 
(1999)
A sample of 73,000 
households from the South 
African October 
Households Survey from 
1995
A probit model of private health 
insurance choice with parameters 
ranging from socio-economic, health 
status and health care utilisation was 
estimated
Private health insurance coverage is significantly more likely 
among the formally employed, married, white, young and those 
who live less than 5 km away from the nearest health care 
facility. Higher income was significantly associated with greater 
probability of coverage. Significantly less likely coverage for the 
permanently disabled and the elderly indicate favourable 
selection. Adverse selection with regard to less easily 
identifiable medical risks is likely, with recent illness and 
hospital admission being associated with having taken out 
insurance coverage.
adverse and 
favourable
cont
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Hopkins and 
Kidd (1996)
A subsample of 16,472 
households from Australia’s 
National Health Survey of 
1989-1990, a 
representative sample of 
the Australian population.
Maximum likelihood logit analysis for 
determinants of demand for private 
health insurance under Australia’s 
universal, tax-financed public health 
insurance system is performed. A first 
specification of socio-economic and 
health status variables attempts to 
capture determinants of private health 
insurance purchase and a second, in 
which the first is nested, also includes 
utilisation variables.
Older people, females in the reproductive ages, families with 
higher income and higher the education level are more likely to 
purchase private health insurance. The probability of purchase 
is higher the more recent the last doctors visit and last hospital 
admittance.
adverse
Savage and 
Wright (2003)
A subsample of 22,913 
households from the 1989- 
1990 National Health 
Survey data released by 
the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics
A probit model of insurance choice is 
estimated and the estimated probability 
of having private hospital insurance is 
substituted for the insurance dummy 
when estimating a hospital service use 
equation. In the regression model of 
length of stay the coefficient for the (in 
the probit model) estimated probability 
that an individual has private hospital 
insurance gives indication of moral 
hazard
Income and age have a significant, positive impact on the 
probability of having private insurance. Health status variables 
(captured by a detailed breakdown of chronic conditions) are 
found to be individually and jointly significant, providing more 
evidence of adverse selection. The main variable of interest of 
the duration of stay regressions, the estimated coefficient on 
the insurance variable, provide quite strong evidence for moral 
hazard amongst old couples and couples with dependants and 
weak evidence for moral hazard amongst young singles.
adverse and 
moral hazard
Cameron et 
al. (1988)
1977-1978 National Health 
Survey data released by 
the Australian Bureau erf 
Statistics
Health care utilisation equations 
(negative binomial estimates) and logit 
models of health insurance choice (for a 
divided sample) using socio-economic, 
health status and utilisation variables
Health care utilisation is highly responsive to health status, less 
to age and sex, and varies little with income. Utilisation is higher 
for privately insured, i.e. more generous coverage, than publicly 
insured. Private health insurance choice is significantly 
increasing with age, income, education level and chronic health 
conditions. These results are interpreted as evidence for 
adverse selection and moral hazard.
adverse and 
moral hazard
Hurd and 
McGarry 
(1997)
A subsample of 7,327 
households from the panel 
of the Asset and Health 
Dynamics Survey 1993- 
1994 (survey of individuals 
bom 1923 or earlier)
Two probit models, one for elderly 
having supplementary private insurance 
and one for paying for it (with socio­
economic, self-reported and other 
health indicator variables), two models 
showing the effect of private insurance, 
health and economic status on the 
probability of utilisation
Subjective health status measures have no or little effect on 
having supplementary private insurance, but income and wealth 
have are strongly associated with having private insurance. 
Even controlling for insurance and economic status, those in 
better health are more likely to purchase health insurance. 
Whether or not someone pays for insurance does not affect the 
probability of a doctor's visit or entering a hospital.
ambiguous
cont.
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Wolfe and 
Goddeeris 
(1991)
Cartwright et 
al. (1992)
Manning et al. 
(1987)
Farley and
Monheit
(1985)
Retirement Health Survey Means comparison for elderly with and
of the Social Security 
Administration 1969-1979 
following a cohort moving 
into retirement
1977 National Medical 
Care and Expenditures 
Survey with data for elderly 
(65 or older), benefit 
provision data of the Health 
Insurance Employers' 
Survey linked to the 
National Med. Exp. Survey
without supplementary private health 
insurance, OLS and In least square 
regression for sun  of health 
expenditures and different types of 
utilisation, probit estimation of 
supplementary private insurance
Multinomial logit model for the 
probability of purchasing supplementary 
private health insurance, Two-step 
analysis for estimation of expected 
medical expenses
Elderly with private health insurance had persistently greater adverse 
expenditures for hospitalisation, physician visits and 
prescription drugs and for other measures of use showed 
greater utilisation, especially resource-intensive care. However, 
they also reported better health and more wealth.
The LS regression results showed that individuals in worse 
health or with more wealth had higher utilisation. Past 
healthcare expenditures affect private insurance demand.
The probit results show modest support for adverse selection 
as several utilisation variables predict private insurance 
coverage (besides being female and being wealthier). Self- 
reported health and disability are not significant.
Purchase of supplementary private insurance is significantly adverse and
more likely among females, individuals in employment, with favourable
high education and with high income. Purchase is also
associated with good health, however, those in fair/poor health
seem to have some difficulty in obtaining coverage, but once
covered they tend to purchase comparatively more insurance.
Expected medical expenses are higher for those with 
supplementary insurance. The results are interpreted as 
consistent with adverse and risk selection.
RAND experiment data 
1974-77 (randomly 
controlled trial) for the 
evaluation of the effects of 
varying generosity of health 
insurance coverage on 
health care utilisation
Data from 1977 National 
Medical Care Expenditure 
Survey
Means test analysis, and a four- 
equation model: (1) a probit model that 
separates user from non-users, (2) a 
probit model for the probability that an 
insured has at least one inpatient stay, 
given that he has other medical 
expenses, (3) a linear regression of the 
logarithm for total annual medical 
expenses of outpatient-users only, and
(4) a linear regression of the logarithm 
for total annual medical expenses of 
any inpatient user
Ordinary least Square and 2 Stage 
Least Square estimation of health 
insurance purchase
Use of medical services responds to co-payment levels.
Medical expenses are significantly higher for plans without co­
payment than the plan with co-payment Insured individuals in a 
plan without co-payment are significantly more likely to use any 
services than insured with 95% co-payment. Use of any 
medical service increases with income for all plans, regardless 
for the co-payment level. Health status is a strong predictor for 
expenditure levels but not for different insurance coverage of 
healthy and sickly. Individuals enrolled in managed care as 
compared to fee-for-service plans had lower expenditure per 
person, but had the same rate of service use, i.e. there is less 
intensive care use in less generous plans.
Purchase of health insurance is significantly associated with 
ambulatory care expenditures.
adverse likely
ambiguous
cont.
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Browne and
Doerpinghaus
(1993)
National Medical Care 
Expenditure Survey data 
1977-1978 of the 
individually insured
A general linear regression model is 
estimated testing across six equations if 
lower-risk individuals purchase less 
complete insurance coverage than high- 
risk individuals
Individuals with socio-economic and health status 
characteristics that indicate high risk have higher utilisation (but 
do not purchase insurance coverage with higher cost-sharing). 
Adverse selection exists, where low and high risks buy a 
pooling policy that implicitly subsidises high risks.
adverse
Griffith and 
Baloff (1981)
Data of members in a start­
up managed care plan 
located in urban S t Louis 
over a 5-year period
Relationship between utilisation rates 
and duration of membership in a 
managed care plan, depending on 
socio-economic subgrouping of the 
study population (sex, race, income, 
education and age) and for different 
employers and cohorts
Substantial reduction in utilisation rates with increasing duration 
of membership over the 5-year period in the start-up. This 
"start-up effect" is strongly evident across all different socio­
economic subgroups, different employers and cohorts.
ambiguous
Conrad et al. 
(1985)
Random sample of 1980 
claims and eligibility data 
for dental health insurance 
in Pennsylvania (Blue 
Shield)
2 and 3 Stage Least Square estimation 
of demand models for premia and total 
expenditure
Dental insurance is more likely with worse self-perceived dental 
health. However, risk-rating based on prior utilisation does not 
lead to overall premia reduction.
adverse
Ellis (1985) Sample of employees of a 
large financial services firm 
in a single metropolitan 
area selecting individual 
health insurance coverage 
1982-1983
Logit estimates of health plan choice, 
i.e. factors affecting managed care 
enrolment versus traditional health 
insurance enrolment over the 
observation period
Choice of more generous health coverage for the following year 
is associated with rising age and higher previous health care 
utilisation.
adverse
Merrill et al. 
(1985)
Data for enrolment and 
utilisation from Salt Lake 
City and Tallahasse
Means analysis and logistic regression 
analysis of health plan choice in 
managed care plans versus traditional 
fee-for-service plans, including socio­
economic and health status and 
utilisation variables
Choice of managed care plans is associated with being 
younger, male and having lower utilisation (as compared to 
traditional insurance plan members). However, the health status 
variables of managed care members do not necessarily indicate 
low risk.
adverse or 
favourable 
likely
Wrightsonet 
al. (1987)
Data from seven plans 
offering different types of 
managed care
Comparison of benefits for disenrolees 
and disenrolment rates among insured
Disenrolees are of lower risk in terms of their socio-economic 
group and their utilisation
adverse
cont.
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Langwell and 
Hadley (1989)
Medicaid consumer survey 
data, medical record data 
and secondary claims and 
eligibility data from 
Nationwide Evaluation of 
Medicaid Competition 
Demonstrations in six 
States (California, Florida, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New 
Jersey, and New York) 
1982-1983
Person-level bivariate and multivariate 
utilisation and cost analyses, for 
example, contrasting the pre-utilisation 
and post-utilisation experience of a 
sample of managed care system 
enrolees in each site with pre-utilisation 
and post-utilisation experience of norv 
enrolees from comparison samples of 
traditional fee-for-service plans
The demonstrations - in many respects a test of the feasibility 
and impact of a managed care system relative to traditional, 
fee-for-service systems - showed significant utilisation reduction 
for enrolees in managed care plans on most sites. However, 
these apparent utilisation changes were not translated into 
program savings, i.e. a clear pattern of cost reductions. Studies 
of evidence of selection bias were undertaken for 2 sites. No 
evidence was detected that persons voluntarily enrolling differ 
significantly from those opting to remain in traditional Medicaid. 
Prior-use techniques and more complex econometric 
techniques failed to uncover bias in beneficiary plan selection.
ambiguous
Long et al. 
(1988)
Data of 1,553 subscribers 
to three Minneapolis-St. 
Paul managed care plans 
(from 27 employers) in 
1984
Multivariate probit model of voluntary 
disenrolment, depending on premia, 
number of plans offered, controlled for 
demographic and utilisation variables
Disenrolment is a function of economic factors, disenrolment 
significantly rises with increase in premia and number of 
available plan choice. However, all demographic variables and 
utilisation variables in the model showed an insignificant 
relationship to disenrolment.
ambiguous
Ellis (1989) Sample of employees of a 
large financial services firm 
in a single metropolitan 
area selecting individual 
health insurance coverage 
1982-1983
Means analysis and 2 generalised logit 
models including socio-demographic 
and health expenditure variables by 
employees health care coverage choice 
in flexible benefit setting, 1983 
introduced three new flexible benefit 
options with (same co-payment in 
1982), but different deductibles, premia 
and stop-losses
Employees' choice strongly displays selection bias across plans 
despite similar socio-demographic characteristics. High option 
plan enrolees experienced significantly higher health 
expenditures the year prior to the change than the least 
generous pan option and significantly higher claims the year 
after the choice.
adverse
Diehr et al. 
(1993)
Data from interview survey 
among enrolees and norv 
enrolees (but eligibies) in 
Washington State's Basic 
Health Plan demonstration 
program
Multivariate analysis, including socio­
economic, insurance status and health 
status variables of utilisation differences 
between enrolee and eligibies in 
demonstration program that provides 
subsidised health insurance for families 
earning less than 200% of the poverty 
level
Substantial differences between enrolees and eligibies in 
education, age, income, employment, race, and insurance 
status. In spite of these demographic and access differences, 
health status was remarkably similar for enrolees and eligibies, 
with the few significant differences favouring the enrolees. In 
addition, previous and subsequent use of health services was 
similar or lower for enrolees. The results for health status and 
utilisation were similar across the three counties, even though 
the counties and the providers were quite different.
ambiguous
Summary of evidence for method (2) favourable/ 
adverse cont.
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Method (3): Multiple plan analysis approach
Billi et al. 
(1993)
Secondary data of 
University of Michigan 
employees, dependants 
and retirees involved in the 
first open enrolment in a 
new university based 
managed care plan
Retrospective study of utilisation and 
demographic characteristics of those 
who enrolled in a managed care plan 
with those who did not compare mean 
plan benefit payments of the managed 
care plan and the traditional Blue 
Cross-Blue Shield basic coverage plan
The group enrolled in the less generous managed care plan 
had a younger median and experienced lower average inpatient 
and outpatient payments per member in the year prior to the 
enrolment. These differences resulted in an overall lower 
payment per member for the new managed care plan group in 
the year prior to their enrolment.
favourable
Brown et al. 
(1993)
Data of Medicare insured, 
claims/benefits and plan 
enrolment in managed care 
plans versus traditional fee- 
for service plans
Comparison of average spending of 
switchers to managed care plans and 
those who remained in traditional fee- 
for service plans using utilisation data 
from two years prior to managed care 
enrolment
Switchers to managed care plans had two years prior to their 
enrolment in these less generous plans about one tenth lower 
spending than insured in more generous fee-for-service plans.
adverse
Altman et al. 
(1998)
Data on plan enrolment 
and utilisation for insured in 
Massachusetts Group 
Insurance Commission 
1993-1996
Analyse factors accounting for 
differences in plan premia of managed 
care and traditional fee-for-service plan 
options, comparing average plan 
benefits and age- and sex-adjusted 
costs
Insured who switch from traditional fee-for-service to less 
generous managed care plans have on average one third less 
benefits than those retaining fee-for-service coverage. Insured 
who switch into the other direction used on average half more 
services than those remaining in managed care plans. Adverse 
selection results primarily form switchers not new enrolees. 
Adverse retention occurs, where remaining high risks magnify 
cost differentials between plans.
adverse and 
favourable
Cutler (1994) Data from the Health 
Insurance Association of 
America, surveying yearly 
3,000 firms whether 
coverage is provided at 
what premia level
Examine empirical evidence on 
insurance premia variability by 
estimating regressions for logarithm of 
benefit costs, depending on previous 
benefits, and plans’ age, racial and 
gender composition, simultaneous 
equation model
Plans with more generous benefits and with a higher share of 
retirees and older worker have higher premia. However, premia 
variability is not explained by demographic differences or 
benefit generosity atone. There is a lack of intertemporal 
pooling, which might occur due to adverse selection, demand 
inadequacy or public subsidies to uninsured.
adverse
Buchmueller 
and Feldstein 
(1997)
Data from employees of the 
University of California 
1993-1994 after it changed 
policy to limit its 
contribution to least 
expensive option
Descriptive analysis and probit models 
of probability for an employee to switch 
depending on premia level, controlling 
for some socio-demographic, and plan 
characteristics
Strong price effects were found. An increase in premia of ten 
USD led to five-fold increase in switchers. Increasing age and 
family size reduce the probability of switching to cheaper, less 
generous plan options.
adverse
cont.
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Price et al. 
(1983)
Data from the American 
Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Program, following 
a large premia increases in 
1982-1983, and benefit 
reductions
Analysis of insured plan choice and 
comparison of premia level for plans of 
different generosity
The most generous plan charges premiums that are double that 
of the less generous plan (whereas the actuarial difference was 
less than ten percent). There are strong economic incentives for 
enrolees to leave certain high-cost plans, where the disparity 
between expected benefits and premium is high. The survival of 
some plans is questionable.
adverse and 
favourable
Jacksorv 
Beeck and 
Kleinman 
(1983)
Data for employer groups 
health insurance coverage 
in Minneapolis-St. Paul 
(Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield) 1978-1981
Secondary claims analysis, comparing 
average health care use and costs of 
those who participated in first open 
enrolment in managed care plans with 
those who remained in traditional fee- 
for-service plans
During initial open enrolments, proportionately younger and 
lower users of health care enrolled in less generous managed 
care plans. For example, enrolees in managed care plans had 
on average half of the inpatient utilisation the year prior to their 
managed care enrolment compared with those retaining 
traditional coverage.
adverse
Price and 
Mays (1985)
Data from the American 
Federal Health Benefits 
program
Comparison of costs and premia across 
plan choices
Over a three-year period the most generous plans (e.g. the 
Blue Cross high-option) underwent a premium spiral and 
experience a reduction in enrolment by half.
adverse
Welch (1989) Data from Towers, Perrin, 
Forster, and Crosby Inc. 
study of the American 
Federal Employees Health 
Benefits program
Comparison of premia of plans of 
different generosity (high and low option 
plans of Blue Cross) for government 
workers
The premia for the most generous plan option is about 80% 
higher than the least generous plan.
adverse and 
favourable
Cutler and
Zeckhauser
(1998)
Data from the Harvard 
University and the 
Massachusetts Group 
Insurance Commission
Analysis of premia and enrolment in 
plans of different generosity after 
changes in employers’ health insurance 
subsidy policy
The more generous plans have higher benefits and have on 
average an older, high-risk membership. A premium-spiral at 
Harvard University led to the disappearance of the high-option 
plan within three years after introducing new policy. Adverse 
selection in the high-option plan at the Insurance Commission 
was contained with subsidies and tight plan management.
adverse
Sodertund 
and Hansl 
(2000)
Annual data from South 
Africa’s 180 registered 
medical schemes, between 
1985-1995
Descriptive statistics and three OLS 
models explore trends in plan enrolment 
and costs of private health insurance 
after risk-rating was legalised
A form of premium spiral is suggested, with worsening risk 
profiles being associated with increase in premia, loss of low- 
risk members and worsening of the financial position of plans. 
The average premia (fixed effects) model suggests risk 
selection, since increases in discretionary benefits, a marker of 
low risks, is significantly associated with lower premia.
adverse and 
favourable
Summary of evidence for method (3) favourable/ 
adverse cont.
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Method (4): Risk adjustment approach
Eggers (1980) Data from a managed care 
Medicare risk contract with 
the Group Health 
Cooperative of Puget 
Sound in the State of 
Washington 1974-1976
Descriptive comparison of utilisation 
and of reimbursement between 
enrolees and non-enrolees in the 
managed care program before the 
open-enrolment started
Beneficiaries who joined managed care during open enrolment 
had half the rate of inpatient utilisation and reimbursement of 
non-enrolees. The open-enrolment beneficiaries’ utilisation of 
medical services indicates a selection process. The incentive 
reimbursements provided to managed care plans were tied to 
the AAPCC, which adjusted for age, sex, residence, welfare 
and institutional status. However, it did not account for other 
factors that might affect differences in reimbursement rates, like 
health status.
favourable
Eggers and
Prihoda
(1982)
Data from three Medicare 
demonstration sites, 
including the Greater 
Marshfield Community 
Health Plan - a managed 
care plan
Descriptive comparison of utilisation 
and reimbursement patterns between 
enrolees and non-enrolees in the 
managed care program for the four 
years prior to the enrolment in the 
managed care plan
Medicare reimbursements for the four years prior to the point of 
enrolment were 14% lower for managed care joiners than for 
non-managed care plan enrolees. The Marshfield managed 
care plan received an AAPCC adjusted payment from 
Medicare, which adjusted for age, sex, race, institutional status, 
and disability status. The adjustment method for selection bias 
used has to consider the prior determined form of selection.
favourable
Dowd etal. 
(1995)
Data from the Twin Cities 
Medicare market, including 
five managed care plans 
with risk contracts, two 
random samples of 
Medicare beneficiaries (one 
managed care plan 
enrolees, one not), 1988- 
1989
Estimation of a model that corrects for 
selectivity bias (two-sector selection 
model), jointly estimating choice and 
expenditure equations (which yield 
selectivity-corrected tobit AAPCC 
expenditure equation coefficients), 
rather than adding more variables to the 
AAPCC formula and measure changes 
in explained variance it is attempted to 
measure the effect of omitted variables
The selectivity-corrected tobit AAPCC expenditure equation 
coefficients show that traditional (non-managed care) 
experience unfavourable selection. Selection on the basis of 
observed variables that are included in the AAPCC formula 
does not lead to over- or underpayments to managed care 
plans. However, the test for the presence of correlation 
between variables omitted from the choice and expenditure 
equations is negative and significant, meaning that these 
variables contribute negatively to traditional plan expenditures 
and indicate favourable selection.
ambiguous
Riley et al. 
(1996)
1994 data from the 
Medicare Current 
Beneficiary Survey, a 
longitudinal, a multipurpose 
survey of a representative 
sample of the Medicare 
population
Bivariate comparison and model 
estimation to predict average cost 
(ratio), including the health status of 863 
managed care plan enrolees and 4,576 
non-enrolees, controlling for 
demographics and area of residence
Managed care enrolees were less likely to report fair or poor 
health. Average predicted costs based on various health-status 
measures were substantially lower for managed care enrolees 
than for respondents in fee-for-service plans.
The Medicare risk adjustment formula (AAPCC) for managed 
care plans does not adequately adjust for better health and 
consequent lower expected costs. The addition of health status 
measures would improve payment accuracy and significantly 
reduce average managed care plan payments.
favourable
cont
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New house et 
al. (1989)
Data from the RAND 
Health Insurance 
Experiment, a sample of 
7,690 person-years of 
those participants who 
completed the study
Estimation and prediction of annual 
expenditures for medical services with 
approximated variables used in the 
current AAPCC formula and an added 
set of health status and prior utilisation 
variables
The variance in total expenditures explained by AAPCC 
variables was 11 percent. Health status variables improved the 
explained variance by another 10-20 percent. The measures of 
prior utilisation substantially improved the explained variance of 
total expenditures. With all prior utilisation variables included 62 
percent of the maximum possible variance was explained. 
However, the remaining one-third of the stable variation in 
expenditures was not picked up by the additional health status 
and prior utilisation variables, stjll leaving room for selection.
adverse or 
favourable
Ellis et al. 
(1995)
Data for a five percent 
Medicare sample, 1992- 
1992
Regression models for total 1991 
Medicare program expenditures, using 
demographic (AAPCC), and different 
diagnostic and procedural variables in 
order to improve adjusting capitation 
payments to managed care plans for 
aged and disabled enrolees
All models with that extended the current AAPCC formula with 
diagnostic information predicted medical costs substantially 
better than the current AAPCC formula. The model that 
accounted for multiple medical conditions of a person achieved 
greatest explanatory power than models that only considered 
diagnostic cost groups. Prospective models predict average 
costs of individuals with chronic conditions as well as 
concurrent models.
adverse or 
favourable
Gruenberg et 
al. (1995)
Data from the 1991 
Medicare Current 
Beneficiary Survey linked 
with Medicare claims, 
expenditures and utilisation 
rates
Multiple regression models predicting 
1992 Medicare costs are compared, the 
demographic (AAPCC) model, and 
models added with health status 
variables, disability measures, a model 
containing a complete set of variables 
and a prior-use model
The comparison of the alternative risk models shows that the 
comprehensive and prior-use models perform and predict best 
Additional variables containing direct and indirect health status 
measures all contribute, but to a significant different degree to 
forecasting health costs. All are suggested to incorporate into 
future AAPCC formulas. The current AAPCC formula performed 
worst and leaves much room for selection bias.
adverse or 
favourable
Weiner et al. 
(1995)
Data from a random 
sample of 624,000 
Medicare beneficiaries
Comparing multiple regression models 
predicting total annual Medicare 
expenditures adding to the AAPCC 
formula ambulatory and inpatient 
diagnoses
The models that extend the current AAPCC formula with 
ambulatory and inpatient diagnoses predict expenditures far 
better. These risk-adjusted capitation payments could 
encourage health plans to compete on the basis of efficiency 
and quality and not risk selection.
adverse or 
favourable
Kronick et al. 
(1995)
Data from five State 
Medicaid programs: 
Colorado, Michigan, 
Missouri, New York and 
Ohio, 1991-1993
Regression models for expenditure 
predictions, using claim and eligibility 
data for Medicaid, including a proposed 
system of diagnostic categories in order 
to improve adjusting capitation 
payments to health plans that enrol 
people with disability
The comparison of the ratio of predicted to actual expenditures 
fora pure demographic model, a prospective disability payment 
system, a concurrent disability payment system, and a model 
using prior-year expenditures showed that the prospective 
disability payment system model predicts best. Using diagnostic 
groups demonstrates greater predictability of costs among 
people with disabilities, but leaves still room for selection.
adverse or 
favourable
cont.
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Mellor et al. Data of retrospectively
(1997) recorded treatment from 73
randomly selected general 
dental practitioners in three 
areas in England between, 
1987-1988 and 1992-1993, 
a random selection of their 
regularly attending 6-12- 
and 14-15-year-old patients
Rice et al. Data from 8,500 general
(2000) practices in England on
prescription expenditures 
1997-1998,1991 census 
data were attributed to 
practice lists on the basis of 
the place of residence of 
the practice population
van Viiet and Panel sample of 35,000
van de Ven individuals from the largest
(1992) Dutch private health insurer
with expenditure and 
insurance coverage data 
for 1976-1980, additional 
survey data on health 
status indicators
van Vliet Data of continuously
(1992) enrolled in a Dutch private
health insurer, 1976-1980, 
survey data on health 
status indicators
van Vliet Dutch panel data for
(1993) 200,000 individuals
Mean analysis/comparison of treatment 
patterns of general dental practitioners 
in the UK working under fee-for-service 
in 1987-1988 with those working under 
capitation in 1992-1993
Regression analysis for variation in age, 
sex, and resident originated prescribing 
units adjusted net ingredient cost 
modelled for impact of health & social 
needs, developing a weighted 
capitation formula for prescription 
expenditures by relating prescription 
costs to demographic, morbidity, and 
mortality composition of practice lists
Comparing performance of six varying 
capitation formulas for predicting 
individual health expenditure (i.e. 
explained variance), besides the basic 
age, sex and regional risk adjustment 
model they apply models with income, 
employment, health status or different 
prior health care utilisation variables
Estimating upper bound of proportion of 
variance in annual individual health care 
expenditure that is predictable, 
comparing predictive performance of 
four error component models for 
different capitation formulas
Simulation of various alternative 
capitation models based on, among 
others, diagnostic information from 
previous hospitalisations____________
Dentists working under capitation in 1992-1993 were carrying 
out fewer examinations, fillings and extractions and were taking 
fewer radiographs for their regularly attending child and 
adolescent patients than dentists working under fee-for-service 
in 1987-1988. However, while treatment under capitation was 
lower patients received marginally more preventive care and 
advice. This might be interpreted as evidence for biased 
selection of new patients, deferment of treatment or 
underprovision for existing high-risk patients.
A needs gradient was developed, based on permanent 
sickness, percentage of dependants in no career households, 
percentage of students, and percentage of births on practice 
lists. These variables (ind. supply characteristics) explained 
41% of variation in prescribing cost adjusted capita across 
practices. This model performed better than the previous 
capitation formula based on previous expenditures and 
demographic characteristics. It formed the basis for more 
equitable prescription budget allocations for 1999-2000.
The currently used basic capitation formula systematically 
overpays some plans and underpays others, thus stimulating 
risk selection. The inclusion of prior total costs as adjusters, for 
example, tripled the explained variance for medical expenditure. 
However, because even with the inclusion of prior utilisation 
variables there is considerable room for risk selection it is 
suggested that formulas should be expanded with indicators of 
health status and previous diagnostic information.
Poor predictive performance for the currently used basic Dutch 
capitation formula might induce risk selection and unfair 
payment of insurance plans. Incorporating prior utilisation and 
diagnostic health status variables into the formula could 
mitigate this. The best performing model (ind. these variables) 
predicts 20% of the variance in indiv. health care expenditures.
Results suggest that the problems of both risk selection and 
windfall profits/losses may be mitigated substantially by 
extending current crude capitation formulas with previous 
hospitalisation information and other data on prior costs.______
unfavourable
likely
not applicable
favourable
favourable
favourable
cont.
60
Birgit Hansl Chapter 2: Analytical context & literature review
cont.
van Bameveld 
et al. (1996)
Data of 69,000 individuals 
insured in a Dutch 
insurance fund 1992-1993, 
cost and utilisation data
Simulation of different proposed 
mandatory high-risk pooling systems for 
predicting insurance plans profits and 
losses, mean analysis
The current basic capitation formula calculated inadequate 
premia for high-risk enrolees, providing incentive for risk 
selection. A system of mandatory high-risk pooling, 
supplementing the formula may reduce these incentives.
favourable
Lamers and 
van Vliet 
(1996)
Panel data set of about 
50,000 individuals 
comprising annual costs 
and diagnostic information 
for 5 successive years
Comparing risk adjusting demographic 
and diagnostic (capitation formula) 
models of in their ability to predict future 
health care costs
Predictive accuracy of a crude age-sex-based capitation 
formula improves substantially when diagnostic information 
from individual prior hospitalisations (the longer the period over 
which diagnostic information is available, the better) is added. 
Adding diagnostic information might improve current capitation 
formulas that still leave room for risk selection.
favourable
Shmueii
(1999)
Pooled cross-section time- 
series data for 4 competing 
Israeli health (tons over 7 
years, aggregated cost 
data and data on their 
population composition
Estimation of several regression models 
to obtain age group specific means 
costs and capitation rates, comparing 
the current capitation rates (based on 
age specialist visit and hospitalisation) 
with more comprehensive ones
The current Israeli capitation formula (based on age, specialist 
visits and inpatient days) underpaid plans for the middle age 
groups and overpaid for the elderly. The proposed capitation 
rate is based on estimated age specific mean costs, also 
including costs for ambulatory care and medicines, which play a 
greater role for the middle age groups. This might reflect a more 
appropriate and fair capitation rate, guaranteeing financial 
stability of funds better since they presently differ in the age 
composition of their members.
favourable
Shmueii
(2003)
Various data sources, 
including the Israeli 
National Expenditure on 
Health: 1962-1999, Use of 
Health Services Survey 
1996-1997, Sickness funds 
reports
Descriptive statistics for the Israeli 
experience of the first 6 years of risk 
adjustment and risk sharing (a system 
consisting of four components: (i) the 
mean normative cost level (the mean 
premium); (ii) the risk-adjustment scale; 
(iii) the payment for ‘severe diseases’ 
(risk sharing); and (iv) lump sum 
subsidies
Inappropriate updating of the mean premium led to deficit 
accumulation in the funds and to a drop in quantity and quality 
of care. The total number of reported ‘severe disease’ cases 
grew by 40% from 1995 to 1998, while total population grew by 
9%, indicating possible gaming of the system by the funds. 
Selection is not assumed, although no research looks for 
possible evidence. Selection might become a threat if risk 
adjusters are not improved, and alternative risk sharing 
mechanisms and updating of the mean premium are discussed.
ambiguous
Schokkaert 
and van de 
Voorde (2000)
Pooled cross-section time- 
series data of about 100 
Belgian sickness funds for 
1995, socio-demographic, 
health status, cost data etc.
Development and estimation of a new 
regression model to explain medical 
expenditures including medical supply 
and other risk adjusters
The currently used Belgian risk adjustment scheme is based on 
different socio-demographic groups, thus leaving room for risk 
selection. With a risk adjustment model, adding medical supply 
and health status variables, large part of the variance in 
aggregated medical expenditure could be explained.
favourable
Summary of evidence for method (4) favourable
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Method (1): Multiple plan choice approach w/out utilisation. A first small group of 
papers analyses multiple-plan choice in health insurance without considering utilisation 
variables. These studies exclusively use sodo-economic variables and health status 
variables in their choice analyses. Several papers in this group examine the determinants 
of an individual or household choice to obtain private (supplementary) health insurance 
coverage, versus relying on public health insurance coverage. These papers often do not 
explicitly look for empirical evidence of selection processes, but rather attempt to assess 
determinants of (supplementary) health insurance. However, in regard to their results it is 
likely that selection takes place. They include, for example, empirical investigations of 
data from the UK: Propper (1989, and Propper et al. 2001) and Besley et al. (1999).37
Propper et al. (2001) uses a pseudo-panel cohort derived from repeated cross- 
sections of the annual UK Family Expenditure Survey 1978-19% to investigate the 
dynamics of supplementary private medical insurance purchase. The estimated demand 
models contain variables of age, income, cohort effects and quality of supplied care, 
allowing for unobserved regional differences and the effect of past purchase. They find 
that purchase of private health insurance rises with age, but falls across the generations. 
Older cohorts are less likely to purchase than younger ones. Income is positively 
associated with purchase. Supply variables affect the purchase of private health insurance, 
even after controlling for unobserved regional effects. This paper is not focused on 
identifying selection, but rather on examining determinants of demand for private health 
insurance in the UK. Thus it does not explicitly conclude selection. The results - that 
purchases increase with age but decrease with cohort, i.e. older cohorts are (ceteris 
paribus) less likely to purchase private health insurance - are explained with differences in 
tastes. Supported by Burchardt and Propper (1999) it is argued that those who use private 
care are less supportive of the equity goals of the British public health services. However, 
although the effect of past purchase is significant its magnitude is comparably small 
(Propper 2001 et al.). It is likely that the results can be interpreted in terms of selection 
where low risks that can afford private health insurance opt out of the public system.
Besley (1999) used a demand model similar to like Propper et al/s (2001) ,but 
focused on how the demand for private health insurance depends on the inflexibility of 
the public sector -  specifically waiting lists. He uses data horn the British Social Attitude 
Survey, a nationally representative annual survey (1986-87, 1989, and 1990-91) of over
37 See also the recent discussion paper from King and Mossialos (2002) on determinants of private health 
insurance in England.
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3,000 individuals. After providing some descriptive statistics on the privately insured a 
simple probit model and a structural (two-equation model) for private health insurance 
demand are estimated. These models contain a range of socio-demographic, socio­
economic, and quality of care variables. Private insurance demand can be linked to several 
individual and household characteristics. The results show that the demand for private 
health insurance rises with age, tailing off for those over 65 (presumably when premia are 
higher). Income, home ownership and occupational attainment are positively associated 
with private health insurance purchase. Larger households are less likely to obtain private 
health insurance. Among the health care quality variables only the long-term waiting list 
variable is statistically significant. These results were robust for the simple probit and the 
structural model. This paper focused on the results that an increase in long-term waiting 
lists is linked to an increased demand in private health insurance. It did not aim to 
identify selection. However, the results for the socio-economic model variables support an 
interpretation of selection effects, i.e. low risks that have enough income to afford 
supplementary private health insurance opt out of the public system.
Among this first group of papers is another subgroup that examines determinants 
of individual or household health insurance plan choice for indications (and sometimes 
the extent) of selection processes (for example: Cutler and Reber 1998, and Dowd and 
Feldman 1985).38 These papers typically focus on the American health insurance market 
Cutler and Reber (1998) investigate adverse selection effects with data on health insurance 
choices by employees of Harvard University. In 1995 Harvard University changed its 
policy from a system of subsidising generous insurance plans to a system of paying a 
fixed contribution independent of plan choice. As a result the price to employees for the 
most generous plan increased by over 500 US Dollars. The idea behind the voucher system 
was that it would encourage competition. People would have an incentive to search for 
the most efficient plan while insurers have an incentive to limit unnecessary care (Cutler 
and Reber 1998). However, adverse selection might occur and destroy die market for 
generous plan entirely. The paper of Cutler and Reber (1998) aims to estimate the welfare 
costs of adverse selection and then to compare these to the benefits of increased 
competition.
The data could be divided into a "treatment" and a "control" group -  a group of 
2/3 of Harvard's 10,000 employees that adopted the voucher-type system in 1995 and a
38 Cardon and Hendel (1996) examine determinants of insurance choice versus being uninsured using data 
from the American National Medical expenditure Survey.
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group of the remaining 1/3 that adopted the system only in 1996. As part of its analysis 
the paper examined die enrolment response to the pricing reform as a function of the 
choice for a more or less generous plan depending on a variety of socio-demographic 
variables (including age, sex, employee type, job tenure, salary single or family plan etc.). 
Age, salary, being female, having a faculty position and job tenure are positively 
associated with choosing a more generous plan. Further, the paper estimated logit models 
for whether people who had insurance in one year dropped coverage in the next year as 
functions of the plan's price change and the same socio-demographic characteristics. The 
result was that premia significantly affect the probability of dropping coverage. Looking 
at the age of switchers between less and more generous plans, it was shown that people 
who disenrol from the more generous plan are significantly younger than the ones who 
remained in the more generous plan. These switchers were also significantly older than 
people that were already in the less generous plan. As a result younger, low risks pooled 
increasingly in the less generous plan and older high risks in the more generous plan. The 
more generous plan experienced losses, subsequently increased its premium and 
encountered another round of nonrandom disenrolment (of younger people). Despite the 
high increase in the premium price, adverse selection again led to significant losses and 
the more generous plan was discontinued within only three years, completing the adverse 
selection "death spiral".
Additional literature, which documents adverse selection in multiple choice health 
insurance arrangements for the American market includes, for example, Browne (1992), 
Bice (1975), Scitovsky et al. (1978), Juba et al. (1980), and McGuire (1981). Browne (1992) 
tests the hypothesis if adverse selection is present in the market for individual health 
insurance by comparing the amount of insurance purchased by low-risk families in the 
individual market with an amount that is predicted they would have purchased had they 
obtained their insurance in the group market. The second purpose of Browne's paper is to 
determine whether the equilibrium in the insurance market is a separating or pooling 
equilibrium if adverse selection is present in the market. The data used on this study come 
form the National Medical Care Expenditure Survey between 1977 and 1978. For the study 
a subsample of the 14,000 participating randomly chosen households was selected, 2,515 
group insured and 225 individually insured households.
The first hypothesis is tested in a four-step process. First, a measure of insurance 
coverage is defined and, second, an insurance prediction equation is estimated for families 
with group coverage. This equation is used in the third step to predict the amount of
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insurance purchased by individual market consumers had they acquired insurance in the 
group market. Fourth, the discrepancy between the insurance actually purchased in the 
individual market and the predicted purchases is analysed. The difference is decomposed 
into various factors and if the discrepancy is greater for low risks than high risks adverse 
selection can be concluded. The results for the demand discrepancy decomposition 
equation show that die difference between actual and predicted group health insurance 
purchases is greater for low risks than for high risks. This is interpreted as a sign for 
reduced insurance consumption of low risks and thus adverse selection. Alternatively, 
low risks receive more insurance through group insurance than they desire.
The second hypothesis of the paper is that in insurance markets a subsidisation of 
high risks by low risks takes place. However, die separating equilibrium definition of 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) precludes a subsidy of this kind.39 Comparing the mean 
contributions of low and high risks to the surplus of insurers tests this hypothesis. If the 
contribution made by low risks exceeds that of high risks there is evidence for information 
asymmetry and cross-subsidisation. This might indicate that the separating equilibrium of 
the Rothschil-Stiglitz model without cross-subsidisation describes the market for 
individual health insurance not very good. The results of the subsidisation test showed 
that low risks subsidise the consumption of high risks in die individual health insurance 
market. Browne's study concludes that the findings for both hypotheses together suggest 
that adverse selection is present in die individual health insurance market This adverse 
selection leads to reduced insurance consumption by low risks and cross-subsidisation.
The here listed papers using the first method approach nearly uniformly suggest 
selection evidence, either for adverse selection (7 out of 11) or for favourable risk selection 
(1 out of 11). The three papers from the UK: Propper (1989, and Propper et al. 2001) and 
Besley et al. (1999) did not explicitiy look for empirical evidence of selection processes, 
however, their results can be interpreted as selection of die young and healthy into 
supplementary private health insurance.
Method (2): Multiple plan choice approach with utilisation. A second strategy for 
empirical investigations into adverse selection is to test for a correlation between a 
household's choice of an insurance contract with the occurrence or severity of health care
39 However, the models of Wilson’s (1977) and Miyazaki’s (1977) allow subsidisation across ride classes. 
Wilson’s model has different assumptions about the insurance firm calculations and his model predicts as a 
resulting equilibrium either a separating equilibrium as in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model or a pooling 
equilibrium with a subsidy from low risks to high risks. Miyazaki’s model assumes that firms can make
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utilisation. Applying choice analysis/ these studies either exclusively use variables 
concerning health care utilisation or a combination of socio-economic variables and health 
care utilisation variables. Again there are a number of empirical papers in this group that 
examine the relationship between individual or household health care utilisation and the 
choice to obtain private (supplementary) health insurance coverage, versus relying on 
public health insurance coverage. These include, for example, empirical investigations of 
data from the UK: Propper (1993), Latin America: Sapelli and Torche (2001) and Sapelli 
and Vial (2003)40, Africa: Hansl and Soderlund (1999), Australia: Hopkins and Kidd (1996), 
and Savage and Wright (2003)41, and the US: Hurd and McGarry (1997)42.
Propper (1993) analyses the demand for private health insurance in the UK where 
the health care market is dominated by the public provider, the National Health System. 
She performs an estimation of insurance choice for supplementary private health 
insurance considering captivity (i.e. the lack of choice over all possible modes under 
analysis) to the public health insurance. The data used in the paper are from a cross- 
sectional survey of 1,360 individuals in England and Wales collected in spring 1987. Two 
independent probit models are estimated, one for the private insurance purchase and a 
second for the propensity to captivity. The propensity to captivity and purchase are both 
associated with income and political outlook, but differently associated with health status, 
health care utilisation and worry over health, attitudes towards risk, and age. Political 
attitude and supply-side constraints rather than health status determine captivity. For 
example, young (<35) and old (>65) are less likely to choose private insurance. Former 
might be due to lack of 'need' and later due to supply-side constraints (policies not 
available for first time buyers in this age group and no coverage of chronic medical 
conditions). Purchase of private health insurance is most strongly associated with ability 
to pay and health status (besides age and risk attitude), but is not associated with 
utilisation. While the relationship between purchase and health care utilisation is not well 
defined there is a positive relationship between recent GP visits and inpatient services, 
which might indicate that households with poor health are more likely to purchase private 
insurance. This could indicate adverse selection in this market (Propper 1993).
losses on individual contracts as long as they break even for the sum of all their contracts. Under these model 
assumptions there is a separating equilibrium with subsidisation of high risks by low risks.
40 See also Bertranou (1998).
41 See also Cameron et al. (1988).
42 See also Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991) and Cartwright et al. (1992).
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Sapelli and Torche (2001) study the determinants of the choice of health insurance 
for Chilean dependant workers and retirees. They are mandated by law to purchase health 
insurance/ but they can choose between public and private health insurance. Privately 
insured have access to a wide range of private and higlvquality providers while the public 
insurance limits access exclusively to lower quality public providers. The paper use data 
from Chile's annual National Socioeconomic Characterisation Survey between 1990-1996/ 
based on random samples of households. A logistic regression model for die choice of 
private health insurance is estimated including socio-economic and utilisation variables. 
Earnings are a key factor in the insurance choice -  the study confirms that higher income 
increases the probability of being privately insured. Additionally there are other 
important factors. High risks/ i.e. older people and woman in the reproductive ages are 
less likely to be privately insured. This might indicate adverse selection into the public 
sector or favourable risk selection into die private sector. However/ private insurers set 
risk rated premia while the public insurance premia are income related. While it seems 
likely that there is some cream-skimming by the private insurers/ highrrisks with low 
income might rationally choose inferior public insurance because they are receive a cross­
subsidy here that is not portable to the better private insurance.
Sapelli and Vial (2003) also study adverse selection and moral hazard in the 
Chilean health insurance market by analysing the relationship between health care service 
utilisation and the choice of either private or public insurance. For dependent workers/ 
who must purchase health insurance either from the one public or several private 
insurance providers, the relationship between health care service utilisation and the choice 
of either private or public insurance is analysed. In the case of independent (self- 
employed) workers, where there is no mandate, they analyse the relationship between 
utilisation and die decision to voluntarily purchase health insurance. The paper uses 1996 
data from Chile's annual National Socioeconomic Characterisation Survey. Count data 
models estimate utilisation equations (where the dependent variables are discrete, i.e. 
number of physician visits and days of hospitalisation consumed by the household in the 
three months prior to the survey).43 Correcting for possible selection bias, die probability
43 The independent variables used in the utilisation equations include income, some 
demographic characteristics, and a dummy on self-reported illness or accident during the 
previous three months. Affiliation to a health insurance plan is utilised as a proxy for the 
fees charged for services. The choice of health insurance plan, in turn, is a function of the 
individual's income, the premium charged for each insurance plan, and the demographic 
characteristics of the individual and his or her dependants.
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of purchasing each type of insurance is estimated. The choice of health insurance is made 
by the household presumably prior to the three-month period. The model is used to detect 
over-utilisation (i.e. moral hazard) associated with the purchase of one kind of insurance.44
For independent workers, they find that insurance plans in Chile receive an 
adverse selection of the population, and their affiliates consume more than they would 
have if they had not purchased insurance (moral hazard). When analysing the choice of 
public and private insurance for dependent workers, they find that adverse selection is 
present only against public insurance based on variables like age and number of 
dependants, but not against private insurance. This can be explained with the fact that 
private insurance has risk-adjusted premia, while public insurance does not However, for 
physician visits, moral hazard is present in both public and private insurance. There is no 
moral hazard in the case of hospitalisation, for either public insurance or private 
insurance. This result is intuitive, since the price elasticity of demand for hospitalisation is 
low.
Hansl and Soderlund (1999) present an empirical analysis of the determinants of 
private health insurance coverage in South Africa. South Africans are either covered by 
the general tax-financed public health system, which is of poor quality or may purchase 
private insurance, which guarantees access to high-quality private health care. The data 
used is a sample of 73,000 households from the South African October Households Survey 
from 1995. A probit model of private health insurance choice with parameters ranging 
from socio-economic, health status and health care utilisation is estimated. The results 
show that individuals are more likely to have health insurance coverage if they are 
formally employed, married, white and young. Those who lived more than 5 km away 
from the nearest health care facility are less likely to have coverage. Higher income is 
significantly associated with greater probability of coverage.
Significantly less likely coverage for the permanently disabled and the elderly 
indicate that risk selection with regard to "easily identifiable" risk factors such as age and 
disability, was operating. At the same time, there were suggestions of adverse selection 
with regard to less easily identifiable medical risks in operation, with recent illness and 
hospital admission being associated with having taken out insurance coverage. Relatively 
high numbers of middle-aged and elderly people able to afford an average private health
44 Altogether six models are estimated: the utilisation of physician visits and hospital days within three 
population groups, holders of a private insurance policy and of public insurance in the case of dependent 
workers, and members of a health insurance plan (be it private insurance or public insurance) in the case of 
independent workers.
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insurance premium/ appear not to have coverage/ and a large proportion of these must be 
forced to rely on the state in the event of serious illness. Taken together with the fact that 
both elderly and young adults had lower levels of coverage/ these figures suggest that 
there are significant levels of both adverse selection and cream-skimming/dumping in the 
South African health insurance market The significant unravelling of insurance risk pools 
in South Africa over the 1990s/ with consequent loss of private health insurance coverage 
for high risk groups placed an increasing burden on the poor public system. While there 
have probably been a number of causes, deregulation of the industry in the late 1980s is 
likely to have been a major contributing factor. Extensive risk rating of medical scheme 
premiums resulted in inequities in access to insurance coverage.
Hopkins and Kidd (1996) investigate the determinants of demand for private 
health insurance under Australia's universal, tax-financed public health insurance system. 
Private health insurance gives members the choice of their own doctor in public hospitals 
and subsidises the cost of private hospital care. It also subsidises ancillary care, like 
physiotherapy and dental care. The paper uses a subsample of 16,472 households from 
Australia's National Health Survey of 1989-1990, a representative sample of the Australian 
population. A logit analysis is applied, with a first specification of socio-economic and 
health status variables attempting to capture determinants of private health insurance 
purchase and a second, in which the first is nested, including additional utilisation 
variables. The results show that the age groups beyond the age of 35 are more likely to 
purchase private health insurance. The probability of purchase is higher the more recent 
the last doctors visit and last hospital admittance, the higher the families income, and die 
higher the education level. Females in the reproductive ages are also more likely to 
purchase private health insurance. The results on the whole confirm that private health 
insurance experiences adverse selection, because enrolees are of higher risk.
Savage and Wright (2003) discuss adverse selection and moral hazard with 1989- 
1990 National Health Survey data released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
containing information of 22,913 households on private hospital usage. They analyse the 
relationship between insurance coverage choice and hospital service usage. In private 
hospitals individuals pay for services, while services in public hospitals are free to all, but 
are delivered after a waiting time. Thus the decision to purchase insurance for private 
hospital treatment depends on the trade-off between the price of treatment, waiting time, 
and the insurance premium. A theoretical model is developed which provides reduced 
form equations for insurance choice, hospital choice, and hospital use. A probit model of
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insurance choice is estimated and the estimated probability of having private hospital 
insurance is substituted for the insurance dummy when estimating the hospital service 
use equation.45 The regression model is estimated with the log of length of stay as the 
dependent variable/ the covariates are reason for hospital stay, the estimated probability 
that an individual has private hospital insurance (obtained from the insurance choice 
probit analysis)/ and some socio-economic variables/ including region of residence. The 
estimated coefficient on the estimated probability of insurance variable gives an indication 
of moral hazard.
In all probit models of private insurance choice, income and age have a significant/ 
positive impact on the probability of having private hospital insurance. Health status 
variables (captured by a detailed breakdown of chronic conditions) are found to be 
individually and jointly significant, providing more evidence of adverse selection. The 
main variable of interest of die duration of stay regressions is the estimated coefficient on 
the insurance variable/ which gives an indication of the extent of moral hazard. The results 
provide quite strong evidence for moral hazard amongst old couples and couples with 
dependants and weak evidence for moral hazard amongst young singles.
Hurd and McGarry (1997) investigate the influence of private supplementary 
health insurance on health care utilisation for the American elderly covered by Medicare. 
Medicare covers 95% of all elderly (65 or over) and pays for approximately half of their 
medical expenses. Most elderly (75%) buy private insurance or receive coverage from 
former employers' retirement packages for services and costs not covered by Medicare. 
They use a data subsample of 7,327 households from die Asset and Health Dynamics 
Survey 1993-1994. They first estimate a probit model for the probability of having private 
insurance. This only includes socio-economic, self-reported health and other health 
indicator variables. They find that income and wealth are strongly associated with having 
private insurance, but most subjective health status measures have little or no effect on 
private insurance status. A second model estimates the probability of paying for private 
insurance as a function of the same variables. Even controlling for insurance and economic 
status, those in better health are more likely to purchase health insurance. Finally, two 
models are estimated, showing the effect of private insurance, health and economic status
45 Separate probit models were estimated for income units with different compositions 
(singles, couples and couples with dependants) to capture their heterogeneity. The single 
and couple income units were separated into young (head aged less than 50 years) and old
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on the probability of (1) seeing a doctor and (2) staying overnight at a hospital. Whether or 
not someone pays for insurance does not affect the probability of a doctor's visit or 
entering a hospital. Thus none of the results provide evidence for adverse selection.
A subgroup among this second group examines the determinants of health service 
usage given that households are insured (Manning and Marquis 1996, Manning et al. 
1987) and specifically the choice to become insured in plans of different levels of coverage 
(for example, Browne and Doerpinghaus 1993). This literature exclusively concerns the 
American health insurance market.
The relationship between insurance and service use is well documented in studies 
based on the American RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Newhouse et al. 1993). The 
RAND experiment was a randomly controlled trial to evaluate the effects of varying 
generosity of health insurance coverage between 1974-1977. A very detailed description of 
the study design can be found in Newhouse et al. (1981). Here only some central features 
of the study will be noted. Families participating in the RAND experiment were randomly 
assigned to health insurance plans that varied in co-payments and deductibles. These 
families came from four metropolitan areas and two rural areas, 70% of them participated 
three years and the remaining 30% five years.46 The different levels of co-payment were 0, 
25,50 or 95%, the different levels of deductibles were 5,19 or 15% of the family income or 
a fixed amount of 1,000 US Dollars. One plan with 95% -payment rate had a deductible of 
150 US dollars per family member (max. 450 US Dollars). At the end of the study each 
family was hypothetically offered supplementary insurance coverage for reducing their 
deductibles by either one third, two thirds of 100% at a given (randomly generated) 
premium. The results of the experiment showed that greater cost-sharing for the insured 
decreased health expenditures. Families with the largest cost-sharing had up to 30% less 
than those without any cost-sharing.
Manning and Marquis (1996)47 and Manning et aL (1987) use RAND experiment 
data in order to analyse issues in health insurance demand and health insurance
partitions and separate probit models were estimated for each, the rationale being that 
young and old, singles and couples are very distinct groups with different behaviour.
46 Families headed by an individual over 62, individuals eligible for other State health programs or families 
within the upper 7% of the national income distribution were excluded.
47 Manning and Marquis (1996) examine the trade-off between risk pooling and moral hazard by estimating 
both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. The paper uses for their estimation 
of the demand elasticity a utility function and applies it to RAND total expenditure data in the 25-95% co­
payment range. The equation system47 uses as dependent variables use of health services and insurance 
choice and independent variables insurance plan co-payment levels, health status, anticipated health care 
expenditures and socio-economic variables. The demand for health care was found to be significantly
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utilisation. Their general findings are that a household's health service consumption is 
higher the more health insurance coverage they have, the greater their income/ and, to 
some extent, the worse their health status.
Manning et al. (1987) analyse health services utilisation for families insured in 
plans of different generosity (i.e. cost-sharing) controlling for socio-economic/ health 
status and regional variables. They use means test analysis and a more precise four- 
equation model. The first equation is a probit model that separates user from non-users, 
describing their characteristics. The second probit model estimates the probability that an 
insured has at least one inpatient stay, given that he has other medical expenses. The third 
model is a linear regression of the logarithm for total annual medical expenses of 
outpatient-users only. The fourth is a linear regression of the logarithm for total annual 
medical expenses of any inpatient user. The results show that the use of medical services 
responds to co-payment levels. Medical expenses are significantly higher for plans 
without co-payment than the plan with co-payment Insured individuals in a plan without 
co-payment are significantly more likely to use any services than those insured with 95% 
co-payment Use of any medical service increases with income for all plans, regardless for 
the co-payment level. Health status was a strong predictor for expenditure levels but not 
for different insurance coverage of healthy and sickly. Individuals enrolled in managed 
care as compared to fee-for-service plans had lower expenditure per person, but had the 
same rate of service use. The results of less intensive care use in less generous plans might 
indicate adverse selection.
The number of papers concerning the analysis of selection processes in the 
American health insurance market with real-world data is substantial. These are, for 
example, Browne and Doerpinghaus (1993), Griffith and Baloff (1981), Farley and Monheit 
(1985), Conrad et al. (1985), Merrill et al. (1985), Wrightson et al. (1987), Langwell and 
Hadley (1989), Long et al. (1988), Ellis (1985 and 1989) and Diehr et al. (1993).« Their data,
associated with price and income, the demand being price and income elastic. The results for the health 
insurance demand show constant absolute risk aversion in income. The estimated demand function is used to 
calculate expenditures for health care and the associated deadweight loss from moral hazard. They conclude 
that optimal plans with coinsurance only would have a co-payment level of around 45%. The rate at which 
the marginal gains from increased risk-pooling equals the marginal loss from increased moral hazard. The 
results for an optimal plan with a deductible or maximal out-of-pocket payment (stop -loss) are less clear, 
indicating possibly a very high stop-loss, which seems not plausible.
48 See also Hill and Brown (1990). They study choices of Medicare beneficiaries to enter different plans by 
comparing health care utilisation data prior individual’s choice of plans of different generosity levels and 
analyse mortality data for all plans in the year following the choice. After adjusting for some socio-economic 
variables, individuals, who chose less generous plans in the following year, had significantly less prior 
service usage. Mortality in the less generous plans is also significantly lower the year after the plan choice.
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empirical methods, and main results are summarised in table 2-4. All the studies named 
here analyse the choice to become insured in plans of different levels of coverage 
including utilisation variables (of some kind).
Browne and Doerpinghaus (1993) analyse data from the National Medical Care 
Expenditure Survey 1977-1978 of the individually insured. The study extends empirical 
investigations of the individual medical insurance market and tests whether there is 
reduced consumption of insurance by low risks, whether a pooling or separating model 
better characterises the market, and whether cross-subsidisation from low to high risks 
occurs. A general linear regression model is estimated, testing across six equations 
whether low-risk individuals purchase less complete insurance coverage than high-risk 
individuals. The study finds that individuals with socio-economic and health status 
characteristics that indicate high risk have higher utilisation (but do not purchase 
insurance coverage with higher cost-sharing). They conclude that adverse selection exists, 
where low and high risks buy a pooling policy that implicitly subsidises high risks. Low 
risks consume less insurance than in a market without adverse selection. Thus the results 
support a pooling rather than separating equilibrium.
The majority of the discussed studies using the second method approach suggest 
selection evidence, either for adverse selection (17 out of 22) or for favourable risk 
selection (7 out of 22). Evidence for moral hazard was found in 3 out of the 22 studies. Six 
publications in the list of 22 reported ambiguous or no evidence for selection. However, 
studies with this outcome concerned only the American health insurance market and were 
often confined to demonstration settings (e.g. Langwell and Hadley 1989 and Diehr et al. 
1993) or managed care start-ups (e.g. Griffith and Baloff 1981).
Method (3): Multiple plan analysis approach. A third, smaller group of studies 
analyses exclusively aggregated, i.e. plan-level, data of multiple plan options for signs of 
selection processes. These studies range from descriptive comparisons of some depicted 
plan characteristics (like average plan age, plan costs and premia) to statistical modelling 
of plan cost functions or plan risk profiles. Most of these studies relate to the American 
health insurance market for example, Billi et al. (1993), Brown et al (1993), Altman et al.
(1998), Cutler (1994), Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997), Price et al. (1983), Jackson-Beeck 
and Kleinman (1983), Price and Mays (1985), Welch (1989), and Cutler and Zeckhauser
They conclude that healthier individuals choose less generous plans and that plans profit from enrolling low 
risks.
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(1998). While two of these studies will be discussed in more detail here in the text, the 
others are shortly described in table 2-4.
Billi et al. (1993) conduct a study to determine whether favourable or adverse 
selection occurred in a preferred provider organisation (PPO) enrolment, a form of 
managed health care, which can be describes as a less generous plan. They use secondary 
data in a retrospective study of the utilisation of health services and demographic 
characteristics of the population involved in the first open enrolment in a new university- 
based PPO. The PPO under study, sponsored by the University of Michigan Medical 
Center, was offered to all its 43,005 employees, dependants, and retirees. Prior to the start 
of the PPO almost all employees had traditional Blue Cross-Blue Shield basic coverage 
and major medical coverage through a separate company. They analysed insurance 
company payments during die one-year period prior to the enrolment to compare the 
utilisation patterns of those who enrolled in the PPO with those who did not The groups 
enrolled in the less generous PPO had a younger median age than the non-PPO group; the 
sex distribution was roughly similar for the two groups. The PPO group experienced 
lower inpatient and outpatient payments per member in the year prior to the enrolment 
These differences resulted in an overall lower payment per member for the PPO group in 
the year prior to their enrolment They conclude that the less generous PPO received 
favourable selection during the open enrolment.
Altman et al. (1998) analyse factors accounting for differences in plan premia of 
managed care and traditional fee-for-service plan options, comparing average plan 
benefits and age- and sex-adjusted costs. They use data on plan enrolment and utilisation 
for people insured through the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission between 
1993-1996. The Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission provides health insurance to 
roughly 133,000 state and local employees and their families, making it the largest 
insurance purchaser in New England. The purchaser offered several health insurance 
plans. The most generous plan is a traditional fee-for-service plan, followed by a PPO plan 
with network providers and mild utilisation restrictions. The ten most stringent plans 
comprise HMO plans. The bulk of the insured enrolled in the one traditional plan or the 
ten managed care plans. Altman's et al. (1998) results show that insured who switch from 
traditional fee-for-service to managed care plans have, on average, one third less benefits 
than those retaining fee-for-service coverage. Also, those insured who switch into the 
other direction, i.e. from less generous managed care plans to fee-for-service plans, used, 
on average, half more services than those remaining in managed care plans. They
74
Birgit Hansl Chapter 2: Analytical context & literature review
conclude that adverse selection results primarily from people switching plans and not 
new enrolees disproportionately moving to certain plans, as the classical adverse selection 
cycle suggests. Thus they talk instead about Adverse retention', defined as the process 
where remaining high risks magnify cost differentials between plans.
While the previous examples are exclusively investigations into the US health 
insurance market, Soderlund and Hansl (2000) explore trends in plan enrolment and costs 
of private health insurance for South Africa's medical schemes after risk-rating was 
legalised. They investigate two hypotheses, first, risk distribution is unequal between 
health insurers and increases over time, and second, risk selection leads to less efficient 
health care spending. Annual data from all (180) registered South African medical 
schemes, including membership information, premia and benefits (by type) and other 
financial plan data between 1985-1995 are used. Soderlund and Hansl (2000) use 
descriptive statistics and estimate three OLS models. One model illustrates the association 
between the plans' pensioner ratio, its organisational nature and time. The two other 
models (one fixed effects) estimate the association of plan premia with several plan 
characteristics (i.e. plan risk and size, plan type etc.).
The results show adverse selection evidence, suggesting a form of premium spiral, 
with worsening risk profiles being associated with increases in premia, loss of low-risk 
members and worsening of the financial position of plans. However, results from the third 
fixed effects model suggest risk selection, since increases in discretionary benefits, a 
marker of low risks, is significantly associated with lower premia. Also, it can be shown 
that risk-rating (and lower costs) for low risks is accompanied by quality improvement
i.e. moral hazard related higher levels of benefits rather than premia reduction. Soderlund 
and Hansl (2000) verify the hypothesis that there has been a definite separation of risks 
between plans over the study period, although it cannot be explicitly attributed to the 
policy change of risk-adjusted premia. It is also concluded that risk-rating, which can be 
directly attributed to the policy change, is associated with increased premia costs (and 
thus worsened inefficiency).
The discussed papers using the multiple-plan analysis approach uniformly suggest 
selection evidence, either for adverse selection (10 out of 11) or for favourable risk 
selection (5 out of 11).
Method (4): Risk adjustment approach. A fourth type of empirical literature is 
described as the risk adjustment approach. Risk-adjustment can either mean to group 
reasonably homogeneous individuals in insurance plans or to adjust plans' premium
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revenues (Newhouse 1996). Studies in this group most often discuss biased selection in the 
context of so-called capitation systems of national health insurance systems or other 
vertically integrated systems. In capitation systems health insurance plans or health care 
providers receive a payment from the government or private payers for each enrolee or 
registered patient. Many countries turned to capitation or competition among managed 
care plans in order to overcome the trade-off between cost and quality in health care 
provision. (Frank et al. 2000).49 In the US, major public health insurance programs, like 
Medicare, and many private health insurance plans offer enrolees a choice of managed 
care plans paid by capitation. In other countries with national health care systems, like 
Israel, the Netherlands, and England, health policy shares similar features. Israel, for 
example, reformed its health care system so that residents may choose among several 
managed care plans which all must offer a comprehensive package of health care services 
set by the regulator.
However, insurance plans paid by capitation have an incentive to distort the 
quality of services they offer to attract profitable and to deter unprofitable enrolees (Frank 
et al. 2000). That means plans will most likely practice favourable or unfavourable risk 
selection, partly to prevent adverse selection, or, as Miller and Luft (1997:20) put i t  
"Under the simple capitation payments that now exist, providers and plans face strong 
disincentives to excel in care for the sickest and most expensive patients. Plans that 
develop a strong reputation for excellence in quality of care for the sickest will attract new 
high-cost enrolees...". This risk selection manifestation in the form of underprovisicn of 
care in order to avoid bad risks is called by Ellis (1998) 'skimping', Newhouse et al. (1997) 
'stinting', while Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) refer to it simply as 'plan manipulation'.
Thus the most common goals of studies in this group are the development and the 
improvement of formulas for health insurance plans' premia adjustments in order to 
reduce insurance plans' incentive to practice risk selection or to compensate plans 
appropriately that offer expensive and extensive care for the sickest These risk adjustment 
formulas are based on insurance enrolee characteristics, including socio-economic, health 
status and health care utilisation information.
49 The capitation or managed care strategy is based on the assumption that costs are controlled by the 
capitation payment while the quality of services is enforced by the market Thus the capitation payment gives 
plans an incentive to reduce costs (and quality), while the opportunity to attract enrolees gives plans an 
incentive to increase quality (and costs). “Ideally, these countervailing incentives lead plans to make efficient 
choices about service quality” (Frank et al. 2000:829).
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Typically the risk adjusters attempt to minimise the time invariant subject-specific 
effect in an equation that seeks to explain variance in annual individual medical 
expenditures. There is extensive research on the contribution of various adjusters to the 
explained variance (for example: Newhouse et al. 1989, Newhouse and Archibald 1993, 
Epstein and Cumella 1988). Socio-economic adjusters such as age, race and geography 
generally explain little or modest variance (Newhouse 1996). Information on health status 
and chronic conditions explain modest variance, but they are based on self-reported 
measures that are hard to audit and are susceptible to gaming (Grown et al. 1993). Prior 
utilisation explains most variance (Ash et al. 1989, Newhouse 1996). However, risk 
adjustment methods are still far from perfect and many empirical studies found evidence 
for selection.
Chemichovsky and van de Ven (2003:1) summarise that "die practice of risk 
adjustment allocation and reimbursement started thirty years ago in the United States 
(US). Since 1972 Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) in the US have had the 
option to risk contract with Medicare, the social health insurance for the elderly. For each 
Medicare patient the HMO then received an adjusted average per capita cost (AAPCC)- 
capitation payment This payment is based on the AAPCC, which is supposed to 
represent the local per capita fee-for-service costs that would have been expended, if the 
individual Medicare recipient had remained in the fee-for-service medical system instead 
of enrolling in the HMO. Until 2000 the AAPCC-capitation was adjusted for the age, 
gender, region, institutional status and welfare status of the individual. In the 1990s risk 
adjustment has been implemented in the health insurance system in at least ten other 
countries, in particular in Europe."
Articles of this fourth type of literature include US studies on risk adjustment for 
HMOs risk contracts with the federal Medicare insurance program for the elderly and 
other capitated delivery systems. These studies generally have two aims. First, they 
investigate evidence for selection bias into Medicare HMOs and commonly conclude that 
the adjustments embodied in the AAPCC formula -  age, sex, welfare status, and 
institutional status -  are too crude. Studies of this group include, for example, Eggers 
(1980), Egger and Prihoda (1982), Dowd et al. (1995), and Riley et al. (1996). Second, they 
discuss improvements in the AAPCC formula, for example, Newhouse et al. (1989), Ellis 
et al. (1995), Gruenberg et al. (1995), and Weiner et al. (1995)50. From this extensive body of
50 See also Kronick et al. (1995) on a system of diagnostic categories that Medicaid programs can use for 
adjusting capitation payments to health plans that enrol people with disability. Frank et al. (2000) assess
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literature for the American health insurance market two articles will be discussed in more 
detail here. Others are shortly described in table 2-4.
Riley et al. (1996) investigate the health status of Medicare enrolees in HMOs and 
fee-for-service plans in order to derive evidence for selection processes. They compared 
the health status of 863 health maintenance organization (HMO) enrollees with that of 
4,576 non-enrollees, controlling for demographics and area of residence, using 1994 data 
from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS). HMO respondents were less likely 
to report fair or poor health, functional impairment, or heart disease. Average predicted 
costs based on various health-status measures were substantially lower for HMO 
respondents than for respondents in fee-for-service (FFS) arrangements. The Medicare 
payment formula for HMOs does not adequately adjust for the better health and 
consequent lower expected costs of HMO enrollees. The addition of health-status 
measures would improve payment accuracy and reduce average HMO payments 
significantly below current levels.
Newhouse et al. (1989) estimates how well proposed additional risk adjusters for 
the AAPCC formula based on health status and prior utilisation predict annual medical 
expenditures among non-elderly. They use data from the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment, a sample of 7,690 person-years of those participants who completed the 
study. The authors estimate and predict annual expenditures for medical services with 
approximated variables used in the current AAPCC formula and an added set of health 
status and prior utilisation variables. The variance explained by AAPCC variables was 
only 11 percent of the variance in total expenditures. Health status variables improved the 
explained variance, raising the percentage of explained variance in total expenditures to 
20-30 percent. The measures of prior utilisation lead to a substantial improvement in the 
explained variance of total expenditures. The prior-year utilisation variable alone rose the 
explained variance to 44 percent, and with all prior utilisation variables included 62 
percent of the maximum possible variance is explained. However, the remaining one-third 
of the stable variation in expenditures was not picked up by these additional health status 
and prior utilisation variables, leaving room for selection.
adverse selection in managed care with data of health claims and enrolment files from the Michigan Medicaid 
program for the years 1991-1993. They combine several factors (dispersion in health costs, individuals' 
forecasts of their health costs, the correlation between use in different illness categories, and the risk 
adjustment system used for payment) in an empirically implementable index that can be used to identify 
services that will be most distorted by selection incentives. They find that information (individuals' 
knowledge and their ability to forecast their health expenses) has a dramatic effect on selection incentives and
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Risk adjustment or capitation payments are also used in Belgium, The 
Netherlands, Israel, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. Thus part of the risk 
adjustment literature is related to specific (integrated) national health care and insurance 
systems in these countries. Van de Ven et al. (2003) discuss risk selection in the sickness 
fund insurance markets of five European countries, Belgium, Germany, Israel, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. They present a conceptual framework for understanding 
risk adjustment and compare risk adjustment systems of the five countries. The article 
concludes that in the case of imperfect risk adjustment—as is the case in all five countries 
in the year 2001—the sickness funds have financial incentives for risk selection, which 
may threaten solidarity, efficiency, quality of care and consumer satisfaction. It is expected 
that without substantial improvements in the risk adjustment formula, risk selection will 
increase in all five countries. Other articles focus on country-specific empirical analyses of 
data, for example, for The Netherlands, van Vliet and van de Ven (1992 and 1993), van 
Vliet (1992), van Bameveld et al. (1996 and 1998)51, Lamers and van Vliet (1996), van Vliet 
(2000), van Bameveld (2001)52. Recent articles for the UK include Mellor et al. (1997), 
Gravelle et al. (2003J53, and Rice et al. (2000). Shmueli (1999) and Shmueli et al. (2003) use 
data for Israel and Schokkaert and van de Vorde use Belgian data.54
From the equally extensive body of risk adjustment literature, mainly related to the 
European health insurance market, four articles, will be discussed here, while others are 
shortly described in table 2-4. The first artide by Mellor et al. (1997) assesses the possible 
impact of capitation payment systems on service delivery of general dental practitioners 
in the UK. The second article by van Vliet and van de Ven (1992) contains an empirical 
analysis with Dutch panel data to show that too crude risk adjusters (on which capitation
if people know what they are commonly assumed to know (age, sex and prior spending), selection incentives 
would be very severe.
31 The studies of van Bameveld et al. (1996) and van Bameveld et al. (1998) essentially have the same 
purpose, assessing forms of mandatory pooling as a supplement to risk adjusted capitation payments. The 
article of van Bameveld et al. (1996) is described in table 2-4. Van Bameveld et al. (1998) uses data of 
enrolees in a Dutch insurance fund during 1988-1991. Different variants of mandatory pooling, high-risk 
pooling with excess-of-loss and proportional pooling are compared. Each variant includes ex post 
compensations (to insurers for some members), depending to various degrees on actually incurred costs. All 
pooling variants reduce the incentives for risk selection which are inherent in the imperfect Dutch capitation 
formula, but they also reduce the incentives for efficiency. They analyse which of the three main pooling 
variants yields the greatest reduction of the risk selection incentives, given a measure for the incentive for 
efficiency (% of total costs for which an insurer is at risk). The high-risk pooling is the most effective.
32 Van Vliet (2000) and van Bameveld et al. (2001) have a similar theme like van Bameveld et al. (1996). 
These two first named articles are not listed on table 2.4 but in the following text.
33 Gravelle et al. (2003) model supply and demand influences on the use of health care with implications for 
deriving a needs based capitation formula.
34 See also Beck and Zweifel (1998) who present evidence for cream skimming in Switzerland’s deregulated 
social health insurance.
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payments are based) provide room for risk selection by the insurers. The two articles of 
Vliet (2000) and van Bameveld (2001) assess forms of mandatory pooling as a supplement 
to risk adjusted capitation payments in The Netherlands.
Mellor et al. (1997) compare the patterns of treatment of general dental 
practitioners in the UK working under fee-for-service in 1987-1988 with those working 
under capitation in 1992-1993. They analyse data of retrospectively recorded treatment 
from 73 randomly selected general dental practitioners in three contrasting areas in 
England during 1987-1988 and 1992-1993. They use data from a random selection of 
regularly attending 6-12- and 14-15-year-old patients. The results of mean analysis show 
that for example, die mean numbers of examinations per year reduced in the three areas 
from 1.75 in 1987-1988 to 1.3 in 1992-1993. Mean numbers of visits per patient dropped 
from 2.7 to 2. Altogether, in 1992-1993, dentists working under capitation were carrying 
out fewer examinations, fillings and extractions and were taking fewer radiographs for 
their regularly attending child and adolescent patients than dentists working under fee- 
for-service in 1987-1988. However, while these patients attended less frequently for 
treatment they also received marginally more preventive care and advice. For example, 
mean percentages of children per dentist receiving oral hygiene instruction rose from 18- 
31% in 1987-1988 to 26-33% in 1992-1993. Dietary advice increased from 3-18% to 11-20%. 
The result of less visits and treatment events might be interpreted as evidence for biased 
selection of new patients, deferment of treatment or underprovision for existing high-risk 
patients. However, the increase in preventive care and advice might indicate a successful 
cost containment strategy.
The article by van Vliet and van de Ven (1992) first has the objective of showing 
that the capitation formula of the Dutch national health insurance system is too crude, 
leading to unfair distribution of funds over insurers and leaving room for risk selection by 
the insurers. Second, it is the objective to investigate more comprehensive formulas that 
may reduce these problems. They use a panel data sample of about 35,000 insured 
individuals from the largest Dutch private health insurance organisation containing 
expenditure and insurance coverage data for the years 1976-1980. Additional survey data 
on health status indicators was available and used. They compare the performance of six 
capitation formulas including a varying number of risk adjusters for predicting individual 
health expenditure. Besides the basic age, sex and regional risk adjustment model they 
apply models with income, employment, health status or different prior health care 
utilisation variables. The results are in many respects in line with findings of similar
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studies employing US data. First, the currently used basic capitation formula 
systematically overpays some and underpays others, thus stimulating risk selection. The 
inclusion of prior total costs as adjusters, for example, tripled the explained variance for 
medical expenditure. However, because even with the inclusion of prior utilisation 
variables there is considerable room for risk selection it is suggested that formulas should 
be expanded with indicators for health status and previous diagnostic information.
Several papers suggest, in case risk-adjusted capitation payments cannot be 
improved in practice, that insurers7 incentive to risk select can be reduced by 
supplementing the capitation payment with a form of risk sharing (or also mandatory 
high-risk and high-cost sharing) between the insurer and the regulator (for example: van 
Bameveld 1996, van Bameveld et al. 1998 and 2001, and van Vliet2000). Risk sharing 
means that insurers are retroactively reimbursed by the regulator for some of the 
expenditures of their members. Van Vliet (2000) and van Bameveld et al. (2001) aim to 
develop and assess forms of mandatory pooling as a supplement to risk adjusted 
capitation payments in The Netherlands. All these papers start out horn the point that the 
currently used Dutch age-sex capitation formula leaves too much room for risk selection 
by sickness funds.
Van Vliet (2000) assesses different forms of mandatory risk pooling arrangements 
across insurers in cases of inadequate risk-adjustment (i.e. if the premium-replacing 
payments do not reflect risk and induce insolvency and risk selection). He uses three 
different data sources, a random sample of 69,000 insured individuals from a Dutch fund 
between 1992-1993, a simulation data set of 100,000 insured and aggregated plan level 
data for several Dutch insurance funds. He compares the predictive performance of two 
high-risk and two high-cost pooling models. His results suggest that that mandatory high- 
risk or high-cost pooling schemes are useful supplements to the current imperfect 
capitation formula for reducing selection and solvency problems.
Van Bameveld et al. (2001)55 describe several forms of risk sharing between 
insurers and the regulator in competitive health insurance markets with imperfectly 
adjusted capitation payments. Optimal risk sharing depends on the weight regulators 
assign to reducing risk selection versus retaining efficiency. This article uses data for six 
consecutive years (1988-19993) for about 47,000 individuals enrolled in one Dutch sickness 
fund. In an empirical analysis they simulate the effects of four forms of risk sharing as a
55 Like Schokkaert et al. (1998), this article present an empirical analysis of trade-offs between selection and 
efficiency.
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supplement to demographic payment systems. The empirical results strongly support the 
conclusion that risk sharing for high-risks and high-costs yield better triade-offs between 
selection and efficiency than outlier or proportional risk sharing.
The majority of the discussed studies using the fourth method approach suggest 
selection evidence/ mostly in the form of favourable or unfavourable risk selection (14 out 
of 23). Some conclude adverse selection or favourable selection (6 out of 23). Three 
publications in the list of 23 reported ambiguous evidence for selection or their results 
were otherwise not interpretable as selection evidence.
Table 2-5/ on the next page, summarises all of the identified methodological 
approaches for empirical investigations into selection processes as discussed in the 
previous paragraphs. The following paragraphs of this section will discuss some of their 
shortcomings and problems.
Problems with previous empirical approaches: Moral hazard and others. The 
problem with the first approach is that it is hard to deduct from only health insurance 
coverage determinants/ such as socio-economic and health status variables/ whether 
adverse selection or risk selection occurs. While socio-economic and health status 
characteristics are valid general health insurance demand indicators/ they do not 
necessarily translate into assumed (but unobserved) utilisation patterns that might 
indicate selection processes. Also, analysis results using this approach suggest that the 
choice between public and private health insurance coverage underlies tight affordability 
constraints and thus might be more a response to price and other factors.
A familiar problem of approach two is that adverse selection effects can be 
empirically clouded by another effect that also takes place within the context of 
information asymmetry: moral hazard. The two processes are impossible to distinguish in 
simple cross-sectional data.56
Under adverse selection high risks are much more likely first/ to choose a complete 
coverage contract and second, to have higher health care utilisation. While moral hazard 
has the same observables, here the causality is different. Households obtain insurance 
contracts with coverage that exceeds their actual risks57 and these households have less 
incentive to be cautious.
56 This problem is widely acknowledged in applied contract theory, where one can also find the most recent 
approaches to overcome this issue, see for example Abbring et al. (2003).
A household might either choose to be overinsured because of its high risk-aversion, or it might be bound 
to a compulsory risk pooling system, for example compulsory employment based health insurance.
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Table 2-5: Methodology approaches for the empirical identification of selection processes
Type/Name Type 1
Multiple-plan choice 
approach w/out 
utilisation
Type 2
Multiple-plan choice 
approach with 
utilisation
Type 3
Multiple-plan analysis 
approach
Type 4
Risk-adjustment
approach
Analysis aim Explain differences in 
insurance coverage with 
set of socio-economic 
and health status 
variables with biased 
selection
Explain differences in 
insurance coverage with 
set of utilisation 
variables (sometimes 
including socio­
economic and health 
status variables) with 
biased selection
Explain differences in 
plan membership with 
plan characteristics 
with biased selection
Develop/validate 
predictors of 
individual health 
expenditures in order 
to risk-adjust and 
counteract selection
Analytical
approach
Compare individuals 
with private vs. public 
insurance or insured of 
distinct insurance plans
Compare individuals 
with private vs. public 
insurance or insured of 
distinct insurance plans
Compare distinct plans Assess explain-able 
variance of different 
expenditure 
determinants
Analysis 
attributes and 
dimension
Determinants of different 
insurance coverage:
• Socio-economic
• Health Status
at one point in time or at 
different time periods
Determinants of different 
insurance coverage:
• Health care 
utilisation and 
others 
at one point in time or at 
different time periods
Plan characteristics:
• Price or Cost
• Size
• Risk profile etc. 
at one point in time or 
at different time periods
Determinants of
insured:
• Socio-economic
• Health status
• Health care 
utilisation and 
diagnostic 
information
Analysis level Individual Individual Aggregated (plan level) Mostly individual
Data Cross-sectional data, 
pooled cross-sectional 
time-series data or two- 
period cross-sectional 
data
Cross-sectional data, 
pooled cross-sectional 
time-series data or two- 
period cross-sectional 
data
Cross-sectional data, 
pooled cross-sectional 
time-series data, two- 
period cross-sectional 
data
Cross-sectional data, 
pooled cross- 
sectional time-series 
data
Analysis results Evidence for adverse 
selection
Evidence for adverse 
and risk selection
Evidence for adverse 
and risk selection
Evidence for risk 
selection
Publication
examples
• Browne (1992)
• Cutler and Reber 
(1998)
• Sapelli and Torche 
(2001)
• Hopkins and Kidd 
(1996)
• Price et al. (1983)
• Soderlund and 
Hansl (2000)
• Newhouse et al. 
(1989)
• Van Vliet and v. 
de Ven (1992)
The state of being insured actually changes the household's behaviour and leads to the 
same observation of higher health care utilisation. Thus in both cases it is observable and 
testable that households with better, more comprehensive coverage have higher health 
care utilisation and health benefits.58 However, this correlation is not informative as to the 
direction of the causality, which makes the two processes indistinguishable in easily 
accessible cross-sectional data (see Abbring et al. 2003a). The papers of Abbring et al. 
(2003a, 2003b) summarise a research program, proposing that the dynamic (i.e. time- 
related) aspect of insurance relationships can help to distinguish adverse selection and
58 The methodological approach type two compares health care utilisation patterns o f  either insured to 
uninsured households or o f households with high coverage to households with low insurance coverage. I f  the 
higher insured group has higher utilisation levels this is seen as a measure o f  adverse selection (or moral 
hazard).
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risk selection.59 Panel data that follow individuals over several time periods, rather than 
simple cross-sectional data can help to distinguish moral hazard from adverse selection.
Another problem arises for the multiple plan analysis approach type three. 
Adverse selection and risk selection might occur simultaneously and are empirically hard 
to distinguish in aggregated data. For example, one observes the average risk profile of 
two plans, while presumably the first risk pool is subject to selection but the second is not 
However, if the first plan experiences risk selection where high risks are dumped and also 
low risks leave because of adverse selection, its average observed risk pool would be 
shown as stable. Even if there would be anecdotal evidence for selection processes, no 
empirical evidence could confirm this.
Finally, the fourth risk-adjustment approach has some problematic limitations. As 
van de Ven et al. (1998) points out the explained variance of individual health care 
expenditures with the risk adjusters is quite small if not marginal. Furthermore, this 
approach is limited to capitation systems and the aim of empirical publications of this 
type is ultimately to design fairer capitation formulas that prevent or reduce profits from 
risk selection. Adverse selection is not considered here per se.
2.3.4 Summary and discussion of the literature review
This chapter's selective literature review can be by no means seen as a comprehensive 
account of all literature on selection processes (which would far exceed the limits of this 
thesis). However, the theoretical concepts of the selection processes were discussed and 
the state of empirical evidence for selection processes thoroughly assessed.
The literature focuses on adverse selection problems rather than risk selection 
problems. This is because adverse selection has the more obvious effect of market 
inefficiency, while risk selection has the more obvious effect of inequity. Thus, the 
mainstream research interest seems to be efficiency and not equity. This might be related 
to a number of factors. First, selection processes are predominantly discussed in the realm 
of economics and theories of market equilibrium where efficiency problems are of central 
concern. Second, the largely Anglophone literature reflects the dominance of a more 
liberal approach towards the economy, markets and the role of the state. Here one can 
observe a clear division of responsibilities between market and government The
59 Chiaporri and Salanie (2003) provide a survey of empirical applications to contract theory with several 
attempts that empirically investigate insurance markets for effects of asymmetry in information, like adverse 
selection and moral hazard.
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government's role is to pitch in when unacceptable equity concerns arise as a market 
result or due to a market failure. In all other cases the market is generally seen as the most 
efficient device for the allocation of goods and services (Bozeman and Bretschneider 1986). 
Or as Pauly and Herring 1999 put it, these (equity) concerns are, "much more a matter of 
opinion," (p. 10), of judgement about equity and of relative political power60 (see also 
Pauly 2002).
Although the literature tends to ignore risk selection or discusses it in the context 
of risk-adjustment and capitation systems used by high-income countries' national health 
insurance systems, the issue of risk selection becomes much more significant when 
addressing low- and middle-income countries. This is because low- and middle-income 
countries have fewer resources with which to support public health care systems. 
Privately financed and/or provided health care often might be the only accessible health 
care in these countries. This means that individuals who cannot afford private health 
insurance risk going untreated in the event of ill-health. Risk selection further undermines 
the ability to receive health care of those most likely to be ill and least likely to be able to 
afford private health insurance. Thus risk selection creates an equity issue of a different 
dimension in low- and middle-income countries. While in high-income countries risk 
selection causes the sick and poor to receive inferior care, in low- and middle-income 
countries the sick and poor will receive no care whatsoever. It is important to consider 
selection processes in low- and middle-income countries, because their practical outcomes 
diverge from outcomes in high-income countries.
The review of the empirical evidence for adverse selection and risk selection led to 
the following conclusions. The first conclusion is that there is a general lack of empirical 
studies of selection processes for low- and middle-income countries. It would be, 
therefore, an important extension of the current literature to conduct such a study - 
considering that selection processes might have an impact of different significance on 
health insurance markets in low- and middle-income countries than in high-income 
countries. Although the methodological challenges of empirical studies are similar in high 
or low- and middle-income countries, an empirical study in the later setting may improve 
understanding of the causes of inequity and inefficiency in low- and middle-income 
countries' health insurance markets.
60 Equity concerns in case of health insurance risk pooling failure is associated with non-economic risk 
factors. Transfers in these cases are matters of judgement about equity and of relative political power.
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Second/ a majority of the reviewed empirical studies/ applying a variety of 
methodological approaches to different data/ concluded adverse selection and/or risk 
selection to some extent. Finally/ there was a range of different methodologies applied in 
these empirical studies. The general challenge for all these methodological approaches 
consists of die fact that the study of motivations for observed individual behavioural 
outcomes has practical and statistical limitations. Thus most of the applied methodologies 
are based on rather intuitive approaches towards selection processes and attempt to 
derive statistical inferences from simple regression models applied to cross-sectional data 
or pooled cross-sectional time-series data. Two favoured attempts that cater to specific 
data measures can be generalised.
1. A favoured approach for the identification of adverse selection is to compare different 
plans or to compare individual plan choices under the assumption that more generous 
health insurers become subject to adverse selection. Generosity is measured here in 
terms of extent of coverage/ premium price/ institutional arrangements that influence 
access to health care and ultimately health care utilisation. This approach takes 
advantage of the fact that selection processes are grouping phenomena/ i.e. some plans 
end up with disproportionate numbers of high risks and others with high proportions 
of low risks. High risks are characterised as individuals with certain socio-economic 
characteristics/ like old age or geographic area of comparably greater poverty, poor 
reported health status and high prior health care utilisation. A potential problem with 
this approach is that observations attributed to adverse selection might be clouded by 
another process, moral hazard.
2. The favoured approach for the identification of risk selection is to analyse plans' risk 
pools under the assumption that insurers have an incentive to favourably select low 
risks (in order to operate more efficiently or maximise their profit). This approach is 
based on the belief that individual health care expenditures can be explained with a set 
of variables combined into individual risk profiles. The risk profile includes socio­
economic variables, health status variables and prior utilisation variables. However, 
this body of literature is devoted to a rather different empirical problem than that of 
simply identifying adverse selection and risk selection in unregulated health insurance 
markets. It tries to identify practical methods that would eliminate the problem of 
cream-skimming (while at the same time preserving incentives for efficiency) in 
competitive health insurance markets with risk-adjustment/capitation systems.
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The presented review revealed gaps and challenges. First, selection processes in 
health insurance markets are understudied in the context of low- and middle-income 
countries. This is of particular concern because of the specific impact these processes have 
on equity and efficiency in those settings. Second, previous methodological approaches of 
empirical investigations into selection processes faced considerable challenges, for 
instance distinguishing selection processes from other health insurance market problems 
like moral hazard. These distinct methodological challenges most likely originated from 
the fact that the well-developed theory on selection processes does not lend itself very 
well to empirical data testing. Additionally there is a shortage of easyly available data. 
Given this, the objective of the next section is to develop the research question and 
research objectives, which will address these identified gaps and challenges.
2.4 Development of the thesis research question and research objectives
The purpose of this section is to develop this thesis' research question and research
objectives based on the literature gaps identified in the previous section. First, the research 
question is developed and the South African case study used to examine this research 
question is briefly introduced. Second, the research objectives are described.
2.4.1 Research question development and case study background
From the presented literature review it could be concluded that there is a very well
developed theory on adverse selection and risk selection in health insurance markets. The
literature recognises that the problems of adverse selection and risk selection either create
inefficiency or inequity. However, a gap in the literature regarding the study of selection
processes in the context of low- and middle-income countries was identified. Selection
processes in those settings should be studied because of their diverging practical
efficiency and equity outcomes.
This thesis' research question is: Are unregulated health insurance markets
characterised by adverse selection and/ or risk selection, thereby creating inefficiency or
inequity? It was pointed out that unregulated health insurance markets either emerge
from health insurance arrangements, which were never subject to government regulation
or they emerge from arrangements, which were initially regulated and became subject to
less regulation, i.e. deregulation. An interesting case for a middle-income country is the
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unregulated health insurance market of South Africa's medical scheme plans in the 
context of its post-deregulation experience of 1995-1998, after premia risk-rating was 
legalised. (A general case study background can be found in Appendix 1.)
South Africa's medical schemes started to develop more than one hundred years 
ago as company-based, quasi-compulsory health insurance plans (Soderlund et al. 1998). 
The first medical scheme was the De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. Mines Benefit Society 
established in 1889 (Soderlund and Hansl 1999).61 These schemes were all mutual 
societies, generally employment-based, and regulated by the government as what were 
called "Friendly Societies" - a broad term used to cover mutual insurance, savings and 
pension arrangements.
It was only in 1967 that legislation was promulgated, in die form of the Medical 
Schemes Act, recognising medical mutual insurers as distinct entities and establishing two 
bodies, the Council for Medical Schemes, and the Registrar of Medical Schemes, to fulfil 
the executive functions of the Act Between 1969 and the mid 1980's government 
involvement in the medical schemes industry, via the Act, and various revisions thereof, 
was considerable. Regulation concerned the relationship between medical schemes and 
the provider community, and both the modes and rates of reimbursement were fixed by 
statute. Schemes were forbidden from charging differential premiums based on risk of ill 
health and were required by law to cover a certain percentage of the nationally mandated 
fee schedule for all health care provided.
In the following years, however, the market joined a worldwide trend towards 
economic liberalisation as people became disillusioned with centrally planned economic 
systems and the efficacy of government intervention in general (Peltzman 1989). In the 
1989 amendment to the Act, rules disallowing risk-rating of premiums and the stipulation 
of minimum reimbursement rates were removed from the statute books;, thereby making 
the sick and elderly much more vulnerable to losing medical scheme coverage (Soderlund 
and Hansl 2000). After the abolition of the apartheid system, the Medical Schemes 
Amendment Act (1993) turned the medical scheme system into a quasi-private industry. 
Medical schemes were now able to compete with medical insurers as they were allowed to 
offer different packages, to underwrite and to reinsure (McIntyre and Bowen 1994). A 
further deregulation in 1994 did away with the regulation of reimbursement rates 
altogether, and allowed contracting and vertical integration between providers and
61 By 1910 there were seven such schemes in existence, and by the beginning of the Second World War in 
1939, there was a total of 48.
88
Birgit Hansl Chapter 2: Analytical context & literature review
medical schemes, paving the way for managed care arrangements. By the end of 1997,176 
medical schemes had been registered under the terms of the provisions of the National 
Health Act, 1977 (Soderlund and Hansl 1999).62
The South African medical schemes are divided into so-called 'open and 'dosed7 
funds. Closed schemes were purely employer-based, mutual, non-profit organisations 
with community rated premiums. Membership in these funds was mostly compulsory for 
employees. In the past risk selection and adverse selection tended not to be real problems 
here. Open schemes were free for public enrolment. As designed, it would be much easier 
for open schemes to differentiate their premiums according to risk and thus pradise risk 
selection. These schemes might also have been subject to adverse selection. Although open 
and dosed schemes are non-profit organisations by law, it is generally considered that 
they function as for-profit enterprises in that the administration fees largely constitute the 
fund surplus. Also, professional administration companies administer both open and 
closed schemes. The processing of claims and the collection of premiums is mostly 
contracted out to these for-profit administrators, who are supposed to act on the 
instructions of the scheme members. In fact, with these administrators medical schemes 
can be seen as quasi-private health insurers.
The Health Systems Trust (HST) (1996) expected early on that the deregulation 
law, which allowed risk-rated premia, would reduce cross-subsidisation within medical 
schemes. Also, medical schemes were expected to become increasingly unaffordable to the 
elderly, chronically ill and low-income earners who would now have to rely more heavily 
on public sector health services (HST 1996). Indeed, several reports indicate unbalanced 
risk concentration in South Africa's unregulated medical scheme plans due to adverse 
selection and risk selection (for example: Soderlund and Hansl 1999, Soderlund and Hansl 
2000).
During the years immediately following the deregulation measure, 1989 and 
onwards, medical scheme membership declined (Rama and McLeod 2001). This happened 
despite the fact that there are tax-concessions for health insurance premiums63 (Price et al.
1996) and that a considerable amount of government finances goes to medical schemes 
through subsidies for civil servants. These subsidies are much higher than comparable
62 More than 30 industrial medical schemes operated under the terms of agreements drawn up with the Labour 
Relations Act, 1956 (Act 28 of 1956).
63 The South African income tax exempts the employer medical scheme contribution from the tax base 
(which can be up to two thirds of the employees contribution).
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government health funding for the poor.64 In addition to the observation that medical 
scheme membership declined it was also noticed that medical scheme contributions and 
benefits rose rapidly (South African Republic 1994).65 However, the contribution increases 
that were observed for many medical schemes did not keep up with increases in 
expenditures on benefits (McIntyre 1993) and many medical schemes faced serious 
financial/solvency problems (South African Republic 1994).66 The absence of substantial 
cost-containment efforts raised serious efficiency concerns.
The rapid increase in contributions prompted many young and healthy members 
to seek alternative insurance coverage with for-profit insurers or to give up insurance 
coverage altogether (HTS 1996). Thus medical scheme membership became increasingly 
unaffordable to many South Africans and the envisioned expansion of the medical scheme 
market to low income earners did not occur. The South African government recognised 
the problem that private medical insurance coverage became increasingly unaffordable for 
many South Africans. Subjects who were able previously to purchase private health 
insurance were driven out of medical schemes to rely on free or subsidised care in the 
public sector. The Department of Health (DoH) (2001) noted that equity could be served 
by retaining medical scheme clientele in the private sector. The argument was here that 
these households should not rely on the public sector, because this would diminish the 
limited resources for the poor and sick.
2.4.2 Research objective development
The literature review revealed a gap in the literature for empirical studies of adverse 
selection and risk selection, and particularly for low- and middle-income countries. 
Distinct methodological challenges have likely inhibited this research, because the well- 
developed theory on these selection processes does not lend itself very well to empirical 
data testing. Moreover, empirical studies in low- and middle-income settings often face 
serious data limitations.
Given these gaps in the literature, the research objective of this thesis is to conduct 
an empirical investigation that delivers evidence of adverse selection and risk selection in 
unregulated health insurance markets. The intention is to present this empirical evidence
64 Up until now only about half of the eligible civil servants have chosen medical scheme coverage.
65 Medical scheme membership, for instance, declined by nearly 4% between 1991 and 1992. Medical 
scheme contributions were equivalent to 7.1% of average formal sector salaries in 1982. Ten years later, in 
1992, they amounted to 15.2% of average salaries (South African Republic 1994).
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with an empirical method from which testable hypotheses can be derived. Also, in view of 
practicability and applicability to low- and middle-income country settings this method 
should be easy to apply to basic insurance data and standard software.
The first research aim is to derive an appropriate method applicable to empirical 
investigations into adverse selection and risk selection with available quantitative 
techniques and easily accessible data. The second research aim is to apply this method to 
an empirical analysis of case study data of an unregulated health insurance market in a 
middle-income country, here panel data of insured households in South Africa's medical 
scheme plans, 1995-1998. However, it will be not the goal of this thesis to advance the 
discussion of how to best distinguish adverse selection from moral hazard for the 
following three reasons. First, this thesis' data do not lend themselves to this purpose. The 
panel data under investigation is too short (four years) to really be able to distinguish 
these two processes. Also, the methodological approach that will be developed in the next 
chapter will allow the allocation of most of the analysis results to adverse selection rather 
than moral hazard.
Second, distinguishing between adverse selection and moral hazard is rather of a 
theoretical nature and will not be of main importance for the purpose of this thesis. Moral 
hazard was basically defined as over-utilisation, i.e. utilisation top-up. This does not 
usually concern the same type of utilisation as in the typical cases of unpredicted ill- 
health. Although most households who do practice moral hazard might have had some 
episodes of ill-health and subsequent health care utilisation, they simply extend, i.e. top- 
up their utilisation unnecessarily. Moral hazard effects are likely to be strongest for extra 
diagnostic procedures, such as seeing a (or another) specialist in order to confirm a 
diagnosis. They might also be found in the more frequent utilisation of discretionary 
services, like physiotherapy and optical services. In health care systems where public and 
private health care provision of different quality exists, moral hazard might be manifested 
in the choice of private over public hospitalisation.
However, if households end up with comparably high utilisation of any of these 
services it would not really matter for an insurance company if this was because this 
household is indeed a high risk or it just behaves like a high risk. This household is de facto 
rightly classifiable as high risk, no matter whether high claims/benefits are the result of 
adverse selection or moral hazard. Also, this thesis' data indicates considerable cost-
66 Medical schemes operate on a pay-as-you-go or cash-flow basis, i.e. benefit payments are largely from 
contributions received during that same year (Prama and McLeod 2001).
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sharing, which diminishes the incentives to practice moral hazard. Nevertheless the 
empirical analysis will distinguish between different types of health care utilisation that 
are more likely among low risks as compared to high risks. For example, evidence for high 
utilisation of discretionary services will not be seen as evidence for high risks and adverse 
selection. It will be interpreted as a type of top-up utilisation by low risks most likely 
initiated by favourable risk selection strategies (i.e. plan manipulation). High utilisation of 
basic/emergency services will be interpreted as evidence for high risks and possibly 
adverse selection. Also, in each model the types of health care services utilised will 
distinguish between public and private hospital utilisation.
Finally, from the literature review, and in particular from previous empirical 
studies, it is clear that the major problems in unregulated health insurance markets are 
selection problems. Previous empirical studies could somewhat identify selection 
processes and most publications assume that higher utilisation is related to adverse 
selection by high risks and not related to moral hazard of low risks. In particular, the few 
publications of the multiple-plan-choice approach that claimed to observe moral hazard 
draw contradicting conclusions from similar results. While Savage and Wright (2003) 
conclude moral hazard horn the observations of longer hospital-stays, other studies, such 
as Sapelli and Vial (2003), could not find evidence for over-utilisation in the case of 
hospitalisation, for either public insurance or private insurance (since the price elasticity of 
demand for hospitalisation is low).
2.5 Summary
This chapter provided the analytical context for the thesis' research question and 
developed the rationale for this research question, which asks whether the two selection 
processes of adverse selection and risk selection increase inefficiency and inequity in 
unregulated health insurance markets. The research question was developed based on die 
literature review and the identified literature gaps, which this thesis wishes to address.
The second part of this chapter introduced the economic model of human 
behaviour as the analytical context of the thesis. Its underlying behavioural assumptions 
were used to explain the two selection processes. Behaviour (like adverse selection) of the 
insured is motivated by economic incentives and poses a serious challenge to health 
insurers. It can be argued that this behaviour forces insurers into practices (like risk 
selection), which are inconsistent with health policy objectives or do not allow coverage
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where really needed - i.e. they fail to fulfil their actual function (Berliner 1982, 1984). 
However, because the effects of adverse selection and risk selection are unsatisfactory for 
all markets participants, it is predictable that individuals will have an incentive to protect 
their health insurance system with institutions other than the market such as state- 
regulation.
The third part presented a review of the literature on adverse selection and risk 
selection in health insurance markets. The critical review of empirical studies that 
investigate selection processes identified several methodological approaches, ranging 
from multiple plan choice to risk adjustment methods. From the literature review it was 
concluded that while there is a large and comprehensive body of literature discussing 
theoretical aspects of selection processes, literature dedicated to the empirical 
identification of selection processes in data is less developed. Also, most literature is 
concerned with the description, discussion and analysis of health insurance problems in 
high-income countries. The situation of health insurance arrangements in low or middle- 
income countries is understudied, particularly in regard to empirical investigations into 
selection processes.
Finally, the fourth part developed the thesis' research question and research 
objective, based on the identified literature gaps. This thesis will contribute to the 
literature that discusses and empirically analyses adverse selection and risk selection in 
unregulated health insurance markets in low- and middle-income countries. The research 
question of whether unregulated health insurance markets are characterised by adverse 
selection and/or risk selection, thereby creating inefficiency or inequity will be examined 
in the context of a middle-income case study - South Africa's medical schemes' post­
deregulation experience, 1995-1998. This thesis's research objective - to conduct an 
empirical investigation that delivers evidence of adverse selection and risk selection -  is 
justified by the result of the literature review, confirming a scarcity of empirical studies in 
low- and middle-income countries. The primary challenge and first research aim of this 
thesis will be to derive a methodological approach for the empirical analysis of selection 
processes with available quantitative techniques and easily accessible data. Herein will lay 
the first main contribution of this thesis. The second research aim is to apply this method 
to the empirical analysis of the South African case study data. This will be the second 
main contribution of the thesis, adding to the limited literature on empirical investigations 
into selection processes in low- and middle-income settings.
The next chapter will develop the method for the thesis' empirical investigation.
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Chapter 3 
Method for empirical testing of 
adverse selection and risk 
selection: a group approach
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to pursue the first research aim and derive a method from 
which empirically testable hypotheses for the presence of adverse selection and risk 
selection in health insurance markets can be derived. First, a group approach will be 
presented. The literature review showed that the standard concepts of adverse selection 
and risk selection are usually explained on a time-scale. They will be reformulated as 
grouping phenomena. Previous methodological approaches, discussed in chapter two, 
used other aspects of selection processes' group dimension. Second, the empirical strategy 
that applies the group approach will be discussed in regard to applicable quantitative 
techniques and data requirements. It was a stated research aim that the empirical method 
should be applicable to easily accessible data and to quantitative techniques that are 
available on common software. Finally, this chapter will develop the thesis' research 
hypotheses based on the developed group approach.
After this introduction, part two of the chapter will derive the empirical 
methodology of the group approach. The key assumption will be that adverse selection 
and risk selection can be formulated as grouping phenomena. Grouping here means that 
selection processes can be distinguished by a segmentation of the insured population into 
easily identifiable groups. The empirical group method is based on two theoretical 
hypotheses that first, unregulated health insurance markets experience inefficient risk
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pooling due to selection processes, and second, that groups of people who take part in 
selection processes have specific observable risk profiles. These two hypotheses mostly 
were explored separately in earlier empirical approaches, namely the multiple plan-choice 
and risk adjustment literature discussed in the previous literature review. The multiple 
plan choice method looked at how people select themselves into plans of different 
generosity levels, while the risk adjustment literature developed methods of assessing 
individual risk profiles.
The third part will present the empirical strategy using the group approach. It will 
be shown that the group method lends itself very well to empirical testing with techniques 
that are available in most software packages, in particular discriminant analysis and 
logistic regression analysis. These techniques can explain group membership for subjects 
that belong to a priori defined groups using a multivariate risk profile. The risk profile can 
accommodate several independent variables, such as socio-economic characteristics, plan 
characteristics, and health status & health utilisation data that are expected to describe 
group differences. Empirically testable expectations can be formulated for variables of this 
risk profile. Data that contains this type of information typically comes in the form of 
either cross-sectional or panel data. This type of data is easily accessible from routinely 
collected individual insurance data or national health (status/ expenditure) surveys.
Finally, die fourth part will develop the thesis7 research hypotheses, based on the 
group method. The main research hypothesis for the thesis' empirical investigation will be 
that South Africa's unregulated medical schemes encountered a lack of market-wide risk 
pooling and a lack of risk pooling within the market (between insurance plan options). 
From this, three research subhypotheses can be formulated.
3.2 Method: a group approach
This thesis' first research aim is to derive a method that yields empirically testable 
hypotheses for adverse selection and risk selection. The purpose of this section is to derive 
a conceptually grounded approach that can be applied to empirical data. As shown in the 
review of the last chapter, adverse selection and risk selection processes are typically 
explained using the dimension of time, because selection processes span over several 
time-periods. However, this theoretical concept does not lend itself very well to empirical 
testing. Rather, methodological approaches in the literature, like the multiple plan choice
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method/ used some form of group comparison/ e.g. comparing characteristics and health 
care utilisation between groups with different levels of insurance coverage. It is 
worthwhile to further explore the description of selection processes as grouping 
phenomena in order to explain the methodological approach for empirical investigations 
into evidence for adverse selection and risk selection. This section will first discuss 
adverse selection and risk selection as grouping phenomena/ emphasising their group 
dimension as compared to their time dimension. Second/ the group method will be 
derived, yielding empirically testable hypotheses for selection processes.
3.2.1 Adverse selection and risk selection as grouping phenomena
The concepts of adverse selection and risk selection are not defined to a level of precision
typically required for empirical testing. This is because these concepts were developed as
explanations for observations of failing or absent (insurance) markets that seemed
economically irrational within simple supply and demand models. However, within
models that do not assume perfect information and perfect markets the concepts of
adverse selection and risk selection can explain these superficial irrationalities. Both
concepts are based on assumptions of the economic model of behaviour and on
assumptions of individual risk perception and risk behaviour. However, behavioural
assumptions are not only hard to incorporate in economic models that describe complex
market processes, but they are also difficult to verify empirically in real markets (as
opposed to limited experimental settings). The heavy reliance of these concepts on
behavioural assumptions makes it difficult to empirically test for selection processes as
well as to distinguish them in data.
Delivery of empirical evidence for adverse selection and risk selection therefore 
requires the translation of standard definitions of adverse selection and risk selection 
processes into empirically testable classifications. This will be done through the 
description of adverse selection and risk selection as grouping phenomena. The following 
paragraphs will first compare the group dimension to the previously overemphasised 
time dimension when explaining adverse and risk selection processes. Second, they will 
suggest a typology for adverse selection and risk selection by looking at them as grouping 
phenomena.
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A. Group dim ension versus time dim ension of selection p ro cesses
Using the time dimension is very useful for understanding selection processes 
conceptually and for illustrating their main features and consequences. However, the 
argument here is that the group dimension is, in addition to time, another very useful 
dimension of these selection processes.
By explaining selection processes using the time dimension, as in figure 3-1, it is 
theoretically possible to distinguish each step of each selection process for each individual 
case over time. But it fails to consider not only that both selection processes can fall 
together in time for any given subject, but also that several selection processes apply to 
different subjects and occur simultaneously. Empirically it is then difficult to distinguish 
between adverse and risk selection, since both processes overlap at any single point of 
observation for different observed subjects.
Figure 3-1: Selection processes time dimension
Adverse Selection Process in Time
time
Information advantage 
about risk is with 
insurance buyer 
before contract 
signing
Insurer
offers contract 
at average 
risk premium
Buyer with 
higher than 
average risk 
more attracted 
to select contract
Insurers calculated cost exceed 
revenue; price adaptation: pricet; 
lower risks drop out. high risks 
stay: costs exceed revenue again - 
spiral process until market dries out
Risk Selection Process In Time
time
Information advantage/ signals Buyer with Signals about
about risk of insurance buyer is used lower than risk of insured
by insurer before contract signing average risk after contract
with risk* adjusted self-selecting more attracted signing
insurance options (cream-skimming) to insurance
or preferred underwriting contract
Insurer excludes 
high risk from coverage by 
dumping them; proportion of good risks 
with of good risks in insurance 
pool rises • process continues 
until only low risks remain insured
The predominant illustration of selection processes using the time dimension also limits 
the view on aspects that classify selection as grouping phenomena. For example, as a 
result of adverse selection it is assumed that insurance plans end up with a 
disproportionately high number of sickly high risks. Thus adverse selection is a process 
that concerns the movement of a specific group of people - those of high-risk - from the
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uninsured population to the insured population where they select themselves adversely 
into specific plans -  namely high risk plans with high-level, expensive coverage. Adverse 
selection also affects the group of already insured low-risks, who will move out of the 
insured population back to the uninsured population as a result of higher premium 
contributions.
As a result of risk selection, it is assumed that insurance plans end up with a 
disproportionately high number of healthy low risks. Thus risk selection is a process that 
concerns the movement of a specific group of people - those of low-risk - from the 
uninsured population to the insured population where they are risk selected into specific 
plans -  namely low risk plans with low, inexpensive coverage fitting their needs. Risk 
selection also affects the group of already insured high risks, who will be forced to move 
out of the insured and back to the uninsured population. Figure 3-2 illustrates these 
processes of adverse selection (AS) and risk selection (RS) in the group dimension.
Figure 3-2: Selection processes group dimension
Adverse Selection and Risk Selection Processes in Group Dimension
UNINSURED POPULATION INSURED POPULATOIN
o
r a
JOINERS
AS -  more high risks join, 
join Plan 1
RS -  more low risks join, 
join Plan 2
SWITCHERS
AS/RS -  more high risks
switch from 2 to 1
RS -  more low risks switch
from 1 to 2
LEAVERS 
AS -  more low risks 
exit, exit Plan 1 
RS - more high risks 
exit, exit both plans L R
Plan 2
Cheap, low
Note: High risks are abbreviated with HR and low risks with LR. Adverse selection is abbreviated with AS 
and risk selection with RS.
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By explaining selection processes using the group dimension, as in figure 3-2, it is 
practically possible to distinguish adverse and risk selection prooesses in the market at 
any observation point in time. In a perfect risk-pooling market, subjects who belong to the 
groups of joiners, leavers or switchers are expected to have, on average, similar 
characteristics and risk profiles like the pool of the insured that they join (the control 
group). Thus, risks are pooled efficiently and there are average risk pools and average-risk 
plans. The uninsured and insured would simply sort themselves according to personal 
preferences that are not risk related.
However, the first key assumption here is that most markets are not perfect and for 
all these markets where selection processes are suspected, one could empirically observe 
that joiners, leavers, and switchers have, on average, different characteristics than the 
existing risk pool of the insured. The second key assumption is that imperfect markets also 
have inefficient risk pooling as a result of either adverse or risk selection. Thus in addition 
to average risk plans there are high-risk plans (with high coverage and high premium 
contributions) that attract high risks and there are low risk plans (with low coverage and 
low premium contributions) that attract low risks.
In summary, the explanation for, and illustration of, adverse selection and ride 
selection using the group dimension, as compared to the time dimension, seems an 
equally fitting and empirically more revealing approach. With the group dimension it is 
possible to define selection processes as grouping phenomena and derive methods that 
can assess whether or not subjects with certain characteristics, indicating their risk 
protiles, select into predicted groups. It is expected that this method, which considers this 
group dimension can lead to conclusive empirical evidence for selection processes in 
health insurance markets and make adverse selection and risk selection processes 
distinguishable from each other.
B. A typology for adverse selection and risk selection
A typology for adverse selection and risk selection is suggested here that is based on the 
group dimension rather than the time dimension. In order to illustrate this typology on 
the next pages two tables were developed. Different selection sub-types are distinguished 
in each column of table 3-1 for adverse selection and table 3-2 for risk selection. For each 
selection-subtype the table rows display: (1) manifestation (exclusion or attraction of low 
or high risks), (2) selection mechanisms, (3) effects, (4) affected membership groups, and 
(5) expected empirical observations if that type of selection takes place. Adverse selection 
will be approached as an issue of choice for certain risk types who want to become or stay
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insured. The key assumption is that individuals' choices of insurance can convey 
information about their risk types. However, the main effect of adverse selection, the 
ultimate exit of low risks out of the market will be also considered as one type of adverse 
selection.
In table 3-1, on the next page, adverse selection type one in column one depicts the 
choice of insurance coverage by high risks. The manifestation is a high proportion of high 
risks entering insurance coverage. This mechanism can be described as adverse selection 
of high risks (possibly because of pre-knowledge about their poor health status). The effect 
is that high risks join insurance plans on average more often. Thus approaching this type 
of adverse selection as a grouping phenomena leads to the reasoning that the affected 
group is the group of joiners. The expected empirical observation is that on average, 
joiners have characteristics that indicate a high-risk protile. They are, for instance, older 
and have higher claims titan a control group of the already insured.
The typology also distinguishes two other types of adverse selection. Type two 
adverse selection is the choice by high risks to join certain insurance plans. This choice can 
manifest itself either by the entrance of high proportions of high risks into high-risk 
insurance coverage or the switch of high proportions of high risks to high-risk plans. High 
risk plans are typically plans that offer extensive or generous coverage at substantially 
higher prices. The affected groups where one could empirically observe adverse selection 
would be joiners and switchers. Type three adverse selection is the choice by low risks to 
discontinue insurance coverage in the observed market segment This choice is manifested 
either by high proportions of low risks exiting insurance coverage or specifically, a high 
proportion of good risks exiting high-risk plans. The mechanism is here called adverse 
selection of low risks. However, this choice is likely to be induced by favourable risk 
selection, i.e. cream-skimming by competitors outside of the observed market segment -  
here called "external risk selection by competitors".67 High-risk plans are exited by low 
risks, in particular, because they offer unnecessary coverage at too high a price for these 
risks. The effect is that, on average, more low risks exit high-risk plans. The affected 
groups that are of interest for exposing this type of adverse selection would be the leavers 
of insurance coverage.
67 The result of the decision to discontinue insurance can be observed not its motivation. It might be that low 
risks are attracted to exit from the observed market segment as a result of favourable risk selection by 
external competitors. Therefore, it should be noted for the later interpretation of results that, although this 
type of observation is classified under adverse selection, it is probably linked to risk selection of external 
competitors.
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Table 3-1: Adverse selection types as group phenomena
Adverse Selection 
MANIFESTATION
lYPe 1 
Choice of insurance 
coverage by high risks
Entrance of High Risks
Type 2 
Choice of certain plans of 
insurance coverage by 
high risks
A. Entrance of High Risks 
into High-Risk Plans
B. Switch of High Risks to 
High-Risk Plans
Type 3 
Choice of discontinued 
insurance coverage by low 
risks
A. Exit of Low Risks
B. Exit of Low Risks from 
High-Risk Plans
MECHANISMS ADVERSE SELECTION OF 
HIGH RISKS
ADVERSE SELECTION OF 
HIGH RISKS
ADVERSE SELECTION OF 
LOW RISKS
EFFECTS High Risks join on average 
more
A. High risks join on average 
more high-risk plans
B. High risks switch on 
average more to high-risk 
plans
A. Low risks leave on 
average more
B. Low risks leave on 
average more high-risk plans
AFFECTED GROUPS JOINERS A. JOINERS
B. SWITCHERS
A. LEAVERS
B. LEAVERS
EXPECTED
EMPIRICAL
OBSERVATIONS
On average joiners have 
characteristics that indicate a 
high-risk profile.
(For example, joiners are on 
average older and have 
higher claims.)
A. On average joiners have 
characteristics that indicate a 
high-risk profile and join 
predominantly high-risk 
plans.
(For example, joiners are on 
average older and have 
higher claims and join more 
often high-risk plans.)
B. On average switchers 
have characteristics that 
indicate a high-risk profile 
and switch predominantly to 
high-risk plans.
(For example, switchers are 
on average older and have 
higher claims and switch 
more often to high-risk 
plans.)
A. On average leavers have 
characteristics that indicate a 
low-risk profile.
(For example, leavers are on 
average younger and have 
lower claims.)
B On average leavers have 
characteristics that indicate a 
low-risk profile and leave 
predominantly high-risk 
plans.
(For example, leavers are on 
average younger and have 
lower claims and leave from 
high-risk plans.)
Risk selection is approached by the insurer in terms of discouraging or attracting certain 
risk types, i.e. favourable selection and unfavourable selection of beneficiaries into health 
insurance coverage and certain health plans. Column one of table 3-2 depicts risk selection 
type one, discouraging high-risk insurance applicants. The manifestation is a low  
proportion of high risks entering the market. This mechanism can be described as 
unfavourable risk selection. Thus approaching risk selection as a grouping phenomena 
leads to the conclusion that the affected group is the group of joiners. The expected 
empirical observation is that on average joiners have characteristics that indicate a low- 
risk profile. The effect is that on average fewer high risks join. Joiners are, for example, 
younger and have lower claims than the control group.
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Table 3-2: Risk selection types as group phenomena
Risk Selection 
MANIFESTATION
Type 1 
Discourage high-risk 
insurance applicants
Restricted Entrance of High 
Risks
Type 2 
Attract low risks to certain 
plans of insurance 
coverage
A. Entrance of Low Risks 
into Low-Risk Plans
B. Switch of Low Risks to 
Low-Risk Plans
Type 3 
Discourage high risks to 
continue insurance 
coverage or switch them 
to high-risk plans
A. Exit of High Risks (from 
High-Risk Plans
B. Switch of High Risks to 
High-Risk Plans
MECHANISMS UNFAVOURABLE RISK 
SELECTION
FAVOURABLE RISK
SELECTION/CREAM-
SKIMMING
A. DUMPING
B. UNFAVOURABLE RISK 
SELECTION
EFFECTS High risks join on average 
less
A. Low risks join on average 
more low-risk plans
B. Low risks switch on 
average more to low-risk 
plans
A. High risks leave on 
average more (high-risk 
plans)
B. High risks switch on 
average more to high-risk 
plans
AFFECTED GROUPS JOINERS A. JOINERS
B. SWITCHERS
A. LEAVERS
B. SWITCHERS
EXPECTED EMPIRICAL 
OBSERVATIONS
On average joiners have 
characteristics that indicate 
a low-risk profile.
(For example, joiners are on 
average younger and have 
lower claims.)
A. On average joiners have 
characteristics that indicate 
a low-risk profile and join 
predominantly low-risk 
plans.
(For example, joiners are on 
average younger and have 
lower claims and join more 
often low-risk plans.)
B. On average switchers 
have characteristics that 
indicate a low-risk profile 
and switch predominantly to 
low-risk plans.
(For example, switchers are 
on average younger and 
have lower claims and 
switch more often to low- 
risk plans)
A On average leavers have 
characteristics that indicate 
a high-risk profile and leave 
predominantly high-risk 
plans.
(For example, leavers are 
on average older and have 
higher claims and leave 
more often high-risk plans.) 
B. On average switchers 
have characteristics that 
indicate a high-risk profile 
and switch predominantly to 
high-risk plans.
(For example, switchers are 
on average older and have 
higher claims and switch 
more often to high-risk 
plans)
Two other types of risk selection are distinguished in the typology. Type two risk selection 
is favourable risk selection or cream skimming by attracting low risks to certain plans of 
insurance coverage. This choice can manifest itself either by the entrance of high 
proportions of low risks into low-risk insurance coverage or the switching of high 
proportions of low risks into low-risk plans. Low-risk plans are typically plans that offer 
limited/less generous coverage at substantially lower prices or plans that spend resources 
towards non-socially productive ends, like high discretionary benefits (Newhouse et al.
1997). The affected groups where one could empirically observe this type of risk selection
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would be joiners and switchers. Type three risk selection is discouraging insured high 
risks to continue insurance coverage or to switch them into high-risk plans. This is 
manifested either by high proportions of high risks exiting insurance coverage or a high 
proportion of high risks switching to high-risk plans. In the first case this mechanism is 
described as dumping and in the second case as unfavourable risk selection.
However, one should keep in mind that risk selection is usually either a 
countermeasure to adverse selection by high risks or a measure to promote low risks to 
choose to become and stay insured. This fact leads to the problems of interrelation and 
overlapping between adverse selection and risk selection processes and the challenge of 
separating both empirically. Table 3-3 describes the overlaps in the expected empirical 
observations for the different adverse and risk selection types defined above. It specifies 
the affected groups that carry potentially similar information for the identification of 
either adverse selection or risk selection. The main overlapping problem is described as 
being between adverse selection type 2B (high risks chose to switch to high-risk plans), 
and risk selection type 3B (pressure on insured high risks to switch to high-risk plans).
Table 3-3: Overlap between expected empirical observations for different selection types
Adverse
Selection
Risk
Selection
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
A. JOINERS B. SWITCHERS A. LEAVERS B. LEAVERS
Type 1
Type 2
A. JOINERS
B. SWITCHERS
Type 3 A. LEAVERS
B. SWITCHERS Switch of High 
Risks to High- 
Risk Plans
From table 3-1 and table 3-2, above, it can be seen that the same characteristics are 
expected for switchers who switch to high-risk plans under adverse selection or risk 
selection. They are expected to have a high-risk profile. In the case of an empirical 
observation in which switchers display a high-risk profile and switch to high-risk plans it 
would be unclear which side (insured or insurer) initiated that process. Thus it could be 
that either adverse selection type 2B or risk selection type 3B took place. While adverse 
selection of type two cannot be clearly distinguished from risk selection of type three by
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using information about the switcher group/ data on other mover groups (joiners for 
adverse selection type two and leavers for risk selection type three) can still identify these 
selection types.
Another problem that is not exactly an overlap problem is pointed out for adverse 
selection type 3A (low risks chose to discontinue insurance coverage and/or switch to 
external competitors). The observed decision of low risks to leave might be due to the 
favourable risk selection efforts by external competitors outside of the observed market 
segment In the case of an empirical observation with leavers displaying a low-risk protile 
it would be unclear which side (insured or external insurer) initiated that process. This 
problem, however, can be solved within the context of a specific observed market - for 
instance it has to be considered whether or not there is any information regarding 
aggressive recruiting by external competitors. Considering that the only overlap problem 
within this developed typology is the one for switchers it can be concluded that the 
generally impact of overlap problems is quite limited.
Based on this typology for adverse selection and risk selection, which considers the 
group dimension, the next section will derive the group method.
3.2.2 Group method
The group method will show that groups of people that take part in selection processes 
have specific observable risk profiles. The groups of interest can be defined by the nature 
of the selection processes. Selection processes also dictate the membership characteristics 
of these groups naturally. Even though there are different subtypes of adverse selection 
and risk selection (as discussed in the previous section) they all have two aspects in 
common. First, they are related to the enrolment of subjects into insurance coverage or the 
(voluntary or in-voluntary) disenrolment of subjects from insurance coverage. Only 
subjects who join, leave, or switch can either practice any selection or can be subject to 
selection. Second, they are related to the enrolment and disenrolment of subjects from and 
to specific insurance risk pools. Only subjects who join, leave, or switch between insurance 
plan risk pools can practice selection and establish insurance plans as a high- or low-risk 
pool.
First, the member group categories concern subjects that move into, out of, and 
within the observed health insurance market These 'moving members', referred to from 
here forward as 'movers', carry valuable information regarding adverse selection and risk
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selection in the observed insurance market. The aim of concentrating on different mover 
groups is to identify similarities and dissimilarities/ which, in turn, makes it possible to 
conclude that either adverse or risk selection patterns exist The primary interest of the 
group method is first, to form mover groups:
(1) Joiners, who newly enter health insurance coverage in the observed market;
(2) Leavers, who exit health insurance coverage in the observed market and
(3) Switchers, between different plans within the observed market
The group method then tests these groups of movers for significant differences in 
individuals' risk characteristics as compared to a fourth group:
(4) Control group members, who, insured in the observed market never join, 
leave, or switch during the period of observation.68
For example, if subjects who recently joined insurance coverage in the observed 
market segment, on average, are more likely to generate claims compared to similar 
subjects in the control group, adverse selection could explain this observation. If recently 
joined subjects are, on average, less likely to claim benefits as compared to similar subjects 
in the control group, risk selection could be the explanation. Thus the group method 
would make adverse and risk selection processes in data visible and it would be possible 
to assess which of the two interrelated processes was prevailing during the period of 
observation.
Second, subjects will move to, from, and between plans of different risks within 
the observed health insurance market Each insurance plan within the market can be 
defined as a risk pool. Different plans vary in their coverage and price level. Plans that 
offer generous coverage at considerable prices will most likely attract high-risk subjects 
and gradually turn into a high-risk pool. Movers' originating or destination plans provide 
valuable information regarding adverse selection and risk selection. The aim of 
considering the movers' originating or destination risk pools is to confirm expected 
adverse and risk selection patterns. It is of interest for the group method to classify plans 
into risk plan groups:
(1) Low-risk plans that, within the observed market, end up with a biased risk pool 
of predominantly low risks; and
(2) High-risk plans that, within the observed market, end up with a biased risk 
pool of predominantly high risks.
68 Alternatively, depending on data availability, the control group could be also a group of uninsured subjects 
or subjects belonging to another insurance arrangement to which this market (segment) is compared.
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The group method would then not only test the groups of movers for significant 
differences in individuals risk characteristics compared to the control group but also if 
they move to, from, or between low risk plans and high risk plans as compared to:
(3) Average-risk plans that, within the observed market, have an average risk 
pool.
For example, let us assume that the recently joined subjects, who were, on average, 
more likely to generate claims as compared to subjects in the control group also 
predominantly joined high-risk plans. Adverse selection, which was suspected above, can 
be supported with this observation. The alternative explanation of high risk-aversion can 
be excluded, since joiners had higher claims on average than the control group subjects. If 
recently joined subjects, who were, on average, less likely to claim benefits as compared to 
similar subjects in the control group, predominantly joined low-risk plans, risk selection 
could be confirmed. Thus the group method would help to attribute the existence of low- 
and high-risk plans to either adverse selection or risk selection.
The next section will discuss the empirical strategy using the group method. It will 
identify, in particular, quantitative techniques that allow the application of the group 
method to empirical data.
3.3 Empirical strategy with the group method: applicable quantitative 
techniques and data requirements
The first research aim of the thesis requires that the derived method has to be applicable to 
available quantitative techniques and easily accessible data. The purpose of this section is to 
discuss the empirical strategy using the group method, and, in particular, applicable 
quantitative techniques and data requirements. It will be shown that the group method 
lends itself very well to empirical testing with techniques that are available in most 
software packages. Also, the data requirements are that of routinely collected individual 
insurance data or national health (status/expenditure) surveys. For data that contain 
information on insurance status, socio-economic characteristics, and health care utilisation 
of individuals, specific variable expectations can be formulated. This section will first 
discuss applicable quantitative techniques for the group method, namely discriminant 
analysis and logistic regression. Second, the data requirements for the group method will 
be discussed.
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3.3.1 Applicable quantitative techniques: discriminant analysis and logistic 
regression
In order to apply the group method to empirical investigations into adverse selection and 
risk selection the method now has to be matched with applicable quantitative techniques. 
The group method assumes that subjects with certain risk characteristics (including 
originating or destination plan membership) are more prominent in identifiable joiner, 
leaver, and switcher groups as compared to a control group. The empirical research 
question becomes then: What are the characteristics and the plan membership of subjects 
that dominate mover groups as compared to the control group?
Thus applicable quantitative techniques have to be able to explain (and thus predict) 
group membership for subjects using a multivariate risk profile. The groups are defined a 
priori based on the group method. The risk profile has to accommodate several 
independent variables that are assumed to be able to describe group differences. In 
summary, the empirical technique needs to meet the following three technical objectives:
1. Evaluate group differences on a multivariate profile,
2. Validate the conceptual classification of observations into proposed groups, and
3. Identify and validate dimensions (variables) of discrimination between groups. 
This limits the discussion to multivariate techniques, which assess the impact of a set of 
metric variables on a non-metric independent variable.
Multiple discriminant analysis allows a researcher to approach questions where 
the dependent variable is discrete (or categorical) and the independent variables are 
metric. Discriminant analysis explains die relationship that impacts the category in which 
an object is located. It is a profile analysis that can also be used as an analytical predictive 
technique. The main objective is to identify the group to which an object belongs and thus 
to understand group membership. It is desired that the group membership for each object 
can be explained or predicted by a set of selected independent variables (Hair et al. 1998). 
However, it can only identify group differences in cases where it is conceptually possible 
to define groups a priori.
Logistic regression is a special type of discriminant analysis confined to the testing 
of two independent categories or groups (Hair et al. 1998). Logistic regression has many 
advantages over classical discriminant analysis and is, for example, less vulnerable to the 
analytical assumptions of non-normality, non-linearity, and heteroskedastidty. It also 
allows the incorporation of dummy variables. Logistic regression generally delivers more 
robust results and has more standardised testing procedures (due to its similarity to linear
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regression) that are widely available in different software packages (Hair et al. 1998). 
Logistic regression is, in particular, the better choice if a problem can be defined into two- 
group test problems making the interpretation of results easier as compared to cases with 
more than two groups (Hair et al. 1998, Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). The group method 
showed that three two-group pairs could be formed. Appendix 2 provides a short 
introduction to the basic logit model and its assumptions.
In summary, logistic regression analysis (also referred to as logit analysis) - as a 
type of multiple discriminant analysis -  is the best choice for the suggested group method. 
First, it is a multivariate technique that can study the relationship between a set of metric 
variables and a non-metric (discrete) independent variable. Second, with this technique all 
three technical objectives are addressed. It can evaluate group differences on a 
multivariate profile, it can test and validate the conceptual classification of observations 
into the a priori proposed groups, and it can identify the dimensions (variables) of 
discrimination between the groups.
3.3.2 Data requirements
Previously the group method could be matched with applicable quantitative techniques. 
Now the data requirements for applications of this group method have to be established.
The data needs to be on the individual level, either in the form of cross-sectional or 
preferably in the form of panel data. It should also allow the technical classification of 
observations into proposed groups and needs to identify and describe variables of 
discrimination between these proposed groups. Data typically collected by insurance 
companies or national health surveys contain the following required information about 
individuals: (1) insurance status, (2) socio-economic characteristics, (3) health status, (4) 
health care expenditures/ utilisation, and (5) plan membership/ characteristics.
For example, subjects that newly joined, recently left, or recently switched are 
usually distinguishable from the rest of the uninsured or insured population (i.e. members 
who were already or who are still insured) in data that records individual/ household 
level insurance status changes. This information is in insurance files typically coded as the 
starting or end date of the insurance contract and in household surveys as the answer to 
the question regarding the household's insurance status (and more specifically if/when 
entered, exited, or changed insurance coverage). With this information it is possible to
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identify the mover groups. Within die logistic regression framework this group 
classification would form the dependant variables.
Information regarding socio-economic characteristics/ health care utilisation and 
plan characteristics are also part of routinely collected insurance data or household health 
surveys. For, example, plan membership and characteristics are distinguishable simply by 
the plan name, its organisational features, premium contributions or cost-sharing levels 
(that allow inference about its generosity or suspected biased risk pooling compared to 
average risk pooling). Socio-economic characteristics of individuals range from age, 
gender and income to residential information. Health status data relate to questions of 
self-reported medical history. Health care utilisation can be claim or benefit information 
from insurance data or expenditure information in household health surveys. Within a 
logistic regression framework these measures would be the independent variables. This 
linear combination of selected variables that will discriminate between the groups is also 
referred to as the risk profile of the observed subjects. The basic requirement of the risk 
profile is that it has to aid the distinction between low- and high- risk subjects. 
Independent variables in the risk profile have differing potential to contribute to the risk 
distinction. Each also has specifically formulated expectations under adverse selection and 
risk selection.
The risk adjustment literature typically uses the explained variance in annual 
individual expenditures to judge the risk discriminating potential of variables, like socio­
demographic characteristics, health status information, and health utilisation in order to 
use them as risk adjusters (Newhouse 1996). It was reported in the literature review that 
socio-economic characteristics like age and gender are not very good risk adjusters, race 
and geography fare a bit better, but prior utilisation is the best risk adjuster. Self-reported 
health status information had mixed results as a risk adjuster, because it faces potential 
verification problems. Although socio-economic variables were identified as not very 
good risk predictors, they have to be included in potential risk profiles for statistical 
reasons (i.e. in order to control for their effects). Also, socio-economic variables are often 
the only "observables' according to insurers sometimes risk select Thus they might cany 
valuable information regarding selection processes (Brown et a t 1993).
If the socio-economic variable age would be included in a risk profile it could be 
expected that insurance coverage for the elderly is either harder to obtain or harder to 
keep, since the risk for ill-health rises with age. Thus it is likely that older people 
adversely select themselves into insurance coverage or that they are unfavourably risk
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selected (i.e. dumped). Younger people are typically targeted by insurers' efforts to attract 
low risks. If joiners are older and leavers are younger than control group subjects then 
adverse selection can be suspected. However, as discussed before, if leavers are younger 
adverse selection might have been induced through the favourable risk selection efforts of 
other insurers. In this case it will be necessary to assess whether or not there is 
information regarding aggressive recruiting by external competitors. Adverse selection 
might also be operating if switchers are older than control group subjects, i.e. high risks 
chose to switch (to high coverage and thus high-risk plans). If joiners are younger and 
leavers are older as compared to the control group risk selection is likely. In the case of 
favourable risk selection switchers are expected to be younger than control group subjects 
(and switch to low-risk plans). Unfavourable risk selection is suspected if switchers are 
older (and switch to high-risk plans).
Variables that contain prior claim and benefits information are expected to be 
excellent risk indicators and factors for risk discrimination because they indicate whether 
or not a subject substantially utilised health services and is thus a low or high risk. 
Insurers always prefer subjects with prospective low risk, since they keep the costs low. 
Insurers are also eager to get rid of subjects with high claims and benefits. Under adverse 
selection joiners are expected to have higher claims and leavers lower claims as compared 
to fiie control group. However, low claims in the leavers groups might also indicate 
favourable risk selection by other competitors. Switchers are expected to have higher 
claims as compared to control group subjects under adverse selection of high risks (into 
high-risk plans). Under risk selection it can be expected that joiners will have lower claims 
and leavers higher claims than the control group. Switchers are expected to have lower 
claims as compared to the control group in the case of favourable risk selection (into low- 
risk plans). Unfavourable risk selection is suspected if switchers have comparably high 
claims (and switch to high-risk plans).
A plan classification variable that classifies plans with regard to their pooled risk 
would be another very useful indicator for risk discrimination. It is expected that subjects 
either self-select themselves or are selected by the insurer with regard to a plan's risk pool 
Under adverse selection it can be assumed that joiners are more likely to be high risks and 
belong more often to high-risk plans and leavers are more likely low risks and belong 
more often to low-risk plans as compared to control group subjects. Adverse selection also 
might be operating if switchers are of high risk and belong more often to high-risk plans 
as compared to control group subjects, i.e. high risks chose to switch to high coverage and
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thus highrrisk plans. Under risk selection it can be expected that joiners are more likely 
low risks and belong more often to low-risk plans and leavers are more likely to be high 
risks and belong more often to high-risk plans as compared to die control group. In the 
case of favourable risk selection, switchers are expected to be of low risk arid belong more 
often to low-risk plans as compared to control group subjects. Unfavourable risk selection 
is suspected if switchers are of high risk and switch to high-risk plans.
Based on this developed group method it will be possible to formulate this thesis' 
empirical testable research hypotheses. It will be developed in the next section.
3.4 Development of the thesis' research hypotheses
This thesis' main research hypothesis expects that one can observe a lack of risk pooling 
between high and low risk enrolees in South Africa's medical schemes. As discussed on 
the previous chapters, this does not exclude the possibility of a separating equilibrium, 
which might indeed be efficient but yet not equitable. This thesis's data and the empirical 
analysis design do not lend themselves to an explicit test for the existence of a separating 
equilibrium, however, this possible interpretation of the results will be discussed.
With the group method it is possible to derive empirically testable hypotheses 
from the thesis' main research hypothesis. First, this main research hypothesis can be 
formulated more precisely with the three subhypotheses shown on the left in figure 3-3. A 
lack of market-wide risk pooling might occur if, for example, most subjects, who recently 
joined insurance coverage, have had high-risk profiles. This might happen either due to 
classic adverse selection - as hypotheses 3A and B suggest - or induced adverse selection 
where external competitors risk select and attract all the low risks -  as formulated in 
hypotheses 1A and B. A lack of risk pooling within the market might happen, if certain 
insurance plan options predominately pool either low or high risks. For example, some 
plans might be more aggressive in breaking risk pooling arrangements, like dumping high 
risks -  as stated in hypothesis 2E - or by refusing coverage to high risks -  as suggested by 
hypothesis 2A.
Second, with the developed selection process typology and the group method 
empirical hypotheses for each subhypothesis can be formulated, including the pair of 
membership groups that should be tested and the risk profile that can be expected. This is 
shown on the right side of figure 3-3.
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Figure 3-3: Research hypotheses and corresponding empirical hypotheses
Research hypotheses Empirical hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: There is competition for low risks 
between medical schemes and for-profit insurers. The 
previously regulated (observed) medical scheme 
market segment is contested, and experiences a 
disproportionate loss of low risks due to:
A. Risk selection by (external) for-profit insurers for low 
risks in the medical scheme market segment, and 
(initiating)
B. Adverse selection with low risks exiting medical 
schemes, and, in particular, exiting their high-risk plan 
options because insurance coverage here is 
comparably expensive and they can find better 
coverage at lower costs elsewhere.
Hypothesis 1: A disproportionate loss of low-risk 
members will be shown by testing the leavers and the 
control group for differences in their risk profiles. If 
medical schemes disproportionately loose low risks it 
will be possible to observe that:
A. Under risk selection by (external for-profit insurers) 
leavers are, for example, younger and have lower 
claims than control group members; and (initiating)
B. Under adverse selection, low risks' exit medical 
schemes, leavers are, for example, younger, have 
lower claims, and have more likely a high-risk plan 
membership than control group members.
Hypothesis 2: In this competition medical schemes
follow several risk-management strategies to protect
their scheme and plan risk pools including:
A. Risk selection that discourages the entry of high-risk 
insurance applicants;
B. Risk selection that attracts the entry of low risks with 
self-selection low-risk plans;
C. Risk selection that prevents the exit of low risks by 
offering low risks to switch Into attractive low-risk plan 
options;
D. Risk selection in the form of pressuring high risks to 
switch into high-risk plan options; and
E. Risk selection by discouraging high risks to continue 
their medical scheme coverage, particularly if they 
belong to high-risk plans.
Hypothesis 2: Med. schemes’ risk selection strategies 
will be shown by testing joiners/switchers/leavers and 
the control group for differences in their risk profiles:
A. Under risk selection that discourages the entry of high 
risks, joiners are, for example, younger and have lower 
claims than control group members;
B. Under risk selection that attracts the entry of low risks, 
joiners are, for example, younger, have lower claims, 
and have more likely a low-risk plan membership than 
control group members;
C. Under risk selection that prevents the exit of low risks, 
switchers are, for example, younger, have lower 
claims, and have more likely a  low-risk plan 
membership than control group members;
D. Under risk selection in the form of pressuring high risks 
to switch; switchers are, for example, older, have 
higher claims, and have more likely a high-risk plan 
membership than control group members; and
E. Under risk selection by discouraging high risks to 
continue their medical scheme coverage, leavers are, 
for example, older, have higher claims, and have more 
likely a high-risk plan membership than control group 
members.
Hypothesis 3: High risks, who are either seeking 
medical scheme coverage or who are already insured 
in the previously regulated medical scheme market 
follow strategies of:
A. Adverse selection by choosing to enter medical 
scheme plan coverage, particularly expensive and 
comprehensive high-risk plan options; and
B. Adverse selection by choosing to switch into medical 
scheme plans with expensive and comprehensive 
coverage, typically high-risk plan options.
Hypothesis 3: Adverse selection strategies of high 
risks will be shown by testing joiners/switchers and 
the control group for differences in their risk profiles:
A. Under adverse selection joiners are, for example, older, 
have higher claims, and more likely have a high-risk 
plan membership than control group members; and
B. Under adverse selection switchers are, for example, 
older, have higher claims, and more likely have a high- 
risk plan membership than control group members.
For example, subhypothesis 3A, of adverse selection strategies of high risks seeking 
medical scheme coverage, in particular high-risk plan coverage, will be shown by testing
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joiners and the control group for differences in their risk profiles. It can be expected that 
under this type of adverse selection joiners are expected to be older, have higher claims 
and more likely a high-risk plan membership than control group members. Under die 
type of adverse selection specified in subhypothesis 3B, where already insured high risks 
seek to switch to high-risk plan options, switchers and the control group will be tested for 
differences in the risk profile. Here it is expected that switchers are, for example, older, 
have higher claims and are more likely to have a high-risk plan membership.
3.5 Summary
This chapter presented die results for the thesis' first research aim -  deriving an empirical 
method with testable hypotheses for adverse selection and risk selection, which is 
applicable to available quantitative techniques and easily accessible data. The group 
method incorporates elements from previous empirical methodologies, namely the 
multiple plan choice and the risk adjustment literature discussed in chapter two. The 
group method is based on the idea that concepts of adverse selection and risk selection 
can be better empirically tested by explaining them as grouping phenomena rather than as 
processes that span over several time-periods.
The first part of this chapter derived the group method. A typology for adverse 
selection and risk selection was developed, which approached the complexity of both 
selection processes by breaking them up into several empirical problems that are easier to 
test. The selection types were distinguished according to their manifestation, mechanisms, 
effects, affected groups, and expected empirical observations. Based on this typology the 
group method was presented, which can disclose in empirical studies whether or not 
subjects practised adverse selection or were risk selected, by observing whether subjects 
with certain risk profiles are more prominent in groups of movers and in certain plans. 
These mover groups are first (1), three different groups of movers -  joiners, leavers, and 
switchers -  as compared to a control group of non-movers, and second (2), groups of 
different plans -  plans that pool low and high risks as compared to average risks. The 
group method supports the theoretical argument that adverse selection and risk selection 
are grouping phenomena and that empirical research should therefore apply methods that 
can assess whether or not subjects of certain risk really group into these specific predicted 
groups. From this approach empirically testable hypotheses can be derived.
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The second part of this chapter identified applicable quantitative techniques 
applying the group method, and addressed the data requirements. Logistic regression was 
suggested as the best choice for empirical studies that want to apply the group method 
because it can explain group membership for individuals that belong to a priori defined 
groups using a multivariate risk profile. Thus the group method leads to three testable 
logistic regression models, which will yield probabilities that a subject or a population 
with certain risk profile characteristic belongs either to one of the three mover groups or 
the control group of non-movers. Significant differences in the specific risk profiles of 
subjects that are more or less likely to join, leave, or switch rather than to belong to the 
control group can then be explained by different selection processes. From the risk profile, 
data requirements for the empirical investigations that wish to apply the group method 
were derived. The data has to be on the individual or household level and in the form of 
cross-sectional or panel data. Either insurance companies or national household surveys 
with a health component typically collect this type of information. This data is relatively 
easily accessible.
Finally, the fourth part developed this diesis' research hypotheses and the 
corresponding empirical hypotheses based on the group method. This thesis' main 
research hypothesis, will be examined in the context of a middle-income country case 
study - South Africa's medical schemes plans.
The group method derived in this chapter will be the backbone of this thesis' 
empirical investigation into evidence for adverse selection and risk selection. The next 
chapter will apply this method to the South African case study data.
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Chapter 4 
Data & empirical analysis: the 
South African case study
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to pursue this thesis' second research aim by conducting an 
empirical analysis into adverse selection and risk selection applying the group method. 
The case study that will be used for this empirical investigation contains longitudinal data 
from the unregulated South African medical scheme market describing the time-period 
between 1995-1998. First, it is the aim to of this chapter to present the data that will be 
used for the empirical analysis. In the course of the data discussion, key issues that 
surfaced during the data examination and preparation will be described. In particular this 
concerns the data format, which is a longitudinal panel. Second, the empirical analysis 
and statistical models for this thesis will be presented. Logistic regression was identified 
in the last chapter as the best quantitative technique for the group method and the 
particular logit model (structure) for the data at hand needs to be specified. The software 
used for the data examination and empirical analysis is STATA™ versions 6 and 7.
After this introduction, part two of this chapter will present the data and data 
sample derivation for the empirical analysis. Discussed key data issues concern the 
identification and exclusion of outliers and missing values and the creation and 
transformation of crucial data variables in preparation of the analysis. The goal here is to 
provide the reader with an understanding of the data sample used for the subsequent 
analysis while also pointing out data peculiarities, namely its panel structure, that are 
essential for the following empirical model building strategy.
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The third part will present the empirical strategy with a logit model for panel data. 
It will be shown that one applied logistic regression model for correlated data, the 
marginal or population averaged model, is the most appropriate logistic regression model 
for the thesis' empirical data analysis. The actual model building will follow a 
confirmatory model specification approach. This specification approach is used because 
the models will essentially be used to confirm existing theory and the group approach. 
The thesis' models are built on two hypotheses, one derived from the multiple plan choice 
literature and a second one based on the risk adjustment literature. With the identified 
model building strategy three models will be specified. These models will discriminate 
between data subgroups using a multivariate risk profile in order to derive empirical 
evidence for adverse selection and risk selection. Expectations for the independent 
variable vector that addresses this thesis' research hypotheses will be described and a 
four-step model building process will be applied.
4.2 Data and data sample: longitudinal panel for 1995-1998
This thesis' second research aim is to conduct an empirical analysis into adverse selection
and risk selection with data describing an unregulated health insurance market in a middle- 
income country. The purpose of this section is to present and discuss the data that will be 
used for the empirical analysis. The data describes a sample of privately insured 
households in an unregulated market of a middle-income country, the Republic of South 
Africa. The part of South Africa's health insurance market that is of concern for this thesis 
is the medical scheme market, which has its historic origins in mutually organised 
employment-based insurance arrangements. Medical schemes were subject to strong 
government regulation between 1960 and 1990. The Medical Scheme Act (1967) made 
them subject to registration with the Office of the Registrar, recognising them as non­
profit entities and preventing any risk-related premia-rating. Following a wave of 
deregulation in the early 1990s many medical schemes introduced risk-rated premia and 
turned into quasi-private health insurers.
Medical schemes cover 20% of the South African population and guarantee its 
member's access to good quality health care provided in the private sector. In 1998 total
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medical scheme expenditure69 compromised about 90% of all private health expenditure 
in South Africa (Rama and McLeod 2001). Medical schemes can be classified into so-called 
'open' or free public individual/group enrolment schemes and 'closed' or restricted 
employment-, union- or other professional-based enrolment schemes. There were 160 to 
180 registered schemes between 1990-1999, among which open schemes represented 30% 
and closed schemes 70%. During this time period the number of open schemes increased 
from 42 to 48 and the number of restricted schemes decreased from 138 to 112. The trend 
in membership development for the two different scheme types followed a similar 
pattern. Most registered schemes, about 60%, were small schemes with less than 6,000 
members. However, the majority of open schemes were large, with more than 30,000 
members, and the majority of closed schemes were small. Between 1990-1999 the number 
of all small schemes decreased from 138 to 89. The decline in the number of small 
registered schemes could be largely attributed to a decrease in small closed schemes 
(Rama and McLeod 2001). Medical schemes are either self-administered or professionally 
administered by for-profit companies (Soderlund and Hansl 1999). The data used here 
originated from a South African for-profit holding company that manages the 
administration of 29 medical insurance schemes.
This section will first discuss the data source and data sample derivation. Second, 
an overview of the data variables and study population will be provided. The overview 
will also comprise the description of how crucial identifier variables for the analysis were 
created. The later concerns a process of classifying plans into different risk pools and the 
depiction of the data subgroups through identifier variables. Finally, it will introduce the 
subgroups of joiners, leavers, switchers, and the control group and compare some of their 
household characteristics by taking the panel structure of the data into account.
4.2.1 Data source and data sample derivation
The data used in this analysis was collected by a holding company that administers 
several of South Africa's medical schemes. It became available in the course of a previous 
research project that investigated the effects of the deregulation policy between 1989-1994 
on risk pooling of the medical schemes (Soderlund and Hansl 1999,2000).70 However, this
69 Medical scheme expenditure accounted for 73% of South Africa’s total private health expenditure. If the 
out-of-pocket expenditures of medical scheme members is included this number rises to 89%.
70 The research project studied trends in risk pooling and efficiency of South Africa’s medical schemes 
following deregulation. It was sponsored by the International Clearinghouse for Health Systems Reform 
Initiatives, the European Union (via the DoH), the Medical Research Council of South Africa, and the
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data was never actually analysed prior to this thesis/ because it challenged the capacities 
and time-constraints of that research project.
The background for this research project was the change in the regulatory regime 
for South Africa's medical schemes. The prior to 1989, under the Medical Scheme Act of 
1967, regulated medical schemes became subject to a series of deregulations by the South 
African government between 1989 and 1993 (HST1996,1998, Soderlund and Hansl 2000). 
In particular the new rule that allowed the replacement of community-rating with risk- 
rating transformed the prior mutual medical scheme system into an unregulated quasi­
private health insurance market with anecdotal evidence for adverse selection and risk 
selection. These anecdotal reports were recognised by the South African government and 
led to a research project in 1997-1998, which aimed to either verify or falsify these 
anecdotal reports with empirical evidence. The project, by Dr. N. Soderlund and the thesis 
author, analysed several data sets and conducted interviews and a document review in 
the office of the regulator, the Registrar of the South African Medical Schemes.
The holding company data, which are used in this thesis, represent the four-year 
time-period between 1995-1998, when most medical schemes switched to the quasi-private 
mode of operation. The last fact is based on the previous research project's observation 
that deregulation rules allowing risk-rating were only fully implemented by the medical 
schemes in the mid-1990s. This conclusion was drawn from interviews with the Registrar 
of Medical Schemes, Danie Kolver, his assistant Ryno van Zijl, and a document review of 
medical scheme files for the years 1989 to 1998 at the Registrar's office in Pretoria. These 
sources consistently indicated that most schemes did not implement risk-adjustment 
strategies, including premia risk-rating, until 1993-1995. In fact very few schemes started 
any risk-adjustment strategies by 1993, and most schemes took at least one or two more 
years before they established strategies that included premia risk-rating. Thus the thesis 
data of South Africa's unregulated medical schemes describe a post-deregulation 
experience. However, a before-and-after deregulation scenario for the analysis of this 
thesis' case study cannot be performed with the available data starting in 1995 (because 
some medical schemes might have adjusted to the deregulation of 1989 earlier than 1995 
when the observed data starts).
The data provided by the medical scheme holding company contains a given set of 
29 medical schemes. This represents a sample of about one-fifth of all South African
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (via the British Department for International 
Development).
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medical schemes, which covered 20% of South Africa's population between 1995-1998. It is 
assumed that this can be seen as a representative sample of the South African medical 
scheme population This is because the selection of medical schemes seems random, 
covering a variety of different schemes, former open-enrolment and closed-enrolment 
schemes and schemes of varying sizes (see table A4-1 in Appendix 4 and the description 
of these plans in subsection 4.2.2.A.). Although there is no founded indication, it might be 
that the selection of given medical schemes is not completely random, and the medical 
schemes administered by this holding company differ from other medical schemes in the 
market (producing biased results).
The data is in the form of a short (four-year) panel of insured individuals and their 
families (i.e. households) belonging to one of the medical schemes and one of their plan 
options. This type of data is often referred to as longitudinal data. The raw data 
compromises N=l,011,735 observations for 71=353,458 insured households over the four 
year observation period between 1995 and 1998, where the unit of observation is the 
household level. The insured households are members of the 29 medical schemes with 49 
plan options altogether. Each of the insured households has observations for at least one 
year and a maximum of four years. It provides detailed information on a series of 
households' socioeconomic characteristics, levels of chosen coverage and premium 
contribution, actual claim and benefit patterns, and the dates when a chosen scheme and 
plan coverage started and ended.
Data is limited to what has been recorded and the data was originally not collected 
for the purpose of this analysis. For example, within the holding company data some 
variable measures were not complete for some household observations. As a result the 
data is partially incomplete - also called unbalanced. Missing data of this type are very 
common in longitudinal data sets, because repeated measurements for one 
subject/household have to be obtained but the circumstances for obtaining these 
measurements are often not within the control of the data collector. After the identification 
of outliers71 and the evaluation of the missing data (process) it was justifiable to exclude 
the small percentage of cases with incomplete or outlier observations (12% or 177,980 of all 
observations, but only 8% or 27,501 of all households). Appendix 3 describes the 
diagnostic techniques used for the initial data examination, in the course of which the 
influence of missing values and outliers was assessed. Consequently the sample used in
71 Compared to the majority of the sample, outliers are characterised by distinct differences. Outliers usually 
represent an extraordinary event that can either be explained by the researcher or not.
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this thesis contains N=833,755 observations belonging to 71=325,957 households over a 
four-year observation period from 1995 to 1998.
4.2.2 Data variables, study population, and created identifier variables
The data contains socio-economic characteristics, like age, gender, number of dependants,
residential area, income and race for the so-called principal member. He or she is the
individual that signed the insurance contract and is responsible for the premium payment
and other occurring insurance costs. Most principal members in the initial sample (about
two-thirds) have some type of dependant (spouses, children etc.).72 This fact causes most
data to reflect household values for more than one individual. Information that is reported
for each household contains data on contributions, co-payments, claims and benefits. It
would therefore be wrong to speak about insured individuals and their characteristics. In
fact, the data mostly covers data per family or household per year, not per subject Thus
the unit of observation for the data analysis will be the household level.
The variables in the data were distinguished according to the following criteria. 
First, there are variables carrying socio-economic characteristics of the principal member, 
like age, gender, number of dependants, income group, race, and a geographical 
characteristic - the postcode of the residential area. Using the recorded post codes, it could 
be distinguished if the principal member's residential area was either rural or urban. This 
information was captured by creating a dummy variable (one if urban, zero otherwise). 
Second, several variables reflect claims, tariffs73, contributions, and benefits per 
household. In addition, this second variable group included a range of different medical 
benefit variables for services like, GPs, specialists, public and private hospitals, dental, 
optical, and other services.
However, since this data was not collected for the purpose of this thesis, several of 
the original measures were converted into other more applicable (and for the empirical 
analysis, useful) variables. For example, all contribution-claim and benefit variables were 
converted into measures per household member and household membership month. 
More importantly, several new variables were created, namely the risk plan and mover 
group identifier variables, which are crucial for the analysis. The following paragraphs 
will briefly describe the data variables, including the plan classification process creating
72 If the data indicates dependants these are covered by the insurance contract
73 In South Africa the tariff is the legally billable amount for medical services and procedures.
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the risk plan variable and the determination of the data subgroups through identifier 
variables.
A. Data variables describing the study population
About two-thirds (70%) of the observed 325,957 households were headed by a male 
principal member. White South Africans constituted about a third of all household 
observations (107,672 or 33%), similar to the Coloured population (102,068 or 31%) and 
Black South Africans (89,852 or 28%). Asian South Africans were by far the smallest group 
of households with only 8%, or 26,373/ headed by an Asian principal member.
Income was originally coded as an approximate income group category between 
zero and 999 based on the income when the household first joined. This coding was 
provided by the medical schemes holding company, the data souroe. It represents no 
actual monetary income value in Rand, but an income category assigned by die medical 
schemes. Zero was the lowest income group and 999 the highest income group. The mean 
income group was 549. The medical schemes were not willing to provide more accurate 
income data stating confidentiality reasons.
In this form the income variable was not very informative, and it was converted 
into a categorical variable, which takes die value zero if a household belongs to a defined 
average income group, comprising all households with income groups between 500-599. 
The variable has the value one if a household belongs to a below average income group 
between 0-499 and the value two if it belongs to an above average income group between 
600-999. The income variable was coded into these three categories, average, below and 
above average, because it was hoped this would provide more easily interpretable results. 
The reference category will be defined as the average income group in the empirical 
analysis. Three percent of the data households had an average income. Thirty-nine percent 
of all household data belonged to the above average income group while 58% belong to 
the below average income group.
Table 4-1 presents the description of several continuous variables. The overall 
mean age (over all household-years) of the principal household member was 42 years and 
the average number of dependants was two. The average claims per member and 
membership month lay at 229 Rand, the average contributions at 242 Rand. A co-payment 
variable was created by calculating the difference between the legally billable amount (or
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tariff) and the actual paid-out benefits.74 The mean co-payment was 23 Rand. Among the 
benefits75, private hospital benefits had the highest overall mean with 43 Rand per 
member and month, while public hospital benefits had file lowest overall mean with 2 
Rand. Claim, co-payment, and benefit data showed a relatively high variation, which is 
due to the unpredictable nature of ill-health events.
Table 4-1: Description o f selected continuous variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Socio-economic
age 833,755 41.65 13.00 0 98
dep (dependants) 833,755 1.90 1.67 0 17
inc (income group) 833,755 548.82 341.01 0 999
Claim-contribution & benefits
tac (claims) 833,755 228.81 440.38 0 94,471
tco (contributions) 833,755 241.61 121.50 0 8,600
co2 (co-payments) 833,755 23.33 123.58 0 44,554
gp (GP benefits) 833,755 22.86 21.04 0 1,457
pub (pub. hospital benefits) 833,755 2.02 49.82 0 31,480
spe (specialist benefits) 833,755 35.67 97.93 0 12,286
prv (priv. hospital benefits) 833,755 42.46 235.75 0 42,826
den (dental benefits) 833,755 16.53 37.81 0 2,503
opt (optical benefits) 833,755 10.68 21.62 0 997
par (paramedical benefits) 833,755 3.25 31.07 0 5,399
Note: This table does not take the panel data structure o f the data into account and instead provides a rough 
summary statistic for these variables over all N=833,75S observations or household-years (rather than 
nsx325,957 households). This is sufficient, however, in order to provide a basic data overview.
The observed households belonged to 29 different medical schemes that altogether have 
49 plan options for their members. This sample of 29 medical schemes was determined by
74 Of altogether three possible co-payment variables -  (1) co-payment 1 per person (claim-tariff), (2) co- 
payment2 per person (tariff-benefit), and (3) total co-payments per person (claim-benefits) - only the co- 
payment2 variable is considered here. The total co-payment variable is an aggregation of co-payment 1 and 2. 
Both are two very different conceptual measures with opposing underlying trends over time. For this reason it 
seemed not to be a very useful variable for further consideration. Co-payment 1 is a measure of provider- 
overbilling over the agreed legal tariff. It will not be considered further because it captures a form of cost- 
sharing, which could not be influenced by the insured household. This co-payment component would add no 
value to the analysis of selection processes. Also, the co-paymentl share of the total co-payment is 
significantly less (approximately 20-30%) than the one of co-payment2. The more significant part of the co­
payment is contained in the co-payment2 variable.
5 GP and public hospital benefits will be classified in this thesis as basic benefits, since both are seen as 
emergency or essential medical services. They represent two different service sectors -  ambulatory and in­
patient care. Specialist and private hospital benefits were classified as negotiable benefits. They are seen as 
negotiable, since cheaper options, like GP or public hospital services, exist. However, they are not 
discretionary. Medicine benefits, another available variable, was not considered further because it was highly 
correlated to other essential and negotiable benefits. A third set of the benefit variables was classified as 
discretionary benefits. Dental, optical and paramedical benefits will be considered further as they stem from 
optional and non-essential services. Two other available discretionary benefit variables of physiotherapy and 
associated/miscellaneous benefits are not considered further because the correlation analysis showed high
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the data set taken from the holding company. It represents a typical sample of the medical 
scheme market, with some (9 out of the 29) schemes having had 'open' or free public 
individual/ group enrolment, and other (20 out of 29) schemes having had 'closed' or 
restricted employment-, union- or professional-based enrolment76 A list of the medical 
schemes (open and closed), together with their overall and average number of 
observations over the four-year observation period is given in Appendix 4, table A4-1.
As in the overall number of the 160-180 schemes between 1990-1999 also this 
thesis' data sample of 29 schemes between 1994-1998 contained one-third open schemes. 
Applying the scheme size categories of the Office of the Registrar, small schemes having 
less than 6,000 members, medium schemes having 6,000-29,999 member and large 
schemes having more than 30,000 members, 21 out of the 29 schemes can be defined as 
small, six as medium and two as large. This distribution also coincides with the overall 
proportion of all 160-180 registered schemes classified as small or large. Among the 21 
small schemes two were open schemes, the remaining were closed schemes. The number 
of open schemes was much higher for die medium and large category, seven out of eight 
This too is confirming that the analysis sample is a good representation of die medical 
scheme market, where the majority of closed schemes was small and the majority of open 
schemes were large. This means of course that a small number of (open) schemes 
contribute the bulk of observations to the analysis. For example, the three largest open 
schemes contribute around 50% of all observations.
Since the data was collected and managed by one holding company, the data 
reflect standard reporting from the plans and can be assessed as reliable. Thus variation in 
the quality of data by scheme or plan is not expected and given the large data point 
number the quality can be assessed as good. No selection bias is suspected in terms of the 
analysed schemes, they represent a typical mix of open and closed, small and large 
schemes that either operated nation-wide or for specific industries. Altogether, the
correlation to all other types of benefits. Besides this, they seemed generally of lesser relevance, because of 
their low values.
76 Official records at the Registrar of the Medical Schemes have only been classifying schemes as open or 
closed since 1997. However, the Registrar’s office was internally classifying schemes according to this 
distinction since about 1992 (Rama and McLeod 2001). The schemes used in this sample were classified 
regarding open and closed with the help of the Registrar D. Kolver and his assistant R. van Zijl based on their 
knowledge and memory (in Summer 1998). However, if schemes changed from open to closed and vice versa 
during 1992-1997 their final classification was used here. Before 1995 open and closed schemes had roughly 
similar membership levels. However, in the period after 1995 membership of closed schemes declined while 
membership in open schemes rose. Also, the number of open schemes rose, while the number of closed 
schemes declined. This was largely due to a change in the status of several schemes from closed to open.
Also, most of the open schemes represent large schemes, while closed schemes are often very small (see also 
Rama and McLeod 2001).
123
Birgit Hartsl Chapter 4: Data <£ empirical analysis
distinction between open and dosed schemes did not matter for this analysis, since both 
their administration and risk pooling followed essentially similar rules under the Medical 
Schemes Act The plan membership of each household is of much more interest since it is 
the plan choice that might indicate adverse selection or risk selection.
Most of the 29 schemes, had only one plan option (39%), five schemes had two 
options (20%), two had three (12%), two had four (16%), and one had six options (12%). 
Table 4-2 compares the number of plan options and their percentage as a share of the 
different plan types.
Table 4-2: Comparison o f number ofplan options for all plan types
Number 
of plan 
options
Freq. 
all plan 
options
Percent 
of all 
plans
Cum. Freq. 
open plan 
options
Percent 
of open 
plans
Cum. Freq. 
closed plan 
options
Percent
of
closed
plans
Cum.
One 19 38.78 38.78 1 4.35 4.35 18 69.23 69.23
Two 5 20.41 59.18 4 34.78 39.13 2 15.38 84.62
Three 2 12.24 71.43 2 26.09 65.22 0 0 84.62
Four 2 16.33 87.76 2 34.78 100 1 15.38 100
Five 0 0 87.76 0 0 100 0 0 100
Six 1 12.24 100 0 0 100 0 0 100
Total 49 100 23 100 26 100
Within the nine open schemes there were 23 plan options. Two and three options were 
most frequent (35% and 26%, respectively). Most open medical schemes have two or more 
plan options among which members can choose. In comparison, among the nine dosed 
schemes the vast majorily (70%) had only one plan option. The list of the medical scheme 
plan options, together with their average number of observations over the four-year 
observation period is given in Appendix 4, table A4-2. From the previous observations 
that most open schemes are medium or large sized and most of the time have more than 
one plan option, it can be derived that medium and large schemes had most plan options. 
This can be confirmed with table A4-2 in Appendix 4.
B. Identifier variables: plan classification and group classification
For the analysis a household's plan membership was only considered in terms of the plan 
classification as a low-, average-, or high-risk plan.77 The classification was done starting 
with the variable means averaged across all plans in die data set over the entire four-year
77Individual plan membership could not be otherwise considered, because the preferred model only allowed 
one clustering option. The model clustered observations from each household, obtained over the maximum
124
Birgit Hansl Chapter 4: Data A empirical analysis
observation period, 1995-1998. Plans were then assessed to determine whether individual 
plan means for several variable values indicated a low-, average-, or high-risk 
accumulation, i.e. if plans comprised low-, average-, or high-risk pools. The plan 
classification into low-, average-, and high-risk plans was done applying the following 
process, the main components of which are also described in table 4-3.
Table 4-3: Group classification into low, high and average risk plans for the South African data
Classified plan type Variables with expected plan means 
below overall mean range 95-98
Variables with expected plan means 
above overall mean range 95-98
Low-risk plan age
claims, contributions
benefits (specifically basic benefits)
High-risk plan age
claims, contributions 
benefits
Average-risk plan no consistent pattern or within overall 
mean range
no consistent pattern or within overall 
mean range
First, the literature review, and in particular the risk-adjustment literature, concluded that 
it is possible to predict individuals' health expenditures (as a measure of risk for ill-health) 
using a few individual risk indicators. Specifically, easily obtainable measures of age and 
prior utilisation were identified as quite reliable measures (e.g. Newhouse 1996). This 
approach was applied here to classify plans into specific risk pools. The variable measures 
of age, contributions, claims, co-payments, and of several benefits were used for the 
classification of plans into low-, average-, and high-risk pools. For example, low-risk plans 
would be expected to show mostly below average values for age, contributions, claims, 
and benefits, in particular basic benefits as compared to the overall data means. High-risk 
plans were expected to display mostly above average values for age, contributions, claims, 
and benefits compared to the overall data means. Plans with average means within the 
overall data mean interval would be classified as average-risk plans.
Second, a list of variable means over the observation period 1995-1998 was 
compiled, averaged across all plans in the data set (and displayed in column one of table 
4-4). These overall means were subsequently compared to individual plan means to 
determine whether the plan mean lay below or above the overall mean. However, rather 
than taking the single number of the overall variable mean as the cut-point for this
observation period of four years, in order to consider the panel character of the data. Another option - using 
49 dummy variables for plan consideration - was dismissed for reasons of impracticability.
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classification/ a deviation/ or mean interval/ was defined around each overall variable 
mean (column three and four in table 4-4).
Table 4-4: Variable means and mean intervals for plan classification
Variables Mean Deviation Mean interval
Soclo-demographic
age 42 4 38<42<46
Claims, contribution and
benefits in Rand
contributions 242 100 142<242<342
co-payment2 23 10 13<23<33
claims 229 80 149<229<309
Basic benefits
GP 23 5 18<23<28
public hospital 2.0 1.5 0.5<2.0<2.5
Negotiable benefits
specialist 36 15 21<36<51
private hospital 43 20 23<43<63
Discretionary benefits
dental 17 5 12<17<22
optical 11 4 7<11<15
paramedical 3.3 2 1.3<3.3<5.3
Note: These are the means over all N=833,755 observations and n=325,957 households.
Third/ die variable means for all individual plans were obtained and compiled in another 
table (see table A5-2 in Appendix 5). Next/ all plan variable means that expressed a value 
above or below the overall mean were marked in this table. If, for example/ a plan's 
variable mean for age lay beyond the upper mean interval border of 46, this would 
indicate for that specific plan that it accumulated older members, i.e. members with a high 
risk. If, on the other hand the plan mean age lay under the lower mean interval border of 
38, this variable would then indicate that the plan pooled predominantly younger 
members, i.e. low risks. Yellow was used to mark plan means below the defined mean 
interval range. Pink was used to mark plan means above the defined mean interval range. 
Plan means that lay within the overall mean interval were left uncoloured and considered 
average risk pooling.
Finally, the identification of a consistent pattern over the variables in table 4-3 and 4- 
4 was focused on, either indicating an accumulation of low risks or high risks. If plans 
consistently showed the expected variable mean patterns that indicated an accumulation 
of low risks they were classified into low-risk plans. Claims and benefits as indicators of 
prior utilisation were identified by the risk adjustment literature as the best risk adjusters, 
while age and other sodo-demographic variables still had some value as risk adjusters.
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Thus the main variables of interest for the classification were, in order of importance: (1) 
total claims/ (2) benefits, either supporting consistently a high or low risk pattern, and (3) 
age, as a supporting socio-demographic variable.
Out of the 49 plans 10 could be classified as low-risk plans. Similarly, if plan 
variable means were consistently above the overall mean range they most likely pooled 
high risks and could be classified as high-risk plans. Ten out of the 49 plans in the sample 
followed this high-risk pattern. The remaining 29 plans either displayed plan variable 
means within the overall mean range or other inconsistent patterns. These plans were 
classified as average-risk plans. The last column of table A5-2 in the Appendix 5 shows the 
classification of plans into low-, average-, and high-risk plans. Table A5-3 in Appendix 5 
summarises the classification result of low- and high-risk plans -  they display only plans 
and variable means for these two groups.
Last, but not least, a sensitivity analysis was performed by either increasing or 
decreasing the overall mean intervals, in order to confirm this classification. The 
sensitivity analysis was performed by increasing and decreasing the overall means 
intervals by 10% (see Appendix 5, table A5-1). Only a small number of mean 
classifications for all plans changed either by increasing or decreasing the means interval. 
Column 5 and column 7 in table A5-1 report these numbers. Increasing the mean interval 
by 10% altogether leads to only 12 mean classification changes for all 539 plan means. 
Decreasing the mean interval by 10% altogether leads to slightly more mean classification 
changes, 33 out of all 539 plan means. These low numbers suggest a very robust plan 
classification.
In Appendix 5 tables A5-4 and A5-5 show the plan classification into low- and 
high-risk plans with a 10% increased mean interval. Among low-risk and high-risk plans 
one mean classification changed for three plans. However, neither of these changes altered 
these plans overall classification as low- or high-risk plans. In Appendix 5 tables A5-6 and 
A5-7 show the plan classification into low- and high-risk plan with a 10% decreased mean 
interval. Among low-risk plans five mean classifications changed for three plans, but all of 
them supported their overall plan classification as low-risk plans. Among the high-risk 
plans five mean classifications changed for four plans. Here too, none of these mean 
classification changes altered their overall plan classification, on the contrary, some 
supported their classification as high-risk plans. Based on the sensitivity analysis it can be
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conduded that the classification of the plans into low-, average-, and high-risk plans is 
robust.78
With this plan classification process it was possible to create a categorical variable, 
called risk (plan), that classified insurance plans into average risk carriers (and thus 
average-risk plans, taking the value zero) and plans with below (value 1) or above average 
(value 2) risks. About 70% of all households belonged to plans that had an average risk 
profile according to this classification. About a fifth belong to classified low-risk plans and 
only about 10% to classified high-risk plans.
The data set also contains households' entry and exit dates for their membership in 
plans and for their membership in schemes. This makes it possible to determine whether a 
household joined medical schemes during the observation period (i.e. belonged to a group 
of joiners) or was already insured in a medical scheme (and belonged to the control group) 
using a coded dummy variable. Similarly, it was possible to distinguish groups of leavers 
of medical schemes from the control group. Thus joiners and leavers only concern the medical 
scheme entry and exit Switchers concern only the movement between different plans 
within a medical scheme. Altogether three dummy variables were created - joiners-control 
(jc), leavers-control (lc), and switchers-control (sc). These will be the independent variables 
in the three models estimated later. Table 4-5 summarises all four groups of households, 
the number of households in the sample used and the attributes of distinction between 
each
For example, for jc the value equals one if a household ever joined a medical scheme 
during the four-year observation period, zero if it belonged to the control group, and is 
marked differently otherwise (for instance if it belonged to the group of leavers or 
switchers). Thus joiners are only households that have a medical scheme entry date 
between 1994-1998.79 Control group households are households with a medical scheme 
entry date before 1994 and no medical scheme exit date or plan switch date. The variable
780riginally this plan classification was done for each of the four years and these overall means. The yearly 
classification led to no changes in the final plan classification. Though some individual mean classifications 
for some plans did change, as happened with the sensitivity analysis. Because these tables are extremely 
space intensive, and do not provide a great deal of added information, and because the plan classification 
algorithm would have been further obscured by more table detail, the author decided to only use the overall 
means tables to describe the classification algorithm in this thesis. However, the yearly classification tables 
are available upon request from the author.
79 Households were marked as joiners, leavers, or switchers for all available observations if they joined, lefi, 
or switched at any point in time during the observation period. This was done because the interest lays in the 
household's profile and behaviour over all available years of observation that either followed the joining and 
switching or preceded the switching and leaving. Due to this coding system the dummies are equivalent to 
time-invariant variables.
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lc was similarly coded. Lc has the value one if the household ever left a medical scheme 
during the four-year observation period. Thus leavers are only households that have a 
medical scheme exit date between 1994-1998.
Table 4-5: Group classification into movers versus control group for the South African data
Group Households Attribute of distinction
Joiners
(ic*1)
73.941
(22%)
• Households joined medical schemes at any time during the observation period
Leavers 
<lc = 1)
97,729
(29%)
• Households left medical schemes at any time during the observation period
Switchers 13,361 • Households switched to another plan within a medical scheme during the observation
(sc = 1) (3.7%) period (about 90% of switchers entered a new plan)
Control 164,620 • Households were already insured and remained insured in original plan and medical
(ic/lc/sc * 0) (50%) scheme during the observation period
The coding for variable sc was slightly different. Switchers are households that entered or 
exited plans within medical schemes not medical schemes during the four-year observation 
period Thus switchers were always already members of a medical schemes (i.e. must have 
joined the medical scheme before 1994 and had such an entry date). Sc equals one if the 
household ever switched plans during die observation period. Thus switchers are only 
households that have a plan exit or entry date between 1994-1998.
It was pointed out that die variable sc was coded one if a household ever entered 
or exited a plan within a medical scheme. With the original data it was not possible to 
determine where switchers who entered a plan of a medical scheme came from or to 
where switchers who exited a medical scheme plan went Most of die switcher 
observations (about 95%) described switchers who entered a plan. Because of the small 
number of switchers who exited plans, both types of switchers had to be pooled in light of 
the later statistical model analysis.80 There will be no further distinction between switcher 
subgroups.
From table 4-5 the four data subgroups of interest can be derived, (1) the group of 
joiners, (2) the group of leavers, (3) the group of switchers and (4) die control group. These 
four data subgroups will be comparatively described in the next section, with 
consideration given to the panel data structure of the data.
80 The discrepancy between the number of switchers that joined and switchers that left is explainable with 
filing negligence. For a plan manager it is far more important to open a file for a switcher that joined rather 
than to close the file of one that left However, this has no effect on the later analysis.
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4.2.3 Comparative data subgroup description considering the panel data structure 
The joiners group counted 73,941 households, the leavers group 97,728, and the switchers
group 13,361 (compared to 164,620 households in the control group and a total of 325,957
households) over the four years of observation. Table 4-6 demonstrates the panel character
of the data, describing the data T pattern for the households in the joiners, leavers,
switchers, and control groups, over the observation period 1=1995,1996,1997, 1998. For
example, die control group contains 164,620 households with uniquely identified
observations over a maximum number of four household years.
Table 4-6: Data pattern over T for the control group versus mover groups
Control
Freq. Perc. Cum. Pattern
Joiners
Freq. Perc. Cum. Pattern
78,205 47.51 47.51 1111 13,996 18.93 18.93 ..11
13,339 8.10 55.61 1... 10,768 14.56 33.49 .111
10,802 6.56 62.17 11.. 9,038 12.22 45.71 1111
10,599 6.44 68.61 111. 6,011 8.13 53.84 ...1
10,368 6.30 74.91 11.1 5,767 7.80 61.64 11..
10,234 6.22 81.12 .111 5,588 7.56 69.20 .11.
7,462 4.53 85.66 1.11 4,885 6.61 75.81 1...
5,394 3.28 88.93 ...1 4,809 6.5 82.31 ..1.
5,060 3.07 92.01 ..11 4,424 5.98 88.29 .1..
13,157 7.99 100 (other) 8,655 11.71 100 (other)
n*164,620 100.00 xxxx n»73,941 100.00 XXXX
Leavers Switchers
23,360 23.9 23.9 11.. 2,566 19.21 19.21 1111
22,786 23.32 47.22 1... 1,655 12.39 31.59 .111
17,707 18.12 65.34 111. 1,532 11.47 43.06 1...
9,192 9.41 74.74 .1.. 1,358 10.16 53.22 ...1
7,655 7.83 82.58 .11. 1,061 7.94 61.16 .1..
5,033 5.15 87.73 ..1. 683 7.36 68.52 111.
3,920 4.01 91.74 1.1. 970 7.26 75.78 ..11
2,983 3.05 94.79 1111 906 6.78 82.56 11..
1.443 1.48 96.27 ..11 719 5.38 87.94 .11.
3,650 3.73 100 (other) 1,611 12.06 100 (other)
n=97,729 100.00 XXXX n-13,361 100.00 XXXX
Note: In the pattern column the participation pattern is shown. A 1 in the pattern means one observation that 
year; a dot means no observation. The largest fraction of households. 47.5% o f the control households, was 
observed for all four years, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. The next largest fraction, 23.9% o f leaver 
households, was observed in 1995 and 1996. At the bottom is the sum o f the participation patterns; all data 
subgroups had households with all four years o f observation.
It describes specifically the participation pattern of the cross-sectional time-series data. Of 
all households in the control group 47.5% have observations for all four time periods, 
while about 71% have at least three years of observations. Joiners have 12.2% of their 
households contributing with four-year observations, leavers only three percent and
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switchers 19.2%. However, all three have 27%, 21%, and 39% of their household 
observations, respectively, contributing at least three years.
The data of n households with recorded histories allows consideration of not only 
the household dimension within each cross-section, but also of households' intertemporal 
dynamics. For example, data with repeated observations is the only way to obtain 
information about individual patterns of change (Davis 2002). These intertemporal 
dynamics within panel data make the distinction between individual and average 
behaviour possible. The following comparative data subgroup description, whenever 
feasible, considers the panel structure of the data. This means that not only will the cross- 
sectional dimension of the data be regarded, but also that changes/ trends over time will 
be considered. The subgroup households will be compared along different characteristics. 
These will be first, their socio-economic household characteristics, second their claim- 
contribution and benefits characteristics, and finally, the characteristics of their plan 
choices.
A. Socio-econom ic characteristics
The socio-economic characteristics were described by the variables of age, gender, race 
and income group for the three mover groups and the control group over the four year 
observation period.81
Figure 4-1 compares the mean age for the control group, joiners, leavers, and 
switchers. It is sufficient to work here with the overall subgroup means and it is not 
necessary to explore the panel structure for the age variable. This is because the age of the 
principal member will change naturally over the four-year observation period, but will 
not reveal any other enlightening trends. The overall mean age of the switchers is the 
highest of the four groups at 44.2 years, followed by the control group at 44.9. The joiners 
mean age is the lowest at 35.5 years. The overall mean age of leavers at 38.8 is above that 
of the joiners but still bellow the control group. Although the overall mean ages for the 
data subgroups are calculated from quite different observation numbers (ranging from 
13,361 for the switchers to 501,158 for the control group), the standard deviation for each 
subgroup was around 12, the minima and maxima between zero and 98.
81 Age was measured as a continuous value, while all other socio-economic variables were categorical.
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Figure 4-1: Mean age comparison for control group versus mover groups
Mean age  of control group  v e rsu s  m over g roups
46 -r—
control group joiners leavers switchers
Groups
Even though overall two-thirds of all households are headed by a male principal member, 
female headed households account for nearly 40% of the joiners (compared to 28% in the 
control group, 32% in the leavers group and 26% in the switchers group). Taking the panel 
data structure into account, table 4-7 describes the one-way tabulation for the gender 
variable. The gender variable is one if the principal household member is female and is 
otherwise zero. The overall column refers to all observations -  the household-years - while 
the between column refers to the households.
Although gender (like race) is a time-invariant variable, the within percent 
tabulation is not 100 and the total of the between column is higher than the n number of 
households.82 This indicates that some households sometimes must have gen=0 and at 
other times gen=l, very unlikely for a time-invariant characteristic. However, this can be 
explained by the possibility that, for some households, the head of the household and thus 
principal insurance member changed during the observation period. This must have 
happened in rare cases (for instance, in 0.22% or 368 of all cases among the control 
group83) due to reasons like death or divorce. Subsequently another household member, 
such as the widow(er), took over the insurance plan as the new principal member. 
Generally, female headed households have higher proportions among the joiners and
82 For time-invariant variables the within column should always show 100, since the variable value should 
stay constant over time (i.e. for all observations o f one household). The within value is often interpreted as a 
stability measure.
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leavers than the control group and lower proportions among the switchers than the 
control group
Table 4-7: One-way table for gender variable for control group versus mover groups
Gender Overall Between Within
Control Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Percent
0 -  male 364,146 72.66 119,554 72.62 99.77
1 -  female 137,012 27.34 45,434 27.60 99.63
Total 501,158 100.00 164,988 100.22 99.73
Joiners
(n «164,620)
0 -  male 99,010 60.93 45,185 61.11 99.93
1 -  female 63,476 39.07 28,790 38.94 99.93
Total 162,486 100.00 73,975 100.05 99.93
Leavers
(n -  73,941)
0 -  male 121,866 66.31 65,901 67.43 99.97
1 -  female 61,915 33.69 31,851 32.59 99.95
Total 183 ,781 100.00 97,752 100.02 99.96
Switchers
(n -  97,729)
0 -  male 22,700 73.58 9,923 74.27 99.75
1 -  female 8,152 26.42 3,467 25.95 99.56
Total 30,852 100.00 13,390 100.22 99.70
(n -13,361)
For the time-invariant variable race the proportion of each race within the four subgroups 
is displayed in figure 4-2.84 Figure 4-2 shows that the race distribution over the four 
subgroups differs significantly. While the control group is dominated by Coloured 
households (39%), joiners and leavers have by far the highest White membership, 43% and 
45% respectively. Whites also have the highest membership proportion among the leavers 
(37%).
It can be observed that first, Coloured headed households seem to enter and 
switch insurance less often, but also leave more often as compared to other groups with a 
similar control group representation (like Whites and Blacks). Thus their membership in 
the market is shrinking. Second, Black households account for the fastest growing racial 
group among the insured - Black joiners exceed the propoiation of Black leavers and Black 
control group members. Third, the Asian membership group, although the smallest, turns 
out to be the most stable one with similar proportions among joiners, leavers and the
83 The number 368 is the difference between the total number of observation in the between column and the 
number of n households in the data.
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control group. However, Asian households switch plans comparatively frequently within 
the schemes of their membership. The proportion of White households, representing the 
largest race membership group, also seem the most volatile. Their proportion among the 
joiners is 15% higher and among the leavers nearly 10% higher than in the control group. 
White households also have the highest proportion of switchers between plans, being 
more prone to change their insurance coverage.
Figure 4-2: Race proportion comparison for control group versus mover groups
Proportion  of ra ce s  of control g roup  v e rs u s  m over g ro u p s
u -
White Asian Black Coloured
■ ■  joiners 42.6 7.42 32.67 17.31
I1 ” 1 leavers 36.97 6.32 22.51 34.2
switchers 45.4 13.6 29.23 11.78
— —  control 28.08 8.62 27.7 35.3
Race
Table 4-8 compares the one-way tables for the variable income group over all four data 
subgroups.85 The income group variable is a typical time-variant variable and it is 
worthwhile to explore it regarding trends over time. In the control group about half of the 
households (46%) had an above average income at some time, while in the joiner group 
considerably fewer (38%) ever had an above average income. The overall and between 
values are quite similar for all four groups, although joiners seem to belong more often to 
the lower income groups. However, households in the control group belonged more often 
to the highest income group and also changed their income group most often.86
84 Since race is a time-invariant variable, it will not change over time and thus, it is here sufficient to only 
assess the overall means over the four years o f observation.
85 Roughly three percent o f all household-years in each o f the groups have an average income, about 60% 
have a below average income, and 40% have an income above the average.
86 The difference between the total number o f  households ever having either o f  the three income levels 
exceeds the n households for the control group most significantly, compared to  all other groups. This is
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Table 4-8: One-way table for income group variable for control group and movers
Income Overall Between Within
Control Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Percent
0 -  average 12,500 2.49 7,926 4.81 50.29
1- below 286,875 57.24 105,433 64.05 88.51
2 -  above 201,783 40.26 74,846 45.47 85.88
Total 501,158 100.00 188,205 114.33 85.85
(n -164,620)
Joiners
0 -  average 6,405 3.94 4,297 5.81 61.49
1* below 100,113 61.61 47,695 64.50 93.14
2 -  above 55,968 34.44 28,150 38.07 88.37
Total 162,486 100.00 80,142 108.39 89.77
(n ■73,941)
Leavers
0 -  average 5,399 2.94 3,963 4.06 69.07
1- below 107,471 58.48 60,355 61.76 92.46
2 -  above 70,911 38.58 40,250 41.19 90.95
Total 183,781 100.00 104,568 107.00 90.99
(n ■ 97,729)
Switchers
0 -  average 1,216 3.94 744 5.57 65.27
1-below 16,362 53.03 7,872 58.92 91.77
2 -above 13,274 43.02 5,873 43.96 90.43
Total 30,852 100.00 14,489 108.44 89.86
(n «  13,361)
Note: Income group is one if  a household belongs to a below average income group, two i f  it belongs to an 
above average income group and zero if  it is in the average income group.
Table 4-9 gives an example of the transition probabilities that can be calculated in panel 
data for time-invariant variables, like income. The transition probability is the probability 
that the income group changes for a household in a following year given that there was a 
certain income value observation in the previous year. For example, if a household had an 
average income in 1994 it can change to a higher or lower income or stay the same in 1995. 
This transition probability is determined by counting transitions, i.e. a probability is 
calculating by counting how many people starting with any income level (average, low or 
high) in one year change their income level in the next year. The rows reflect the initial 
values and the columns the final values. The first row in table 4-9 shows the transition 
probability of an average income control group household for income changes during any 
year of observation. Each year 57.36% of average income control households remained in 
the average income group in the next year. Of the remaining 42.4%, for 2.24% the income 
fell below average, for 40.4% the income rose to above average.
supported by the values in the within percent columns, where the control group’s comparably low levels 
indicate a lower stability of the lower income groups. Households with low income levels tend to improve 
income level more often if belonging to the control group than if belonging to any of the mover groups.
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Table 4-9: Transition probability for income group variable for control group and mover groups
Control
Income
0 1 2 Total
0 - average 57.36 2.24 40.4 100
1- below 1.67 92.56 5.77 100
2 -  above 0.41 5.09 94.5 100
Total
Joiners
2.48 55.63 41.89 100
0 - average 62.87 3.58 33.54 100
1- below 2.36 93.98 3.66 100
2 -  above 0.68 5.64 93.67 100
Total 4.09 61.08 34.83 100
Leavers
0 - average 63.36 3 33.64 100
1- below 1.61 90.9 7.49 100
2 -  above 0.62 4.02 95.36 100
Total 2.87 56.18 40.96 100
Switchers
0 - average 75.56 2.89 21.54 100
1 -below 2.21 93.41 4.38 100
2 -  above 0.83 5.14 94.03 100
Total 4.2 50.72 45.08 100
Note: The rows reflect the initial values and the columns the final values.
Figure 4-3 illustrates the transition probabilities of each income group for all subgroups. 
Each year some 60% of joining, leaving, and control group households and 75% of 
switching households with an average income remained at that income level in the next 
year. However, with 30-40% probability, joiners, leavers and control group members 
improve from the average income to the above average income level. Switchers have a 
comparably lower probability of only 22% for that transition.87
Those households starting at the below or above average income level generally 
have much lower transition probabilities. For example, below average income control 
group households had a 1.7% chance to become an average income household and a 5.8% 
chance to become an above average income household. Among households with an initial 
below average income, joiners are least likely to experience income growth as compared to 
all other groups. Leavers are most likely to achieve income growth and they also have the 
highest probability of remaining on the highest income level as compared to all other 
groups. However, these differences range only on a scale of one to three percent and do 
not reveal spectacular discrepancies between the groups.
87 Thus the more switchers remain in the average income group, the less they progress towards an above 
average income group.
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Figure 4-3: Transition probability comparison of income for control group versus mover groups
Average income
100 -----
70
Incom e group
I joiners 
switchers
Heavers
control
Below average  incom e
100
10  -
Incom e g roup
I joiners 
switchers — control
Heavers
Above average incom e
100
Income group
HeaversI joiners 
switchers — control
Note: Each o f the three graphs displays the transition probabilities from one o f the three different initial income values, 
while the columns in each graph reflect the final value. For example, the left figure displays the transition probabilities o f 
the average income group (zero) to the below average income group (one) and above average income group (two). Thus, 
the probability values for the columns o f income group zero are the probabilities o f the subgroup household to remain in 
the average income group, i f  started out in it.
B. C la im -c o n tr ib u tio n  a n d  b e n e f i t  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s
The claim-contribution and benefit characteristics of households from the three mover 
groups, joiners, leavers, and switchers and the control group, will be the variables of: 
claims, contributions, co-payments, and several medical benefits.88 Although these are all 
time-variant variables, which should be described with respect to the panel structure, this 
is not feasible here due to the limited thesis volume. It is here of main interest to examine 
how their overall means vary over the four data subgroups
Figure 4-4 compares the claim and contribution means of the control group with 
the three mover groups. The average claims (tac) in Rand are the highest for the groups of 
switchers and leavers, exceeding the claims of the control group. Only the joiners group 
has lower average claims as compared to the control group. The mean contribution (fcco) 
levels of all mover groups exceed the average contribution of the control group. The 
contribution-claim ratio is above one for the joiners, which is higher than that of the 
control group. For leavers claims exceed the contributions (the contribution-claims ratio is 
below one) and are lower as compared to the control group.89
88 All variables are continuous variables. The medical benefits are classified into essential emergency services 
like GP and public hospital benefits, non-essential negotiable services like specialists and private hospital 
benefits, and discretionary services like dental, optical and paramedical benefits. The variable values are 
measured in South African Rand per membership month and member.
89 The switchers’ contribution-claim ratio is one and nearly equals the ratio o f the control group.
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Figure 4-4: Mean claim and contribution comparison for control group versus mover groups
Mean claim and contribution of control 
group versus mover groups
joiners leavers switchers control group
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Figure 4-5 describes the comparison of the subgroups' mean values for the co-payment 
variable (co2), the essential benefit variables: GP (gp) and public hospital benefits (pub), 
the non-essential benefit variables: specialist (sp) and private hospital benefits (prv), and 
the discretionary benefit variables: dental (den), optical (opt), and paramedical benefits 
(par).
Figure 4-5: Mean co-payment and benefits comparison for control group versus mover groups
Mean co-paym ent an d  benefits for con tro l g ro u p s  v e rsu s  m over
g ro u p s
0
0
co2 9P pub spe prv den opt par
■ ^ ■ jo in e r s 24.82 22 14 1.15 34.67 41.54 i7.ee 10.67 2.78
r — I l e a  vers 28.22 24.38 3.07 38.15 49.17 20.17 13.89 3.81
switchers 32.83 21.58 0.97 40.66 50.03 1846 9.65 3.73
— - — control group 21.14 22 65 1.92 36.18 40.48 15.16 9.85 3.16
Co-payment & benefits
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Leavers have higher average co-payments in comparison to the control group, but 
they also have higher essential benefits (being the highest among all mover groups). 
Switchers displayed higher average co-payments, lower essential benefits, but higher non- 
essential and discretionary benefits than the control group.
Taking the panel data structure into account, table 4-10 summarises as an example 
the descriptive statistic for dental benefits for all four subgroups. The overall mean for 
dental benefits is lowest for the control group (15 Rand) and highest for the leavers (20 
Rand), spanning over a range from zero to a maximum of 1,162 Rand for the control group 
and 2,503 Rand for the leavers. The average dental benefit for each control group 
household varied between zero and 911 Rand, but was substantially more for leavers and 
joiners. The dental benefits 'within' (each household) varied for the control group between 
minus 374 and 73990 and naturally some of those deviations from each household's 
average must be negative.
However, the deviation for the households of joiners and leavers is much higher -  
about a thousand Rand. Both, joiners and leavers did not only have higher dental benefits 
on average, they also deviated from their average much more than the control group 
households.
Table 4-10: Summary statistic for dental benefits o f control group versus mover groups
Dental
benefits
Control
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
overall 15.15 29.41 0 1,162 N * 501,158
between 22.58 0 911 n -  164,620
within 20.85 -374 754 T-bar * 3.0
Joiners
overall 17.99 44.73 0 2,503 N * 162,486
between 39.40 0 2,118 n ■ 73,941
within 28.72 -1161 1,197 T-bar* 2.2
Leavers
overall 20.17 55.10 0 2,503 N -  183,781
between 53.15 0 2,178 n *  97,729
within 31.36 -1182 1.223 T-bar* 1.9
Switchers
overall 18.46 40.69 0 1,406 N * 30,852
between 37.64 0 932 n * 13,361
within 25.71 -685 721 T-bar * 2.3
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C. P la n -c h o ic e  c h a ra c te r i s t ic
The plan-choice characteristic of households is described by the plan classification variable 
for a plan's risk type.91 Although this variable is time-variant for the overall data, because 
households could switch between plans of different risk levels, for households within the 
different mover-groups the plan classification variable is in fact time-invariant. In the 
general data this variable could change if households switch between plans but remain 
within the medical scheme they originally belonged to.92 However, the subgroups were 
constructed such that if a household moves at any time during the observation period all 
observations with that household identification (ID) were marked as a mover. That means 
each household that joined a plan is marked as a joiner for that specific plan over all years 
of its observation. Thus the risk plan variable is time-invariant for the data subgroups (as 
long as the household ID stays constant).93
Figure 4-6 displays the member proportions for each risk plan within the four 
types of households. The risk plan variable describes the risk level of the plans that the 
households belong to.
Figure 4-6: Member proportion for risk plan types within control group versus mover groups
63.80
63 68
70.46control
switchers
Risk plan type
Member proportion for risk plan types within control group 
versus mover groups
50
40
30
20
Note: The risk variable has the value zero if a household had an observation for an average risk plan, one if 
the plan is classified as a low risk plan and two if it is of high risk.
90 In the within definition the global average has to be added in again, here 754-15.15=738.85.
91 The risk plan variable is categorical.
92 However, it should be noted, that the risk plan variable would only capture som e o f  these switchers, those 
that switch between plans o f different risk levels.
93 Since it is time-invariant for the subgroups, it is here sufficient to only regard the overall means over the 
four years o f observation.
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While in the control group about 70% of all households belonged to a plan with an 
average risk profile, switchers and joiners belonged to a similar plan only in about 60% of 
the cases. All groups had higher proportions of their observations in plans with a low-risk 
profile as compared to plans with high-risk profiles.94 However, joiners and switchers 
more frequently belonged to a low-risk plan compared to the control group. Leavers 
belonged less often. And while leavers belonged more often to a high-risk plan before 
they exited, as compared to the control group, joiners were less likely to belong to a high- 
risk plan.
In summary, the comparative data subgroup description illustrated that the 
exploration of the data panel structure could reveal more exact and additional, valuable 
information regarding several issues of interest, particularly for time-variant variables. For 
example, income mobility and dental benefit patterns over time differ considerably 
between the data subgroups. This is because panel data not only describe cross-sectional 
characteristics of the observed households, but also changes over time. Thus panel data 
provide more data-points per household95 and also allow the exploration of individual 
intertemporal dynamics. These advantages of panels, or longitudinal data96, make it 
possible to analyse problems that can be hardly addressed by cross-sectional or time-series 
data alone (Hisao 1986). For example, testing of hypotheses regarding certain assumed 
household behaviours, like health care utilisation patterns in order to depict a household's 
risk type, becomes much more reliable with panel data, where a household's utilisation is 
observed over several time periods.
However, these special features of panel data can create new and difficult 
statistical problems, particularly in non-linear model building.97 Specifically, they will
94 Although this difference was highly in favour of low risk plans for the joiners (28% versus 9%) it was 
remarkably less pronounced for the leavers group (17% versus 12%) Switchers are less likely to belong to an 
average risk plan and tend to concentrate more in either low or high risk plans as compared to any other 
subgroup.
95 These data also economise on households in many settings where it is desirable to observe the same 
household repeatedly rather than to observe different households at each point in time. Also data collection is 
arguably more reliable for studies in which the same households are followed repeatedly than in cross- 
sectional studies. There are other advantages for specific conditions and settings that involve experimental 
designs (see Davis 2002).
96 The term longitudinal data is most often used by authors to describe repeated measurements data in which 
the repeated measurements factor is time. Longitudinal data, then, are a special case of repeated data. Others 
apply the term longitudinal data strictly to data that are collected over long time periods and uncontrolled 
conditions compared to repeated data for short time periods and experimental conditions. In this second case, 
repeated measurements data are a special case of longitudinal data (Davis 2002).
97 Thus even though researchers agree that behaviour differs from one measured occasion to the next within 
each household, this intrahousehold variability of panel data is rarely explored. There are three aspects related 
to this fact. First, many statistical methods for panel data have only developed to a reasonable degree in the
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require special statistical methods because each set of observations for each household 
tends to be intercorrelated96 and data may be partially incomplete or unbalanced.99 This 
means this thesis7 empirical strategy needs to consider and accommodate these specific 
panel data requirements. The next section will describe the empirical strategy that 
considers the panel data structure of the South African data set
4.3 Empirical strategy: a logit model for panel data
In order to pursue this thesis7 second research aim of conducting an empirical analysis 
into adverse selection and risk selection the empirical strategy for the analysis, applying the 
group method to the case study data of South Africa's unregulated medical scheme 
market needs to be specified. The purpose of this section is to describe the specific 
empirical strategy and statistical models for the South African panel data used in this 
thesis. While the last chapter depicted the general method of logistic regression as the best 
quantitative technique for the group method, the aim here is to identify the particular logit 
model structure that is best suited for the data at hand. First, this section will present an 
applied logistic regression model for correlated data -  the marginal or population 
averaged model, which is the selected logistic regression model for the empirical analysis. 
The marginal model with its parameter estimation method and coefficient interpretation 
will be shortly introduced. Second, the model building strategy for this thesis7 empirical 
analysis will be discussed, which will lead to the specifications of the marginal logit 
models applied. The aim is, in particular, to provide and derive variable expectations 
based on theory and previous research in order to address the thesis7 research hypotheses. 
Finally, the model building process will be described. It will be explained how the final 
models were developed in order to establish that a credible model building process was 
followed, which resulted in the best models for this analysis.
last few years; second, their highly technical descriptions are perceived as inaccessible for applied 
researchers; and third, analysis software only became available recently (Moskowitz and Hershberger 2002).
98 Repeated observations for the same household result in so-called clustered or correlated data.
99 This concerns missing values in longitudinal data, although it is possible to distinguished between different 
reasons why they are missing. In general missing values arise whenever the response of a subject is missing 
for one or more time points and thus the number of repeated measures across subjects is not constant. Data 
are labelled incomplete if intended measurements are not taken, are lost, or otherwise unavailable (Diggle et 
al. 2002). Unbalanced data are a result of measurements that are made intentionally at an uncommon set of 
times on all subjects. Missing values resulting in incomplete and/or unbalanced data raise the same technical 
difficulties but relate to different conceptual issues.
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4.3.1 Applied logistic regression with panel data: the marginal model
The data used for this thesis are panel data that contain household insurance data
collected over four successive years. At the end of each year, each household's
contribution, claims, benefits, and whether a household continued to be insured, or joined,
left, or switched insurance during the current year were recorded. However, because
households leave, join, and switch during the four-year observation period, not all
households have observations for all four years, resulting in the problem of incomplete
data. But since there is usually more than one (year) observation for each household, each
household also represents a cluster of correlated observations. Thus as a second problem,
the lack of independence in the observations arises because there is more than one year of
measurements for each household.
The measurements of a household's contribution, claims, and benefits can change 
horn observation to observation (i.e. they are time-variant) and they are called subject- or 
cluster-specific covariates. The household's principal member characteristics of age, 
gender, number of dependants, race, income level, and residential area are recorded when 
each household joins insurance, i.e. the first year of any record. Most of a household's 
principal member characteristics are constant (i.e. time-invariant) and they are called 
subject- or duster-level covariates (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). However, since 
observations in the same cluster tend to exhibit intraduster correlation, standard analysis 
methods, like cross-sectional models, that ignore the dusters are inadequate. They lead to 
models with a poor fit and poorly estimated variances (Neuhaus et al. 1991).
Over recent years statistical research has developed several related types of 
extensions of the of generalised linear model (GLM) and quasilikelihood methods, 
specifically for the analysis of this type of correlated data (Davis 2002). Incomplete or 
missing data can also be accommodated with this model methodology.100 The applied 
panel data literature discusses three extensions of GLMs for longitudinal data: (1) 
marginal models, (2) random effects models, and (3) transition (Markov) models. All three 
models have logistic formulations, however, each model is different in its underlying idea 
and the interpretation of the coefficients as well as their area of application.
This thesis' analytical aim is to characterise and contrast populations of households 
or subjects and the focus is therefore on the population averaged response. Marginal 
models assume that observations within each subject are correlated, but intraindividual
100 However, the restriction here is that the missing data process is MCAR (missing completely at random) or 
MAR (missing at random).
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correlation can be modelled separately from the regression of the response on explanatory 
variables. This model expresses the marginal expectation as a function of die explanatory 
variables. The intraindividual correlation is a known function of the marginal means and a 
vector of an unknown additional parameter. Thus in addition to modelling the effects of 
covariates on the marginal expectations/ a model for die association among observations 
from each subject must be specified (Davis 2002). The interpretation of the estimated 
covariate coefficient fi* applies to a specific observed group with a shared attribute rather 
than individual subjects. This represents/ for example/ the effects of explanatory variables 
on that group of households' chances of joining or not.
Marginal models are also referred to as population averaged models (Zeger et al. 
1988 and Neuhaus et al. 1991), because parameters only have interpretations in terms of 
the influence of covariates on the population averaged response. Thus marginal models 
are most effectively used in population studies like this, where the focus is the difference 
in the marginal or population average response between two groups. Or in other words, 
they are best fitted to settings where it is of interest to assess the effects of duster-level or 
time-invariat covariates whose values cannot change. Since a marginal model is best 
suited for covariates that describe the effect of the covariate in broad groups of subjects, 
rather than individual subjects, it is, compared to the transition101 or random effects 
model102 most suited for this thesis' empirical investigation. However, in order to be able
101 Transition models assume that observations within each subject are correlated because present 
observations are explicitly influenced by past outcomes. The model expresses the conditional mean of the 
present outcome as a function of covariates and past responses, giving past outcomes the role of additional 
predictors. The covariate effects are interpreted as being adjusted for the subject’s response history (Davis 
2002). The estimated covariate coefficient fi** of the transition model can be interpreted as the change per 
unit change in x in the log odds of joining, among households who did not join in the past (see Diggle et al. 
2002). The effects of time-invariant covariates may be poorly estimated (Davis 2002). That makes 
transitional models most fitting to settings where it is of interest to assess the effects of time-variant 
covariates adjusted for the subjects’ response histories. For example, this method would have been 
appropriate for this thesis if it would have been of primary interest to determine whether the chance of joining 
at a certain time depends, on whether or not households joined or left insurance coverage in the past.
However, the focus of this thesis’ empirical investigation will be not the effects of time-variant covariates 
adjusted for the househols’ response histories.
102 Random effects models assume that observations within each subject are correlated because of their 
sharing of unmeasurable or unmeasured (omitted) variables and that this heterogeneity (or within-subject 
correlation) can be accounted for by including a subject-specific random term. Conditional on the values of 
the random effect, the repeated observations for each subject or the responses are assumed to be independent 
The model also requires an assumption about the distribution of the random effects across subjects in the 
population. The covariate effects are interpreted in terms of their influence on both an individual’s response 
and on the average response of the population (Davis 2002). Random effect models are also referred to as 
subject- and cluster-specific models (Zeger et al. 1988, Neuhaus et al. 1991) or latent variable models 
(Bartholomew 1987). They are best fitted to settings where it is of interest to assess the effects of cluster- 
specific or time-variant covariates whose values can change at the subject level, however, the interpretation of 
time-invariant factors is difficult (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). The estimated covariate coefficient^*** 
can be interpreted as the change per unit change in x  in the log odds of joining for an individual household
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to understand the interpretation of the estimated marginal logistic regression parameters 
it is useful to describe the statistical method employed by the marginal model.
It is assumed that the statistical method strives to describe an outcome y u, for 
cluster (or subject) i at time t as a function of covariates x u and parameters ai specific to 
the ith cluster. Lety u be a dichotomous random outcome variable and x u a p x l  vector of 
covariates at time t for subject i, where t = 1,... T and / =1,... N. Some of the covariates are 
constant within each subject (time-invariant/cluster-level variables), some may change 
from observation to observation (time-variant/cluster-spedfic variables), but there is 
heterogeneity across subjects. The marginal model then models the marginal expectation, 
E(YU), as a function of the explanatory variables. The marginal response is the average
response over a subpopulation that shares a common value of x. The correlation between 
repeated observations is modelled separately from the marginal mean and variance of the 
response vector.
Marginal models have the following three assumptions (Davis 2002, Diggle et al. 
2002): (1) the marginal expectation of the response, E(YU)  = p u depends on explanatory 
variables and the relation can be described through a known link functiong(pu)  = x u ’fi*;
(2) the marginal variance Var(yu)  is related to the marginal expectation via a known 
variance function and a scale parameter; and (3) the correlation between observations is a 
known function of the marginal means and an additional parameter a*
The marginal model does not explicitly model subject-to-subject heterogeneity, the 
underlying logit model only specifies the marginal distribution of the averaged 
population response (modelled as a function of the covariates). Thus it models the 
marginal or population averaged distribution, rather than conditional distribution, given 
previous observations (Liang and Zeger 1986). The method is to average over the 
statistical distribution of the random effect term a. The statistical distribution of the 
random effects is not specified and the lack of distributional assumptions poses some 
problems when estimating the coefficients. The model coefficients apply to a regression 
model for a population with an averaged random effect a* (and the interpretation applies 
to broad groups of subjects, not to a specific subject). A logistic marginal model is then 
given as:
(Diggle et al. 2002). However, the focus of this thesis’ empirical investigation will be on groups of 
households with a shared attribute rather than on an individual household with a specific attribute.
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logit P(yit = 1 | x u)  = a*+ fi* x u (Equation 4-1: Marginal logit model)
The estimated coefficient /?* of a population average logit model measures the 
change in the logit of the proportion withy=l for a unit increase in x (Neuhaus et al. 1991). 
The form of the joint distribution of the repeated measurements is not fully specified and 
the estimation of /?* is approached with the semiparametric generalised estimating 
equation method (GEE) (Liang and Zeger 1986). The GEE approach is an extension of 
quasilikelihood to longitudinal data analysis and specifies the likelihood for marginal 
distributions and a working covariance matrix for the vector of repeated measurements 
from each subject.103 However, this requires assumptions about the nature of the 
correlation. Most software packages offer four possible correlation assumptions: 
independent, auto-regressive, unstructured or exchangeable correlation (see also Hosmer 
and Lemeshow 2000, Davis 2002).
Under the independent model the correlation between the observations is zero, i.e. 
the correlation influence can be assumed to be small enough to fit a regression model for 
independent data. This correlation model leads only to consistent estimates of the 
parameter vector and covariance matrix given that the regression model is correctly 
specified. However, the correct variance of the parameters is often not supplied in 
standard software (Davis 2002). The assumption of no within correlation for this thesis' 
household observations seems quite unreasonable. The estimation of this model would 
then in fact be equivalent to the estimation of a standard logit/ probit model. It would be 
only justifiable to use this correlation model if the correlation is low and the observations 
for each household are the same. In the model results section in chapter 5 the correlation 
matrix for each of the three models will indeed show that the correlation is not low. For 
these reasons the independent working correlation was not further considered.
The unstructured model, which assumes that the correlation between pairs of 
responses is different, would seem to be a good choice, because it is the most general and 
efficient model. However, this model generally requires the estimation of a large number 
of parameters that are of lesser importance here (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Thus, 
although the estimation of unique pairwise correlation is very flexible, it is often not 
successful. Also, the occurrence of missing data complicates the estimation (Davis 2002). 
Each of this thesis' subgroups had a lot of data (several thousand households for an 
average of more than two years) and so estimating the full correlation matrix seemed
103 See Liang and Zeger (1986) and Davis (2002) for good introductions to GEE.
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feasible and was tried. However models with an unstructured correlation did not 
converge. For these reasons the unstructured model was abandoned.
In the auto-regressive model with its time or order association within the 
observations, correlation decreases as the distance between the time points increases. Thus 
the correlation structure is defined as the usual correlation matrix for an AR(g) model. 
This is also called multiplicative correlation. These correlations decay very quickly as the 
spacing between observations increases. However, settings where there is an explicit time 
component are very specialised (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). When attempting to 
estimate the full correlation matrix for this thesis' models the resulting working 
correlation did not indicate a serial correlation of the residuals diminishing with 
increasing lags, which would imply an AR process. The correlation matrix did, however, 
look similar to an equal-correlation model, which corresponds to an exchangeable 
correlation structure. Thus the auto-regressive model was abandoned in favour of the 
exchangeable model.
The exchangeable correlation assumes a constant correlation between pairs of 
responses, meaning the correlation of observations within households is a constant Under 
the assumption that observations covary equally within households, only a single 
parameter needs to be estimated, similar to a "random" effect Also, this correlation model 
produces asymptotically valid standard errors even if the correlation structure is not truly 
exchangeable. In this thesis' analysis the interest lies solely in the estimation of the 
regression coefficients, but correlation between observations needs to be taken into 
account in order to obtain best estimates. For this case the exchangeable correlation model 
is most often recommended as the working correlation and was also chosen for this diesis' 
analysis.104
Liang and Zeger (1986) derive the so-called information sandwich estimator as an 
estimator of the covariance matrix. They show that the GEE yields consistent and 
asymptotically normal estimates of the regression coefficients and their variances even if 
the time dependence is misspecffied (i.e. the assumed working covariance matrix). In 
addition, the loss of efficiency from an incorrect covariance matrix is inconsequential with 
large numbers of subjects as exist in this thesis' data (Davis 2002). The information
104 The assumption of constant correlation between any two repeated measurements may not always be 
justified in a longitudinal study with a focus on changes over time. However, it is fitting if the responses in a 
household’s cluster (are not naturally ordered and) were obtained from different family members living in 
that household, as is the case for this thesis’ data (Davis 2002). For this thesis the focus was not cm changes 
over time.
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sandwich estimator, in most software packages referred to as the robust estimator, should 
always be used unless there is strong evidence for a correct specification of the working 
correlation structure from previous studies (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). This robust 
estimator is used in the thesis'analysis.
The estimated covariate coefficient fi* of the marginal model is interpreted as the 
change per unit change in jc in the log odds of the proportion of households that join (or 
leave or switch).105 The estimated odds ratios describe the risk of an event via proportions 
in the population and are much like odds ratios from other logistic regression models. 
Thus the estimated odds ratios of a marginal model are relatively simple to interpret since 
they compare odds computed horn proportions of subjects in the population at different 
levels of the comparison covariate (holding all other variates fixed) (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2000).106
As an example, assume an odds ratio of 4 for a five-year age difference in people 
who leave insurance. Here the odds of leaving insurance coverage computed from the 
proportion of households whose principal members are five years older than some age 
reference level is four times higher than that based on the proportion of households whose 
principal members are at the reference age, holding all other variables constant If age is 
linear in the logit the odds ratio holds for a five year difference at any age. The same 
interpretation is valid for the population average odds ratio of 2 for having a 10 Rand 
increase in basic benefits. The odds of being a leaver computed from the proportion of 
households who have 10 Rand more benefits than some reference level is 2% less than the 
odds of leaving based on the proportion of households who are at the reference, holding 
all other variables constant. The odds ratio for 10 Rand difference holds for any basic 
benefit level if basic benefits are linear in the logit. The examples showed that the 
marginal model is best used when the objective is to describe the effects of covariates in 
broad groups of subjects in the population. This broad interpretation comes at the cost of 
not using available information from repeated measures of the study subjects' covariates 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).
105 Note that if all individuals with the same x have the same probability of joining/leaving/switching, the 
population frequency is the same as the individual’s probability. However, when there is heterogeneity in the 
risk of joining/leaving/switching among subjects with a common x, the population frequency is the average of 
the individual risks (Diggle et al. 2002).
106 However, a disadvantage is that this broad interpretation does not make use of information available in 
repeated measurements for each subject and that parameters depend on the degree of heterogeneity in the 
population.
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The next section will describe the model building strategy and model specification 
for this thesis' marginal logistic regression models.
4.3.2 Model building strategy and process
The first step in a model building process is to select the method for specifying the 
models. The discussed data have a number of variables from which it is possible to select 
for inclusion in the logistic regression analysis. Here die confirmatory specification 
approach is applied, where the complete set of variables is prior-selected and the model is 
essentially used to confirm a hypothesis or theory.107 This approach makes the model 
building process relatively easy at this stage, because the variable selection is determined 
by the literature, specifically literature that discusses methods of empirical investigations 
into selection.
The theoretical review of the selection processes and, in particular, the reviewed 
literature on empirical evidence for adverse selection and risk selection provided the 
underlying theory and hypotheses. First, the selection processes' theoretical concepts and 
the multiple plan choice literature, extended by the developed group approach, provided 
the theoretical hypothesis that adverse selection and risk selection are grouping 
phenomena that can be empirically identified within data subgroups. These are groups of 
subjects who join, leave, or switch insurance plans. Second, the risk adjustment literature 
provided the hypothesis that is it possible to determine a subject s risk using a risk profile 
comprised of different risk predictors (or variables that were called risk adjusters).
107 A second, alternative, model building approach is the sequential search method, either in the form of the
(1) stepwise estimation or the (2) forward addition and backward elimination. In the former the independent 
variable with the greatest contribution is added first. Independent variables are then selected for inclusion 
based on their incremental contribution compared to the variable(s) previously included (Hair et al. 1998).
The stepwise approach allows addition or deletion at each stage. The later, forward addition is similar to the 
stepwise procedure, with the distinction that once a variable is added there is no reversion of that decision at a 
later stage. The backward elimination starts with the computation of the equation with all independent 
variables and then deletes the variable(s) that do not contribute significantly. Again, if a variable is once 
deleted, this approach does not include a reversion of that action at a later stage. Although this approach 
maximises the predictive ability of a model it can experience serious caveats in regard to the model 
interpretation. Since both of these approaches select variables one by one, it is highly unlikely that correlated 
variables will enter the model, which can lead to the misleading conclusion that not-included variable(s) are 
inconsequential. Excluded variables might be highly related to the dependant variable but also correlated to 
independent variables already in the model. A third model building approach is called the combinatorial 
approach, where the best fitting subset and combination of independent variables is selected as the model. 
Although this approach can identify the best overall equation with available software, it is not possible to 
address issues like multicollinearity, the effect of influential observations, and the general interpretability of 
the results with this method. However, these last two described general model building methods are not yet 
available for fitting correlated data models in commercially available software packages. This thesis is 
therefore left with the first approach: the confirmatory specification.
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Empirical evidence for selection processes is concludes from unequal pooling of these 
risks in certain insurance plans.
This led to the thesis' main research hypothesis of a lack of risk pooling in South 
Africa's unregulated health insurance market due to adverse selection and risk selection. 
Within the case study setting of this thesis' this main research hypothesis was formulated 
into three subhypotheses. The key assumptions here were that it is possible to empirically 
identify adverse selection and risk selection because assumptions about the risk profiles of 
people within observed data subgroups can be made. If, for example, subjects with low- 
risk profiles join the medical schemes plans and particularly low-risk plans more, 
evidence for risk selection is likely.
The risk adjustment literature also provides these risk profile assumptions, and 
formulates specific variable expectations, in order to classify risks as low or high risks 
(and determine whether unequal risk pooling and empirical evidence for selection 
processes can be concluded). This means that the specific model building strategy used in 
this thesis will apply a confirmatory perspective with the purpose of verifying theoretical 
concepts and the developed group approach.
Thus the proposed logistic models have to explain membership in the defined 
mover groups using a multivariate risk profile and test whether or not these mover 
groups significantly differ in their risk profiles as compared to a control group. If the risk 
composition differs, evidence for either adverse selection or risk selection can be 
concluded. For the applied logistic regression analysis the required technical classification 
of observations into proposed groups that would provide the dependent variable was 
provided in this chapter's data section. The selection of the independent variables with 
their expectations (for the risk profile) of the proposed logistic models, were mainly based 
on hypotheses and results of previous empirical investigations from the risk adjustment 
and multiple plan choice literature, described in chapter two. Similar variables were 
described for the data at hand in the previous data section. This makes it possible to 
specify this thesis' analytical models. The following paragraphs will specify the models, 
summarise the variable expectations, and shortly describe the different steps of the model 
building process.
ISO
Birgit Hansl Chapter 4: Data <£ empirical analysis
A. Model specification and variable expectations
Three discrete choice models were formulated/ whereby the probabilities of different 
statuses of insurance coverage were hypothesised to be a function of household 
characteristics: Lo^it[insurance coverage status] = a  + /?' X + e
Where X is the vector of independent variables with the coefficients a  and /? that 
represent parameters to be estimated/ and e is a normally distributed random error term. 
The models were specified as marginal (or population averaged) logit models for panel 
data, which apply the semiparametric GEE in order to obtain parameter estimates. For the 
marginal models the within-group correlation structure for the panel was that of an equal- 
correlation model (exchangeable correlation). The information sandwich estimator or 
robust estimator of variance was used, producing valid standard errors/ even if the 
within-group correlation structure was incorrectly hypothesised. The XTLOGIT/ PA 
ROBUST command/ with the clustering option over each household's ID, was used within 
the STATA™ statistical software system for computation (STATA 1999).108 The three 
different models were specified with different dependant variables but the same set of 
independent variables.
Model A: Joiners versus control group LogitQc] a c  + j3’X + s
Where the dependant variable jc indicates whether a household joined insurance 
coverage (i.e. plans) at any point during the observation period or belonged to the control 
group of observed households that never changed their insurance coverage over the four 
observed years (i.e. was already insured or remained insured in the same plan).
Model B: Leavers versus control group Logit[lc] ■ a  + /?’ X + e 
Where the dependant variable lc indicates whether a household left insurance 
coverage at any point during the observation period or belonged to the group of observed 
households that never changed their insurance coverage over the four years.
Model C: Switchers versus control group Logitfsc] ■ a  + /?' X + e 
Where the dependant variable sc indicates whether a household switched 
insurance plan coverage at any point during the observation period or belonged to the 
group of observed households that never changed their insurance coverage over the four 
years.
Table 4-11 describes the vector X of independent variables. These independent 
variables are also referred to as the main effects.
,08 The STATA™ command XTGEE, FAMILY(BIN) LINK(LOGIT) CORR(EXCH) ROBUST estimates the 
same population averaged model.
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Table 4-11: Description o f vector of independent variables
Variable Variable
Name Description
age Age of principal member
gen Gender of principal member -  female (1). male (0)
dep Number of dependants of principal member (being household members)
inc Income group of principal member -  below average (1). above average (2), average (0)
race Race of principal member-Asian (1), Black (2). Coloured (3), White (0)
urb Residential area -  urban (1), rural (0)
tac Claims per household member and month in Rand
tco Contributions per household member and month in Rand
co2 Co-payments (^legally billable amount minus benefits) per household member and month in Rand
gp GP benefits per household member and month in Rand
pub Public hospital benefits per household member and month in Rand
spe Specialist benefits per household member and month in Rand
prv Private hospital benefits per household member and month in Rand
den Dental benefits per household member and month in Rand
opt Optical benefits per household member and month in Rand
par Paramedical benefits per household member and month in Rand
risk Risk type of plan -  low risk (1), high risk (2), average risk (0),
The following paragraphs will describe the variable expectations under adverse selection 
and risk selection. These expectations are mainly derived from previous research by this 
author and from the risk-adjustment literature. They address the thesis' research 
hypothesis/ that unregulated health insurance markets encounter an unstable market-wide 
risk pool and imbalanced risk pools within the market (i.e. between insurers' plan 
options). Most of these variables are assumed to deliver some evidence for unequal risk 
pooling in the South African unregulated medical scheme market
First, socio-economic variables like age, gender, race, and residential area were 
concluded to be of some use as risk indicators in the risk-adjustment literature (Newhouse 
1996). For example, aside from the fact that older people might leave more and younger 
people might join more for natural reasons, it can be still expected that the risk for ill- 
health rises with age and thus insurance coverage is then either harder to obtain or harder 
to keep (Hansl and Soderlund 1999, Soderlund and Hansl 1999). From this it could be 
hypothesised that it is likely that older people adversely select themselves into insurance 
coverage and are also more likely to be unfavourably risk selected (i.e. dumped) by 
insurers. Younger people are typically targeted by insurers' efforts to attract low risks. 
Thus under adverse selection it is assumed that joiners are older and leavers are younger 
than control group subjects. However, if leavers are younger adverse selection might have 
been induced through the favourable risk selection efforts of external private, commercial 
insurers. In this case it will be necessary to assess whether or not there is information
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regarding aggressive recruiting by external competitors. Adverse selection might also be 
operating if switchers are older than control group subjects/ i.e. high risks chose to switch 
(to better coverage and thus high-risk plans). Comparably/ under risk selection it is 
expected that joiners are younger and leavers are older as compared to the control group. 
However/ this observation might be also influenced by natural life-cyde decisions and 
events, i.e. people join insurance coverage when they are young, starting their 
professional life and exit insurance coverage when old due to death. In the case of 
favourable risk selection switchers are expected to be younger than control group subjects 
(and switch to low-risk plans). Also, unfavourable risk selection is suspected if switchers 
are older (and switch to high-risk plans).
For gender and dependant number similar expectations can be formulated. 
Unfavourable risk discrimination against female insurance applicants and existing 
members is likely/ because higher utilisation levels in reproductive years and in old age 
can be expected. The same reasons might induce females to seek insurance/ which can 
result in adverse selection. Under adverse selection it is expected that females are more 
prominent among joiners and males are more prominent among the leavers as compared 
to the control group.109 Subjects with a high number of dependants are of higher risk to 
induce costs because more people are covered under one insurance contract They are 
expected to have more difficulties obtaining and keeping insurance. Insurers are expected 
to seek low-risk singles. Under risk selection it is expected that joiners have fewer 
dependants and leavers have more as compared to the control group. Under adverse 
selection it is assumed that joiners have more dependants and leavers fewer in 
comparison to the control group. Again, fewer dependants in the leavers groups might 
also indicate favourable risk selection by external private competitors.
Income110/ race,111 and urban residency112 are not expected to be the basis for risk 
discrimination in insurance coverage. They are, nevertheless, important control variables 
and should be included in the statistical analysis for that reason.
109 However, gender biases also occur in employment and compensation practices such that men might have 
generally higher level of insurance coverage, whereas women are expected to receive coverage via their 
spouses (Hansl and Soderlund 2000).
Income might function as an affordability constraint for subjects* ability to obtain and to keep insurance. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the demand for health care increases with increasing income, and thus one 
would predict increasing levels of insurance coverage with increasing income (Soderlund and Hansl 1999). 
However, for low-income earners it would be rational to seek subsidised employment-based insurance 
because illness will be more likely to have ruinous effects on their households* limited disposable income.
111 Historic inequities, prejudices on the part of employers, and lower demand for western medical care 
among Non-whites could lead to higher levels of insurance coverage amongst whites, other factors being 
equal (Soderlund and Hansl 2000).
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Second/ variables that are some function of prior utilisation are graded by the risk- 
adjustment literature as potentially the best risk indicators (Newhouse 1996). Within the 
context of this analysis/ variables that might reflect prior utilisation include: claims, 
contributions/ co-payments, and different benefits. Medical benefits will be distinguished 
into essential emergency benefits, like GP and public hospital benefits, non-essential 
negotiable benefits like specialists and private hospital benefits, and discretionary benefits 
like dental, optical, and paramedical benefits.
For example, claims indicate whether or not a subject substantially utilised health 
services and is thus a low or high risk. Insurers would always prefer subjects with 
prospective low risk, since they keep costs low. Insurers are also eager to get rid of 
subjects with high claims. Thus under adverse selection joiners are expected to have 
higher claims and leavers lower claims as compared to the control group. However, low 
claims in the leavers group might also indicate favourable risk selection by external 
private competitors. Switchers are expected to have higher claims as compared to control 
group subjects under adverse selection of high risks (into high-risk plans). Under risk 
selection, however, it is expected that joiners will have lower claims and leavers higher 
claims than the control group. Switchers are expected to have lower claims as compared to 
the control group in the case of favourable risk selection (into low-risk plans). Also, 
unfavourable risk selection is suspected if switchers have comparably high claims (and 
switch to high-risk plans).
Contributions and co-payment are, on their own, less able to explain or predict 
subjects' risk and thus less useful as factors for risk discrimination. Contributions, for 
example, could be only used by South African medical schemes to purposefully 
discriminate between risks since the deregulation policy was implemented in the early to 
mid 1990s. In cases of unfavourable risk selection one would expect leavers and switchers 
to have higher contributions than the control group (because insurers can charge high 
risks higher contributions). However, for new insurance applicants the expectations are 
less straightforward, since insurers cannot really predict their future claim levels. It might 
be expected that the economic incentive of profit-maximisation brings them to charge 
relatively high premiums for new members, leading to the observation of generally high
112 Urban residency might provide an indication of subjects' access to insurance coverage and health care 
services. Since urban dwellers have better access to both one would predict increasing levels of insurance 
coverage with urban residency. Therefore, insurers would rather select rural dwellers into insurance since 
their likelihood of cost occurrence is lower (Newhouse 1996). However, rural households are hard to access
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contribution levels for joiners (even if among these are favourably risk selected low risks) 
compared to the control group.
However, a better indicator is the contribution-daim ratio. If, for example, the ratio 
is above one, i.e. claims exceed the subjects' contributions, insurers would classify this 
member as a high risk. Similarly, if the contribution-daim ratio is below one the subject is 
a low risk in the eyes of the insurer. Thus, under adverse selection, joiners are expected to 
have lower and leavers higher contribution-daim ratios than the control group. However, 
for the model estimations in the analysis it was dedded to only indude one of the two, 
either the contribution variable or the contribution-daim ratio. The models will consider 
the contribution variable only, while the average contribution-daim ratio for each mover 
group was presented in this chapter's data section.
Co-payment is in some way a function of health care utilisation, because in most 
cases of ill-health health services are used, costs are induced, and shared costs may arise. 
The problem is that co-payment rates vary for different types of services, but die co­
payment variable itself cannot specify on what type of medical service it was spent Also, 
the co-payment variable gives no indication about the total underlying claim or benefit 
level.
For example, a high risk would spend co-payments on essential services that 
usually have low co-payment rates, while a low risk would probably spend it on 
discretionary services, for which co-payments can be substantial. Lets say a low risk gets a 
massage that costs 20 Rand and the co-payment rate for physiotherapy is 50%. This would 
cost both the insurer and the insured 10 Rand. Similarly, lets assume a high risk gets a 
prescription for a chronic condition filled by a GP for 100 Rand with a co-payment rate of 
10%. This would cost the insurer 90 Rand and the insured 10 Rand. Thus each risk type 
might end up with the similar co-payment but very different total claims and benefits. 
Also, each risk type would have spent their co-payment on different service types.
This shows that the co-payment variable alone cannot be used to distinguish who 
is a high risk and who is a low risk without also considering other claim and benefit 
variables. First, high claims with any level of co-payments indicate a high risk, while low 
claims always will indicate a low risk, regardless of the co-payment level. Second, high 
essential benefits with any level of co-payments indicate a high risk, while low essential 
benefits always will indicate a low risk, regardless of the co-payment level. The expected
for insurance underwriters and these households also have little incentive to take out insurance if they cannot 
easily access health care facilities.
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observations regarding adverse selection and risk selection have to be based on 
observations for these claim and benefit variables. Nevertheless, they were included as 
control variables in order to be assessed together with the claim and benefit variables.
The remaining seven variables of this group are different benefits variables that 
would allow a more qualified assessment of the kind of health care services used and thus 
what risk type a household belongs to. Benefits for essential emergency services (i.e. GP 
and public hospital benefits)113 are expected to be good risk indicators for high risks. 
Benefits for negotiable non-emergency services (i.e. specialist and private hospital 
benefits) and benefits for discretionary services (i.e. dental, optical and paramedical 
benefits) are expected to be of lesser significance for high risks. In fact negotiable and 
discretionary services are expected to be more prominent among low risks, because high 
standard services function as luxury goods. They are offered preferentially to low risks in 
order to make their insurance costs justifiable and thereby keep them insured. Otherwise 
the expectations for negotiable and discretionary benefits are identical to the essential 
services. Subjects with low benefit patterns are of low risk and are more attractive to 
insurers, because of their low costs.
Finally, the plan classification variable that classifies plans with regard to their risk 
pool is expected to be a very good indicator for risk discrimination. It is expected that 
subjects either self-select themselves or are selected by the insurer into specific plan risk 
pools. For example, under adverse selection it is assumed that joiners are more likely to be 
high risks and belong more often to high-risk plans, leavers are more likely low risks who 
more often belong to low-risk plans as compared to control group subjects. Under risk 
selection it is expected that joiners are more likely low risks and belong more often to low- 
risk plans, and leavers are more likely to be high risks and belong more often to high-risk 
plans as compared to the control group.114
The following table 4-12 and table 4-13 summarise the expected observations 
under adverse selection (AS) or risk selection (RS) using the developed typology for 
adverse selection and risk selection from chapter three.
113 Subjects with high essential benefits are costly for the insurer and are more likely to be dumped, while 
insurers are interested in recruiting people with prospective low essential benefits. The expectations for the 
essential benefits variables are similar to those of the claim variable. However, public hospital services is 
deemed the better indicator of risk, because in many instances GPs function as natural gatekeepers for non- 
essential and discretionary services that are more interesting for high risks.
114 If switchers are of high risk and switch more often to high coverage (i.e. high-risk plans) as compared to 
control group subjects adverse selection might be operating, switchers are expected to be of low risk and 
belong more often to low-risk plans in the case of favourable risk selection. If switchers are of high risk and 
switch to high-risk plans unfavourable risk selection is suspected.
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Table 4-12: Expected empirical observations under adverse selection
Adverse Selection 
MANIFESTATION
Type 1 
Choice of insurance 
coverage by high risks
Entrance of High Risks
Type 2 
Choice of certain plans of 
insurance coverage by high 
risks
A. Entrance of High Risks into 
High-Risk Plans
B. Switch of High Risks to 
High-Risk Plans
Tvoe 3 
Choice of d iscontinued 
insurance coverage by low 
risks
A. Exit of Low Risks
B. Exit of Low Risks from 
High-Risk Plans
MECHANISMS ADVERSE SELECTION OF 
HIGH RISKS
ADVERSE SELECTION OF 
HIGH RISKS
ADVERSE SELECTION OF 
LOW RISKS
AFFECTED GROUPS JOINERS A. JOINERS
B. SWITCHERS
A. LEAVERS
B. LEAVERS
EXPECTED
EMPIRICAL
OBSERVATIONS
On average Joiners:
1. Are older, female, non­
single
2. Have higher claims, 
lower contribution-claim 
ratios
3. Have higher essential 
and non-essential 
benefits
A. On average Joiners:
1. Are older, female, non­
single
2. Have higher claims, 
lower contribution-claim 
ratios
3. Have higher essential 
and non-essential 
benefits
Join high-risk plans
B. On average Switchers:
1. Are older, female, non­
single
2. Have higher claims, 
lower contribution-daim 
ratios
3. Have higher essential 
and non-essential 
benefits
Switch to high-risk plans
A. On average Leavers:
1. Are younger, male, 
single
2. Have lower daims, 
higher contribution-daim 
ratios
3. Have lower essential, 
non-essential benefits 
and higher discretionary 
benefits
B. On average Leavers:
1. Are younger, male, 
single
2. Have lower daims, 
higher contribution-claim 
ratios
4. Have lower essential, 
non-essential service 
utilisation and higher 
discretionary benefits
Leave from high-risk plans
For example, adverse selection type 2A can be suspected (table 4-12, column two) if it is 
observed that subjects in the joiner group are older, female, non-single, have higher 
claims, co-payments, essential and non-essential benefits, and belong more often to high- 
risk plans as compared to the control group. As described in table 4-13 (column two) risk 
selection of type 2A can be suspected, if it is observed that joiners are more likely to be 
younger, male, single, have lower claims, essential and non-essential benefits, but higher 
discretionary benefits, and belong more often to low-risk plans as compared to the control 
group.
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Table 4-13: Expected empirical observations under risk selection
Risk Selection 
MANIFESTATION
Type 1 
Discourage high-risk 
insurance applicants
Restricted Entrance of High 
Risks
Type 2 
Attract low risks to certain 
plans of insurance 
coverage
A. Entrance of Low Risks into 
Low-Risk Plans
B. Switch of Low Risks to 
Low-Risk Plans
Type 3 
Discourage high risks to 
continue insurance 
coverage or switch them to 
high-risk plans
A. Exit of High Risks (from 
High-Risk Plans
B. Switch of High Risks to 
High-Risk Plans
MECHANISMS UNFAVOURABLE RISK 
SELECTION
FAVOURABLE RISK
SELECTION/CREAM-
SKIMMING
A. DUMPING
B. UNFAVOURABLE RISK 
SELECTION
AFFECTED GROUPS JOINERS A. JOINERS
B. SWITCHERS
A. LEAVERS
B. SWITCHERS
EXPECTED
EMPIRICAL
OBSERVATIONS
On average Joiners:
1. Are younger, male, 
single
2. Have lower claims, 
higher contribution-claim 
ratios
3. Have lower essential, 
non-essential and higher 
discretionary benefits
A On average Joiners:
1. Are younger, male, 
single
2. Have lower claims, 
higher contribution-claim 
ratios
3. Have lower essential, 
non-essential and higher 
discretionary benefits
Join low-risk plans
B. On average Switchers:
1. Are younger, male, 
single
2. Have lower claims, 
higher contribution-claim 
ratios
3. Have lower essential, 
non-essential and higher 
discretionary benefits
Switch to low-risk plans
A. On average Leavers:
1. Are older, female, non­
single
2. Have higher claims, 
contributions, lower 
contribution-claim ratios
3. Have higher essential 
and non-essential 
benefits
Leave high-risk plans
B. On average Switchers:
1. Are older, female, non­
single
2. Have higher claims, 
contributions, lower 
contribution-claim ratios
3. Have higher essential 
and higher non-essential 
benefits
Switch to high-risk plans
B. Model building process
A model building process was selected that folloes four stages:
(1) Variable inclusion verification with univariate model assessment
(2) Model variable check for linearity in the logit
(3) Model check for interactions
(4) Assessment of model fit
This four-stage model building process is established in the literature for applied logistic 
regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000) and was employed for each model described in 
the preceding section. The model building steps (1) to (3) are mapped out in detail in 
Appendix 6.
First, a univariate model assessment with each selected variable was performed in 
order to verify the variable inclusion. This first step is particularly important because a
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confirmatory model specification approach was used for the variable selection. Therefore/ 
it is necessary to assure that the selected set of variables achieves the maximum prediction 
while maintaining an efficient model. The use of the Wald tests for marginal models with 
correlated data is advised here (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). The Wald test found some 
association with the outcome for most variables in all three models, which justified the 
initial variable selection for the multivariate analysis and resulted in the so-called main 
effects model.
Second, the model variables were checked for linearity in the logit, which is a key 
assumption for any logistic regression analysis. Upon completion of this model building 
step, the initial variable selection for each model remained the same, confirming the main 
effects model.
Third, the models were checked for interactions, another important assumption for 
logistic regression analysis. Any interaction between two variables implies non-constant 
values for one variable over levels of the other. For example, an interaction term between 
gender and income entails that the slope coefficient for income is different for females and 
males. During this model building step, several interaction terms needed to be added to 
each main effects model, resulting in the so-called preliminary final models. Each of the 
three preliminary final models, Models A, B and C, had 17 similar variables and 15 
different interaction terms. These models were preliminary final models because they 
were not yet checked for their model fit.
The final step of the model building process, the model fit assessment, will be 
presented in the next chapter after the discussion of the model results. The next section 
will summarise this chapter.
4.4 Summary
This chapter presented the data and empirical strategy used in order to pursue this thesis' 
second research aim of conducting an empirical analysis into adverse selection and risk 
selection applying the group method. The data used for this empirical analysis describe a 
panel data sample of an unregulated health insurance market in a middle-income country, 
South Africa's medical schemes between 1995-1998.
The first part of this chapter discussed the data and data sample derivation. First, a 
representative data sample for South Africa's unregulated medical schemes between 
1995-1998 was derived. It contains of n =325,957 households belonging to 29 schemes with 
49 plan options. The data provide detailed information on a series of households' sodo-
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economic characteristics, contribution, claim and benefit characteristics, and die dates 
when a chosen scheme and plan coverage started and ended. Two crucial variables for the 
later analysis were created, die plan classification variable that classified plans into 
different risk pools and the data subgroup (or mover group) identifier variables. Based on 
the subgroup identifier variables the data subgroups could be defined and described. The 
comparative data subgroup description took the panel data structure into account, which 
provided additional valuable information on households' intertemporal dynamics, like 
income mobility or claim and benefit patterns. While panel data make hypothesis testing 
for household behaviour more reliable, each set of household observations tends to be 
intercorrelated and sometimes incomplete, which requires special statistical methods for 
the analysis.
The second part of this chapter presented the empirical strategy for this thesis' 
panel data analysis using logistic regression. First, among the applied statistical models 
for this type of correlated data, which also have logistic formulations, the marginal or 
population averaged model was identified as the best suited. The empirical method using 
the marginal logit model specifies the likelihood for marginal distributions and a working 
covariance matrix for the vector of repeated measurements from each subject The 
parameter estimation is approached with the GEE method. Software packages that can fit 
marginal models are widely available and thus easily accessible. The presented model 
building strategy followed a confirmatory approach and led to the model specifications. 
Three models were specified to bring about evidence for adverse selection and risk 
selection in the unregulated South African medical scheme market Model A discriminates 
between joiners and the control group, Model B discriminates between leavers and the 
control group, and Model C discriminates between switchers and the control group. The 
selection of the independent variables (for the risk profile) of the proposed logistic models 
and their formulated expectations were based on hypotheses from previous empirical risk 
adjustment studies, the multiple plan choice literature. A four-step model-building 
process was applied in order to ensure that the specified models fulfilled the assumptions 
of logistic regression, i.e. that they are efficient and predict well. The results were three 
preliminary final models, Models A, B, and C, each with 17 similar variables (or main 
effects) and 15 different interaction terms. These models were deemed preliminary final 
models because they still need to be checked for their model fit.
The results of the models developed for this thesis' empirical investigation will be 
presented and interpreted in the next chapter.
160
Birgit Hansl Chapter 5: Analysis results & interpretation
Chapter 5 
Analysis results & interpretation
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to fulfil this thesis7 research objective by presenting the 
results of the empirical investigation and by assessing the research hypotheses. The 
empirical analysis aimed to either verify or falsify the main research hypothesis that South 
Africa's unregulated health insurance markets experience a lack of risk pooling. This main 
research hypothesis was formulated into several subhypotheses. First/ it is the aim of this 
chapter to present the results of the statistical models that were specified in the previous 
chapter. Second, the results for the model fit assessment will be presented, comprising 
several standard diagnostic statistics. Third, the results of the three models will be 
interpreted in regard to their evidence for adverse selection and/or risk selection. Finally, 
it will be the aim of this chapter to summarise and review the empirical analysis results, 
particularly in regard to the previously formulated research hypotheses.
After this introduction, part two of the chapter will present the model estimation 
results. The goal here is to describe and explain the results for the logit models, which are 
based on estimated probabilities and odds ratios. Each model will enable the assessment 
of risk profile differences between a control group of constantly insured individuals and, 
in Model A, medical scheme plan joiners, in Model B, leavers, and in Model C, switchers.
The third part of this chapter will conclude the results for the statistical analysis 
with the results for the model fit assessment. However, since diagnostic statistics for the 
overall fit of logistic regression models for correlated data have not yet been developed 
the model fit assessment will be approximated with standard methods developed for 
normal uncorrelated data. The aim here is to apply several standard model fit assessment 
methods to the three logit models by assuming that the observations are not correlated, as
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opposed to not performing any model checking at all. This will, however, limit the 
interpretation of the model fit assessment results, since they will not represent the model 
fit results of the actual marginal models, but their logistic proxy models. The applied 
model fit assessment methods range from summary measures of goodness-of-fit to logistic 
regression diagnostics.
The fourth part will interpret the model results and assess evidence for adverse 
selection and risk selection in South Africa's unregulated medical scheme market between 
1995-1998. It will begin with a summary and synthesis of the empirical analysis results 
within the group method framework. It will be shown that evidence for adverse selection 
is very limited and the typical adverse selection cycle cannot be confirmed. However, 
there is overwhelming evidence for risk selection, in the form of discouraging the entry of 
high risks, cream-skimming of low risks and dumping of high risks. The results 
interpretation will then be discussed for all models and variables, including socio­
economic variables, claim-contribution & benefit variables, and the plan classification 
variable. It will be demonstrated that the results of all three models can be interpreted as 
evidence for either adverse selection or risk selection.
Finally, the fifth part will review the model estimation results in the context of this 
thesis' research hypotheses. This assessment will verify this thesis' main research 
hypothesis, that South Africa's unregulated health insurance market encountered a lack of 
risk pooling.
5.2 Results of model estimation
The purpose of this section is to present the results of this thesis' empirical investigation 
into evidence for adverse selection and risk selection with data describing the unregulated 
medical scheme market in South Africa. First, this section will present the estimation 
results of Model A, which assesses differences in the risk profiles of medical scheme plan 
joiners and the control group of the constantly insured in medical schemes. Second, the 
results of Model B will be described, which aimed to discriminate between leavers from 
the medical scheme plans and the control group. Finally, the results of the third logistic 
regression model are presented. This final model assesses differences in risk profile 
characteristics of those who switch between medical scheme plans and the control groupi
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5.2.1 Model A results: joiners-control group
Model A tested for differences between the risk profiles of joiners (households that join 
medical scheme plans during any time during the observation period) and the control 
group (households constantly insured in medical scheme plans over the whole 
observation period). The dependant variable for Model A is jc, with jc=l for households 
that joined at any point during the observation period and zero otherwise. Table 5-1 on 
the next page displays Model A's coefficients/ odds ratios/ semi-robust standard errors/ z- 
scores/ two-tailed p-values, and 95% confidence intervals for the population average 
model, with exchangeable correlation. The 663,644 observations that entered Model A 
were clustered over 238,561 households. The minimum of observations per household is 1 
(year) and the maximum is 4 years, yielding an average of 2.8 observations per household. 
Model A's covariates are all at least significant at the five percent level as shown in table 5- 
1. The following estimated within household working correlation matrix R can be 
reported:
cl c2 c3
rl 1.0000
r2 0.8642 1.0000
r3 0.8642 0.8642 1.0000
r4 0.8642 0.8642 0.8642
The interpretation of the estimated odds ratios horn this population averaged 
model is straightforward, since it compares odds computed from proportions of subjects 
in the population at the different comparison covariant levels holding all other covariates 
fixed. For example the estimated population average odds ratio for a female headed 
household (gen) is 1.2. The interpretation is as follows: the odds of belonging to the joiners 
group computed from the proportion of households that are female headed is nearly one 
and a half that of households who are male headed, holding all other variables constant
Table 5-2 shows the odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for all significant 
continuous variables in Model A. Using the results of the estimated logit and odds for age 
in table 5-1 the estimated odds ratios for an increase in 10 years of age can be calculate as 
0.54. Thus for every increase of ten years in age the likelihood of being in the joiners group 
decreases by about half.115
115 This would be a questionable statement if it could be not expected that the additional likelihood of being a 
joiner for a 20 year-old as compared to a 30 year-old is similar to the additional likelihood of a 60 year-old as 
compared to a 50 year-old. However, it was shown that age can be treated as linear in the logit - thus this 
interpretation is valid over all ages.
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Table 5-1: Estimated coefficients, odds ratios, standard errors, z-scores, two-tailedp-values, and 95% 
confidence intervals for Model A
Modal A
Variables
Jc
Coef. Odds Ratio Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% C 1]
Socio-economic
age -0.06188** 0.93999 .0005983 -103.44 0.000 •0.06305 -0.06071
gen (female) 0.13556** 1.14518 0.03254 4.17 0.000 0.07179 0.19933
depm = 1 (below)* -0.02544** 0.97488 0.00532 -4.78 0.000 -0.03587 -0.01501
depm = 2 (above)* -0.03039** 0.97007 0.00621 -4.89 0.000 -0.04256 -0.01822
*ref. ca t is average
dependant number
icgm = 1 (below)A 0.11218** 1.11872 0.01209 9.28 0.000 0.08848 0.13589
icgm = 2 (above)A 0.13465** 1.14414 0.02300 5.86 0.000 0.08958 0.17972
Aref. cat. is average income
race = 1 (Asian)' -0.82924** 0.43638 0.01863 -44.52 0.000 -0.86575 -0.79273
race = 2 (Black)' -0.61434** 0.54100 0.01670 -36.78 0.000 •0.64707 -0.58160
race = 3 (Coloured)' -1.42872** 0.23962 .0138872 •102.88 0.000 •1.45594 -1.40150
'ref. cat. is White
urb (urban) 0.22973** 1.25826 0.01882 12.21 0.000 0.19284 0.26662
Claim-contribution and
benefits
tac (claims) -0.00013** 0.99987 0.00001 -11.37 0.000 •0.00015 -0.00011
tco (contributions) 0.00054** 1.00054 0.00002 31.62 0.000 0.00051 0.00058
co2 (co-payments) 0.00019** 1.00019 0.00001 12.63 0.000 0.00016 0.00021
gp (GP benefits) 0.00045** 1.00045 0.00013 3.48 0.001 0.00020 0.00070
pub (pub.hospital benefits) -0.00017* 0.99983 0.00007 -2.35 0.019 -0.00031 -0.00003
spe (specialist benefits) 0.00018** 1.00018 0.00001 11.84 0.000 0.00015 0.00021
prv (priv. Hospital benefits) 0.00013** 1.00014 0.00001 11.12 0.000 0.00011 0.00016
den (dental benefits) 0.00060** 1.00060 0.00006 9.34 0.000 0.00047 0.00073
opt (optical benefits) 0.00086** 1.00086 0.00007 12.15 0.000 0.00072 0.00100
par (paramedical benefits) 0.00016** 1.00016 0.00003 5.75 0.000 0.00010 0.00021
Plan classification
risk = 1 (below)** 0.31103** 1.36483 0.02147 14.49 0.000 0.26895 0.35311
risk = 2 (above)** -0.33860** 0.71277 0.02411 -14.05 0.000 •0.38584 -0.29135
** ref. cat. is average risk
Interactions
age*gen 0.01026** 1.01032 0.00082 12.59 0.000 0.00866 0.01186
age*icgm -0.00079** 0.99921 0.00021 •3.82 0.000 •0.00120 -0.00039
age*depm -0.00001** 0.99999 0.00000 -4.77 0.000 -0.00001 0.00000
age*opt ■0.00001** 0.99999 0.00000 -7.45 0.000 •0.00002 -0.00001
age*pub 0.00001** 1.00001 0.00000 3.22 0.001 0.00000 0.00001
depm*gen 0.04221** 1.04311 0.00510 8.28 0.000 0.03221 0.05221
depm*gp -0.00037** 0.99963 0.00006 -6.14 0.000 -0.00048 -0.00025
icgm*race -0.06063** 0.94117 0.00869 -6.98 0.000 -0.07766 -0.04360
icgm*den •0.00015** 0.99985 0.00002 -6.05 0.000 -0.00020 -0.00010
race*gen -0.00024** 0.99977 0.00003 -7.77 0.000 •0.00029 -0.00018
race*den 0.00013** 1.00013 0.00001 9.52 0.000 0.00010 0.00015
gp*tco 0.00000** 1.00000 0.00000 6.1 0.000 0.00000 0.00000
risk*gen 0.06285** 1.06487 0.01559 4.03 0.000 0.03229 0.09341
risk*icgm 0.04410** 1.04509 0.00352 12.54 0.000 0.03721 0.05100
risk*race 0.04174** 1.04263 0.00913 4.57 0.000 0.02385 0.05963
cons 1.60846** 0.03091 52.04 0.000 1.54788 1.66904
Wald chi2(37) = 35821.34 N > 663.644
Prob>chi2 = 0.000 n = 238,561
Note: ** significance level o f 1%, * significance level o f 5%
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Table 5-2: Estimated odds-ratios and 95% confidence intervals for continuous variables in Model A
Variable Odds ratio 95% Cl
age* 0.5386 0.53795 0.53922
tac (claims)** 0.9987 0.99868 0.99872
tco (contributions)** 1.0054 1.00538 1.00545
co2 (co-payments)** 1.0019 1.00188 1.00192
gp (GP benefits)** 1.0045 1.00425 1.00477
pub (pub. hospital benefits)** 0.9983 0.99816 0.99843
spe (specialist benefits)** 1.0018 1.00178 1.00182
prv (priv. hospital benefits)** 1.0013 1.00128 1.00132
den (dental benefits)** 1.0060 1.00589 1.00613
opt (optical benefits)** 1.0086 1.00849 1.00877
par (paramedical benefits)** 1.0016 1.00010 1.00022
Note: Afor a 10 year increase, A*for a 10 Rand increase
The estimation of odds ratios in the presence of interaction is explained for the gender 
variable, controlled for age. When there is interaction between a factor and another 
variable, the variable odds ratio estimate also interacts with that factor. The log-odds ratio 
will not simplify to a single coefficient, instead it involves as many coefficients as the 
factor and the interaction variable have. In table 5-3 the estimated odds ratios (OR) and 
95% confidence intervals (Cl) for gender from Model A are calculated over different ages.
Table 5-3: Estimated odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for gender for Model A, controlling for age
age 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
OR
(gen* 1) 
95% Cl
1.41
1.35-1.46
1.56
1.51-1.60
1.72
1.68-1.77
1.91
1.85-1.98
2.12
2.02-2.22
2.35
2.21-2.49
2.60
2.42-2.80
The results demonstrate that the effect of gender on the odds of being a joiner increases 
with rising age. The increase in joining probability is significant for all ages but in 
particular for women 50 years and older. A female headed household that is in its 
reproductive years is estimated to have a joining probability one and a half times that of a 
household headed by a male. However, a female headed households in its retirement age 
(when likelihood to incur medical costs is also high) has a joining p r o b a b i l i ty  of more than 
two times that of a male headed household at the same age. The joining probability 
increase here can be as little as 2.4 times or as high as 2.8 times with 95% confidence. For 
the results presented here, however, only odds ratio calculations for significant 
interactions, which are of particular value to the overall results interpretation of the joiner- 
control model, will be discussed. For the socio-economic variables in Model A, the 
following results were obtained.
165
Birgit Hansl Chapter 5: Analysis results <& interpretation
The probability of joining medical scheme plans decreased significantly with 
increasing age of principal members.116 Females have a higher probability of joining 
medical scheme plans than males. The odds of joining are 1.2 times larger for female 
headed households than for male headed households.117 However/ the estimated odds 
ratios for gender, controlling for age (table 5-3), demonstrate that the effect of gender on 
the odds of being a joiner increases with rising age, particularly for women 50 years and 
older. The comparably lower odds for younger women can be partly explained by their 
higher likelihood to be insured through their spouses. However, the significant positive 
interaction gender*dependants also suggests some effect of gender on the odds of joining 
with an increase in the number of dependants (the odds ratios for gender, controlling for 
dependant number, are displayed in table A7-1 in Appendix 7). The increase in joining 
probability is higher for female headed households as compared to male headed 
households with similar numbers of dependants.118
Households with an above and with a below average number of dependants had a 
significantly lower probability of joining compared to households with an average 
number of dependants.119 Results for the income group variable show that households 
with below and with above average income had significantly higher probabilities of 
joining compared to households with average incomes.120 Race-group effects were 
marked, where households headed by Asian, Coloured, and Black Africans have 
significantly lower probabilities of joining than White Africans. Historic inequities, 
prejudices, and lower demand for Western health care among Non-whites were expected 
to explain these differences. Probability of joining is significantly higher for households in
116 The significant interactions age*dependants, age*opt, and age*pub have very small coefficients and did 
not lead to considerable variations in the odds for age, controlling for dependants, for optical, or for public 
hospital benefits. Thus these results are not displayed here.
117 The significant interaction gender*race, has a very small coefficient and did not lead to variations in the 
odds for gender, controlling for race. Similarly, the significant gender*risk interaction did not lead to 
variations in the odds for gender, controlling for risk plan joined. These results are not displayed here.
118 A female household with one dependant is about one time more likely to join insurance than a similar 
male household. However, the joining probability of a female household rises to one and a half times of that 
of a male household when they both have a similar number of six dependants, all other variables being equal.
1,9 The significant interaction dependants*gp has a very small coefficient, not leading to variations in the 
odds for dependants, controlling for GP benefits. (The results are not displayed.)
120 The results for below average income households complies with the expectation that low income earners 
have a higher financial risk and thus economic incentive to seek insurance. The impact of health costs on 
their disposable income would be far more devastating than for wealthier households. Since above average 
income households also have higher odds of joining as compared to average income households, income also 
seems to function as an affordability constraint for a household’s preference to obtain insurance coverage. 
The odds ratios for the models’ significant interaction income*risk (in Appendix 7, table A7-2) indicate that 
within each risk plan type, the odds increases slightly for joining a high-risk plan at both income levels.
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urban rather than rural areas. This supports the expectation that households living in 
urban areas have better aiccess to health insurance (and health care).
For the contribution-claim and benefit variables die following results are displayed 
in table 5-2. The odds for a 10 Rand increase in claims for households that join is less than 
one times that of households in the control group. The probability of joining medical 
scheme plan coverage increases significantly for households with increasing negotiable 
non-essential high-end services (such as specialist and private hospital benefits). The 
probability of joining also increases with rising discretionary service utilisation, i.e rising 
dental, optical, and paramedical benefits. This is also true for the essential service type of 
GP benefits. However, joining probability increases with decreasing essential public 
hospital benefits. A household's probability of joining medical scheme plans increases 
with increasing contributions and co-payments.
Finally, the results for the plan classification variable show that the probability of 
joining increases with households' probabilities of entering low-risk plans as compared to 
households entering average-risk plans. The odds of joining are 1.4 times larger for 
households who joined below average risk plans than for households who joined average- 
risk plans. However, joining probability decreases with the decreasing probability of 
households entering plans with above average risk profiles. The odds of joining, for 
households that joined high-risk plans, are only two-thirds that of similar households 
joining average-risk plans.121 The next section will present the estimation results of the 
leavers-control model, Model B.
5.2.2 Model B results: leavers-control group
Model B tested for differences between the risk profiles of leavers (households that leave 
medical scheme plans during any time during the observation period) and die control 
group. The dependant variable for the Model B is lc, where lc=l for households that left at 
any point during the observation period and zero otherwise. On the next page table 5-4 
displays Model B's coefficients, odds ratios, semi-robust standard errors, z-scores, two- 
tailed p-values, and 95% confidence intervals for the population average model, with 
exchangeable correlation. The 684,939 observations that entered Model B were clustered 
over 262,349 households. The minimum of observations per household is 1 (year) and the
121 The risk*income interaction was significant. The odds ratios for risk, controlling for income, are in table 
A7-3 (Appendix 7). While within each income group the odds of joining increased for high/low risk plans, 
compared to average plans, the odds increase was highest for above average incomes joining a low risk plan.
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Table 5-4: Estimated coefficients, odds ratios, standard errors, z-scores, two-tailedp-values, and 95% 
confidence intervals for Model B
Model B
Variables
Ic
Coef. Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% c  q
Socio-economic
age -0.03612** 0.96453 0.00064 -56.08 0.000 -0.03738 -0.03485
gen (female) 0.68371** 1.98122 0.02963 23.07 0.000 0.62563 0.74179
depm * 1 (below)* -0.06332** 0.93864 0.00948 •6.68 0.000 -0.08191 -0.04473
depm = 2 (above)* -0.05722** 0.94439 0.01702 -3.36 0.001 -0.09057 -0.02386
*ref. cat. is average
dependant number
Icgm * 1 (below)* 0.16825** 1.18323 0.01195 14.07 0.000 0.14482 0.19168
icgm * 2 (above)* 0.22438** 1.25155 0.02366 9.48 0.000 0.17800 0.27076
*ref. cat. is average income
race * 1 (Asian)* -0.99478** 0.36980 0.02053 •48.45 0.000 •1.03503 -0.95454
race = 2 (Black)' -1.10995** 0.32958 0.02573 -43.14 0.000 -1.16038 -1.05952
race s  3 (Coloured)* -1.27728** 0.27879 0.03342 •38.22 0.000 -1.34278-1.21178
*ref. c a t is White
urb (urban) 0.21248** 1.23674 0.01809 11.75 0.000 0.17702 0.24793
Claim-contribution and
benefits
tac (claims) 0.00005** 1.00005 0.00001 3.9 0.000 0.00003 0.00008
too (contributions) 0.00024** 1.00024 0.00002 10 0.000 0.00019 0.00029
co2 (co-payments) 0.00027** 1.00027 0.00005 5.59 0.000 0.00018 0.00036
gp (GP benefits) 0.00093** 1.00093 0.00004 22.22 0.000 0.00085 0.00101
pub (pub.hospital benefits) -0.00015* 0.99985 0.00007 -2.01 0.045 -0.00029 0.00000
spe (specialist benefits) -0.00006** 0.99994 0.00002 -3.73 0.000 •0.00010 -0.00003
prv (priv. hospital benefits) •0.00008** 0.99992 0.00001 -5.95 0.000 -0.00010 -0.00005
den (dental benefits) 0.00111** 1.00111 0.00006 19.75 0.000 0.00100 0.00122
opt (optical benefits) 0.00198** 1.00198 0.00008 23.86 0.000 0.00182 0.00214
par (paramedical benefits) 0.00008* 1.00008 0.00004 2.23 0.026 0.00001 0.00015
Plan classification
risk * 1 (below)** -0.08470** 0.91879 0.01501 -5.64 0.000 -0.11412 -0.05528
risk ■ 2 (above)** 0.21934** 1.24526 0.01864 11.77 0.000 0.18281 0.25587
** ref. cat. is average risk
Interactions
age*gen -0.01187** 0.98820 0.00071 -16.83 0.000 -0.01325 -0.01049
age*depm 0.00067** 1.00067 0.00021 3.21 0.001 0.00026 0.00107
age*icgm -0.00250** 0.99751 0.00019 •13.22 0.000 •0.00287 -0.00213
age*race 0.00759** 1.00762 0.00026 29.63 0.000 0.00709 0.00810
age*den •0.00002** 0.99998 0.00000 -14.67 0.000 •0.00002 -0.00002
age'opt -0.00002** 0.99998 0.00000 -11.91 0.000 -0.00002 -0.00002
age*co2 -0.00001** 0.99999 0.00000 -6.19 0.000 -0.00001 0.00000
age*pub 0.00000* 1.00000 0.00000 2.5 0.012 0.00000 0.00001
age*tac 0.00000** 1.00000 0.00000 2.88 0.004 0.00000 0.00000
gen*icgm -0.01372** 0.98638 0.00471 -2.91 0.004 •0.02294 -0.00449
race*too -0.00019** 0.99981 0.00001 -17.63 0.000 •0.00021 -0.00017
icgm*race 0.02922** 1.02965 0.00206 14.17 0.000 0.02518 0.03326
icgm*urb -0.05555** 0.94596 0.00889 -6.25 0.000 -0.07298 -0.03812
opt*tac 0.00000** 1.00000 0.00000 •2.85 0.004 0.00000 0.00000
risk*icgm 0.03389** 1.03447 0.00372 9.11 0.000 0.02659 0.04118
cons 0.87973** 0.03334 26.38 0.000 0.81438 0.94508
Wald chi2(37) = 20066.5 N -  684.939
Prob >chJ2 * 0.000 n ■ 262.349
Note: ** significance level o f 1%, *,significance level o f 5%
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maximum is 4 years, with an average of 2.6 observations per household. Model B's 
covariates are all at least significant at the five percent level. The following estimated 
within household working correlation matrix R can be reported:
cl c2 c3 c4
rl 1.0000
r2 0.8455 1.0000
r3 0.8455 0.8455 1.0000
r4 0.8455 0.8455 0.8455 1.0000
Table 5-5 displays the calculated odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for all 
significant continuous variables in Model B. The estimated odds ratio for an increase in 10 
years of age is 0.7. This result can be interpreted as meaning that for every increase of ten 
years in age the likelihood of being in the leavers group decreases by about one third. 
Since age can be treated as linear in the logit, the interpretation is valid over all ages.
Table 5-5: Estimated odds-ratios and 95% confidence intervals for continuous variables in model B
Variable Odds ratio 95% Cl
ageA 0.6968 0.69596 0.69771
tac (claims)** 1.0005 1.00048 1.00052
tco (contributions)** 1.0024 1.00236 1.00244
co2 (co-payments)** 1.0027 1.00261 1.00280
gp (GP benefits)** 1.0093 1.00926 1.00942
pub (pub.hospital benefits)** 0.9985 0.99836 0.99863
spe (specialist benefits)** 0.9994 0.99936 0.99943
prv (priv. hospital benefits)** 0.9992 0.99918 0.99921
den (dental benefits)** 1.0111 1.01104 1.01128
opt (optical benefits)** 1.0198 1.01984 1.02016
par (paramedical benefits)** 1.0008 1.00072 1.00088
Note: Afor a 10 year increase and ^  for a 10 Rand increase
First, the results for the socio-economic variables are presented. Probability of leaving 
medical scheme plan coverage decreases significantly with increasing age of principal 
members.122 Females have a higher probability of leaving insurance coverage. The odds of 
leaving are nearly two times larger for female headed households than that for male 
headed households. However, the calculated odds ratios for gender, controlling for age, 
displayed in the Appendix 7 in table A7-4, demonstrate that the effect of gender on the 
odds of being a leaver decrease with rising age, particularly for women younger than 
40.123
122 The calculated odds ratios for the significant interactions age*den, age*opt, age*pub, age*co2, and 
age*tac, controlling age for dental, optical and public hospital benefits, co-payments, and claims are not 
displayed here. Because these interactions were extremely small they add not further interpretable 
information.
123 Female headed households in the reproductive years have a leaving probability of 1.5, but in the retirement 
age of only 0.8 times that of households headed by similarly aged males.
169
Birgit Hansl Chapter 5: Analysis results <t interpretation
Households with an above and with a below average number of dependants have 
a significantly lower probability of leaving insurance as compared to households with 
average numbers of dependants.124 The results for income show that households with 
below and with above average incomes have a significantly higher probability of leaving 
insurance as compared to households with average incomes.125 Race-group effects were 
significant with households headed by Asian, Coloured, and Black Africans having a 
significantly lower probability of leaving insurance coverage than White Africans. The 
explanation for these results might lay in unequal access for Non-whites to health 
insurance options outside the medical scheme market. Probability of leaving is 
significantly higher for households in urban, as opposed to rural, areas, indicating better 
access for urban households to different insurance options.126
For the claim and benefits variables the odds ratios are displayed in table 5-5. The 
odds of a 10 Rand increase in claims for households that leave is more than one times that 
of a household in the control group. The probability that households leave medical 
scheme plans increases significantly with decreasing negotiable non-emergency services: 
specialist and private hospital benefits. This is also true for the essential service type of 
public hospital benefits, while the probability of leaving increases with increasing 
essential service utilisation of GP benefits.127 The probability of leaving increases with 
rising discretionary service utilisation, i.e rising dental, optical, and paramedical benefits. 
Probability of leaving increases with increasing contributions and co-payments.
For the plan classification variable the following results were obtained. The 
probability of leaving decreases with households' probability of leaving low-risk plans
124 The calculated odds ratios for dependants, controlling for age are displayed in Appendix 7, table A7-S.
The increase in leaving probability is significant for older households near retirement age with above average 
dependant numbers. Households with above average dependant numbers of age older than 60 have a one time 
higher leaving likelihood than that of households at the same age with average number of dependants.
12 The fact that below average income households have higher odds of leaving than households with average 
incomes, holding all other variables equal, matches the expectation that low income presents a strong 
affordability constraint. However, it contradicts the expectation that low-income earners have a higher 
economic incentive to keep insurance. Thus it seems very likely that, if low-income earners leave, they seek 
insurance somewhere else. The significant interaction age*income (Appendix 7, table A7-6) showed 
decreasing odds for leaving with age. The odds ratio for the income*risk interaction (Appendix 7, table A7-7) 
showed that households, regardless their income, have increasing odds of leaving high-risk plans. Thus 
income functions as an affordability constraint for insurance coverage in general and for alternative choices.
126 Decreasing odds that urban households leave (calculated for the significant interaction urban*income in 
Appendix 7, table A7-8) suggests that urban households with high income have a lower leaving probability.
However, the public hospital benefit coefficient only became significant at the 95% level after controlling 
for age. Also, in the section describing the data subgroups it was shown that leavers had on average the 
highest public hospital benefits among all mover groups, exceeding the mean of the control group 
significantly. Leaving probability increases with increasing GP benefits. However, it was assumed that in 
most health care systems GPs function as gatekeepers for high-end services.
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compared to households leaving average-risk plans. However, leaving increases with the 
probability of households leaving plans with above average risk profiles.128
The next section will present the estimation results of die switchers-control model, 
Model C.
5.2.3 Model C results: switchers-control group
Model C tested for differences between the risk profiles of switchers (households that 
switch medical scheme plans during any time during the observation period) and the 
control group. The dependant variable for Model C is sc, with sc**l for households that 
switched a plan at any point during the observation period and zero otherwise. Switchers 
were coded in the data either if households joined or left a plan within a medical scheme. 
It could be not distinguished where a switcher that joined came from or where switchers 
that left went However, of the about 31,000 switcher observations, more than 90% are 
from switchers that joined. Because of the small number of switchers that leave, both types 
of switchers had to be pooled for the statistical model analysis. For the interpretation it is 
of importance to keep in mind that these results mainly concern switchers that joined a 
new plan.
Qn the next page table 5-6 displays Model C s coefficients, odds ratios, semi-robust 
standard errors, z-scores, two-tailed p-values, and 95% confidence intervals for the 
population average model, with exchangeable correlation. The 532,010 observations that 
entered Model C were clustered over 177,981 households. The minimum of observations 
per household is 1 (year) and the maximum 4 years, with an average of 3 observations per 
household. Model C s covariates are all significant at the five percent level, except the 
below average dependants number, the above average income group, and paramedical 
benefits. The following estimated within household working correlation matrix R can be 
reported:
cl c2 c3
rl 1.0000
t 2 0.7715 1.0000
r3 0.7715 0.7715 1.0000
r4 0.7715 0.7715 0.7715
128 The significant interaction risk*income leads to calculated odds (Appendix 7, table A7-9) that increase 
within each income group. However, the odds increase is higher for above average income households to 
leave a high-risk plan rather than an average-risk plan.
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Table 5-6: Estimated coefficients, odds ratios, standard errors, z-scores, two-tailedp-values, and 95% 
confidence intervals for Model C
Model C
Variables
sc
Coef. Odds Ratio Std. Err. X P>|z| [95% C 1]
Socio-economic
age •0.00671** 0.99331 0.00101 •6.66 0.000 •0.00869 -0.00474
gen (female) 0.24360** 1.27583 0.06394 3.81 0.000 0.11828 0.36891
depm * 1 (below)* 0.01540 1.01552 0.01187 1.3 0.195 •0.00787 0.03866
depm * 2 (above)* 
*ref. c a t is average 
dependant number 
icgm = 1 (below)A
■0.05222**
0.08251**
0.94912
1.08601
0.01166
0.01188
-4.48
6.94
0.000
0.000
-0.07508 -0.02936 
0.05922 0.10580
Icgm = 2 (above)A 
Aref. cat. is average income 
race = 1 (Asian)'
0.00203
0.13200**
1.00203
1.14111
0.01718
0.03299
0.12
4
0.906
0.000
•0.03165 0.03570 
0.06735 0.19665
race * 2 (Black)' •0.65239** 0.52080 0.04349 -15 0.000 -0.73763 -0.56715
race = 3 (Coloured)' 
'ref. c a t is White 
urb (urban)
-1.27134**
0.11245*
0.28045
1.11901
0.04804
0.04903
-26.46
2.29
0.000
0.022
-1.36550 -1.17719 
0.01636 0.20854
Claim-contribution and
benefits
tac (claims) -0.00007** 0.99993 0.00002 -2.93 0.003 •0.00012 -0.00002
tco (contributions) -0.00063** 0.99937 0.00013 -4.96 0.000 •0.00088 -0.00038
co2 (co-payments) 0.00031** 1.00031 0.00003 8.83 0.000 0.00024 0.00037
gp (GP benefits) 0.00103** 1.00104 0.00027 3.8 0.000 0.00050 0.00157
pub (pub.hospital benefits) -0.00085** 0.99915 0.00017 -4.85 0.000 -0.00119-0.00050
spe (specialist benefits) 0.00008* 1.00008 0.00003 2.28 0.022 0.00001 0.00014
prv (priv. hospital benefits) 0.00008** 1.00008 0.00003 3.21 0.001 0.00003 0.00013
den (dental benefits) 0.00022** 1.00022 0.00005 4.36 0.000 0.00012 0.00032
opt (optical benefits) -0.00077** 0.99923 0.00011 -6.98 0.000 •0.00098 -0.00055
par (paramedical benefits) -0.00008 0.99992 0.00006 •1.28 0.200 •0.00021 0.00004
Plan classification
risk »1  (below)** 0.42828** 1.53462 0.08650 4.95 0.000 0.25875 0.59782
risk ■ 2 (above)**
** ref. cat. is average risk
-0.56429 0.56877 0.17065 -3.31 0.001 -0.89875 -0.22983
interactions
age*gen -0.00987** 0.99018 0.00139 -7.12 0.000 •0.01258 -0.00715
age*tco 0.00002** 1.00002 0.00000 6.14 0.000 0.00001 0.00002
gen*icgm 0.04919** 1.05042 0.01299 3.79 0.000 0.02372 0.07466
gen*gp 0.00093** 1.00093 0.00022 4.22 0.000 0.00050 0.00137
icgm*race -0.08189** 0.92137 0.00586 •13.98 0.000 •0.09337 -0.07041
icgm*gp -0.00085** 0.99915 0.00017 -5.05 0.000 -0.00118-0.00052
race*spe •0.00004 0.99996 0.00002 -1.81 0.071 -0.00009 0.00000
race*tco -0.00015** 0.99985 0.00003 -4.38 0.000 •0.00022 -0.00008
urb*pub 0.00069** 1.00069 0.00018 3.78 0.000 0.00033 0.00104
risk*age -0.00601** 0.99401 0.00086 -6.97 0.000 •0.00770 -0.00432
risk*gen 0.25842** 1.29489 0.02626 9.84 0.000 0.20697 0.30988
risk*icgm 0.02203* 1.02227 0.00894 2.46 0.014 0.00451 0.03955
risk*urb 0.31010** 1.36356 0.07107 4.36 0.000 0.17080 0.44940
risk*opt 0.00079** 1.00079 0.00010 7.73 0.000 0.00059 0.00099
risk*tco 0.00031** 1.00032 0.00005 6.81 0.000 0.00022 0.00041
cons -1.88824** 0.07114 •26.54 0.000 •2.02767 -1.74882
Wald chi2(37) >5431.19 N -  532.010
Prob > ch!2 * 0.000 n ■ 177,981
Note: ** significant level o f I %, * significance level o f 5%
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In table 5-7 the calculated odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for all significant 
continuous variables in Model C are displayed. The calculated odds ratio for a 10 year 
increase in age is 0.93. The interpretation is that for every increase of ten years in age the 
likelihood of being in the joiners group decreases by about 7%.129
Table 5-7: Estimated odds-ratios and 95% confidence intervals for continuous variables in Model C
Variable Odds ratio 95% Cl
ageA 0.9331 0.91677 0.95379
tac (claims )** 0.9993 0.99926 0.99933
tco (contributions)** 0.9937 0.99346 0.99397
co2 (co-payments)** 1.0031 1.00305 1.00316
gp (GP benefits)** 1.0135 1.00981 1.01089
pub (pub. hospital benefits)** 0.9915 0.99120 0.99186
spe (specialist benefits)** 1.0008 1.00074 1.00085
prv (priv. hospital benefits)** 1.0008 1.00074 1.00085
den (dental benefits)** 1.0022 1.00210 1.00230
opt (optical benefits)** 0.9923 0.99211 0.99254
par (paramedical benefits)** Not significant
Note: Afor a 10 year increase, ** for a 10 Rand increase
First, the following results for the socio-economic variables were obtained. Probability of 
switching medical scheme plan coverage decreases significantly with increasing age of the 
principal member.130 Females have a higher probability of switching insurance coverage. 
The odds of switching are 1.3 times larger for female headed households than for male 
headed households. However, the calculated odds ratios for gender, controlling for age, 
(Appendix 7, table A7-10) demonstrate that the effect of gender on the odds of being a 
switcher decreases with rising age, particularly for women between 20 and 40 years of 
age.131 Also, the significant interaction gender*risk leads to a substantial odds ratio 
increase for female headed households switching to high-risk plans (rather than for 
switching to low-risk plans as compared to switching to an average plan).132
Households with an above average number of dependants have a significantly 
lower probability of switching insurance as compared to households with an average 
number of dependants. Households with below average incomes have a significantly
129 Since age can be treated as linear in the logit the interpretation is valid over all ages.
130 The age*claim interaction had extremely small coefficients near zero. The calculated odds ratios for the 
significant interaction of age*tco, with age controlled for contributions did not contain further information for 
this interpretation and thus the results are not displayed here.
131 While female headed households in their reproductive years have an estimated switching probability of 
more than one time that of households headed by similarly aged males, female headed households in their 
retirement age have a switching probability of only two thirds that of male headed households.
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higher probability of switching insurance plans as compared to households with average 
incomes, while above average income households have a positive but not significant 
coefficient for switching plans compared to average income households.133 Significant 
race-group effects were detected, with households headed by Coloured and Black 
Africans having a significantly lower probability of switching insurance coverage than 
White Africans.134 Probability of switching is significantly higher for urban households 
than for rural households, supporting the hypothesis of better access to insurance options 
and health services for urban households.135
In Model C the claim and benefits variables displayed the following results. The 
odds for a 10 Rand increase in claims for a household that switches is less than that of a 
household in the control group (table 5-7). The probability that households switch medical 
scheme plans increases significantly with increasing negotiable non-emergency service 
utilisation of specialist and private hospital benefits. Switching also increases with rising 
discretionary service utilisation of dental benefits and decreasing optical benefits 
(paramedical benefits did not predict probability of switching). The switching probability 
decreases with essential public hospital benefits but increases with GP benefits. 
Probability of switching insurance increases with decreasing contributions and increasing 
co-payments.
For the plan classification variable the probability of switching increases with the 
probability that households switch to low-risk plans as compared to households switching 
to average-risk plans. The odds of switching are 1.5 times larger for households that 
switch to below average risk plans than those of households switching to average-risk 
plans. Switching probability decreases with the probability of a household switching to a 
plan with an above average risk profile. The odds of switching, for households that switch
132Table A7-11 in Appendix 7 shows that female headed households switching to high-risk plans are over two 
times more likely to switch than male households. Female headed households switching to low-risk plans are 
only one and a half time more likely to switch compared to male headed households.
133 The first coefficient matches the expectation that low income earners have a higher economic incentive to 
keep insurance, even if it means switching to other plans. Again, the impact of health costs on their 
disposable income would be far more devastating than for wealthier households. The sign of the second, 
above average income coefficient supports the hypothesis that income functions as an affordability constraint
134 However, the odds of switching for households headed by Asian Africans are higher than for households 
headed by White Africans. The interaction race*income is significant in Model C and the calculated odds 
ratios for race, controlling for income, displayed in Appendix 7, table A7-12, reveal decreases in the 
switching probability for Asian, Black, or Coloured households within the below average income group as 
compared to White households. Particularly noticeable is the decrease for Asian households’ switching 
probability after controlling for income. It becomes nearly equal to that of similar White households.
Prevailing economic inequities might be here a valid interpretation.
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to above average risk plans, are only half of those of similar households switching to 
average-risk plan.136
Before the result of the three models could be interpreted in regard to evidence for 
adverse selection and/or risk selection they were assessed for their model fit This is the 
last step of each statistical analysis based on model building. The next section will shortly 
summarise the results of the model fit assessment for the Models A, B, and C.
5.3 Results of model fit assessment
The purpose of this section is to present the results of the model fit assessment for the 
three models used in this diesis' empirical analysis. Severed standard methods and 
diagnostic statistics for the overall fit of logistic regression models are available, which 
range from summary measures of goodness-of-fit to logistic regression diagnostics. 
However, diagnostic statistics for the overall fit of a logistic regression model have not yet 
been extended for the use in model assessments for correlated data models (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2000).
Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) suggest that in such a case the analysis should be 
approximated with standard methods developed for normal uncorrelated data, rather 
than the inferior option of performing no model checking at all. This means, in the case of 
this thesis' analysis, that instead of fitting the marginal models (for panel data) and 
assessing their model fit, similar logit models (designed for cross-sectional data) should be 
fitted and assessed for their fit Or in other words, simple logit models should be fitted 
and then be assessed for their model fit using correlated data, but assuming that the 
observations are in fact not correlated. However, a clear disadvantage of this procedure 
will be that the then fitted and assessed models will not consider the typical panel data 
correlation. Thus the model fit assessment of these proxy models has to be interpreted 
with caution. Applying these methods of goodness-of-fit and logistic regression 
diagnostics will merely indicate the fit of the actual marginal models, but may not stand 
up to the standards of precise measurement
133 The significant interaction urban*risk demonstrates that the odds of switching increase for urban
households, no matter to which plan they switch (Appendix 7, table 7-13). The odds increase is significantly
higher for switching to high-risk plans, compared to similar urban households switching to low-risk plans.
136 The estimated coefficient for the risk*age interaction was significant and the effects of risk on the odds of 
switching, controlled for age (presented in Appendix 7, table A7-14) show that the decrease in the odds of 
switching with rising age is significant, in particular, for switchers to low-risk plans.
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In order to obtain die results discussed in this model assessment section all three 
Models, A, B, and C, were estimated using the LOGIT command in ST ATA™ for normal 
cross-sectional data (i.e. assuming uncorrelated data). The ROBUST option allowed the 
specification of clusters (here over household IDs) such that within the clusters the 
assumption of independence was relaxed.
There are several standard approaches for assessing the tit of models, which range 
from the evaluation of overall measures of tit to the examination of individual 
components of the summary statistics, and logistic regression diagnostic, often with 
graphs. Summary measures of goodness-of-fit are provided in most software packages 
with the output for any fitted model. Although summary statistics provide only limited 
information on the tit of model components, they can indicate interesting deviations from 
the tit  The complete model tit assessment is presented in detail in Appendix 8. Here only 
a short summary will be presented.
The summary measures of goodness-of-fit, like the Pseudo-R-Square, the Pearson 
goodness-of-fit chi-square statistics, and the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test did 
not show a convincing fit for the proxy models. This could be expected, considering the 
inappropriateness of these proxy models for the data at hand. However, the results of the 
classification tables and ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) curves for the proxy 
models indicated acceptable to good classification and discrimination. Generally, overall 
goodness-of-fit measures and classification tables are only one part of model tit 
assessments. They provide single numbers that summarise a considerable amount of 
information. Given the model, the context and the objective, some measures performed 
better, some worse (see also the discussion in chapter 6).
For a better judgement of a model's fit, logistic regression diagnostics are 
performed in order to see if a fit was supported over the entire covariate pattern. The 
examination of covariate patterns is very important, since the previously discussed 
summary statistics, based on the Pearson chi-square residuals, only summarise the 
agreement between observed and fitted values in a single and hard to assess number. 
These diagnostic regression techniques are nearly exclusively based on the visual 
assessment of graphs (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).
Components of the residual sum-of squares are key quantities for logistic 
regression diagnostics. These are first, the residuals for each covariate pattern, the hat
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matrix, and the leverage values derived from i t137 The plots of leverage values versus 
Pearson residuals for all three proxy models (in Appendix 8) demonstrate that only a very 
small number of covariate patterns deviated, which indicates good model fit
Another diagnostic statistic examined the decrease in the Pearson chi-square 
goodness-of-fit statistic (Ax2) and the effect on the value of the estimated coefficients
A
(A/?) caused by deleting an observation (and all others sharing the covariate pattern).138 
These diagnostic techniques can easily identify covariate patterns that are poorly fit (large 
values of Ax2) and those that have a great deal of influence on the values of estimated
parameters (large values of A p ).
Among the selection of various types of plots, each focusing on a different aspect
• A
of fit, three were chosen here. The first two are the plots of Ax2 and of A (3 versus the 
estimated logistic probability. The third is a plot of Ax2 versus the estimated logistic
A
probability where the size of the plotting symbol is proportional to the size of A /?. These 
three plots for the proxy models, presented in the Appendix 8, show only a very small 
number of deviating covariate patterns and indicate very good model fit
The limitations of these summary measures of goodness-of-fit and logistic 
regression diagnostics are discussed in chapter 6. However, in this case all goodness-of-fit 
measures and logistic regression diagnostics were applied to the simple logistic models, 
which only functioned as proxies for the actual models in order to make up for the lack of 
fit assessment tools for models with correlated data. After this thorough assessment it can 
be concluded that even the proxy models are well fit That leads to the conclusion that the 
actual models used, which are more appropriate for the data, fit very well.
The model fit assessment results were the final results for this thesis' empirical 
analysis. The next section will interpret the model estimation results.
137 The hat matrix is the matrix that provides the fitted values as the projection of the outcome variable into 
the covariate space. The diagonal elements of the hat matrix are called the leverage value. They are 
proportional to the distance from a covariate to the mean of the data (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).
For the mathematical foundation of these diagnostics see Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) p. 173.
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5.4 Interpretation of model estimation results
The purpose of this section is to interpret the estimation results of the presented logistic 
regression models. This interpretation will focus on evidence for adverse selection and 
risk selection, which, as hypothesised, would lead to a lack of risk pooling in South 
Africa's unregulated medical scheme market. As discussed on the previous chapters, this 
does not exclude the possibility of a separating equilibrium, which might indeed be 
efficient but yet not equitable. This thesis's data and the empirical analysis design do not 
lend themselves to an explicit test for the existence of a separating equilibrium, however, 
this possible interpretation of the results will be discussed. This section will first, evaluate 
the empirical analysis results within the group method framework. Then the 
interpretations for Model A of joiners and the control group will be discussed, followed by 
Model B, of leavers and the control group, and finally Model C, of switchers and the 
control group
5.4.1 The results within the group method framework
The group method aimed to derive evidence for adverse selection and risk selection, by 
defining population subgroups within the insured population -  households that enter, 
exit, and switch insurance plans compared to a control group of the constantly insured. 
The selection processes were categorised into several subtypes in order to specify die 
expected observations for households' risk profiles under each type of adverse selection 
and risk selection. This yielded two matrix-style tables, one for each selection type, 
specifying, among other things, the expected empirical observations for each group. The 
empirical analysis results will be synthesised on die next pages with these two tables, 
highlighting coinciding expected and actual observations.
Evidence for adverse selection, summarised with table 5-8 on the next page, is 
rather limited. Among adverse selection types one and two, only the more likely entry of 
females and thus more frequent female membership among joiners and switchers, 
consistently indicates adverse selection. Generally, a more frequent choice of insurance 
entrance among female headed households was expected to be one (among several other) 
indicating high-risk factor.139 However, aside from this variable only higher non-essential 
benefits supports the adverse selection hypothesis. Other, more substantial, components
139 However, it was pointed out in the gender variable expectation and results interpretation that gender biases 
might occur in employment and compensation. For this reason it was not deemed a very good risk indicator 
for the conclusion of the existence of evidence regarding selection processes.
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of the household profiles did not indicate the preferred entry of high risks into the medical 
scheme market or specifically high-risk plans. Thus from such a limited number of not 
very strong risk indicators adverse selection of type one or two cannot be concluded.
However, table 5-8 shows more evidence for adverse selection of type three, where 
low risks discontinue insurance coverage in the observed medical scheme plans 
(presumably giving up insurance coverage altogether or joining a for-profit insurer).
Table 5-8: Concluded adverse selection types
Adverse Selection 
MANIFESTATION
Type 1 
Choice of insurance 
coverage by high risks
Entrance of High Risks
Type 2 
Choice of certain plans of 
insurance coverage by 
high risks
A. Entrance of High Risks 
into High-Risk Plans
B. Switch of High Risks to 
High-Risk Plans
Type 3 
Choice of discontinued 
insurance coverage by low 
risks
A. Exit of Low Risks
B. Exit of Low Risks from 
High-Risk Plans
MECHANISMS ADVERSE SELECTION OF 
HIGH RISKS
ADVERSE SELECTION OF 
HIGH RISKS
ADVERSE SELECTION OF 
LOW RISKS
EFFECTS High Risks join on average 
more
A. High Risks join on 
average more high-risk plans
B. High risks switch on 
average more to high-risk 
plans
A. Low risks leave on 
average more
B. Low risks leave on 
average more high-risk plans
AFFECTED GROUPS JOINERS A. JOINERS
B. SWITCHERS
A. LEAVERS
B. LEAVERS
EXPECTED
EMPIRICAL
OBSERVATIONS
AND COINCIDING
ACTUAL
OBSERVATIONS
On average Joiners:
1. Are older, female, non­
single
2. Have higher claims, 
lower contribution-claim 
ratios
3. Have higher essential 
and higher non- 
essential benefits
A On average Joiners:
1. Are older, female, non­
single
2. Have higher claims, 
lower contribution-claim 
ratios
3. Have higher essential 
and higher non- 
essential benefits
Join high-risk plans
B On average Switchers:
1. Are older, female, non­
single
2. Have higher claims, 
lower contribution-claim 
ratios
3. Have higher essential 
and higher non- 
essential benefits
Switch to high-risk plans
A On average Leavers:
1. Are younger, male, 
single
2. Have lower claims, 
higher contribution- 
claim ratios
3. Have lower essential, 
lower non-essential 
service utilisation and 
higher discretionary 
benefits
B On average Leavers:
1. Are younger, male, 
single
2. Have lower claims, 
higher contribution- 
claim ratios
3. Have lower essential 
lower non-essential 
service utilisation and 
higher discretionary 
benefits
Leave from high-risk plans
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Table 5-9: Concluded risk selection types
Risk Selection 
MANIFESTATION
Type 1 
Discourage high-risk 
insurance applicants
Restricted Entrance of High 
Risks
Type 2
Attract low risks to certain 
plans of insurance 
coverage
A. Entrance of Low Risks 
into Low-Risk Plans
B. Switch of Low Risks to 
Low-Risk Plans
Type 3 
Discourage high risks to 
continue insurance 
coverage or switch them to 
high-risk plans
A. Exit of High Risks (from 
High-Risk Plans
B. Switch of High Risks to 
High-Risk Plans
MECHANISMS UNFAVOURABLE RISK 
SELECTION
FAVOURABLE RISK
SELECTION/CREAM-
SKIMMING
A. DUMPING
B. UNFAVOURABLE RISK 
SELECTION
EFFECTS High risks join on average 
less
A. Low risks join on average 
more low risk plans
B. Low Risks switch on 
average more to low risk 
plans
A. High Risks leave on 
average more (high risk 
plans)
B. High risks switch on 
average more to high risk 
plans
AFFECTED GROUPS JOINERS A. JOINERS
B. SWITCHERS
A. LEAVERS
B. SWITCHERS
EXPECTED
EMPIRICAL
OBSERVATIONS
AND COINCIDING
ACTUAL
OBSERVATIONS
On average Joiners:
1 Are younger, male, 
single
2. Have lower claims, 
higher contribution- 
claim ratios
3. Have lower essential, 
lower non-essential and 
higher discretionary 
benefits
A. On average Joiners:
1. Are younger, male, 
single
2. Have lower claims, 
higher contribution- 
claim ratios
3. Have lower essential, 
lower non-essential and 
higher discretionary 
benefits
Join low-risk plans
B. On average Switchers:
1. Are younger, male, 
single
2. Have lower claims, 
higher contribution- 
claim ratios
3. Have lower essential, 
lower non-essential and 
higher discretionary 
benefits
Switch to low-risk plans
A. On average Leavers:
1. Are older, female, no­
single
2. Have higher claims, 
higher contributions, 
lower contribution- 
claim ratios
3. Have higher essential 
and higher non- 
essential benefits
Leave high-risk plans
B. On average Switchers:
1. Are older, female, no­
single
2. Have higher claims, 
higher contributions, 
lower contribution- 
claim ratios
3. Have higher essential 
and higher non- 
essential benefits
Switch to high-risk plans
Several components of the households' risk profiles, like age, benefit characteristics and 
the type of plan that is more frequently exited indicate that low risks leave. Specifically it 
shows that these low risks, are more likely to leave high-risk plans, i.e. risk pools with a 
higher a presence of high risks.
Thus it seems that adverse selection in the form of low risks discontinuing 
insurance coverage in the South African medical schemes can be concluded. However, 
while discussing the expectations, it was pointed out that this type of adverse selection
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might be induced by external favourable risk selection, depending on the degree of 
competition between insurers. Two facts speak for the interpretation of these last results 
as evidence for external favourable risk selection. First, no considerable evidence of 
adverse selection into the medical scheme plans could be found. This means die typical 
adverse selection cycle, where high risks disproportionately enter specific high-risk plans 
and in turn low risks give up insurance coverage, cannot be confirmed. Second, the South 
African medical scheme market in the 1990s was surely a contested health insurance 
market and the better explanation is that low risks left due to aggressive underwriting by 
the medical scheme plan competitors.
Altogether, much stronger evidence for risk selection of all three types could be 
found, as summarised in table 5-9 on the previous page. For example, for risk selection 
type one and type 2A, joiners clearly display a low risk profile. They are younger and 
have lower claims, a contribution-claim ratio over one, lower essential benefits, and higher 
discretionary benefits. Also, joiners predominantly enter low-risk plans. All these factors 
are strong indicators for low risk. This allows the interpretation of these results as 
overwhelming evidence for risk selection in the form of discouraging the entry of high 
risks and cream-skimming of low risks. Switchers also display a low risk profile and 
predominantly switch to low-risk plans, confirming the cream-skimming hypothesis. 
Finally, risk selection also works on the side of market exit, where high risks were 
dumped. Leavers' risk profiles display, in particular, high claims and contribution-claim 
ratios under one and a tendency to leave high-risk plans. These results can be interpreted 
as evidence for risk selection type three, where high risks are pressured to leave insurance 
coverage.
This summary of the results interpretation predominantly demonstrates evidence 
for risk selection in the South African medical scheme data during the time of observation. 
Unfavourable and favourable risk selection by medical scheme plans led to the 
observation of cream-skimming and dumping. The medical scheme market was also 
contested at the time of observation - external for-profit insurers competed aggressively 
for low risks from the medical scheme plan segment. The next three sections will discuss 
the results interpretations for Model A, Model B and Model C.
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5.4.2 Model A results interpretation: joiners-control group
First, among the socio-economic variables in Model A, age delivered very good evidence 
for selection. Younger people are more likely to join medical scheme plans, because their 
lower risk for ill-health makes them a target for favourable risk selection (cream- 
skimming) by insurers. Younger people might also have a higher joining probability 
because they tend to enter professional life and take out health insurance. However, the 
decrease in joining probability with age was interpreted as unfavourable risk selection by 
insurers against the elderly in the insurance market where older persons have poorer 
access to health insurance coverage. Given that older households have a higher likelihood 
of ill-health and thus health care costs, it is unlikely that they should express a lower 
joining preference.
Interestingly, the results for the variables gender and number of dependants also 
could be interpreted as evidence for selection processes. For example, females have a 
higher probability of joining medical scheme plans than males and older females are more 
likely to join, as are females with several dependants. Given that females have a higher 
expected risk of using health care resources, particularly, when older, and that females are 
more likely to seek insurance with further dependants compared to similar males, it can 
be assumed that adverse selection in terms of females joining health insurance takes place.
Households with an above average number of dependants have a higher 
likelihood of health related costs, and a lower joining probability. This result is interpreted 
as evidence for unfavourable risk selection practised by the insurers against large 
households, because the later seem to have comparably more difficulties in obtaining 
medical scheme coverage. However, households with below average numbers of 
dependants also join less frequently. Presumably, households with no dependants have 
less economical incentive to pay for medical scheme plan coverage that is rarely used.
As expected, the results for the variables income, race, and residency cannot be 
interpreted as evidence for adverse selection and risk selection.
Contribution-claim and benefit variables that are some function of prior utilisation 
were expected to deliver the best evidence for selection. The results and interpretations in 
regard to evidence for selection processes are very good for the variables of claims and 
benefits. The negative coefficient for claims can be interpreted as evidence for favourable 
risk selection of low risks by die insurer among insurance aspirants that results in lower 
claims among new recruits. Given that households with high claims have a higher 
likelihood of ill-health and health care costs, it is unlikely that these high risks would
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display a lower joining preference. Joiners match the expected profile of low risks when 
examining the results for the utilisation/benefit variables. The probability of joining 
increases/ in particular/ with increasing non-essential high-end services and discretionary 
services, and with decreasing essential benefits.140
Contributions and co-payments were, as expected, less able to deliver evidence in 
regard to adverse selection or risk selection on their own. Higher contributions for joiners 
are in line with the expectation that insurers charge new members in unregulated markets 
higher premiums. They do this in order to maximise their profit under the uncertainty of 
possibly insuring high risks. However, the data subgroup description (in chapter four) 
showed that joiners (as all other mover groups) have, on average, higher contributions 
than the control group but also have the lowest claims, yielding a contribution-claim ratio 
of above one. This result is consistent with the expectation that households with 
contribution-claim ratios above one are of low risk and are subject to favourable risk 
selection by insurers. The joining probability increases with decreasing claims and 
essential benefits, but rising non-essential and discretionary benefits. Thus the rising co­
payments can be explained as being generated by low risks, who use non-essential and 
discretionary services with typically high co-payments. The co-payment variable supports 
the favourable risk selection hypothesis.
Finally, it was expected that the plan classification variable would be a very 
powerful variable for providing evidence for selection.141 The interpretation of these 
results confirmed the hypothesis that favourable risk selection is operating in the South 
African medical scheme market Low risks are selected into the market by the medical 
scheme plans. Households are much more likely to join low-risk plans as compared to 
average-risk plans and are less likely to join high-risk plans as compared to average-risk 
plans. This result, in particular, is important since most variables already identified 
joiners as low risks. Given that joiners have a lower expected risk of using health care 
resources (i.e. lower claims), it can be assumed that favourable risk selection takes place in 
the market in terms of directing favourable enrolment towards designed low-risk plans.
However, the results do not exactly support the case of a separating equilibrium. 
As Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) point ou t a separating equilibrium can exist if the
140 GP benefits also predict joining and joining probability increases with increasing GP benefits. However, it 
was assumed that, because in most health care systems GPs function as gatekeepers for high-end services 
used so extensively by low risks, this result indicates that joiners might be, in fact, low risks.
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market can efficiently sort high and low risks into either more generous or less generous 
plans, while charging individuals their expected costs. In the observed South African 
medical scheme market the insurer seemed to be able to sort high and low risks into either 
more generous or less generous plans to a certain degree, but they seemed not to be able 
to charge individuals their expected costs. This point seems to be valid in regard to the 
contributions in particular. Despite the fact that the risk profile of the joiners is indicating 
a higher probability of low risks as compared to control group members, the joiners' 
contributions are significantly higher. This is also true for the co-payment variable, but the 
later can be better explained together with the benefit structure of joiners.
5.4.3 Model B results Interpretation: leavers-control group
First, similar to toe socio-economic variables of Model A, age, gender, and number of 
dependants delivered very good evidence for selection in Model B, while income142, race, 
and residency could not be interpreted as evidence for selection processes. The decrease in 
the likelihood of leaving with age indicates that young, low risks leave the market 
segment, which at first sight looks like classic adverse selection. However, these low risks 
can either discontinue insurance coverage altogether (i.e. not only in medical schemes) or 
resume coverage with other for-profit insurers. It is very likely that this adverse selection 
was initiated by the cream-skimming efforts of the competing for-profit insurers.
Females have a higher probability of leaving medical scheme plans and the effect 
of gender on the odds of being a leaver decrease with rising age, particularly for women 
younger than 40, during their reproductive years. Unfavourable risk selection is likely (in 
the form of dumping female headed households).143 Households with no or few 
dependants were expected to have a lower likelihood of health costs as compared to
141 However, the odds for above average income households to join a low-risk plan rather than average-risk 
plan increase were slightly higher than all other odds increases. This supports the favourable risk selection 
hypothesis that low risks are selected into the market, and specifically low-risk plans.
142 Below average income households have higher odds of leaving than households with average incomes, 
matching the expectation that income represents an affordability constraint, but contradicting the expectation 
that low-income earners have a higher economic incentive to keep insured. It might be that low income 
leavers seek insurance somewhere else. Then it could be expected that leaving low income households are 
younger, because as low risks they are likely to be the focus of favourable risk selection by competitors. This 
could be confirmed: while high income households leave more frequently regardless their age, low income 
leavers only show odds ratios above one in younger age, when their lower risk allows them to obtain cheaper 
coverage elsewhere. Households, regardless their income, have increasing odds of leaving high-risk plans. 
Thus income functions as an affordability constraint for insurance coverage in general and for alternative 
choices. These results can be interpreted as evidence for strong competition and cream skimming.
143 It could be argued that for some younger women the likelihood of leaving is so much higher than for men 
because they get married and obtain insurance through their spouses.
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similar households with average dependants number. Nevertheless the former are in fact 
less likely to leave insurance. Risk-aversion paired with favourable selection might be 
operating here, where insurers try to keep risk-averse low-risk households in their pooL 
Since households with an above average number of dependants are of higher risk, their 
lower probability for leaving can be interpreted as evidence for adverse selectioa 
However, the odds of leaving for the significant interaction dependants*age increase with 
age, leading to the interpretation that older households with several dependants are more 
likely to be dumped.144 Thus while for households with an above average number of 
dependants the evidence is inconclusive, supporting either adverse selection or 
unfavourable risk selection, favourable risk selection can be concluded from the result that 
households with no dependants are less likely to leave insurance coverage.
Claims and benefits variables also provide very good evidence for adverse 
selection and risk selection in Model B. An increase in households' probability of leaving 
with increasing claims is here interpreted as unfavourable risk selection. Given the higher 
likelihood of ill-health and health services usage for people with high claims, it is unlikely 
that this result reflects a higher leaving preference among high risks. It rather suggests 
that the insurers dump people with high risk, i.e high claim levels. Probability of leaving 
increases with decreasing essential and negotiable benefits, but with increasing 
discretionary benefits. Thus leavers mostly matched the expected profile of low risks 
when examining the utilisation/ benefit variables.
However, the variables of contribution and co-payment only partly supported this 
interpretation. Increasing contributions support the descriptive results that leavers have a 
higher mean contribution and a lower calculated contributicn-claim ratio (of below one) 
compared to the control group. This could be interpreted as evidence for unfavourable 
risk selection by medical scheme plans, dumping high risks. Leaving probability increases 
with increasing claims and rising discretionary benefits, but decreasing essential benefits. 
Rising co-payments and increasing claims support the profile of exiting high risks and the 
hypothesis of unfavourable risk selection. However, the increasing co-payments together 
with the decreasing essential services but rising discretionary services support the profile 
of leaving low risks and the hypothesis of adverse selection initiated by external cream-
144 The increase in leaving probability is, in particular, significant for older households near retirement age 
with above average dependant numbers. Given these households’ higher expected risk and thus difficulties in 
securing new insurance coverage, frequent leaving seems unlikely to be their preference, unless they exit 
insurance for natural reasons, i.e. death.
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skimming. Thus while the evidence for the co-payment variable cannot interpreted 
conclusively, a form of risk selection seems to be likely.
Taking the results (from the comparative data subgroup description in chapter 
four) and the other claim-contribution variables into account, the benefit profile of leavers 
might match either that of high risks or low risks. Increasing claims and some descriptive 
results support the profile of high risks and therein the hypothesis of unfavourable risk 
selection by insurers, that dump high risks out of the South African medical scheme plans. 
However, increasing discretionary benefits and decreasing essential benefits indicate that 
a considerable fraction of low risks might be among the leavers. This supports the 
hypothesis of adverse selection most likely initiated by cream-skimming of medical 
scheme plans' competitors (i.e. external favourable risk selection). It is very likely that 
both processes took place simultaneously in the South African medical scheme market
The results for the plan classification variable were expected to be powerful 
evidence for either adverse selection or risk selection. They confirmed the previous two- 
sided interpretation of die estimation results obtained from the leaver-control group 
model. The result that households are more likely to leave high-risk plans as compared to 
average-risk plans can be interpreted as confirming the hypothesis of unfavourable risk 
selection or dumping of high risks, particularly from high-risk plans.145 However, the 
results could also confirm the adverse selection hypothesis that low risks leave high risk 
plans more frequently (possibly initiated by external favourable risk selection), 
particularly if they can afford coverage somewhere else.146
Evidently the data supports the hypothesis of adverse selection and risk selection. 
While there is support for the unfavourable risk selection hypothesis - several variables 
identified leavers as high risks -  some estimation coefficients can only be interpreted in 
light of adverse selection (probably initiated by external favourable risk selection). 
Altogether, the South African medical scheme market seems to have been contested and 
dominated by fierce competition between medical scheme insurers and their for-profit 
competitors. Thus while the focus was on selecting low risks, high risks were willingly 
discarded in this process. As with Model A, evidence in support of or against the case of a 
separating equilibrium can be not concluded.
143 Also, the lower probability that households leave a low-risk plan, could be attributed to favourable risk 
selection efforts by the insurers to keep low risks in the medical schemes with designed low-risk plans.
146 Above average income households tend to leave high-risk plans rather than average-risk plans. This 
supports the adverse selection hypothesis that low risks exit the market and in particular high-risk plans.
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5.4.4 Model C results interpretation: switchers-control group
The sodo-economic variables of age, gender and number of dependants delivered less 
dear evidence for either adverse selection or risk selection in Model C as compared to 
Modds A and B. Income, race, and residency could not be interpreted as evidence for 
selection processes.
The higher likelihood of the young to switch can be interpreted as favourable risk 
selection, where insurers try to keep low risks in the pool by switching them to designed 
low-risk plans. Given the lower risk of ill-health for younger people this makes diem a 
target for favourable risk selection. Females have a higher probability of switching 
medical scheme plan coverage. Given that females have a higher expected risk of using 
health care resources than males - particularly in their reproductive years -  their greater 
frequency of switching to high-risk plans at young ages can be interpreted in two ways. 
First, it might point towards unfavourable risk selection, where female high risks are 
pressured to switch to more expensive high-risk plans. Second it might be a sign of 
adverse selection by high-risk females into high-risk plans, in order to secure better and 
more comprehensive coverage for expected health risks. Thus die interpretation of the 
gender variable results here is incondusive.
Households with an above average number of dependants have a significantly 
lower probability of switching medical scheme plans as compared to households with an 
average number of dependants. These larger households are expected to be of high risk. 
Together with the positive sign of the non-significant coefficient for the below average 
dependant number, this allows the interpretation of the result as evidence for favourable 
risk selection, where insurers preferably offer low risks opportunities to switch to low-risk 
plans.
In Model C the claim and benefits variables provided very good evidence for 
selection. Decreasing claims were interpreted as evidence for favourable risk selection and 
insurers' efforts to influence low risks to switch into designed low-risk plans. The 
probability of switching increases with increasing high-end, non-essential and 
discretionary benefits that were expected to function as luxury goods, while essential 
benefits decrease with the probability of switching.147 The results for the variables of 
contribution and co-payment - on their own less able to deliver evidence in support of 
adverse selection or risk selection - support the interpretation of the claim and benefit
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variables. Decreasing contributions are consistent with the expectation that under 
favourable risk selection, low risk households switch into less expensive low-risk plans. 
This result can be interpreted as evidence for favourable risk selection, where insurers 
induce low risks with low claims, to switch to less expensive low-risk plans. Since the 
switching probability increases with decreasing claims and essential benefits, but rising 
discretionary and non-essential benefits, the high co-payments of leavers can be explained 
as being generated by low risks. Thus the co-payment variable supports the favourable 
risk selection hypothesis. Altogether the claim and benefit profile of switchers matched 
that of low risks. This supports the hypothesis of favourable risk selection by the South 
African medical scheme insurers that selected low risks into low-risk plan options 
providing a wide range of non-essential, luxury services.
The final variable of plan classification is, as expected, a very powerful variable for 
adverse selection or risk selection evidence. Switching probability decreases with the 
probability of a household switching to a plan with an above average risk profile. Again, 
these results are of great importance, since most variables already identified switchers as 
low risks. Given that switchers had a lower expected risk of using health care resources 
(i.e. lower claims), it can be assumed that favourable risk selection takes place in terms of 
directing households' continuing enrolment towards designed low risk plans.148 Thus, the 
interpretation of the risk plan variable confirmed the favourable risk selection hypothesis, 
that low risks are selected preferentially by South African medical scheme insurers to 
continue coverage in designed low risk plans.
In Model C the results lend some support to the case of a separating equilibrium. 
Medical schemes seemed to be able to sort high and low risks into either more generous or 
less generous plans, and they seemed to be able to charge individuals their expected costs. 
Matching the fact that the risk profile of the switchers indicates a higher accumulation of 
low risks in the switcher group as compared to control group, the switchers' contributions 
and co-payments are significantly lower.
The next section will summarise the results of the statistical models within the 
context of the research hypotheses.
147 However, switching probability increases with increasing GP benefits. It was assumed, however, that in 
most health care systems GPs function as gatekeepers for services typically used by low risks, supporting the 
interpretation that switchers are low risks.
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5.5 Results review in the context of the research hypotheses
The purpose of this section is to review the results of the empirical analysis in the context
of this thesis' research hypotheses. The thesis' empirically testable/ main research 
hypothesis sought to explore whether South Africa's unregulated health insurance market 
encountered a lack of market-wide risk pooling and a lack of risk pooling within the 
market (between insurers' plan options). Within the case study setting/ this main research 
hypothesis could be formulated into three more precise subhypotheses.
On die next page table 5-10 displays the three empirical hypotheses in the left 
column and the research hypotheses assessment in regard to the results from the empirical 
analysis in the right column. The two first research hypotheses assumed/ in particular/ risk 
selection activities by die previously regulated but now unregulated medical scheme 
insurers as a result of competition with other South African for-profit insurers. Hypothesis 
three assumed adverse selection strategies by high risks. Strong empirical evidence for 
adverse selection and risk selection under hypotheses one and two was concluded. For 
example/ external favourable risk selection of low risks out of the medical scheme plans 
leads to a disproportional loss of low risks for the market-wide medical scheme risk pool. 
Most likely this type of risk selection induces adverse selection. Low risks left medical 
schemes/ and particularly high-risk plans, because they became unattractive/ and because 
competitors offered better choices. However, empirical evidence for adverse selection 
strategies by high risks was very slim and delivered no support for the third hypothesis 
that assumed adverse selection. It could be neither concluded that high risks in particular 
entered (high-risk) medical scheme coverage, nor that high risks switched to high-risk 
plans in particular.
With table 5-10 and the concluded evidence for adverse selection and risk selection 
horn the South African case study, the research hypotheses can be assessed. Research 
hypothesis one can be verified. The previously regulated medical scheme market segment 
is contested, and experienced a disproportionate loss of low risks. It could be shown that 
external favourable risk selection of low risks was conducted by the for-profit medical 
scheme plan competitors. They most likely initiated adverse selection in the form of low 
risks leaving the medical schemes, in particular high-risk plans, by attracting them to low- 
risk plan options. They most likely initiated adverse selection in the form of low risks
148 The dramatic decrease in the probability of switching to low-risk plans with rising age supports the 
favourable selection hypothesis that only expected low risks are given incentives to switch to designed low- 
risk plans.
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leaving the medical schemes, in particularly high-risk plans, by offering them better low- 
risk plan options.
Table 5-10: Research hypotheses & concluded empirical evidence for the South African case study
Results fo r em pirical hypotheses A ssessm en t o f research  hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Strong evidence for a disproportionate 
loss of low-risk members was shown by testing the 
leavers and the control group for differences in their 
risk profiles. Medical schemes lost disproportionately 
low risks; it was observed that:
A. Assuming risk selection by (external for-profit insurers), 
leavers were, for example, younger and had lower 
claims than control group members; and (initiating)
B. Assuming adverse selection where low risks exit 
medical schemes, leavers were, for example, younger, 
had lower claims, and had more likely a high-risk 
plan membership than control group members.
Hypothesis 1: Verification of competition for low risks 
between medical schemes and for-profit insurers. The 
previously regulated medical scheme market 
segment is contested, and experiences a 
disproportionate loss of low risks due to:
A. Risk selection by (external) for-profit insurers for low 
risks in the medical scheme market segment took 
place, and (initiating)
B. Adverse selection with low risks exiting medical 
schemes, and, in particular, high-risk plan options 
Medical scheme coverage probably became 
comparably expensive and more suitable options were 
offered elsewhere.
Hypothesis 2: Strong evidence for med. schemes’ risk 
selection strategies was shown by testing 
joiners/switchers/leavers and the control group for 
differences in their risk profiles:
A. Assuming risk selection that discourages the entry of 
high risks, joiners were, for example, younger and had 
lower claims than control group members;
B. Assuming risk selection that attracts the entry of low 
risks, joiners were, for example, younger, had lower 
claims, and had more likely a low-risk plan 
membership than control group members;
C. Assuming risk selection that prevents the exit of low 
risks, switchers were, for example, younger, had 
lower claims, and had more likely a low-risk plan 
membership than control group members;
D. No evidence for risk selection in the form of pressuring 
high risks to switch; with switchers having, for example, 
older, had higher claims, and had more likely a high- 
risk plan membership than control group members; and
E. Assuming risk selection by discouraging high risks to 
continue their medical scheme coverage, leavers were, 
for example, older, had higher claims, and had more 
likely a high-risk plan membership than control group 
members.
Hypothesis 2: Verification of competition, and 
verification of several hypothesised strategies applied 
by medical schemes to protect their scheme and plan 
risk pools:
A. Risk selection was concluded in form of discouraging 
high-risk insurance applicants from entering medical 
schemes;
B. Risk selection was observed in form of low risks being 
attracted to enter low-risk plans;
C. Risk selection took place, with low risks switching into 
attractive low-risk plan options, preventing them from 
leaving;
D. Risk selection in the form of pressuring high risks to 
switch into high-risk plan options could not be 
concluded; and
E. Risk selection by discouraging high risks to continue 
their medical scheme coverage is likely, particularly if 
leavers belong to high-risk plans.
Hypothesis 3: Insignificant evidence for adverse 
selection strategies of high risks by testing 
joiners/switchers and the control group for differences 
in their risk profiles:
A. Under adverse selection joiners are, for example, older, 
have higher claims, and more likely have a high-risk 
plan membership than control group members; and
B. Under adverse selection switchers are, for example, 
older, have higher claims, and more likely have a high- 
risk plan membership than control group members.
Hypothesis 3: No verification of the hypothesised 
adverse selection strategies of high risks, either 
seeking medical scheme coverage or already insured 
here:
A. Adverse selection by choosing to enter medical scheme 
plan coverage, particularly expensive and 
comprehensive high-risk plan options; and
B. Adverse selection by choosing to switch into medical 
scheme plans with expensive and comprehensive 
coverage, typically high-risk plan options.
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Research hypothesis two can be also verified for most part Medical scheme plans 
applied various risk selection strategies in order to protect their risk pools. They 
discouraged high risks from entering medical scheme plan coverage and dumped already 
insured high risks. However, evidence could be not confirmed for unfavourable risk 
selection in the form of pressuring high risks to switch to high-risk plans. Medical scheme 
plans favourably selected low risks, by offering self-selecting low-risk plans for new low 
risk applicants or offering already insured low risks the opportunity to switch to low-risk 
plan options. Research hypothesis three cannot be verified. No or insufficient evidence 
was found for high risks either seeking to enter medical scheme plans, in particular high- 
risk plan options, or insured high risks trying to switch to high-risk plan options. It could 
be argued that die dominant risk selection strategies diminished adverse selection 
processes.
In conclusion of this subhypotheses assessment, the main research hypothesis 
could be verified. South Africa's unregulated medical schemes encountered a lack of risk 
pooling. The results indicated that first, the whole observed medical scheme market 
segment experienced a lack of risk pooling due to risk selection. Risk selection was an 
expected outcome, because in such unregulated health insurance markets (as in the case of 
the South African medical scheme market) it is legal to risk select If medical scheme plans 
and other for-profit insurers can now practice risk selection, it is not surprising that there 
is competition for low risks. Since for-profit insurers could begin risk selecting much 
earlier, they obviously had a competitive advantage and were able to extract a 
considerable number of low risks from the medical scheme market The results of the 
empirical analysis - that many low risks leave medical scheme plans - can be best read as a 
direct consequence of competition between the medical scheme plans and for-profit 
insurers.
Second, within the observed medical scheme market segment the ever more 
competitive environment led to a lack of risk pooling. If some plans were better at 
identifying and dumping high risks or identifying and attracting low risks they had a 
competitive advantage compared to the rest of the medical scheme plans. They would be 
more successful in pooling low risks as a result of better risk selection. Similarly, other 
plans that did not implement risk selection procedures would very likely become high- 
risk pools over time. The results of the empirical analysis could confirm that a distinction 
between low- and high-risk plan options, which pool different risks, is possible. The 
results also confirmed that over the four years of observation high-risk plan options
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pooled high risks and low-risk plan options pooled low risks. However, the most 
interesting result here was that the drive for this risk pool disparity between medical 
scheme plans was due to the plans' own diverging risk selection strategies. Thus here too 
the results can be interpreted as a direct consequence of higher competition between 
different medical scheme plans.
Last but not least adverse selection did not contribute to the lack in risk pooling. 
In light of the overwhelming evidence for risk selection this is, however, a rather expected 
result since risk selection combats adverse selection.
The result of the three models could not be very well interpreted within the 
framework of a separating equilibrium. Although to a certain degree South African 
medical schemes seemed to be able to sort high and low risks into either more generous or 
less generous plans, they seemed to be not able to charge individuals their expected costs. 
For example, despite the fact that the risk profile of the joiners indicated a higher 
accumulation of low risks in the switcher group as compared to control group, the joiners' 
contributions and co-paymets were significantly higher. Only in the switeher-control 
model did the low-risk profile of the switchers match the switchers' significantly lower 
contributions and co-payments. This might indicate that plans more efficiently separated 
existing members, but not new medical scheme applicants. However, in the data sample 
used for this thesis' analysis switchers only represent a very small fraction of the observed 
medical scheme membership -  3.7% of all households. Also, the data analysis did not 
focus on the analysis of trends over time for membership or risk pooling, partly because 
the data observation period was quite short No definite test or assessment for the 
existence of a separating equilibrium can be concluded due to these limitations to data 
and data analysis design. However, if the results are interpreted in light of this hypothesis, 
tiie formation of a separating equilibrium for the South African medical scheme market 
seems unlikely.
All results of this thesis' analysis have now been presented and reviewed in the 
context of the research hypotheses.
5.6 Summary
This chapter fulfilled this thesis' research objective by presenting the results of the 
empirical investigation into whether unregulated health insurance markets, such as South
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Africa's medical scheme market, experience adverse selection and/or risk selection. The 
presented results could be interpreted as empirical evidence for selection. Since the residts 
of the analysis yielded evidence for selection processes it could be concluded that the 
empirical method, which utilised available quantitative techniques and was applied to 
easily accessible data, fulfilled its purpose successfully. This means that both research 
aims -  first, deriving of an easily applicable method for empirical investigations and 
second, testing of this method on a case study data set - were effectively accomplished.
The first part of this chapter presented the estimation results for the three logit 
models - Model A, which compared medical scheme plan joiners and the control group, 
Model B, which compared leavers and the control group, and Model C, which compared 
switchers and the control group.
The second part described the results for the model fit assessment However, since 
diagnostic statistics for the overall fit of a logistic regression model with correlated data, 
such as used here, have not yet been developed, the literature suggested approximating 
the model tit assessment with standard methods developed for unconelated data models. 
The thorough model fit assessment of the proxy models was evaluated as being good. 
Based on this, the conclusion was drawn that the actual marginal models used, which are 
more appropriate for the correlated data, were fitted very well.
The fourth part presented the interpretations of the model estimation results and 
concluded evidence for selection in South Africa's unregulated medical scheme market 
between 1995-1998. Three main inferences can be made, based on the interpretation of the 
statistical model results. First, overwhelming evidence for favourable selection of low 
risks into to the medical scheme plans could be derived from the joiner-control group 
Model A. Support for favourable risk selection practised by medical scheme plans arose 
also from the switcher-control group Model C. Second, evidence for unfavourable 
selection by medical scheme plans in the form of dumping could be concluded from the 
leaver-control group Model B. Third, evidence for adverse selection was not found.
Finally part three of this chapter reviewed the analysis results in the context of the 
research hypotheses. Research hypotheses one and two were verified. First, competition 
between the medical scheme plans and for-profit insurers caused risk selection, breaking 
established risk pooling arrangements. Second, medical scheme plans applied various risk 
selection strategies, protecting their risk pools, with some plans pooling increasingly high 
risks and other plans pooling increasingly low risks. Research hypothesis three was not 
verified due to insufficient evidence for adverse selection, specifically the absence of the
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typically expected adverse selection cycle. Thus this thesis' main research hypothesis was 
verified: South Africa's unregulated health insurance markets encountered a lack of 
market-wide risk pooling and a lack of risk pooling within the market
The empirical analysis of this diesis is concluded. The next chapter will present 
this thesis' discussion including policy recommendations for the South African case study.
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Chapter 6 
Discussion: thesis contributions, 
lim itations & policy relevance
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss this thesis' contributions, selected limitations and 
policy relevance, which will enable the assessment of the research question. The thesis 
applied a method that yielded testable hypotheses for empirical investigations into 
adverse selection and risk selection to an empirical analysis of an unregulated health 
insurance market. This is the major contribution of this thesis. In doing so, a number of 
limitations have been identified. From the results of the empirical analysis for the South 
African case study it is possible to derive the thesis' policy relevance. First it is the aim of 
this chapter to discuss the thesis' main contributions. Second, limitations of this thesis, 
mostly related to the data and empirical analysis, will be discussed. Finally, the thesis' 
policy relevance will be assessed and the originally posed research question answered.
Part two of this chapter will discuss the group approach and the empirical analysis 
as this thesis' main contribution. The generalisability of the developed method will be 
assessed, based on the data requirements of either individual-based cross-sectional or 
panel data. It will be shown that the group approach is generalisable to different country 
settings and various insurance arrangements. In particular, it can be assumed that it is 
easily applicable to low and middle-income country-settings, because of the limited data 
requirements. This was demonstrated by applying it to the case study data from South 
Africa.
The third part of this chapter will mainly discuss limitations of the data and of the 
empirical analysis performed in this thesis. However, the assumption of rationality and
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the inference of motivation from observed outcomes of behaviour are the fundamental 
limitation of this research, aside from the technical limitations of data and analysis. First 
these two issues will be shortly discussed before turning in more detail to the data 
limitations from the South African case study. Data subgroup and plan classification and 
issues related to the formulated expectations of the risk-profile variables will be 
considered. Second, a discussion on limits to interpreting the results of the empirical 
analysis that had to be considered in order to derive meaningful interpretations will be 
included. Finally, limitations of the thesis' model-fit assessment will be discussed. The 
problem of absent diagnostic statistics for the fit-assessment of logistic regression models 
for correlated data will be discussed as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the 
different summary measures of goodness-of-fit and logistic regression diagnostics, also 
presented previously.
The fourth part will discuss the thesis' policy relevance. First the general political 
relevance will be considered. It will be shown that the results support the research 
hypotheses, because causality between the observed results and concluded risk selection 
can be assumed. Possible explanations for this thesis' most interesting result the 
overwhelming evidence for risk selection but absence of evidence for adverse selection, 
will be discussed. The results will also be assessed in light of this thesis' research question 
- whether of evidence of risk selection can be interpreted as increasing inequity. Second, 
the specific policy relevance of the thesis' empirical results for the South African case 
study will be discussed. Two strategies for political action proposed and implemented in 
order combat increasing inequity in South Africa's health insurance arrangements will be 
shortly discussed. Some further policy recommendations derived from this thesis' results 
will be formulated.
6.2 Discussion of the thesis’ contributions
The purpose of this section is to discuss the main contribution of this thesis, the 
application of the group method to an empirical investigation that seeks to identify 
adverse selection and risk selection in easily accessible data. The method emphasises the 
group dimension of these selection processes, which was underrepresented in previous 
research. It was the objective to highlight this particular dimension of selection processes 
through which it becomes feasible to examine these complex processes empirically. The
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aim was to break complex selection processes down into empirical problems that are easy 
to explore analytically.
The literature acknowledges that, as a result of adverse selection and risk selection, 
health insurance risk pools change. Theoretical concepts of both selection processes, which 
are used in the literature, explain how people's motivation to select into specific health 
insurance plans leads to different risk pools. It was therefore intitutive to look at 
individual (or household) selection behaviour, which consists of joining, leaving and 
switching between health insurance plans. The risk pool of health insurance plans can 
only change in two ways: either because the risk profiles of the same individuals within 
the pool change, or because individuals who move into, out of, or between risk pools 
contribute to risk profile changes. Thus during selection processes people with certain risk 
profiles self-select or become subject to insurers' selection into or out of certain risk pools. 
Previous empirical investigations, like die multiple plan choice approach, compared 
individual characteristics of people who choose insurance plans of different generosity 
levels. Some of these studies divided the insured population into the subgroups of 
possible carriers of the selection process -  people who move into, out of, and between 
insurance plans - and compared their characteristics to die rest of the insured population.
This thesis contributes to the empirical literature on adverse selection and risk 
selection with an application of the group method and die execution of an empirical 
analysis of South Africa's unregulated health insurance market Adverse selection and risk 
selection in health insurance markets are of academic and political concern. There are 
several studies on these issues for high-income countries but there are rarely any for low- 
and middle-income countries. This empirical analysis adds to these few existing studies, 
thereby increasing die understanding of selection processes in health insurance markets in 
a low- and middle-income country context However, in conducting the diesis' empirical 
analysis a number of limitations have been identified. Most were related to the real world 
data, which is usually flawed or even non-existent. Thus data represents the main 
limitation of the group approach, because data is often imperfect The next section will 
discuss some of the limitations that were faced during the empirical analysis, including 
data limitations.
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6.3 Discussion of selected thesis limitations
The purpose of this section is to discuss selected limitations of this thesis, particularly in 
regard to the data used and the empirical analysis performed. Nevertheless, in addition to 
these technical limitations, the two fundamental limitations of research of this kind: (1) the 
assumption of rationality and (2) die inference of motivation horn observed outcomes of 
behaviour will be discussed first. This thesis employed an economic approach and 
accepted the general model of rational economic behaviour as its fundamental underlying 
assumption. The empirical analysis, its results and interpretations presented here are 
based on the fact that only consequences or outcomes of behaviour are observed, not 
motivations.
The assumption of rationality can be a powerful assumption for explaining 
behavioural outcomes. However, economists do not literally believe that everyone always 
behaves perfectly rationally. For example, the model of economic behaviour is not based 
on perfect information. Although an individual's decisions and actions are mainly driven 
by information, imperfect information does not mean that individuals are acting 
irrationally or unpredictably. The assumption here is rather that the accumulation of 
information is only possible under certain cost constraints, and that rational individuals 
will only collect additional information as long as their expected marginal utility is greater 
or equal to the marginal costs of doing so. However, this information equilibrium is 
different for different participants in the market, and the phenomenon of asymmetric 
information may occur. In a health insurance market this might lead to selection 
processes, which not only destroy efficient competitive market outcomes and potentially 
lead to market failure, but also constitute grave inequities that might call for political 
action. This means that the rationality concept is quite precise and can be prescriptive. 
Thus this thesis' economic approach complements political science, sociology, psychology 
and other disciplines.
The fact that only consequences or outcomes of behaviour, and not motivations, 
are observed is a limitation that all disciplines face. The thesis' economic approach, as 
with other scientific approaches, is built on interplay between theory and observable data. 
Models are built to help explain the data and data are used to help refine models. 
However, data and analytical limitations can influence the inference from observed 
outcomes of behaviour to its motivation.
This section will proceed by first discussing specific data issues related to the 
South African case study. Second, issues related to the empirical analysis will be
198
Birgit Hansl Chapter 6: Discussion & policy relevance
discussed/ namely limits on the interpretation of the results. Finally, the model fit 
assessment will be discussed, focusing on the limits of the different presented measures of 
goodness-of-fit and logistic regression diagnostics.
6.3.1 Limitations of the South African data
As with all retrospective studies, data here was limited to what has been recorded. Also, 
the data was not designed for assessing risk pooling and selection processes. Some data 
limitations were previously discussed in the data section in chapter three. This concerned, 
for example, die possible selection bias of medical scheme plans. The data set provided by 
the medical scheme plan management firm contained a given set of medical scheme plans, 
and, although it was assumed that this sample is representative, this might not be the case, 
which could have biased the results. Another important weakness is the lack of control for 
environmental or organisational factors that might affect plans' risk pooling. Plan size and 
plan management variables could be not considered in this study. Omitting these factors 
may have biased results.
One important limitation of the data was its short time horizon. Unfortunately the 
data was only available for four years of observation. It might have been useful to present 
alternative model results (for example logistic regressions by individual years). Originally 
it was planned to rim alternative regressions by individual years. However, the extensive 
data examination prior to the data analysis did not suggest more exploitable yearly 
variations in the data between 1994-1998. Therefore die plan of yearly or other time- 
related split-sample analysis was abandoned. The limited time horizon of the data is also 
related to the limited ability to test for a separating equilibrium. As expressed in chapter 
five, the data analysis did not focus on the analysis of trends over time for membership or 
risk pooling, because die data observation period was quite short A longer time- 
dimension of the data and the analysis of time-trends might have better lent itself to the 
assessment of a separating equilibrium hypothesis.
The discussion of the limitations of data used in this thesis' analysis will focus on 
limitations related, first, to data subgroup and plan classification and second, to the 
variables of the risk profile.
First, the data subgroup classification divided insured households into: (1) 
households who newly enrolled into medical scheme plans during die observation period, 
i.e. the joiners, (2) households who disenrolled from medical scheme plans, i.e. the leavers,
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(3) households who switched between plans, i.e. the switchers, and (4) households who 
remained constantly insured in one plan, i.e. die control group. One procedural problem 
here was that the length of the observation period for households varies, since some 
joined, left, or switched in die first or second year or some only moved during die fourth 
year. This means that, on average, joiners, leavers, and switchers have shorter observation 
periods than the control group (which observation period is by definition four years). 
However, the statistical estimation method that was applied did consider this type of 
censored or incomplete data. Another problem arose when households joined or switched 
just before the year ended or left at the beginning of a year. For example, households who 
entered at the beginning of a year have observations over several months as compared to 
households who just joined a month before the end of a year. However, calculating all 
time-invariant variables other than age, such as contributions, co-payments, claims and 
benefits as per member and membership month for each household solved that problem.
Nevertheless, other problems remained. While households that just joined or 
switched the year before the observation period started, in 1995, or left after the data time 
series ended in 1998, were counted into the control group, households that were actually 
observed to join in the beginning of 1995 were counted into the joiners group. Also, it 
could be not considered that there might be households that moved more than once, for 
example, households that joined or switched and then left Each household received a new 
ID upon joining and this ID ceased to exist upon leaving. Thus the same household that 
left one medical scheme could have joined another medical scheme under a new ID 
during 1995-1998. This means that it remained unobservable where joiners or switchers 
came from or to where leavers went For individuals who joined a medical scheme, it is 
not clear whether they came from another medical scheme inside or outside the sample, 
from the external for-profit insurers or from the uninsured population.
For example, leavers might have left insurance coverage completely, they may 
have joined another medical scheme within or outside the sample, or they may have 
joined for-profit insurance. Indeed it is possible that they left insurance with the schemes 
because of a life-terminating event. This has a particular implication for the hypothesis 
that under risk selection older people are more frequently dumped from insurance. Older 
households might terminate medical scheme coverage more frequently than other 
households because of the death of the principal member. For the switchers it was only 
possible to observe households that joined into a new plan within a scheme or left a 
certain plan for another within the same scheme but not from which plan they came or
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which new plan they joined. Again, this is due to the fact that the ID number of each 
individual change with each membership move because it is connected to the particular 
plan they join, leave, or switch to. Also, it was pointed out that most switcher observations 
were for joining switchers (90%).
Another data subgroup classification concerned the plan classification into 
different risk pools. This classification of plans into low-, average-, and high-risk plans 
depended on: (1) the concluded ability of variables to function as reliable risk-adjusters, 
(2) the definition of the mean intervals that were the basis for this classification, and (3) the 
judgement of whether the means displayed a consistent pattern indicating an 
accumulation of either low risks or high risks. This plan classification process had its 
limitations, i.e. it was to some extent subjective, but it was not arbitrary, since it followed a 
classification algorithm spelled out in chapter 4. The ability of variables to function as 
reliable risk-adjusters was based on findings in the risk adjustment literature. In order to 
support the plan classification algorithm, based on the definition of the mean intervals, a 
sensitivity analysis was performed, which indicated that the plan classification was robust 
even when the mean interval increased or decreased by 10%. Probably the last part of the 
classification algorithm, the judgement of whether the means displayed consistent pattern 
indicating an accumulation of either low risks or high risks carried most subjectivism.
For example, plan 17 in table A5-2 in Appendix 5 was classified as an average-risk 
plan, despite having for five variables above average variable means. Plan 17 had higher 
than average discretionary benefits, but only average total claims. Also, the mean age was 
below the overall average. Thus the pattern was not consistent with high-risk 
accumulation. On the contrary one might have suspected that this plan attracted young 
low risk with generous discretionary services. However, plan 17 had above average 
specialist benefits and the average total claims were near the upper mean interval border. 
Taking all these observations together it was decided that there was no consistent pattern 
that could be derived from the overall plan means. The means pattern for plan 17 was 
inconclusive and that is why it was not included into the group of low or high-risk plans, 
but classified as an average-risk plan.
Second, there are limitations regarding the variables used as risk indicators for the 
households7 risk profiles. For example, the age variable could be loaded with several 
contrasting effects. On one hand, it could be expected that older households leave medical 
scheme plans due to death, but this remains unrecognised in the data. On the other hand, 
young households are expected to enter medical schemes more often, because they join
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the workforce. Effects like these can diminish the usefulness of the variable age for 
identifying adverse selection or risk selection effects. Similar problems might arise for 
other variables. For instance/ the gender of the head of household is strongly influenced 
by the workforce composition and compensation practices that allow coverage of females 
with their spouses and vice versa. However/ these limitations were considered in the 
formulation of the variable expectations under adverse selection and risk selection. Most 
variables that were affected by this problem were only included as control variables.
Another possible limitation includes the coding of the income variables. First/ the 
original income variable provided no absolute Rand values, but instead had coding for 
approximate income group categories between zero and 999. This coding was die only 
income indicator provided by the medical schemes holding company, which assigned 
these categories. Confidentiality reasons were given as an explanation for the lack of more 
precise income data. These income categories only provided a relative income value, with 
zero being the lowest income category and 999 the highest For the analysis the income 
variable was converted into a categorical variable with only three categories, average, 
below and above average. It was hoped that this would provide more easily interpretable 
results, with the reference category defined as the average income group in die empirical 
analysis. This coding produced uneven income groups. The average income group was 
defined as households of the income categories 500-599. The below average income group 
was defined for the income categories 0-499 and the above average income group for the 
income categories 600-999. In retrospect it would have been better if the average income 
group would have been coded wider. However, the income variable was not a key 
variable for the purpose of this analysis, but rather functioned as an important control 
variable. It is unlikely that the uneven income groups resulting from this coding had an 
influence on other analysis results. Also, the results for the income variable were not used 
for the deduction of possible adverse selection or risk selection.
6.3.2 Limits on the interpretation of the analysis results
This discussion focuses on the empirical analysis and the limits to interpreting its results, 
in particular, the limited ability to interpret the results within a framework of a separating 
equilibrium, issues regarding the nature of relationships in statistical models, and other 
considerations in order to obtain meaningful interpretations results.
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In chapter 5 it was expressed that the result of the three models could be not very 
well interpreted within the framework of a separating equilibrium. Specifically, only the 
switeher-control model supported the separating equilibrium hypothesis. However, 
switchers only represented a very small fraction of the observed medical scheme 
membership (3.7% of all households) in this thesis' data sample. Also, due to the 
previously discussed short data observation period, the data analysis could not focus on 
time trends for membership or risk pooling. Thus data with longer time horizons might 
better lend itself to the assessment of a separating equilibrium hypothesis.
After estimating coefficients it is of concern to assess the significance of the 
variables in the model (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). This concerns the statistical 
hypothesis, which asks whether the independent variables in the model are significantly 
related to the dependent variable. Regression analysis evaluates the contribution of each 
variable to the model by testing for its statistical significance and then examines the 
significance of its effect on the dependent variable (Menard 2001). In logistic regression 
the method for evaluating the statistical significance of the contribution of an independent 
variable to the explanation of a dependent variable is either the likelihood ratio test or the 
Wald statistic.149 The regression coefficient is then examined to determine whether the 
change in the dependent variable associated with a given amount of change in the 
dependent variable is large enough to be concerned about (Menard 2001). The point of 
importance here is that this concerns an association, and does not imply a causal 
relationship. Relationships that are described by statistical models are predictive but may 
or may not be causal (Menard 2001).
For the estimated models in this thesis, statistical significance of the contribution of 
most independent variables to the explanation of variations in the dependant variable was 
found. As expected, several independent variables acted as good predictors for a 
household being a joiner, leaver or switcher, rather than a control group member. 
However, some variables might have been effects as easily as causes (for instance having 
belonged to a high-risk plan). Thus the group membership predictors could be interpreted 
as effects or causes for a household's likelihood of belonging to one of the data subgroups. 
However, these results are best interpreted without implying a causal relationship. In a 
statistical sense all that can be said is that these variables are associated with a certain 
group membership.
149 The guiding principle here is to compare observed values of the response variable to predicted values 
obtained from models with and without the variable in question (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).
203
Birgit Hansl Chapter 6: Discussion & polity relevance
Furthermore, the interpretation of results always concerns a second issue besides 
determining the functional relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables, namely, defining the appropriate units of change for the independent variable 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). The latter is important because the estimated coefficient 
for the independent variable represents the slope (or rate of change) of a function of the 
dependent variable per unit change in the independent variable. In logistic regression the 
slope coefficient represents the change in the logit corresponding to a change of one unit 
in the dependent variable (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). In order to derive correct 
interpretations the differences between two logits have to be meaningful. For the models 
used in the empirical analysis of this thesis, the estimated coefficients for the independent 
variables were of main interest, while the intercepts were of lesser interest Some variables 
were dichotomous (e.g. gender), others polychotomous (e.g. race), and several were 
continuous. Some issues related to the most widely used measure of association, the odds 
ratios, are discussed here.
First, the odds ratio for a variable is obtained by exponentiating its estimated 
coefficient The odds ratio is then used as a measure of association. In the case of a 
dichotomous variable it approximates the likelihood of an outcome - how much more or 
less likely it is -  to be present among those with x=l than among those with x*0. 
However, two important limits should be kept in mind when interpreting the odds ratios. 
Number one is that often the interpretation of the odds ratio is performed in terms of 
relative risk150, based on the argument that it approximates the relative risk in many 
instances (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). But this is only true under certain fairly 
restrictive conditions (of very small odds). In general, using the odds ratio to represent a 
risk ratio will overstate the strength of the relationship (Menard 2001). Thus an odds ratio 
of 2 for females that join insurance compared to males does not necessarily mean that the 
risk of joining is about two times as high for females as for males.151 Limit number two is 
that although the odds ratio is the parameter of interest in most logistic regressions 
(because of its easy interpretation) its estimate has a skewed distribution However, for 
large sample sizes, such as used in this thesis, the distribution of the odds ratio estimate is 
normal (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).152
130 The odds ratio is a ratio of two odds while the risk ratio is a ratio of two probabilities.
131 This approximation can often be misleading and should be avoided. Besides, if needed, the relative risk
can be calculated separately (see Menard 2001).
133 Since in most cases the sample size requirements are too big, inferences are usually based on sampling
distribution of the odds ratio logit that follows a normal distribution for even small sample sizes.
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Second, most computer packages automatically provide odds ratio estimates (and 
their confidence interval) based on the exponentiation of each coefficient However, these 
estimates are only of interest for dichotomous variables coded zero or one with no 
interactions. For all other variable types (polychotomous and continuous variables), with 
or without interactions, specific methods have to be applied to calculate odds ratios of 
interest that provide meaningful interpretations.153 These methods were applied in this 
thesis' chapter five when calculating odds ratios for the results and subsequently 
interpreting them.154 Here some issues regarding the interpretation of odds ratios for 
continuous variables are pointed out as examples.
The interpretation of the estimated coefficient for continuous variables depends on 
how that variable entered the model and the units of the variable. The slope coefficient 
gives the change in the log odds for an increase of one unit in x, which is of little interest in 
most settings (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). For example, in this thesis's models a one 
year increase in age or one Rand increase in claims is too small for a meaningful 
interpretation. Similarly, a change of 50 or 100 Rand seems too large. A ten year change in 
age to be most meaningful seemed in the context of the analysis, because it represented an 
age difference that can be easily understood and interpreted. Hence, odds ratios (and 
confidence intervals) were calculated for the continuous scale covariates for a change of 
ten units in the covariates (10 Rand for all claims, contributions, and benefits and 10 years 
for age).
However, interpretations derived from these estimated odds ratios are based on 
the assumption that the logit is linear in the continuous covariate.155 In order to be able to 
derive interpretations valid over the whole range of the continuous variable, the linearity 
in the logit for each continuous variable had to be tested beforehand.156 Further, if there is 
interaction between two variables, the estimates of the odds ratio for the first variable 
depends on the value of the second variable with which it is interacting. In cases where 
interactions are present the correct model-based estimates for the odds ratios can be 
obtained by calculating the difference between the two logits and then exponentiating the
193 For an excellent description the interested reader is referred to Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000).
194 The mathematical equations for their calculation can be obtained from Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000). 
'"For example, it is expected that the additional likelihood of being a joiner for a 20 year-old compared to a 
30 year-old is similar to the additional likelihood for a 50 year-old compared to a 60 year-old.
196 For example, it was shown that age can be treated as linear in the logit, making the interpretation of the 
odds ratio for a 10 year change in age valid over all ages.
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value.157 For the results interpretation in chapter five, relevant interaction between a risk 
factor and another variable was calculated and incorporated into die interpretation.
6.3.3 Limits of the model fit assessm ent
The main limitation of the model fit assessment was pointed out in chapter five. Due to 
the lack of diagnostic statistics for the overall fit of logistic regression models for 
correlated data, the model checking was performed with proxy-models for uncorrelated 
data. These methods, developed for non-correlated data, limited the model fit assessment 
in terms of its interpretational value, because they really assess the fit of a different model 
(and not the one from which the results were obtained). However, the main focus of the 
discussion here is on the limits of the measures of goodness-of-fit and logistic regression 
diagnostics.
A. Summ ary m easures of goodness-of-fit
Summary measures of goodness-of-fit are functions of residuals defined as the difference
between the observed and fitted value (y-y). The difference between the observed and the 
fitted value can be measured in several ways in logistic regressions. However, fitted 
values are calculated for each covariate pattern and depend on the estimated probability 
of the covariate pattern (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).
There is no widely accepted direct analogue to the R2 of linear regression models. 
This is because an R2 measure seeks to make a statement about the "percentage of the 
variance explained", but the variance of a dichotomous/categorical dependent variable 
depends on the frequency of distribution of that variable. For a dichotomous dependent 
variable, variance is at a maximum for a 50-50 split and the more lopsided the split, the 
lower the variance. This means that R-squared measures for logistic regressions with 
differing marginal distributions of their respective dependent variables cannot be 
compared directly. Comparison of logistic R-squared measures with R2 from linear 
regressions is also problematic. Also, the pseudo R2 measure does not strictly assess 
goodness-of-fit of a model but compares the predicted values from the fitted model to a 
model with no data or an intercept-only model (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Thus it is 
more effective to attempt to measure strength of association. Nonetheless, a logistic R- 
squared measure is available in most software packages as Pseudo-R-Square.
157 For the algebraic details see Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000).
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Two other goodness-of-fit tests for logistic regression models offered in most 
software packages are the Pearson goodness-of-fit chi-square statistic and the Hosmer- 
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test158 The Pearson chi-square goodness-of-fit test is a test of 
the observed against the expected number of responses using cells defined by the 
covariate patterns (STATA 1999). However, if the number of covariate pattern is close to 
the number of observations the Pearson chi-square test is not appropriate and the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit chi-square test might be a better choice (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2000).159 However, in cases where these tests indicate an acceptable model fit 
this does not mean that the model necessarily explains much of the variance in the 
dependent, only that what it does explain is significant As with other tests, as the sample 
size gets larger, the test's power to detect differences from the null hypothesis improves. 
Generally, these measures of fit only provide a rough index of whether a model is 
adequate. There is no convincing evidence that selecting a model that maximises the value 
of a given measure leads to a model that is optimal in any sense other than having a 
higher or lower value of that measure (Long and Freese 2001).
Often individual components of the summary statistic are examined. For example, 
classification tables are obtained by cross-classifying the outcome variable with a 
dichotomous variable whose values are derived from the estimated logistic probabilities. 
A cut-point is defined (most commonly 0.5) in order to compare each estimated 
probability to i t  Estimated probabilities are thus used to predict group membership and it 
is assumed that if the model predicts accurately then there is evidence that the model fits. 
Unfortunately, this is not always the case. For example, a logistic model may fit, but still 
have a poor classification (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Also, classification always 
favours classification into the larger group, independent of a model's fit This is the case 
because classification is sensitive to the relative size of the two groups. Thus classification 
tables are not very useful measures of model performance. Another reason for the limited 
function of classification tables as measures of model performance is that they depend 
heavily on the distribution of the probabilities in the sample. Sensitivity and specificity are 
declining with more heterogeneous populations and tend to be most accurate for 
polarised populations. Differences in the sensitivity and specificity of two compared
138 For a more detailed mathematical description of the pseudo R-squared measure and these two goodness- 
of-fit test statistics see Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) and STATA Manual (1999:Vol2).
159 The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test divides subjects into deciles based on predicted probabilities 
and computes a chi-square from observed and expected frequencies. Then a probability (p) value is computed 
from the chi-square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom to test the fit of the logistic model.
207
Birgit Hansl Chapter 6: Discussion & polity relevance
models may be therefore due to the different population-mix and not their performance 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).
It is important to realise that models with summary measures of goodness-of-fit 
that indicate a poor fit may still discriminate well. In the end the assessment of model 
performance is in equal parts determined by both the summary measures of goodness-of- 
fit and discrimination. Overall goodness-of-fit measures and classification tables are often 
used as useful supplements for the assessment of fit, because of their advantageous ability 
to provide single numbers that summarise a considerable amount of information. 
However, given the model, the context, and the research objective, some measures 
perform better, some worse.
B. Logistic regression d iagnostics
Several logistic regression diagnostics were performed in order to see if a fit was 
supported over the entire covariate pattern. Logistic regression diagnostic techniques can 
easily identify covariate patterns that are poorly fit and those that have a great deal of 
influence on the values of estimated parameters. However, they rely purely on the visual
A
assessment of plots (for instance Ax2 or A/? versus the estimated logistic probability). 
This is because the distribution of the diagnostics under the hypothesis that the model fits 
is only known within specific limits (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). All diagnostics in this 
thesis were evaluated by covariate patterns. 160 Hence, approximations of their 
distributions based on the normal distribution (under binomial errors) depend on the 
number of subjects with that pattern (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). However, Models A, 
B, and C contain some continuous variables and the number of covariate patterns and 
number of observations is nearly equal. In this case these statistics cannot be relied upon 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Thus the diagnostics statistics are hard to assess in terms 
of what sustains a large or small value. Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) argue that in the 
end this assessment has to be a judgement based on each particular data set (as it was in 
this thesis).
Logistic regression diagnostics results are optionally used to delete observations 
with extreme covariate patterns in order to improve the fit of the models. However, in this 
thesis all goodness-of-fit measures and logistic regression diagnostics were applied to
16° STATA™ calculates all diagnostic statistics (and residuals) in terms of covariate patterns (m), not 
observations (/i), i.e. all observations with the same covariate pattern are given the same diagnostic statistic 
(STATA 1999). Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) argue that this w-asymptotic statistics is more appropriate 
than /i-asymptotic statistics.
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simple logistic models. The later only functioned as proxies for the actual correlated data 
models in order to make up for the lacking fit assessment tools for models with correlated 
data. For these reasons the diagnostic was only used for visual assessment of the fit of the 
proxy models, assuming uncorrelated data.
The next part will discuss die policy relevance of the analysis results.
6.4 Discussion of policy reievance
The purpose of this section is to discuss the policy relevance of this thesis' results. This 
section will first discuss the general policy relevance of the results and how these results 
address the research questions that motivated this thesis. This concerns, in particular, 
issues related to the causality and the generalisability of the thesis' results. Second, die 
specific policy relevance of this thesis' empirical results for the South African case study 
will be discussed by focusing on two strategies for political action that have been 
proposed.
6.4.1 General policy relevance of the results
In the last chapter the interpretation of die empirical results led to the conclusion that 
selection processes existed in South Africa's unregulated medical scheme market The first 
question that needs to be discussed here is if causality between the results and their 
interpretation as evidence for the two selection processes can be assumed. Thus it needs to 
be discussed whether or not the results from the empirical analysis indeed support the 
research hypotheses. The second issue would be to assess the results in light of the 
research question. Can the analysis results for adverse selection or risk selection evidence 
be interpreted in terms of increasing inefficiency or inequity in South Africa's unregulated 
medical scheme market? The answer to these questions determines the general policy 
relevance of the results from the South African case study, in particular, their 
generalisability to similar settings in other countries.
A. Causality between resu lts and their interpretation a s  evidence for selection  p ro cesses
The fifth chapter assessed this thesis' three research hypotheses and concluded that there
is primarily evidence for risk selection. Hypotheses one and two assumed that due to 
competition and risk selection, the South African unregulated medical scheme market 
would encounter unstable risk pooling. The observed results confirmed anecdotal reports
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of aggressive underwriting and thus risk selection practices by the medical schemes' for- 
profit competitors. As a result households that indicated a low risk profile left medical 
scheme plans, and, in particular, high-risk plans. Although without a context these results 
look like classical adverse selection, it could be shown that for fius thesis' data it was 
external favourable risk selection. As another result of competition medical scheme plans 
dumped high risks and discouraged their entry. Dumping was demonstrated by the 
higher likelihood of households with high-risk profiles to leave high-risk plans. 
Discouraging high-risk entry was demonstrated by showing that households with high- 
risk profiles were less likely to join medical scheme plans and less likely to remain in 
medical scheme plans through switching. Medical scheme plans also attracted low risks to 
enter and to remain in their risk pools. Attraction of low risks to enter medical schemes 
was demonstrated with a higher likelihood of households with low risk profiles to join 
and to switch within schemes to low-risk plan options. South Africa's unregulated 
medical schemes did not show expected signs of adverse selection.
The technical connection between the expectations for the risk profile variables and 
the assumed evidence for adverse selection and risk selection was based on previously 
discussed theory and empirical studies, as already discussed in chapter four. As an 
example, the higher leaving probability of observed high-risk households, which was 
interpreted as dumping, is here discussed. It is unlikely that households that display a 
high-risk profile, i.e. having high claims and essential benefits, have a higher leaving 
preference. But since the medical schemes can risk select it would be harder for these 
households to obtain new affordable coverage. Thus it is very likely that the result can be 
interpreted as evidence for unfavourable risk selection in the form of dumping high risks.
However, here it is rather of interest to discuss whether file results are intuitive 
and why there is such limited evidence for adverse selection. Using the same example it 
seems that the results and their interpretation are generally intuitive. First since risk 
selection was legal for all medical scheme plans they had a strong incentive to risk select 
and to stay profitable in this competitive environment At the same time this executed risk 
selection strategy prevented any adverse selection in the form of high risks entering plans 
disproportionately. However, one very interesting fact is that adverse selection effects 
were observed when they were actually initiated by insurers' risk selection efforts, i.e. low 
risks left plans of higher-than-average risk or medical scheme plans altogether. Thus the 
typical adverse selection cycle was not observed. Medical scheme plans experienced a 
disproportionate number of members with high risk, not because people with the
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information advantage of being of higher-than-average risk sought medical scheme plan 
coverage, but because low risks were enticed to abandon their medical scheme plan 
coverage through the risk selection efforts of competitors. Also, since there was no 
evidence for adverse selection, the overlapping problem of adverse selection and moral 
hazard, widely considered in die literature, does not need to be discussed here.
The main conclusion from this part of the discussion is that the unregulated 
medical scheme plans encountered risk selection processes but not adverse selection. The 
absence of adverse selection is one of the most interesting results of this thesis, especially 
since it is usually the prime focus of the theoretical literature as well as empirical studies. 
Two possible explanations are discussed here.
First, the studied time period of the unregulated South African medical scheme 
plans from 1995-1998 coincided with the actual implementation period of new laws that 
allowed risk selection. Insurance files at the Office of the Registrar showed that few 
medical scheme plans implemented risk selection earlier than 1993-1994 and most of them 
only changed their practices at that point in time. The overwhelming evidence for risk 
selection might then be related to an immediate short-term effect of the deregulation 
policy on medical scheme plan behaviour. Behaviour adjustment to these changes might 
take longer on the demand-side (and could be not observed because this case study's short 
time horizon). This could explain the lack of evidence for adverse selection. Nevertheless, 
over time, as the option for high risks to obtain affordable medical scheme coverage 
erodes, they might become more pressed to identify plans into which they can adversely 
select themselves. However, it is questionable if this would be possible in this setting with 
the high level of risk selection. It would be interesting to replicate studies of this kind in 
other unregulated market settings, preferably with more time observations, and assess 
their evidence for adverse selection.
Second, if the results found here could be replicated for other markets it might be 
that the problem of asymmetry of information is generally exaggerated and insurers can 
actually discriminate between risks very well with a few very basic risk indicators. This 
would be an important finding, because studies in the risk-adjustment literature derived 
only very limited predictive ability for most of these factors. However, this finding would 
support the well-know trade-off between efficiency and equity in unregulated health 
insurance markets. Risk selection here most likely prevents adverse selection and 
improved market efficiency, but creates inequity issues along the way.
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B. Generalisability of resu lts as  evidence for increasing inefficiency & inequity
Since a causal relationship between the results of the South African case study and their
interpretation as overwhelming evidence for risk selection seems likely, the results should 
be assessed in light of this diesis' research question. The question here is whether or not it 
is possible to conclude inequity from the observed results of risk selection.
It seems very likely that inequity occurred, since high risks are more likely to lose 
affordable health insurance coverage. As pointed out in chapter two, when reviewing the 
effects of risk selection on market equity there are two equity concerns connected to this 
result. First, there will be uninsured high risks with low incomes who might be willing to 
buy insurance, but who cannot afford the offered risk-adjusted medical scheme plan 
coverage. These high risks might be also excluded as uninsurable risks. Unable to pay for 
health care out of their pockets they will experience income-related inequity in access to 
health care. This will have to be combated by South Africa's public sector provisions for 
the poor and sick, since this option is available. However, South Africa's public health 
sector provision is of much lower quality than the private health sector. Private sector 
health care can only be accessed with private or medical scheme plan coverage. Second, 
there will be uninsured high risks who could afford medical scheme plan coverage but 
who would be excluded solely on the grounds of being uninsurable high risks. However, 
in the event of cost intensive ill-health they may be unable to pick up their bills and 
become a burden for public health sector. Households who should be able to take out 
insurance coverage privately actually cannot, and have to rely on resources that were 
allocated to the poor and needy. In conclusion in South Africa's unregulated health 
insurance market inequity increased due to risk selection.161
The research question that motivated this thesis -  whether or not adverse selection 
and risk selection create inefficiency and inequity in unregulated health insurance markets 
-  could be partly answered. Risk selection in unregulated health insurance markets goes 
hand in hand with inequity. The diesis' results do not only confirm theoretical predictions 
and intuitive expectations, they also fit into the picture of other research on South Africa's 
unregulated medical scheme market that used different data and different methods (Hansl 
and Soderlund 2000, Soderlund and Hansl 1999,2000). From this discussion it can be also
161 As pointed out in chapter five and the discussed limitations, the results are hard to interpret in regard to the 
existence of a separating equilibrium and thus efficiency. It is unclear if risk selection led to an efficient 
separating equilibrium. However, even if efficiency could be obtained -  here in form of a separating 
equilibrium -  charging high risks substantially more is widely seen as inequitable. Anecdotal evidence 
suggest at least some transitional inefficiency, some plans delaying risk selection strategies experienced the 
adverse selection ‘death spiral’ and ended up in bankruptcy.
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concluded that the results have policy relevance beyond the South African case study. 
This thesis' results are generalisable to similar unregulated health insurance arrangements 
in other country-settings, particularly of low- and middle-income.
However, the generalisability of the thesis's results has some limits. A particular 
feature of the South African health insurance market was that for-profit insurers operated 
side by side with the former mutual medical schemes. Their strong competitive position 
contributed significantly to the observed results of overwhelming risk selection. The 
existence of such a group of strong competitors might not occur in other cases. However, 
it can be expected that unregulated health insurance markets are very contested, leading 
in fact to similar results as those from the South African case study. This predicted 
observation of risk selection in unregulated health insurance markets might also occur to a 
different extent in other settings, depending on other factors. Cultural factors (like strong 
community orientation or high societal cohesion) and economic factors (like income 
heterogeneity) might mitigate some of the observed effects. For other societies it is in fact 
expected that the most considerable influence lies in the history and institutional 
organisation of their health care financing and health care provision. Nevertheless, it is 
expected that countries will experience predominantly similar effects of risk selection: (1) 
more competitive/contested health insurance markets and (2) the rise of strong equity 
concerns.
The general policy relevance of the thesis is based on specific analysis results. It 
confines the relevancy to the two broad expected effects of risk selection in unregulated 
health insurance markets, as listed in the previous paragraph. However, general policy 
strategies to combat these negative effects on equity of less regulation have to be assessed 
within the context of each specific country in question. In this thesis, specific policy 
recommendations could only be derived for the South African case study in the context of 
the unregulated medical scheme market during the observation period of 1994-1998. 
These policy recommendations will be discussed in the next section.
6.4.2 Policy relevance of the South African case study
The results suggested that the observed South African unregulated medical scheme plans 
experienced inequity created by risk selection processes.162 This inequity problem seems to
162 The transitory inefficiency problem concerned only a few medical plans. Their potential failure could be 
justified with a higher level of competition after this transition. Thus it would not call for policy 
interventions.
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be of substantial political concern/ because high risks cannot obtain or afford health 
insurance coverage and will stretch the thin resources of South Africa's public health 
sector that are intended for the poor. It was pointed out that while there is income-related 
inequity in access to health care there is also inequity in the form of high risks being 
unable to obtain any insurance coverage/ no matter their income level/ because they are 
uninsurable risks. In both of these cases, the equity problem could be overcome if risks 
would be pooled in larger risk pools where cross-subsidisation makes insurance 
affordable for all risk types. This could be achieved within a mandatory or social 
insurance system, for example.
However, there are two specific strategies for political action designed to mitigate 
the observed deregulation effects in South Africa's medical scheme market that have been 
proposed and/or implemented. The first is the re-regulation of the medical schemes and 
second, taking other inequities in South Africa's health sector into account, it is the 
introduction of a national or social insurance system. These two strategies are discussed 
below.
First, the next-best solution for the South African regulator could be to simply re- 
regulate medical schemes and reinstall the rule of the Medical Schemes Act, which 
prohibited the risk-adjustment of premiums. This would make it easier for high risks to 
obtain insurance coverage. However, it seems unlikely that this solution would lead to 
sustainable risk pooling for medical schemes. This is because low risk will still be exposed 
to the risk selection efforts of the for-profit insurers, who do not fall under the Medical 
Schemes Act Thus the equity problem would be solved in the short run, but this strategy 
might not prevent the financial ruin of many medical schemes in the long run, due to 
unfair competition from the for-profit insurers. In the long run this would also leave their 
high-risk ex-clientele later stranded without insurance coverage as potential burdens for 
the public sector.
A re-regulation of the South African medical scheme market did happen. A new 
Medical Scheme Act (No. 113) passed the parliament in 1998. The implementation took 
effect in January 2000, and since then several amendments followed (HST 2003). The new 
Act opened medical schemes to public enrolment - the enrolment of any eligible applicant 
is now compulsory. Also, community-rating was reinstated by abolishing risk- 
adjustments for age and ill-health.163 The primary objective of the new Act was the
163 Medical schemes also have to provide a comprehensive package of hospital and outpatient services, the 
Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMBs).
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extension of coverage in terms of member numbers and their benefits (HST 2003). The 
opening of the schemes to the large low-income market and the shift of costs to the young 
and healthy was intended in order to create larger risk pools and bring the costs down for 
the bulk of the members.
However, the latest report on medical schemes in the South African Health Review 
2002 concludes that these intended consequences did not occur. First, the number of 
beneficiaries did not significantly increase164 and medical schemes did not become more 
affordable for low-income people (HST 2003). Second, for a number of different reasons 
there was little progress in reducing costs, leading to a persisting trend of increasing 
contributions. In turn, the risk of low-income earners dropping out of the medical scheme 
market increased even further, despite the fact that medical scheme contributions were 
already tax deductible (HST 2003). Furthermore, risk selection practices were not 
completely eliminated (HST 2003). Thus even after the re-regulation, inequity in terms of 
health care access remained and the public burden for taking care of the sick and poor 
increased.
In this respect it also seems very useful to consider the pre-existing inequities in 
South Africa's health care financing and provision. The medical scheme market only 
covers the 20% of the South African population, which is able to afford health insurance. 
An even smaller proportion, 4% of the population that is insured with for-profit insurers, 
while the larger population relies on a tax-base financed public system (HST 2003). In 
order to tackle the persisting inequities after the end of the Apartheid state, social health 
insurance became a widely discussed alternative in South Africa's public, academic, and 
political arena (McIntyre and Owen 1994, DoH 1997a, HST 2003). Mandatory social 
insurance could create larger risk pools with better cross-subsidisation and solve the 
pressing equity issues (n /e /r /a  1996).
A Social Health Insurance (SHI) plan was indeed put forward by the Department 
of Health (DoH 1997). The discussion of alternative forms of health care financing 
continues and, in particular, SHI is still a priority among interventions for addressing 
equity, efficiency and long run sustainability problems in South Africa's health care 
financing (HST 2003).
Both of the two political strategies described could have been derived as policy 
recommendations from the thesis' results. This only confirms its policy relevance in 
answer to the research question. However, the re-regulation of the medical schemes,
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effective by 2000/ has been, to date, not successful. This is die case because this 
intervention only considers die medical scheme plans and does not prevent for-profit 
insurers from practicing risk selection. This biased selection on one end of the South 
African health insurance markets breaks, and will continue to break, the cross-subsidising 
risk pooling arrangements of the medical scheme market In order to prevent inequity and 
to protect the public sector from becoming more and more responsible for taking care of 
the sick and poor, it is recommended here that the regulatory framework be extended 
beyond the medical scheme market to all private health insurance arrangements in South 
Africa. This would protect the medical scheme market from loosing low risks to the for- 
profit market and enable more sustainable risk pooling. However, this would not solve 
the bigger inequity issue related to South Africans' unequal access to health care services 
(HST 2003). Here the social health insurance plan, put forward by the Department of 
Health in 1997 as an alternative way of financing health care, seems a more 
comprehensive approach. It not only has the potential to solve the equity problems 
pointed out in this thesis, since larger risk pools provide better cross-subsidisation, but it 
also has the potential to provide a sustainable long-term solution for South Africa's health 
care financing.
The next section will summarise this discussion chapter.
6.5 Summary
This chapter assessed the thesis' research question, whether adverse selection and risk 
selection create inefficiency or inequity in unregulated health insurance markets, by 
discussing the thesis' main contributions, selected limitations and policy relevance.
Finally, with the results of this thesis' empirical analysis it was possible to discuss this 
thesis' policy relevance and answer parts of the research question, concluding that risk 
selection creates inequity.
The second part of this chapter discussed application of the group method to an 
empirical investigation in a middle-income country as the thesis' main contribution. The 
performed empirical analysis contributes to the few empirical studies that investigate 
selection processes in low- and middle-income countries.
164 Between 2000 and 2001 the membership increased by less than one percent (HST 2003).
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Part three discussed a number of limitations, which were mainly identified while 
conducting the empirical analysis into South Africa's unregulated medical scheme market 
In addition to technical limitations, the two fundamental limitations of research of this 
kind, namely the assumption of rationality and the inference of motivation from observed 
outcomes of behaviour were discussed. The technical limitations were related to the case 
study data and the empirical analysis performed in this thesis.
The fourth part of this chapter discussed the thesis' policy relevance. First, the 
general political relevance of this thesis' results was confirmed, since causality between 
the analysis results and their interpretation as evidence for risk selection is very likely. The 
results partly answered the research question that motivated this thesis: risk selection 
creates in unregulated health insurance markets inequity. This result seem generalisable to 
similar settings in other countries. Second, the specific policy relevance of the thesis' 
empirical results for the South African case study was discussed. Two proposed and/or 
implemented strategies for political action in order to mitigate the rising equity concern 
for South Africa's medical scheme market were presented.
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Chapter 7 
Summary & conclusion
7.1 Principal findings
The purpose of this section is to summarise and conclude the principal findings of the 
thesis. The objective of the thesis was to conduct an empirical analysis that would 
determine whether unregulated health insurance markets experience adverse selection 
and risk selection. From this, two research aims were derived. The first research aim was 
to derive an appropriate method for empirical investigations into adverse selection and 
risk selection that would use available quantitative techniques and easily accessible data. 
The second research aim was to apply this method to an empirical analysis of case study 
data from an unregulated health insurance market in a middle-income country. This 
empirical analysis was the heart of the thesis, which was motivated by the research 
question: are unregulated health insurance markets characterised by adverse selection 
and/or risk selection, thereby creating inefficiency or inequity? This section will first 
summarise the thesis in regard to its research objective and research aims. Second, the 
answer to the research question will be summarised.
7.1.1 Research objective and research aims
The purpose of this section is to summarise the usefulness of the group method and to 
summarise the results of the South African case study to which the group method was 
applied.
A. The group method for empirical Investigations
The group method is based on the argument that the explanation or illustration of 
selection processes using die group dimension is equally fitting and revealing as
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compared to the previously emphasised time dimension. Previous empirical 
investigations examined characteristics of individuals, who are the carriers of the selection 
processes, by dividing data of insured households into subgroups of households who 
move into, out of, and between insurance plans. They observed whether households with 
certain risk profiles are more prominent in certain mover groups and in certain risk 
pooling plans. From this group method it was possible to derive an empirically testable 
hypothesis, this thesis7 main research hypothesis: South Africa's unregulated medical 
schemes encountered a lack of market-wide risk pooling and a lack of risk pooling within 
the market (between insurers' plan options) due to adverse selection and risk selection.
Matching quantitative techniques were identified that are able to explain group 
memberships for households using a multivariate risk profile, i.e. test whether or not 
households of different mover groups have significantly different risk profiles as 
compared to a control group. The risk composition of groups can be then attributed to 
certain selection processes. Discriminant analysis and, in particular, logistic regression 
analysis were identified as applicable quantitative techniques for empirical investigations 
because of their ability to evaluate group differences on a multivariate profile.
The group method is applicable to cross-sectional or panel data of insured 
individuals or households that contain the dates when these people join, leave, and switch 
insurance plans as well as basic membership and insurance utilisation information. This 
data is widely available because insurance companies routinely collect i t  This data also 
represents the main limitation of the group approach, because real world data is often 
flawed or even non-existent However, if the data limitation problem can be overcome, the 
group method is generalisable to different country-settings, various insurance 
arrangements and also non-health related markets.
It can be concluded here that the first research aim was fulfilled -  the derived 
group method is highly appropriate for empirical investigations into adverse selection 
and risk selection. The validity of the group method for empirical investigations was 
tested in this thesis on real world data of South Africa's unregulated medical schemes.
B. Result sum m ary for the South African case  study
The empirical analysis performed in the thesis, applying the group method, led to model 
estimation results from which the existence of selection processes in the South African 
health insurance market during the time of observation was concluded. The analysis 
results and their interpretation, based on three research hypotheses that were derived
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from this thesis' main hypothesis, led to three conclusions. First overwhelming evidence 
for favourable risk selection of low risks into medical scheme plans could be derived. 
Second, the existence of evidence for unfavourable risk selection by medical scheme plans 
in the form of dumping high risks was concluded. Third, leavers have some low risk 
characteristics, which seems like evidence for adverse selection. However, since the 
typical adverse selection cycle was not observed, it was concluded that this result actually 
detected external favourable risk selection by the for-profit medical scheme plan 
competitors.
In conclusion of the assessment of these research subhypotheses, the main research 
hypothesis, that South Africa's unregulated medical scheme market encountered a lack of 
risk pooling, could be verified. The thesis' main result was that risk selection, not adverse 
selection, contributed to a lack of risk pooling. First, the overall medical scheme plan 
lacked risk pooling due to external favourable risk selection by for-profit medical scheme 
plan competitors. Competition between the medical scheme plans and for-profit insurers 
caused risk selection, breaking established risk pooling arrangements. Second, there was a 
lack of risk pooling between different medical scheme plans. Competition here caused risk 
selection between medical scheme plans. Over the four-year observation period high-risk 
plan options continued to pool high risks and low-risk plan options continued to pool low 
risks.
It was concluded that the second research aim was fulfilled -  the application of the 
group method to an empirical investigation into selection processes using data from South 
Africa's unregulated medical scheme market produced distinguishable evidence for 
selection processes.
Both research aims - the development of an easily applicable method for empirical 
investigations and testing of this method on a case study data set - were effectively 
accomplished.
7.1.2 Research question and policy relevance
It is the purpose of this section to present the conclusion for the thesis research question 
and confirm the limits of this thesis' scope, particularly regarding policy relevance. The 
results from the empirical analysis partly supported the research question that motivated 
this thesis. While it could be confirmed that risk selection created inequity, it could be not
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conduded that adverse selection created inefficiency (because no adverse selection 
evidence was found).
The general political relevance of the thesis' results was conduded from the very 
likely causality between the case study's analytical results and expected effects of risk 
selection. The result of inequity due to risk selection was deemed generalisable to similar 
settings in other countries. It was predicted that unregulated health insurance markets in 
other countries would most likely experience two of the observed risk selection effects: (1) 
more competitive/ contested health insurance markets and (2) the rise of strong equity 
concerns, varying in their extent, depending on economic, cultural, or institutional factors.
However, the policy relevance is limited to these expected effects of risk selection, 
and the result that less regulation in health insurance markets cannot resolve or address 
all issues that health care systems in middle- and low-income countries face. This is 
particularly true of inequity problems (resulting from risk selection or not). General 
strategies to combat these negative equity effects of less regulation have to be assessed 
within the context of each specific country. Specific policy recommendations were derived 
in this thesis, for the South African case study. The case study context placed the results of 
the analysed data into die time period 1994-1998, when South Africa's medical scheme 
plans were less regulated and could risk-relate premium contributions.
Two specific policy implications for the South African case study that consider the 
broader features of the South African health sector were brought forward. Both policies 
essentially aim towards an enlargement of health insurance risk pools in order to make 
insurance more affordable for low-income people and in order to lighten the public 
burden for taking care of the sick and poor. The first is to impose more regulation, not 
less, on the medical scheme market and extend the regulatory framework beyond the 
medical scheme market to all private health insurance arrangements in South Africa. Part 
of this recommendation was implemented with the re-regulation of South Africa's 
medical scheme market, effective horn 2000. However, this re-regulation did not consider 
the practice of for-profit insurers. As a result it could be observed that biased risk selection 
by South Africa's for-profit insurers continued to break the cross-subsidising risk pooling 
arrangements of the medical scheme plans by extracting their low risks. The second 
recommendation concerns the proposed implementation of some kind of mandatory 
health insurance system, such as the discussed Social Health Insurance plan. The later 
recommendation addresses the larger equity issues in South Africa's health care system. It
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would not only create larger risk pools with better cross-subsidisation, it would also 
provide a sustainable long-term solution for South Africa's health care financing.
7.2 Limitations
This thesis' economic approach accepted the assumption of the general model of rational 
economic behaviour as its analytical context and the empirical analysis drew inference of 
motivation from observed outcomes of behaviour. These are also the two fundamental 
limitation of research of this kind, besides the technical limitations of the actual data and 
analysis, as discussed in chapter six. However, it was concluded that rationality can be 
precise and prescriptive, allowing the economic approach to complement political science, 
sociology, psychology and other disciplines. The issue of making inferences about 
behavioural motivations based on observed consequences or outcomes of behaviour is a 
limitation that empirical research in all disciplines faces. Scientific approaches are built on 
interplay between theory and observable data. However, technical data and analysis 
limitations can influence these inferences.
As a retrospective study, data was limited to what had been recorded and to data 
that were not designed for assessing risk pooling and selection processes. However, it was 
concluded that the two main data limitations - first, the practical data subgroup & plan 
classification and second, the limits of the variables used as risk factors - were sufficiently 
considered to ensure that the statistical analysis results were still valuable. Also, the data 
set contained a given set of medical scheme plans, and although it was assumed that this 
sample was representative, this may not have been the case, which could have biased die 
results. Another weakness was the lack of control for environmental or organisational 
factors, such as plan management details that might have affected plan risk pooling.
Technical limitations related to the analysis, such as limits on the model results 
interpretations and the model fit assessment were acknowledged and, if possible, taken 
into consideration. The lack of adequate model fit assessment methods for the thesis' 
correlated data models seemed the most serious limitation here. This made it hard to 
evaluate the quality of the models in terms of efficiency and predictive ability. However, a 
good model is not made of only descriptive capacity and predictive ability, although 
models are preferred that can be successfully taken to new data and that can help answer
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policy questions. Arguably, these data and analysis limitations influenced the offered 
results and their interpretation as behavioural outcomes from specific motivations.
One important limitation was that the result of the analysis could be not very well 
interpreted within the framework of a separating equilibrium. A longer time-dimension of 
the data and the analysis of time-trends might have lent itself better to the assessment of a 
separating equilibrium hypothesis.
7.3 Contribution to knowledge
In spite of the limitations discussed in chapter six the thesis contributes to the empirical 
literature on adverse selection and risk selection in health insurance markets. Adverse 
selection and risk selection are of great concern both in academic and political circles. 
Most literature on these issues is focused on high-income countries. However, there are a 
few studies in the context of low- or middle-income countries (e. g. Sapelli and Vial 2003, 
Soderlund and Hansl 2000). The thesis' empirical analysis of selection processes in South 
Africa's medical scheme market adds to these few existing studies, thereby increasing the 
understanding of the behaviour of health insurance market participants in a middle- 
income country context.
Empirical evidence for adverse selection and risk selection is hard to identify. The 
empirical analysis was the centrepiece of this thesis and its major contribution. The 
significance of this thesis lies in the successful application of the group method to the 
empirical analysis of the South African case study.
The empirical analysis of the South African case study data adds to the few 
empirical studies that explore adverse selection and risk selection in low- and middle- 
income countries. It contributed in particular to the few studies that have tried to 
empirically identify adverse selection and risk selection in South Africa's medical scheme 
market (Soderlund and Hansl 1999,2000, Hansl and Soderlund 1999). However, none was 
based on individual-level insurance data as used in this thesis, or applied the specific 
group method.
In addition to the empirical analysis, this study also explored the policy relevance 
of the results. Specifically, the impact of less regulation for the South African medical 
scheme market was examined. The results indicated that the effects of less regulation in 
middle-income country health sector reforms, in particular, leaving health insurance 
arrangements unregulated, conflicts with the common health policy objective of equity.
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More competition and efficiency comes at the price of less equity in health care access for 
low-income groups, confirming the known efficiency-equity trade-off. The thesis' policy 
recommendations support the position that there is need for more, not less, regulation in 
low- and middle-income countries in order to make health care financing and health care 
provision more equitable.
7.4 Outlook for future research
This thesis explored the research question of whether unregulated health insurance 
markets are characterised by adverse selection and/or risk selection, thereby creating 
inefficiency or inequity. The focus was on an empirical investigation into evidence for 
these selection processes. However, this thesis concludes with a call for more empirical 
studies of adverse selection and risk selection and their effects. First, studies of this kind 
are missing, in particular, for the health sector in low- and middle-income countries. 
Second, the thesis' result which showed a lack of evidence for adverse selection, needs to 
be replicated and confirmed with other studies. The result seems controversial since it 
suggests that the problem of asymmetry of information in health insurance markets might 
be exaggerated in theoretical and empirical literature. It seems that insurers can actually 
risk discriminate (and risk select) very well with only a few basic risk indicators. 
However, the limited time horizon of this thesis also limited its ability to test explicitly for 
a separating equilibrium. It would be interesting to replicate studies of this kind in other 
unregulated market settings, preferably with more time observations, and assess their 
evidence for adverse selection and a separating equilibrium. Aside from this, there are 
many related research questions that were not answered here.
For example, while there is a large body of regulation theory (which was not the 
subject of this thesis) there are remarkably few researchers who explore the particular 
issue of health sector regulation in low- and middle-income countries (see Kumaranayake 
et al. 2000 and Hongore and Kumaranayake 2000 for good examples to the contrary). This 
seems particularly astonishing, since these countries can ill afford to waste resources that 
will not achieve all of the proclaimed aims of health sector regulation. This concerns 
potential future research questions, which assess the effects of more or less regulation in 
the health care sector. Equally important research questions would be ones which would 
compliment these effect analyses with decision analyses concerning the political decision
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making process about whether to increase or decrease regulation in low- or middle- 
income countries' health sectors. There are several explanations that suggest themselves as 
to why there is such limited literature on these issues, and from these, several areas for 
future research and political engagement can be easily formulated.
First, there is the need for more and better data in order to conduct assessments of 
the effects of implemented policies. It would be helpful to not only provide low- and 
middle- income countries with policy recommendations but also with specific monitoring 
tools for assessing the effects of each recommended policy. In particular, tools should be 
developed that allow easy data collection for before-and-after scenario comparisons. There 
is a lack of easily applicable benchmarks that evaluate policies in those countries.
Second, alternative health care financing methods have to be further explored for 
low- and middle- income countries that have limited or no history of Western health 
insurance arrangements. This is a particular political imperative since many public health 
care sectors in low- and middle- income countries are at the limit of their capacities, if 
existing at all. Here sustainable long-term solutions, rather than political patchwork, as in 
the South African re-regulation example, are called for. Moreover, these alternatives have 
to take the limits of political institutions in those countries into account This indudes, for 
instance, their often moderate ability to perform complicated regulation tasks that 
Western governments also struggle with (see, for example, on government failure: Le 
Grand 1991). Until now, research and experiments on this issue have been sparse for low- 
and middle- income countries (recent exceptions are: Wiesmann and Juetting 2000, 
Purohit 2001, McCord 2001, Baminghausen and Sauerbom 2002 and Miriam 2003).
Finally, aside horn conveniently demanding greater commitment from politicians 
in low- and middle- income countries, who are often trapped and challenged by electoral 
cydes and bureaucratic institutions comparable to the West, economists are asked to 
examine their approaches to understanding and explaining behaviour of partidpants in 
health insurance markets. For example, Nyman's Theory of Demand for Health Insurance 
(2003) comprises a new approach that is truly interested in understanding behaviour 
related to health insurance coverage, rather than focusing purely on mathematical aspects 
of modelling that behaviour.165 He develops a health insurance demand theory based on 
the fact that consumers are not necessarily averse to risk or uncertainty but are averse to
163 He argues that understanding health insurance demand does not require complex models but experientially 
derived intuition (Nyman 2003).
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income losses.166 This approach can explain the intuitive conclusion that the voluntary 
purchase of fair health coverage makes consumers better off and not worse as 
controversially discussed among economists (e.g. Pauly 1968, Pauly 1983). Thus 
economists who are interested in empirical modelling of health insurance behaviour 
should not apply the conventional theoretical model without scrutiny, simply because it 
allows them to perform the desired empirical analysis. At the least, empirical studies that 
try to model insurance behaviour should explicitly state or clarify behavioural 
assumptions that underlay their modelling efforts.
166 Thus insurance is demanded because of its income implications, not because of implications regarding 
certainty (Nyman 2003).
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Appendix 1
Case study background: Republic of South Africa
The following background for the case study of an unregulated health insurance market 
concerns facts about the Republic of South Africa. In addition to the presentation of a 
more general introduction to this African country, this section will also emphasise major 
economic and political developments that influenced the South African health care system 
between 1995 to 1998 -  the time frame of the thesis' case study and empirical analysis. The 
aim is to put the data analysis in the later part of the thesis into the context of the events 
that occurred during the years of data collection.
The Republic of South Africa occupies the southernmost part of the Sub-Saharan 
African continent. It is divided into nine provinces, each with its own Legislature, Premier 
and Ministers. The provinces are the Western Cape, the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the 
Northern Cape, Free State, North-West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and the Northern 
Province. Before 1993 South Africa was divided into four 'independent states' (Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei), six 'self-governing territories' (KwaZulu, 
KaNgwane, QwaQwa, Lebowa, Gazankulu, and KwaNdebele), and four provinces of 
'White South Africa' (Cape, Natal, Orange Free State, and Transvaal (see figure Al-1).
South Africa's population accounts for 40.58 million people made up of Black 
Africans (76.7%), White Africans (10.9%), Coloured Africans (8.9%), and Indian/Asian 
Africans (2.6%). More than half of the population lives in urban areas. These numbers are 
the result of the first official census in post-apartheid South Africa in October 1996167 
(Government of South Africa 2003). The countiy's population estimates in the year 2001 
stood at 44.6 million, of which 52% were women. The annual population growth rate is 
2.1% (UNECA 2003).
South Africa's history is tied to the apartheid system that was established after the 
National Party (NP) won the elections in 1948. In most respects, apartheid was a more 
systematic and brutal continuation of the segregationist policies of previous governments. 
However, a new concern with racial purity was apparent in laws prohibiting interracial 
sex and in provisions for population registration requiring that every South African be 
assigned to one discrete racial category or another. The apartheid state also created a
167The second democratic census was held in October 2001. First census results are expected in Summer 
2003.
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permanent White political majority by eliminating the voting rights of all Black Africans, 
hom elands' for Africans (and coloured people) were created where alternative political 
provisions could be made. This included the enforcement of total segregation, so that 
every town was carved into separate 'group areas', sorting people by racial categories as 
shown in their identity books and entered in a national register.
South Africa's first democratic election took place in April 1994, and led to a 
Government of National Unity (GNU). A new constitution, adopted by Parliament in May 
1996, came into force in February 1997 after certification by the Constitutional Court Soon 
afterwards, the NP withdrew horn the GNU, leaving only the IFP (Inkatha Freedom 
Party) to partner with the African National Congress (ANC) in the Cabinet South Africa 
is still facing enormous challenges at all society levels in regard to its former segmentation 
along racial lines.
South Africa's economy faced serious problems after the abolition of apartheid in 
the middle 1990's.168 Two main issues have dominated the economic performance of South 
Africa since 1995. First, the Rand went through three currency crises, 1996,1998, and 2001, 
and fell steadily against other currencies.169 Second, in 1996, the Government announced 
its macroeconomic stabilisation strategy, which incorporated its priorities for Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), based on the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) austerity measures.170 Economic growth for the last two years (2001/2002 and 
2002/2003) has been disappointing. While growth in total real gross domestic product 
(GDP) averaged 2.6% (0.5% per capita) between 1996 and 2001 (UNECA 2003), the 
weakening of the international economy was reflected in a slowdown of growth during 
2002. South Africa, like other developing economies, is highly susceptible to trends in the 
economies of its major trading partners (the United States, United Kingdom, Europe and 
the Far East) and regional political instabilities still negatively affect investor perceptions.
168 Apartheid also included the retention of economic power in white hands, by tightening the job colour bar 
and directing skilled blacks into their own areas. This was linked to a policy of industrial decentralisation, so 
that centres of industry could be set up on the borders of homelands, to which black and white employees 
could travel from opposite sides without infringing group areas (McIntyre et al. 1995).
169 Also, the price of gold -  on which the extensive domestic mining industry relies - fell on the international 
market in concert with the Rand. This made major reductions in mine labour necessary just when an increase 
employment in the industrial sector was urgent. At the same time, the good prospects for South Africa’s 
export trade offered by a cheaper Rand were weakened by the sudden collapse of Far Eastern markets, to 
which South Africa looked for expansion (Government of South Africa 1999).
170 In particular, the vision of a society in which sound health, education and other services are available to all 
was stated with commitments to financing low-income housing, a national school feeding programme, water 
and sanitation projects, free primary health care services, and enhanced small business support.
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Despite the fact that South Africa has the most advanced economy on the African 
continent, and has been highly commended for its successful macro-economic policies, 
wide disparities of wealth remain, with obvious implications for broader socio-political 
policy directions. Although South Africa is classified as a middle-income country great 
inequalities in the distribution of income are reflected in the following numbers: 51% of 
the income belonged to the richest 10% of the households and only 4% to the poorest 40% 
(World Bank 1994). The Gini-coeffident of income concentration for 1994 was 0.65 
(Whiteford and McGrath 1994), more than 20% higher than for other middle-income 
countries. This strong economic segmentation of South Africa's sodety can be also seen in 
the health sector.
Under the apartheid system health care financing and health care delivery was 
grossly inequitable.171 Naturally, it was one of the highest priorities of the new democratic 
South African government to change this for the better. Three constitutional imperatives 
are the guidelines for today's health legislation and policy: (1) realise the right of access of 
health care to all, in particular, (2) promote children's right to basic health care and (3) 
ensure that nobody is refused emergency medical care172 (HST 2003). The White Paper on 
the Transformation of the South African Health System (DoH 1997b) set out a plan for 
decentralising health-care delivery as well as re-orientating services to focus on primary 
health care. Its objectives were to unify the fragmented health services at all levels into a 
comprehensive and integrated national health system. However, the envisioned National 
Health Bill, which has already taken more than seven years to draft, is not expected to pass 
the Parliament until the end of 2003 (HST 2003). The major goal of the Bill is to create a 
National Health System that includes public, private, and non-governmental providers 
and to coordinate services equitably and efficiently173 (DoH 1996).
171 Under the apartheid system health care was separated along racial lines and health care financing 
according to the racially separated geographic regions (McIntyre et al. 1995). White Africans had not only 
higher income, the governments spent more per person on services in ‘White* areas. Because the White 
population was concentrated in urban areas health care facilities here were well-developed and comparable to 
developed countries. However, half of the South African population, mostly Black Africans, lived in 
peripheral areas at the household subsistence level with inadequate health care provision (McIntyre et al. 
1995). White, high-income earners were often members of insurance plans - the medical schemes - and 
obtained their medical care from the private sector. Some Non-White, low to middle-income earners (one 
third of the population) living in poor urban areas had some access to low-cost medical schemes (as a result 
of their strong unionisation since 1979). These low-cost schemes are usually attached to employer’s 
companies or industrial sectors (Soderlund and Hansl 1999). However, half of the South African population, 
mostly Black Africans, lived in peripheral areas at the household subsistence level with inadequate health 
care provision (McIntyre et al. 1995).
172 South African Constitution, articles 27 (1), (2) and (3) and 28 (1).
173 It will also establish a legal framework for the district health system and the regulation of public and 
private facilities. It will detail the rights and duties of health-care users and providers, set up a complaints
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Two trends, in public and private health care financing could be observed since the 
early 1990's. Falling per capita public health care financing followed a period of 
substantial growth in public health care expenditures/between 1992 and 1998.174 Private 
health care expenditure rose while the number of people with access to private care fell, 
putting an additional burden on the overstretched resources of the public sector (HST 
2003).175 Together with limited economic growth in the late 1990's and persistent public 
sector inefficiencies this interrupted the initial trend of increasing access and equity in 
South Africa's health care, starting after the first democratic election in 1994.
The term "equity"176 is commonly found in publications regarding the South 
African health care sector and has been a goal of many South African health policies. In 
international health policy debates of the last decade efficiency-driven perspectives started 
to dominate. For example, there has been a rapid development of approaches aimed at 
cost-effective rationing of scarce resources for health care. Some progress has been made
mechanism, address access to and confidentiality of information, and provide mechanisms for national and 
provincial health authorities to consult with all stake-holders.
74 According to the latest data available for 1998-1999 the government accounts for 44% of South Africa's 
health care financing sources, 39% is contributed by private households, and 17% by private employers. A 
small amount of 0.1% comes from donors and NGOs. (HST 2003).
175 Even though more than 60% of all health care expenditure go to the private sector it serves less than 20% 
of the population (DoH 2001). Moreover, private sector medical scheme coverage declined as a proportion of 
the total population according to the latest 1998-1999 data. This probably reflects rising unaffordability of 
medical scheme membership as costs escalated in the private sector (HST 2003).
176 Global health professionals have struggled with a definition for equity for some time. Mooney (1987) went 
even that far to conclude that equity is a value laden concept which has no uniquely correct definition (after 
discussing five theories of equity in distribution of health resources: 1. A theory of maximum - Rawl’s theory 
modified to include health care institutions providing opportunity as the social good; 2. Altruism as a basis 
for equity - Titmuss' Kantian view of national responsibility to provide equitable service delivery 
altruistically or equal access; 3. A fair share theory of distribution - Margolis' process utility theory of doing 
one's fair share or equality of access for equal need; 4. Commitment to equity • Sen's focus on sympathy and 
commitment to another's ill health status and access; and 3. Equity as externality - Culyer's health care 
consumption where government determines the merit good or extent of consumption). Other authors were 
more comfortable providing definitions of equity in the health literature: (1) Whitehead (1990): “Equity in 
health implies that ideally everyone should have a fair opportunity to attain their full health potential and, 
more pragmatically, that no-one should be disadvantaged from achieving this potential, if it can be avoided.” 
(2) Berman et al. (1989): “A common definition of equity in the public health literature is that the primary 
determinant in the use of services should be the need for diem. Other factors such as income, race, location of 
residence and so forth should not play an important role in selecting who receives care and who does not” (3) 
Newbrander et al. (1995): “Equity means equal opportunity of use of health services for equal need”, and (4) 
Daniels (1982): “Access to health care is equitable if and only if there are no information barriers, financial 
barriers, or supply anomalies that prevent access to a reasonable or decent basic minimum of health care 
services.”. The consensus definition arrived at is from the World Health Organisation (WHO), developed by 
Margaret Whitehead (1990). Acknowledging that inequity has a moral and ethical dimension it refers to 
differences in health, which are not only unnecessary and avoidable, but in addition are considered unfair and 
unjust in the context of a specific society. Thus equity in health was defined by the WHO as minimising 
avoidable disparities in health and its determinants -  including but not limited to health care -  between 
groups of people who have different levels of underlying social attributes (income, gender, ethnicity, 
geography, etc).
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in reducing mortality and morbidity and in reducing inequalities in health and access to 
health care. However/ many avoidable inequalities in health persist
Equity was an essential feature of the redistributive policies in post-apartheid 
South Africa/ aspiring to reduce the significant levels of inequality.177 The discussion of 
equity in the political arena of South Africa includes most frequently three views of 
equity/ i.e. focus on the health of die most vulnerable/ inclusion and narrowing gaps 
between the poorest and the richest segments of the population in health care access178 
and consumption. The manner in which these equity-oriented policies were (and were 
not) implemented over the past few decades and the factors that influenced this require 
further analysis. However/ high levels of aggregate ill health - exacerbated by HIV/AIDS - 
and persistent inequalities in ill health/ mortality and access to health care indicate that 
distributional issues remain inadequately addressed. There exists a widening gap between 
necessary and actual public allocations for health/ and between the private and public 
health sector. Resources are concentrated either in central hospitals or in urban private 
care, confronting disadvantaged communities with spiralling health care costs. Those with 
the greatest health needs are often those with the least ability to access good quality health 
services. One of the strongest determinants for the consumption of good quality health 
care remains the (private) health insurance status of a person (Hansl and Soderlund 1999). 
Private health insurance only guarantees South Africans access to good quality health
177 It is important to clarify the understanding of equity and equality. Although these terms have different 
meanings, they are frequently used interchangeably. Equity adheres to predetermined norms or standards, 
which are considered fair or just when describing gaps, differences or disparities. These norms or standards 
vary from place to place, from time to time and from one community to the other. Due to the difficulties in 
setting these norms or standards -  frequently influenced by values and judgments -  the notion of inequality is 
more frequently used. Contrary to equity, equality does not take into account whether the existing gaps, 
differences or disparities are fair or just. In other words, inequity is unjust or unfair inequality.
178 There is of course some ambiguity regarding the term access. Having access to health care does not 
automatically lead to utilisation. Transforming potential access into realised access or utilisation is depending 
on a dynamic interaction with demand or felt need and various enabling factors such as ability and 
willingness to pay, travel time, quality of care, etc.
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services. Thus in South Africa obtaining health insurance is widely discussed in terms of 
equitable access to good quality health care.
Birgit Hansl Appendix 2
Appendix 2
The basic logit model and its assum ptions
Logit models are able to approach empirical problems where it is of interest to estimate 
the effect of the covariates on a dichotomous outcome with odds ratios. For example, this 
thesis seeks to estimate the effect of selected variables on the likelihood that an event 
occurs, i.e. if households are more likely to join, leave, or switch insurance coverage rather 
than not. The thesis considers the analysis of a panel of N households, having recorded 
histories that indicate the presence or absence of an event in each T equally spaced time 
period. These types of statistical models, which have an endogenous variable that only 
takes discrete values, are known as categorical, qualitative-dependent or qualitative- 
choice models. The most widely used discrete-response models are the linear probability 
model, the probit model, and die logit model.
Logit analysis or logistic regression employs the logit model as one type of 
discrete-response model. In most cases, like the empirical analysis in this thesis, die 
dependant variable y only assumes two values - 1 if an event occurs and 0 if it does not 
These models are referred to as models with dichotomous dependant variables. For 
example, applying the analytical problem of this thesis, a logit analysis here would 
comprise a dependent variable y with the value 1 if an individual was a joiner, leaver or 
switcher and zero if in the control group (for i= 1, ...N  households). Suppose now that y 
takes the value 1 with the probability p, and y takes the value 0 with the probability (1 -p). 
Then one can formulate the expected value of y, Ey as the probability that the event will 
occur as the following:
Ey=\p + 0(1-p) — p (Equation A2-1: Event probability)
If we assume that the probability is a function of a vector of independent 
explanatory variables, x, and of a vector of unknown parameter B die general discrete 
model is the following:
Prob(y i = 1) = F(B’x . )  = E(y ,  | x (. ) (Equation A2-2: Discrete model probability function) 
As mentioned above the three most applied functional forms for F are the linear 
probability model, the probit model, and the logit model (Hisao 1986). With the linear 
probability model it is possible to have estimated probabilities outside the 0-1 range 
because it does not constrain B’x, values to lie between 0 and 1. The logit and the probit
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model limit the probability between 0 and 1. The probability functions for probit models 
use the standard normal distribution and for logit models use the logistic distribution. The 
logit model is the following:
ewF(w) = -------  (Equation A2-3: Logit model)
\ + ew
In the simple linear regression model we assume that an observation of a random 
outcome variable y can be expressed as a function of x, y  = p’x + v . For the error term v 
the most common assumption is that it follows a normal distribution with a mean of zero 
and some variance that is constant across the levels of the independent variable. This is 
different for cases with a dichotomous outcome variable. The logit models correspond to 
the cumulative distribution of v being logistic (Hisao 1986).
Logistic regression is used to predict the likelihood that an individual case will fall 
into one of two possible groups or classifications, similar to discriminant analysis - 
another tool for examining binary, non-interval data. However, logistic regression is not 
as restrictive as discriminant analysis in its assumptions about the characteristics of the 
data used. This makes logistic regression analysis preferable over two-group discriminant 
analysis (Hair et al. 1998). Multiple linear regression and discriminant analysis share 
fundamental assumptions about normality, homoskedastidty and linearity.179
Logistic regression is, in general, less sensitive to underlying assumptions than 
discriminant analysis. In particular, when the assumption of multivariate normality is 
violated, the p values derived from logistic regression are still accurate, whereas the p 
values derived from discriminant analysis are marginally biased.180 Likewise, violations of 
the assumption of homogeneous covariance may artificially raise the p values in 
discriminant analysis but not logistic regression.181 Logistic regression does not require 
linear relationships between the independents and the dependent, but it does assume a 
linear relationship between the logit of the independents and the dependent Finally, 
dichotomous predictor variables are more applicable to logistic regression than
179 Normality means that samples of the independent variables have to be normally distributed. The errors are 
normally distributed. Homoskedasticity assumes that the populations of the groups being compared have 
equal covariance (dispersion) matrices. The variance of the errors is constant, i.e. homogeneity of variance. 
Linearity requires linearity of relationships between variables. The population means of the dependent 
variables at each level of the independent variable can be arranged on a straight line.
180 First, however, the distortions to the p  values in discriminant analysis are marginal when the sample size is 
large. Second, both techniques are undermined by violations of normality when the sample size is small. 
Third, severe violations will also undermine the power and efficacy of logistic regression, despite the 
accurate p  values.
181 This is not a problem for discriminant analysis when the sample size of each group is similar.
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discriminant analysis.182 Other conditions, such as multicolinearity183, are also significant 
for logistic regression. Since the assumptions for multiple regression differ substantially 
from logistic regression a comprehensive list of these assumptions for logistic regression is 
provided here (based on Menard 2001).
First of all it has to be ensured that the model is correctly specified which requires:
• Inclusion of all relevant variables in the model. If relevant variables are omitted, the 
common variance they share with included variables may be wrongly attributed to 
those variables, or the error term may be inflated.
• Exclusion of all irrelevant variables. If causally irrelevant variables are included in 
the model, the common variance they share with included variables may be wrongly 
attributed to the irrelevant variables. The more the correlation of the irrelevant 
variable(s) with other independents, the greater the standard errors of the regression 
coefficients for these independents.
• Low error in the explanatory variables. Ideally low measurement error and no 
missing cases are assumed.
These three assumptions are crucial to consider before and during the model 
building process. Other conditions for logistic regression are:
• Cases or error terms are assumed independent. Violations with serious effects occur, 
for instance, in correlated samples. In before-after studies, panel data or time-series 
data subjects cannot always provide multiple observations at different time points. 
However, specific methods are available to adapt logistic models to handle non- 
independent (or correlated) data.
• Large samples. Logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) rather 
than ordinary least squares (OLS) to derive parameters. MLE relies on large-sample 
asymptotic normality, which means that reliability of estimates decline when there are 
few cases for each observed combination of X variables.
• Independent variables are not linear functions of each other. To the extent that one 
independent is a linear function of another independent, the problem of 
multicollinearity will occur in logistic regression. As die independents increase in 
correlation with each other, the standard errors of the logit (effect) coefficients will
182 Dichotomous predictor variables should not be subjected to discriminant analysis, although Monte Carlo 
studies suggest that this issue is trivial.
183 The assumption of non-multicolinearity means that the independent variables are not linear combinations 
of each other. Perfect multicolinearity makes estimation impossible, while strong multicolinearity makes 
estimates imprecise.
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become inflated. Multicollinearity does not change the estimates of the coefficients, 
only their reliability. Nowadays, software (like STATA) automatically accounts for 
multicolinearity and excludes detected variables from the estimated models.
• Linearity. Logistic regression does not require linear relationships between the 
independents and the dependent, but it does assume a linear relationship between the 
logit of file independents and the dependent
• Additivity. Logistic regression does not account for interaction effects except when 
interaction terms (usually products of standardized independents) are created as 
additional variables in the analysis.
• Expected dispersion. In logistic regression the expected variance of the dependent can 
be compared to the observed variance, and discrepancies may be considered under- or 
over-dispersion. If there is moderate discrepancy, standard errors will be over- 
optimistic and one should use adjusted standard error. Adjusted standard error will 
make the confidence intervals wider.
The test for the last set of assumption should be part of each model building 
process. For, example, possible multicolinearity should already be considered during the 
variable selection in the model building process.
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Appendix 3
Outliers and missing values
Any multivariate model aims to identify complex relationships, but influencing factors, 
like outliers, missing values, and violated analysis assumptions can compound across 
several variables and distort the statistical results. Besides a clear understanding of the 
assumptions for the specific multivariate technique used, a careful data examination 
before any analysis is necessary. This will ensure that the statistical requirements for the 
multivariate analysis are met. This appendix applies diagnostic techniques in order to 
assess the influence of outliers and missing values.
Outliers are observations characterised by distinct differences as compared to die 
majority of the sample. On one hand they can provide additional information about 
unrecognised population characteristics or, on the other hand, they can be non­
representative of the population and thus bias the statistical analysis. Before categorically 
excluding outliers from any analysis they should be evaluated in regard to their potential 
information value and in regard to die objectives and the context of die study.
Outliers may arise due to procedural factors like data entry errors or coding 
mistakes. Usually, however, outliers represent an extraordinary event that can either be 
explained by the researcher or not If the researcher decides that there is a reasonable 
explanation for die uniqueness of that observation die outlier is included in the analysis 
otherwise it is often excluded. In addition to these types of outliers there are others that 
tire unique in their combinations of values across several variables and less in regard to 
values outside the ordinary range. These observations are typically retained because they 
might represent a valid population segment. For a more thorough discussion on this topic 
see Barnett and Lewis (1984) or Rousseeuw and Robust (1987).
For the diesis, data outliers resulting from procedural data entry and coding errors 
or outliers with values that could be not explained were excluded. During the early data 
cleaning process a very small number of outliers resulting from data entry/coding errors 
were excluded. For example there were fewer than ten cases where a gender was 
miscoded. Instead of the original F for female and M for male, two other letters of die 
alphabet appeared. Outliers in the form of values that could not be explained by the 
researcher appeared in the South African data set in the form of "false negative values". 
They are referred to as false negative values since it would be technically impossible for 
these variables to have a negative value. Thus it can be assumed that negative values
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generally emerged from entry mistakes. False negative values were very rare and they are 
summarised in table A3-1 below. The co-payment variable had most false negative values, 
0.2% of all cases. All false negative values were excluded during the data cleaning process.
Table A3-1: Outliers -  false negative values in original data
Variable Number of 
observations
Negative values
Number Percent
age 1,009,272 1 0
gender (female) 1,011,735 0 0
dependents 1,011,735 0 0
income 1,011,735 0 0
race 1,011,735 0 0
tac (claims) 1,011,695 179 0.02
tco (contributions) 1,011,735 0 0
co2 (co-payments) 1,011.735 1,999 0.20
gp (GP benefits) 958,663 10 0
pub (pub.-hospital benefits) 944,991 69 0.01
spe (specialist benefits) 958,636 148 0.01
prv (priv. Hospital benefits) 954,483 168 0.02
den (dental benefits) 958,453 20 0
opt (optical benefits) 914,708 28 0
par (paramedical benefits) 928,476 51 0.01
Note: This is based on the original data o f N-1,011.735 observations over n=353,458 households.
For the remainder of the data several diagnostic techniques were applied in order to 
identify less obvious outliers. The univariate detection of outliers included the evaluation 
of the histogram of variable observations. However, not all results are shown here. The 
histograms of the two variables age and optical benefits were chosen as examples for 
illustration purposes. Next page figures A3-1 and A3-2 display the histograms for each 
variable. For the age variable the histogram shows no observations that lie significantly 
outside the bulk of observations. There are very few observations at fire tail ends of the 
distribution, for ages below 10 and above 90. But since that is a part of a normal age 
distribution they cannot be classified as outliers. The histogram for the optical benefits 
shows some very large observations that could be classified as outliers. However, even 
though a small number of observations, particularly for the later continuous benefit 
variable, occurred in the outer range of observations, there were none that could not be 
explained or were outright non-normal.
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Figure A3-I: Univariate outlier detection with histogram fo r  variable age
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Figure A3-2: Univariate outlier detection with histogram fo r  variable optical benefits
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Most of the data variables represent utilisation benefits for different medical 
services. These medical benefits typically have irregular and extreme patterns because 
they are due to unexpected, unique events. Also, since it is the objective of this study to 
investigate the inclusion or exclusion of households from insurance due to unusual socio­
demographic or utilisation profiles exclusion of observations with these characteristics 
could be not justified.
The bivariate outlier detection assessed pairs of variables through a scatterplot. 
This joint assessment of variables through a scatterplot can help to identify isolated points 
that fall outside the range of observations as potential outlier cases. Here, serving as an 
illustration, the scatterplots for the two variables of age and optical benefits are presented 
in figure A3-3. In the scatterplot it is to be seen that there are no cases that can be noted as 
particularly isolated points and therefore potentially classified as outliers.
Figure A3-3: Bivariate outliers detection with scatterplot fo r  age and optical benefits
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Even if the bivariate outlier detection would have revealed cases that could be potential 
candidates for an outlier classification, it seems unjustified to exclude them from the 
following data analysis. All potential outliers represent unique observations that are the 
result of possibly extreme but explainable events. Also, it is assumed that these
264
Birgit Hansl Appendix 3
observations represent specific population members, who cany valuable information 
regarding the influence of these unusual values on their insurance status.184
It can be summarised that there is/ first, not a large number of outliers. Second, for 
these outliers no demonstrable proof can be provided that they are truly deviant and do 
not in fact represent a valid segment of the observed population. This judgement was 
derived not only from the characteristics of the outliers but also from the objective of the 
data analysis. As was previously mentioned, it is in the nature of several 
(utilisation/benefit) variables to represent values that have their origins in irregular 
and/or catastrophic events. These sometimes quite extreme values can indeed be seen as a 
result of unique events, making these observations prone to be classified as outliers.
For this research these cases are a perfectly valid segment of the population and 
carry important and valuable information. This is because in the context of the analysis - 
with its objective of identifying differences between risk profiles of various population 
groups -  a wide variation of variable values in the data was assumed. In some cases this 
could appear as outlier behaviour. Finally, the deletion of outliers may improve the fit of 
the multivariate analysis but at the same time limit its generalisability (see also Hair et al. 
1998). On the basis of these arguments it could be not justified to exclude any other 
observations with potential outlier characteristics from the analysis, aside from the "false 
negative" values.
Missing values are very common in longitudinal data because, typically, repeated 
measurements for one subject have to be obtained. The circumstances for obtaining these 
measurements are often not within the researcher's control so the results are unbalanced 
or partially incomplete data. The response from a subject, for example, may be missing at 
one point in time due to factors unrelated to the outcome of interest. Missing data affect
184 Another diagnostic method identifies multivariate outliers. This multivariate assessment of each 
observation across a set of variables measures the multidimensional position of each variable relative to some 
common point. The Mahalanobis distance or Wilks’ test are the most widely used methods for this outlier 
detection. Mahalanobis D2 evaluates the distance in multidimensional space of each observation from the 
mean center of the observation and also allows a statistical significance testing (Hair et al. 1998). The power 
of these classical methods decreases radically with the increasing number of observations and often fails 
because they are affected by the observations they are supposed to identify. Hadi (1992,1994) developed a 
method that presents a reasonable solution to these problems (for the STAT A™ command that executes this 
test see STATA 1999). However, this approach is computationally extremely demanding and when applied to 
the data exceeded the programs capacities. When applied to a subsample of data this diagnostic test classified 
a number of observations as potential outliers. However, each variable in the data shows some extreme 
observations, but observations seem not to have extreme patterns for an extensive number of variables. This 
fact alone already suggests that they cannot be considered as unrepresentative of the population. Thus even 
with the multivariate test separating a number of observations as outliers they seem to be similar enough to 
the rest of the observations. It was decided that no observation should be eliminated on the grounds of this 
diagnostic outlier test.
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the generalisability of the results and the primary concern is to determine the reasons or 
mechanisms underlying the missing data. The extent of missing data is mostly a 
secondary issue (Hair et al. 1998).
All missing data processes lead to missing values, either due to events external to 
the respondent (like data collection problems and entry errors) or due to the respondent's 
behaviour (like information denial). If the missing data process can be explicitly identified 
the missing data are called ignorable, because the use of specialised analysis methods will 
accommodate these data. Ignorable missing data processes include, for instance, missing 
observations from a population that are not included in a taken sample or censored data.
Censored data are incomplete because of their stage in the missing data process 
(Hair et al. 1998). In the thesis this type of ignorable missing data occurs. To recall, 
households were divided into groups. The control group consists of households that 
stayed insured throughout the whole four-year observation period. On the other hand the 
mover groups of leavers, joiners, and switchers consisted of households that naturally 
could have joined, left, or switched during any year within the four-year observation 
period. For these movers the data entries for one, two, and even three years can be 
missing, because they left, switched, or did not yet join. However, the techniques and 
software procedures selected for this thesis' censored data (through generalised 
estimating equation method, GEE, for generalised linear models, GLM) are robust to this 
problem. Thus while ignorable missing data are a result of random missing data 
processes, where the observed values are a random sample of population values, they can 
be explicitly accommodated by selected analytical methods.
However, most missing data processes cannot be addressed with particular 
analytical techniques. Therefore, it is first necessary to assess the extent and impact of the 
missing data in order to determine whether or not the missing data process is random 
and, if not, which approaches for dealing with missing data should be applied (Hair et al. 
1998).
The following table A3-2 gives the summary statistics for all missing values in the 
original data. The second column describes the number and proportion of cases with 
missing values for each variable. The last set of columns displays the number and percent 
of valid cases including mean and standard variation for all metric variables. Missing 
values range from zero to 10 percent of all cases for a given variable. The optical benefits 
variable has the highest level of missing values of around ten percent Most other 
variables lie well below that at around five percent Among the N*l,011,735 observations
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of the data 833,755 have not a single missing value for any variable. This means 88% of all 
observations in the data are complete.
Table A3-2: Summary statistics and pattern o f missing data
Variable Missing values
Number Percent Number
Valid cases
Percent Mean Std.dev.
age 2,346 0.25 945,155 99.75 41.57 13.06
gender (female) 0 0 947.501 100 n.a. n.a.
dependants 0 0 947,501 100 1.90 1.68
income 0 0 947,501 100 551.61 341.86
race 0 0 947,501 100 n.a. n.a.
tac (claims) 40 0 947,461 99.98 248.98 588.92
tco (contributions) 0 0 947,501 100 242.63 122.56
co2 (co-payments) 0 0 947,501 99.80 25.30 145.95
gp (GP benefits) 52,974 5.59 894,527 94.41 23.43 21.40
pub (pub.-hospitai benefits) 65,657 6.93 881,844 93.07 2.27 50.42
spe (specialist benefits) 52,995 5.59 894,506 94.41 42.79 127.55
prv (priv. Hospital benefits) 56,853 6.00 890.648 94.00 55.36 325.03
den (dental benefits) 53,170 5.61 894,331 94.39 17.53 37.98
opt (optical benefits) 93,771 9.90 853,730 90.10 10.70 21.50
par (paramedical benefits) 80,986 8.55 866,513 91.45 3.64 32.65
Note: This is based on the original data o f N=1,011,735 observations over n=353,458 households.
It is most likely that data entry mistakes are the reason for the manifestation of missing 
values in this data. For example, in the case of relatively rare medical benefits, like 
paramedical or optical benefits, when the actual benefit was zero die entry was often 
falsely left empty or filled with a dot in die spreadsheet and not filled with a numerical 
zero. When transforming these data from spreadsheets into ST AT A™, STATA™ 
automatically fills empty cells with a dot and counts all cells with a dot as missing data 
values. In summary, the missing data process appears to be due to procedural factors such 
as data error entries that create invalid codes, disclosure restrictions, failure to complete 
entries or the morbidity of a respondent This type of missing data process cannot be 
explicidy identified. It is thus not ignorable. However, die classification of the missing 
data process in regard to its degree of randomness would allow the application of 
appropriate approaches to deal with missing data.
The randomness classification of missing data processes described by Litde and 
Rubin (1987) is most widely accepted. It describes three missing data mechanisms, which 
consider die response variable and the effect of the covariate. First, there is the missing 
completely at random (MCAR) mechanism if the probability of observing the response is 
independent of observed and unobserved outcome values and the covariate. Second, there
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is the missing at random (MAR) mechanism if the probability of observing the response is 
independent of the unobserved outcome values but dependent on the observed outcome 
values and the covariate, conditioned on the value of the covariate. Third, the missing 
data mechanism is non-random or informative if the probability of observing die response 
depends on unobserved outcome values and possibly the covariate (see Davis 2002 and 
Diggle et al. 2002).185
There are different methods for the diagnosis of the randomness of die missing 
data processes. The most widely used approach assesses the randomness of. missing data 
processes through group comparisons of observations with missing versus valid data for 
each variable on the other variables. This standard approach is used here in order to 
classify the missing data process.186 For this approach each variable's observations with 
valid values in one group and observations with missing values in the other group are 
tested for significant differences on the remaining metric variables. The process starts with 
the test for group differences of the first variable on the remaining variables. Subsequendy 
the process is iterated for every variable (i.e. for each variable these groups are formed 
and then tested for significant differences on the remaining variables), until it is completed 
for all variables. The missing data process can be assumed to be MCAR if no significant 
differences between the two groups on other variables exist. For metric variables f-tests 
can be performed. For categorical variables a comparison of the proportions of each group 
is done. The results of this standard test for missing data randomness are shown in the 
tables A3-3 to A3-4 at the end of this section.
From these it could be concluded that die missing data process for this thesis' data 
is MCAR or at least MAR. Among the twenty-six variables twenty were metric and six 
categorical. Three metric variables -  dependants, income and contributions -  had no 
missing values and thus could not be tested against the other variables. Of the remaining 
17 metric and six categorical variables, the majority showed a clear random missing data 
process with mosdy insignificant differences between the groups of missing and non- 
missing values of the other variables. A noticeable pattern of predominandy significant
183 Diggle and Kenward (1994) refer to the MCAR as complete random dropouts, the MAR as random 
dropouts and the non-random mechanism as the informative dropout, but consider only the response variable.
186 A second less often used approach for assessing the randomness of missing data is through dichotomised 
variable correlation. The dichotomous variables are formed by replacing valid values with one values and 
missing values with zero values. Then the correlation between missing values of pairs of variables is 
analysed. Missing data processes are not associated, i.e. do not affect a number of variables and thus are 
MCAR if the correlation is low or moderate. This test works, however, only for metric variables. A third 
method, Little’s MCAR test is an overall test of randomness for missing data that determines whether the
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tests between the two groups only occurred for one variable -  age. However, since the 
number of cases with missing values for this variable is extremely low (on average around 
5% of all recorded values) the impact of these differences is likely to be marginal. The 
small number of cases involved makes these significant f-tests of little concern in regard to 
a non-random missing data process. The observed values of the variables can be seen as a 
true random sample of all values with no underlying process that biases the observed 
data. In summary, with 88% of all cases complete (without any missing values), and the 
majority of missing data concentrated in a very small proportion of cases, die missing data 
process is assumed to be random and is classified as MCAR or at least MAR. This 
classification of the missing data process allows the application of a range of approaches 
to deal with missing data.
Missing data mechanisms that are classified as MCAR allow the application of 
standard approaches to analysis and the use of one of the following remedies for the 
missing data. These are: (1) use of observations with complete data only, (2) deletion of 
cases and/or variables, (3) imputation, and (4) model based procedures (Hair et al 1998, 
Little and Rubin 1987).187 In the first, complete case approach, all cases with missing data 
are discarded. In the second approach certain subsets of cases or variables that have 
unusually high concentrations of missing values are deleted. Imputation means that the 
missing values are estimated based on valid values of other variables and/or cases in the 
sample.
The literature is divided on the preference of one or the other approach of dealing 
with missing data. In case of randomly missing data Hisao (1998) and Ramsay (2002) 
recommend the complete case approach in favour of any other method. Ramsay (2002) 
argues that the best option is to live with bias problems of complete data subsamples 
rather than accepting the problems that data deletion and imputation bring. The main 
argument against the complete case approach is that it is wasteful of data when the 
dropout process is unrelated to the measurement process188 and in many situations the 
sample size might be reduced to an inappropriate size. Hair et al. (1998) and Diggle et al.
actual missing data pattern is significantly different from expected randomly distributed missing data. 
Unfortunately the test is not part of the STATA™ software and could not be applied here.
187 If the missing data mechanism is MAR the non-response mechanism is ignorable and likelihood based 
inferences are still valid. In the case of the non-ignorable missing data mechanism all methods of analysis are 
biased and even though some approaches for these cases have been developed most of them are not yet 
available in standard software packages (Davis 2002).
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(2002) prefer imputation methods as the solution for data with MCAR processes. 
However, careful consideration has to be given to its potential impact on die analysis, in 
particular to the seduction of believing that the data are complete after all and to the 
danger that estimators applied for real and imputed data are substantially biased 
(Dempster and Rubin 1983).
The simplest solutions for this thesis7 missing data process, classified as MCAR or 
at least MAR, are either the complete case analysis or the deletion of cases and/or 
variables. The descriptive statistics for the missing values in the South African data, as 
discussed above, showed that the extent of missing data is small and that the sample is 
sufficiently large to allow the deletion of all cases with missing data. For the data analysis 
of this thesis the complete case analysis was chosen, i.e. all cases with missing data were 
excluded.
188 If the data was not MCAR, it would possess non-random elements that bias results and even though only 
complete observations are used, it cannot be assumed a random sample with respect to the distribution of the
measurements o f y u . The results would be not generalisable to the population.
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Table A3-3: Results fo r  missing data randomness diagnosis through group comparisons with missing versus valid data fo r  categorical variables 
Groups formed by missing/valid data
Variable
genF
Female
0
age
1 Total genF 0
tac
1 Total genF 0
den
1 Total genF 0
9P
1 Total genF 0
spe
1 Total
0 1,904 704,984 706,888 0 158 706,730 706,888 0 34,450 672,438 706,888 0 34,260 672,628 706,888 0 34,392 672,496 706,888
0.19 69.81 70 0.02 69.99 70 3.41 66.59 70 3.39 66.61 70 3.41 66.6 70
1 560 302,356 302,916 1 61 302,855 302,916 1 18,754 284,162 302,916 1 18,724 284,192 302,916 1 18,757 284,159 302,916
0.06 29.94 30 0.01 29.99 30 1.86 28.14 30 1.85 28.14 30 1.86 28.14 30
Total 2,464 1,007,340 1,009,804 Total 219 1,009,585 1,009,804 Total 53,204 956,600 1,009,804 Total 52,984 956,820 1,009,804 Total 53,149 956,655 1,009,804
0.24 99.76 100 0.02 99.98 100 5.27 94.73 100 5.25 94.75 100 5.26 94.74 100
opt par co2 prv pub
genF 0 1 Total genF 0 1 Total genF 0 1 Total genF 0 1 Total genF 0 1 Total
0 69,561 637,327 706,888 0 58,721 648,167 706,888 0 1,686 705,202 706,888 0 37,868 669,020 706,888 0 45,540 661,348 706,888
6.89 63.11 70 5.82 64.19 70 0.17 69.84 70 3.75 66.25 70 4.51 65.49 70
1 27,349 275,567 302,916 1 24,462 278,454 302,916 1 474 302,442 302,916 1 19,451 283,465 302,916 1 21,163 281,753 302,916
2.71 27.29 30 2.42 27.58 30 0.05 29.95 30 1.93 28.07 30 2.1 27.9 30
Total 96,910 912,894 1,009,804 Total 83,183 926,621 1,009,804 Total 2,160 1,007,644 1,009,804 Total 57,319 952,485 1,009,804 Total 66,703 943,101 1,009,804
9.6 90.4 100 8.24 91.76 100 0.21 99.79 100 5.68 94.32 100 6.61 93.39 100
Urban
urban 0
age
1 Total urban 0
tac
1 Total urban 0
den
1 Total urban 0
9P
1 Total urban 0
spe
1 Total
0 123 67,320 67,443 0 37 67,406 67,443 0 4,567 62,876 67,443 0 4,559 62,884 67,443 0 4,566 62,877 67,443
0.01 6.67 6.68 0 6.68 6.68 0.45 6.23 6.68 0.45 6.23 6.68 0.45 6.23 6.68
1 2,341 940,020 942,361 1 182 942,179 942,361 1 48,637 893,724 942,361 1 48,425 893,936 942,361 1 48,583 893,778 942,361
0.23 93.09 93.32 0.02 93.3 93.32 4.82 88.5 93.32 4.8 88.53 93.32 4.81 88.51 93.32
Total 2,464 1,007,340 1,009,804 Total 219 1,009,585 1,009,804 Total 53,204 956,600 1,009,804 Total 52,984 956,820 1,009,804 Total 53,149 956,655 1,009,804
0.24 99.76 100 0.02 99.98 100 5.27 94.73 100 5.25 94.75 100 5.26 94.74 100
opt par co2 prv pub
urban 0 1 Total urban 0 1 Total urban 0 1 Total urban 0 1 Total urban 0 1 Total
0 6,552 60,891 67,443 0 5,902 61,541 67,443 0 91 67,352 67,443 0 4.749 62,694 67,443 0 5,176 62,267 67,443
0.65 6.03 6.68 0.58 6.09 6.68 0.01 6.67 6.68 0.47 6.21 6.68 0.51 6.17 6.68
1 90,358 852,003 942,361 1 77,281 865,080 942,361 1 2,069 940,292 942,361 1 52,570 889,791 942,361 1 61,527 880,834 942,361
8.95 84.37 93.32 7.65 85.67 93.32 0.2 93.12 93.32 5.21 88.12 93.32 6.09 87.23 93.32
Total 96,910 912,894 1,009,804 Total 83,183 926,621 1,009,804 Total 2,160 1,007,644 1,009,804 Total 57,319 952,485 1,009,804 Total 66,703 943,101 1,009,804
9.6 90.4 100 8.24 91.76 100 0.21 99.79 100 5.68 94.32 100 6.61 93.39 100
Cont.
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Cont
Aslan
ra 0
age
1 Total ra 0
tac
1 Total ra 0
den
1 Total ra 0
9P
1 Total ra 0
sp e
1 Total
0 2,416 919,019 921,435 0 185 921,250 921,435 0 51,035 870,400 921,435 0 50,826 870,609 921,435 0 50,982 870,453 921,435
0.24 91.01 91.25 0.02 91.23 91.25 5.05 86.19 91.25 5.03 86.22 91.25 5.05 86.2 91.25
1 48 88,321 88,369 1 34 88,335 88,369 1 2,169 86,200 88,369 1 2,158 86,211 88,369 1 2,167 86,202 88,369
0 8.75 8.75 0 8.75 8.75 0.21 8.54 8.75 0.21 8.54 8.75 0.21 8.54 8.75
Total 2,464 1,007,340 1,009,804 Total 219 1,009,585 1,009,804 Total 53,204 956,600 1,009,804 Total 52,984 956,820 1,009,804 Total 53,149 956,655 1,009,804
0.24 99.76 100 0.02 99.98 100 5.27 94.73 100 5.25 94.75 100 5.26 94.74 100
opt par co2 prv pub
ra 0 1 Total ra 0 1 Total ra 0 1 Total ra 0 1 Total ra 0 1 Total
0 90,425 831,010 921,435 0 78,116 843,319 921,435 0 1,992 919,443 921,435 0 54,824 866,611 921,435 0 63,364 858,071 921,435
8.95 82.29 91.25 7.74 83.51 91.25 0.2 91.05 91.25 5.43 85.82 91.25 6.27 84.97 91.25
1 6,485 81,884 88,369 1 5,067 83,302 88,369 1 168 88,201 88,369 1 2,495 85,874 88,369 1 3,339 85,030 88,369
0.64 8.11 8.75 0.5 8.25 8.75 0.02 8.73 8.75 0.25 8.5 8.75 0.33 8.42 8.75
Total 96,910 912,894 1,009,804 Total 83,183 926,621 1,009,804 Total 2,160 1,007,644 1,009,804 Total 57,319 952,485 1,009,804 Total 66,703 943,101 1,009,804
9.6 90.4 100 8.24 91.76 100 0.21 99.79 100 5.68 94.32 100 6.61 93.39 100
Black
rb 0
age
1 Total rb 0
tac
1 Total rb 0
den
1 Total rb 0
m gp
1 Total rb 0
spe
1 Total
0 1,947 728,683 730,630 0 191 730,439 730,630 0 35,123 695,507 730,630 0 34,925 695,705 730,630 0 35,076 695,554 730,630
0.19 72.16 72.35 0.02 72.33 72.35 3.48 68.88 72.35 3.46 68.9 72.35 3.47 68.88 72.35
1 517 278,657 279,174 1 28 279,146 279,174 1 18,081 261,093 279,174 1 18,059 261,115 279,174 1 18,073 261,101 279,174
0.05 27.6 27.65 0 27.64 27.65 1.79 25.86 27.65 1.79 25.86 27.65 1.79 25.86 27.65
Total 2,464 1,007,340 1,009,804 Total 219 1,009,585 1,009,804 Total 53,204 956,600 1,009,804 Total 52,984 956,820 1,009,804 Total 53,149 956,655 1,009,804
0.24 99.76 100 0.02 99.98 100 5.27 94.73 100 5.25 94.75 100 5.26 94.74 100
opt par co2 prv pub
rb 0 1 Total rb 0 1 Total rb 0 1 Total rb 0 1 Total rb 0 1 Total
0 73,785 656,845 730,630 0 61,717 668,913 730,630 0 1,552 729,078 730,630 0 38,807 691,823 730,630 0 47,201 683,429 730,630
7.31 65.05 72.35 6.11 66.24 72.35 0.15 72.2 72.35 3.84 68.51 72.35 4.67 67.68 72.35
1 23,125 256,049 279,174 1 21,466 257,708 279,174 1 608 278,566 279,174 1 18,512 260,662 279,174 1 19,502 259,672 279,174
2.29 25.36 27.65 2.13 25.52 27.65 0.06 27.59 27.65 1.83 25.81 27.65 1.93 25.72 27.65
Total 96,910 912,894 1,009,804 Total 83,183 926,621 1,009,804 Total 2,160 1,007,644 1,009,804 Total 57,319 952,485 1,009,804 Total 66,703 943,101 1,009,804
9.6 90.4 100 8.24 91.76 100 0.21 99.79 100 5.68 94.32 100 6.61 93.39 100
Cont.
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Cont. Coloure d
rc 0
age
1 Total rc 0
tac
1 Total rc 0
den
1 Total rc 0
mgp
1 Total rc 0
sp e
1 Total
0 1.752 677,852 679,604 0 144 679,460 679,604 0 39,521 640,083 679,604 0 39,340 640,264 679,604 0 39,409 640,195 679,604
0.17 67.13 67.3 0.01 67.29 67.3 3.91 63.39 67.3 3.9 63.4 67.3 3.9 63.4 67.3
1 712 329,488 330,200 1 75 330,125 330,200 1 13,683 316,517 330,200 1 13,644 316,556 330,200 1 13,740 316,460 330,200
0.07 32.63 32.7 0.01 32.69 32.7 1.36 31.34 32.7 1.35 31.35 32.7 1.36 31.34 32.7
Total 2,464 1.007.340 1,009,804 Total 219 1,009,585 1,009,804 Total 53,204 956,600 1,009,804 Total 52,984 956,820 1,009,804 Total 53,149 956,655 1,009,804
0.24 99.76 100 0.02 99.98 100 5.27 94.73 100 5.25 94.75 100 5.26 94.74 100
opt par co2 prv pub
rc 0 1 Total rc 0 1 Total rc 0 1 Total rc 0 1 Total rc 0 1 Total
0 69,607 609,997 679,604 0 60,245 619,359 679,604 0 1,684 677,920 679,604 0 42,584 637,020 679,604 0 48,983 630,621 679,604
6.89 60.41 67.3 5.97 61.33 67.3 0.17 67.13 67.3 4.22 63.08 67.3 4.85 62.45 67.3
1 27,303 302,897 330,200 1 22,938 307,262 330,200 1 476 329,724 330,200 1 14,735 315,465 330,200 1 17,720 312,480 330,200
2.7 30 32.7 2.27 30.43 32.7 0.05 32.65 32.7 1.46 31.24 32.7 1.75 30.94 32.7
Total 96,910 912,894 1,009,804 Total 83,183 926,621 1,009,804 Total 2,160 1,007,644 1,009,804 Total 57,319 952,485 1,009,804 Total 66,703 943,101 1,009,804
9.6 90.4 100 8.24 91.76 100 0.21 99.79 100 5.68 94.32 100 6.61 93.39 100
White
rw 0
age
1 Total rw 0
tac
1 Total rw 0
den
1 Total rw 0
9P
1 Total rw 0
spe
1 Total
0 1,277 696,466 697,743 0 137 697,606 697,743 0 33,933 663,810 697,743 0 33,861 663,882 697,743 0 33,980 663,763 697,743
0.13 68.97 69.1 0.01 69.08 69.1 3.36 65.74 69.1 3.35 65.74 69.1 3.37 65.73 69.1
1 1,187 310,874 312,061 1 82 311,979 312,061 1 19,271 292,790 312,061 1 19,123 292,938 312,061 1 19,169 292,892 312,061
0.12 30.79 30.9 0.01 30.9 30.9 1.91 28.99 30.9 1.89 29.01 30.9 1.9 29 30.9
Total 2,464 1,007,340 1,009,804 Total 219 1,009,585 1,009,804 Total 53,204 956,600 1,009,804 Total 52,984 956,820 1,009,804 Total 53,149 956,655 1,009,804
0.24 99.76 100 0.02 99.98 100 5.27 94.73 100 5.25 94.75 100 5.26 94.74 100
opt par co2 prv pub
rw 0 1 Total rw 0 1 Total rw 0 1 Total rw 0 1 Total rw 0 1 Total
0 56,913 640,830 697,743 0 49,471 648,272 697,743 0 1,252 696,491 697,743 0 35,742 662,001 697,743 0 40,561 657,182 697,743
5.64 63.46 69.1 4.9 64.2 69.1 0.12 68.97 69.1 3.54 65.56 69.1 4.02 65.08 69.1
1 39,997 272,064 312,061 1 33,712 278,349 312,061 1 908 311,153 312,061 1 21,577 290,484 312,061 1 26,142 285,919 312,061
3.96 26.94 30.9 3.34 27.56 30.9 0.09 30.81 30.9 2.14 28.77 30.9 2.59 28.31 30.9
Total 96,910 912,894 1,009,804 Total 83,183 926,621 1,009,804 Total 2,160 1,007,644 1,009,804 Total 57,319 952,485 1,009,804 Total 66,703 943,101 1.009,804
9.6 90.4 100 8.24 91.76 100 0.21 99.79 100 5.68 94.32 100 6.61 93.39 100
Note: Each cell contains the table fo r  the categorical variable o f  each page: (1) female gender, (2) urban residency, (3) Asian, (4) Black, (5) Coloured or (6) White race and 
the comparison o f  its realisation frequency within the group o f  missing and valid values o f  the other variables. The first row fo r  each variable realisation in the cells contains 
the number o f  observations o f  the row variable fo r  the column variable groups o f  missing and valid data. The rows below display the proportion. The interpretation o f  the 
bottom left cell is the following: the proportion o f  missing values fo r  the variable co-payment2 among Whites is 0.09% in comparison to the proportion among Non-Whites 
0.12%. This result leads to the conclusion that there is no significant difference between these proportions. Moreover, the very few  cases o f  missing values fo r  co-payment2 o f  
908 among Whites and 1,252 among Non- Whites make it extremely unlikely that their ignorable difference has any impact in form  o f  a non-random missing data process.
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Table A3-4: T-test results fo r  missing data randomness diagnosis through group comparisons with missing versus valid data fo r  metric variables 
Groups formed by missing/valid data
Variables age den 9P opt par prv pub sp e tac co2
age Sig-level 0.000 0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
nrandom Missing \ 53,107 52,887 96,698 83,006 57,216 66,570 53,051 218 2,159
Present \ 954,233 954,453 910,642 924,334 950,124 940,770 954,289 1,007,122 1,005,181
m missing \ 37.52 37.49 40.58 39.95 38.06 38.93 37.50 46.97 45.18
m present \ 41.73 41.73 41.61 41.65 41.71 41.69 41.73 41.51 41.50
den Sig-level 0.094 0.676 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.879 0.698 0.701
random missing 2,367 \ 9 43,722 29,996 4,135 13,518 148 177 2,159
present 954,233 \ 956,591 912,878 926,604 952,465 943,082 956,452 956,423 954,441
m missing 18.87 \ 22.89 32.50 34.10 38.16 36.35 17.07 16.44 17.87
m present 17.55 \ 17.56 16.84 17.02 17.47 17.29 17.56 17.56 17.55
gp Sig-level 0.641 0.000 \ 0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.075 0.183
r/nrandom missing 2,367 229 \ 43,935 30,209 4,345 13,729 175 177 2,160
present 954,453 956,591 \ 912,885 926,611 952,475 943,091 956,645 956,643 954,660
m missing 23.73 41.43 \ 32.65 33.33 35.46 34.28 26.42 20.61 22.90
m present 23.52 23.52 \ 23.08 23.20 23.47 23.37 23.52 23.52 23.52
opt Sig-level 0.010 0.416 0.347 0.464 0.877 0.646 0.470 0.218 0.000
random missing 2,252 16 9 \ 34 132 64 129 156 1,884
present 910,642 912,878 912,885 \ 912,860 912,762 912,830 912,765 912,738 911,010
m missing 11.84 15.06 17.45 \ 7.96 10.96 9.43 12.05 8.54 7.92
m present 10.67 10.67 10.67 \ 10.67 10.67 10.67 10.67 10.67 10.68
par Sig-level 0.000 0.644 0.721 0.000 0.114 0.509 0 883 0.770
random missing 2,287 17 10 13,761 \ 147 64 134 163 1,945
present 924,334 926,604 926,611 912,860 \ 926,474 926,557 926,487 926,458 924,676
m missing 8.20 0.03 0.00 17.48 \ 8.19 1.03 4.23 4.58 9.46
m present 3.80 3.81 3.81 3.60 \ 3.81 3.81 3.81 3.81 3.80
prv Sig-level 0.002 0.795 0.052 0.000 0 000 \ 0.000 0.537 0.219 0.000
r/nrandom missing 2,361 20 10 39,723 26,011 \ 9,544 144 112 2,127
present 950,124 952,465 952,475 912,762 926,474 \ 942,941 952,341 952,373 950,358
m missing 79.74 38.42 263.91 302.63 291.86 \ 249.40 75.10 19.00 168.83
m present 57.81 57.86 57.86 47.21 51.29 \ 55.93 57.86 57.87 57.62
Cont.
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Cont.
pub Sig-level 0.028 0.906 0 881 0.000 0.000 0.926 ■ 0.722 0.473 0.000
random missing 2,331 19 10 30,271 16,544 160 \ 141 167 2,060
present 940,770 943,082 943,091 912,830 926,557 942,941 \ 942,960 942,934 941,041
m missing 4.79 3.84 0.00 8.85 10.32 2.07 \ 3.99 5.31 8.79
m present 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.23 2.30 2.44 \ 2.44 2.44 2.43
spe Sig-level 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.000
r/nrandom missing 2366 203 10 43890 30168 4314 13695 \ 135 2156
present 954289 956452 956645 912765 926487 952341 942960 \ 956520 954499
m missing 56.27 317.19 161.68 169.13 175.98 225.17 199.18 \ 63.61 122.43
m present 43.79 43.76 43.82 37.79 39.52 43.00 41.56 \ 43.82 43.64
tac Sig-level 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
r/nrandom missing 2,463 53,162 52,942 96,847 83,127 57,212 66,651 53,065 \ 2,093
present 1,007,122 956,423 956,643 912,738 926,458 952,373 942,934 956,520 \ 1,007,492
m missing 327.65 10.02 0.33 398.21 332.12 92.12 213.68 2.06 \ 480.42
m present 252.12 265.78 266.25 236.83 245.15 261.93 255.04 266.19 \ 251.83
co2 Sig-level 0.252 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.739
r/nrandom missing 2,463 53,203 52,984 96,634 82,968 57,286 66,603 53,145 152 \
present 1,005,181 954,441 954,660 911,010 924,676 950,358 941,041 954,499 1,007,492 \
m missing 30.58 1.18 0.02 42.89 36.84 10.49 24.28 0.30 22.69 \
m present 26.94 28.38 28.44 25.25 26.06 27.94 27.13 28.43 26.95 \
Note: Each cell contains five values. The first is the significance fo r  the t-test fo r  comparing the row variable mean fo r  the column variable groups o f  missing data versus 
valid data. The second and third cells contain the number o f  observations o f  the row variable fo r  the column variable groups o f  missing and valid data. The last two cells 
display the mean o f  the row variable fo r  the column variable groups o f  missing and valid data. The interpretation o f  the bottom left cell is the following: the t-test comparing 
the mean fo r  the row variable co-payment2 between the groups o f  missing and valid data o f  the column variable age has a significance level o f  0.252. This result leads to 
intermediary conclusion that there is no significant difference between the mean o f  co-payment2 fo r  the group o f  missing and valid values in age. Moreover, the sample sizes 
o f  the co-payment2 variable fo r  the groups o f  missing values and valid values in age are 2,463 and 1,005,181, respectively. The extremely small sample size fo r  the missing 
values (0.24% o f  all recorded values) indicates that the impact o f  any differences would be marginal and would give no reason fo r  concern, even i f  the t-test would have been 
significant. The mean o f  co-payment2 fo r  the group o f  missing values in age is 30.6 Rand per person per month, fo r  the group o f  valid values 26,9.
276
Birgit Hansl Appendix 4
Appendix 4
Medical schem es and their plan options
Table A4-1: Medical schemes by number of observations in ascending order, 1995-1998
Rank Total frequency 
over the four-year 
observation period
f(N)
Average frequency 
over the four-year 
observation period
f(N/4)
Percent Cum. (%)
29 2,427 607 0.24 0.24
28 2,987 747 0.30 0.54
27 3,153 788 0.31 0.85
26 6,831 1,708 0.68 1.52
25 6,876 1,719 0.68 2.20
24 7,650 1,913 0.76 2.96
23 7.709 1,927 0.76 3.72
22 7,809 1,952 0.77 4.49
21 8,147 2,037 0.81 5.30
20 9,210 2,303 0.91 6.21
19 9,497 2,374 0.94 7.15
18 10,223 2,556 0.94 8.08
17 11,150 2,788 0.94 9.02
16 11,154 2,789 1.10 10.13
15 12,035 3,009 1.19 11.32
14 13,613 3,403 1.35 12.66
13 15,112 3,778 1.49 14.15
12 18,202 4,551 1.80 15.95
11 18,614 4.654 1.84 17.79
10 21,333 5,333 2.11 19.90
9 21,539 5,385 2.13 22.03
8 35,660 8,915 3.52 25.56
7 38,463 9,616 3.80 29.36
6 42.043 10,511 4.16 33.51
5 61,805 15,451 6.11 39.62
4 68,155 17,039 6.74 46.36
3 80,582 20,146 7.96 54.32
2 180,982 45,246 17.89 72.21
1 278,774 69,694 27.55 100
Total 1,011,735 252,934 100
Note: Closed schemes are marked black, open schemes red. The numbers are based on the original data over 
N=l, 011,735 observations and n=353,458 households. For reasons o f  confidentiality the names o f  the 
schemes are not given here. However, upon request they are available from  the author.
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Table A4-2: Medical schemes and their plan options by frequency in ascending order, 1995-1998
Rank
of schem e
Number of 
plans
Average frequency 
f(N/1995-1998)
Percent Cum.
29 1 607 0.24 0.24
28 2 747 0.30 0.54
27 3 788 0.31 0.85
26 4 1,708 0.68 1.52
25 5 1,719 0.68 2.20
24 6 1,913 0.76 2.96
23 7 1,927 0.76 3.72
22 8 1,952 0.77 4.49
21 9 2,037 0.81 5.30
20 10 2,303 0.91 6.21
19 11 2,374 0.94 7.15
18 12 2,556 1.01 8.16
17 13 2,788 1.10 9.26
16 2,789 1.10 10.36
14 1.418 0.56 9.82
15 632 0.25 10.07
16 739 0.29 10.36
15 3,009 1.19 11.55
17 2,749 1.09 11.45
18 260 0.10 11.55
14 19 3,403 1.35 12.90
13 20 3,778 1.49 14.39
12 4,551 1.80 16.19
21 1,097 0.43 14.82
22 3,453 1.37 16.19
11 23 4,654 1.84 18.03
10 24 5,333 2.11 20.14
9 25 5,385 2.13 22.27
8 8,915 3.52 25.79
26 4.412 1.74 24.01
27 1,630 0.64 24.65
28 1,300 0.51 25.17
29 1,574 0.62 25.79
7 9,616 3.80 29.59
30 351 0.14 25.93
31 1,564 0.62 26.55
32 2,244 0.89 27.43
33 5,457 2.16 29.59
6 10,511 4.16 33.75
34 6,416 2.54 32.13
35 4,095 1.62 33.75
5 15,451 6.11 39.86
36 14,603 5.77 39.52
37 849 0.34 39.86
4 38 17,039 6.74 46.59
3 20,146 7.96 54.56
39 5,408 2.14 48.73
40 3,612 1.43 50.16
41 11,126 4.40 54.56
2 45,246 17.89 72.45
42 4,912 1.94 56.50
43 34,169 13.51 70.01
44 1,067 0.42 70.43
45 2,682 1.06 71.49
46 1,324 0.52 72.01
47 1,091 0.43 72.45
1 69,694 27.55 100
48 68,709 27.16 99.61
49 985 0.39 100
29 Total: 49 252,934 100
Note: Closed schemes are marked black, open schemes red. The numbers are based on the original data over 
N= 1,01 i, 735 observations and n=353,458 households over four years o f observation. The scheme and plan option names 
are here not disclosed for reasons o f confidentiality. However, upon request they are available from the author. The table 
can be read like the following: The largest scheme with rank one was an open scheme and accounted on average for 
69,694 (or 28%) o f all observations per year. This scheme had two plan options (48 and 49), one with an annual average 
o f 68,709 (or 27%) o f all observations and one with on average 985 (or 0.4%) o f all observations.
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Appendix 5 
Plan classification
Table A 5-1: Mean intervals for ofplan classification and sensitivity analysis
Variable Mean Classification 
mean Interval
Sensitivity 
analysis 10% 
Increased mean 
Interval
Mean class, 
changes 
with 10% 
Increase
Sensitivity 
analysis 10% 
decreased 
mean Interval
Mean class, 
changes 
with 10% 
decrease
Soclo-demographic
age 42 38<42<46 37.6<42<46.4 1 38.4<42<45.6 3
Claims, contribution 
and benefits In Rand
contributions 242 142<242<342 132<242<352 3 152<242<332 3
co-pa yment2 23 13<23<33 12<23<34 0 14<23<32 1
claims 229 149<229<309 141<229<317 2 157<229<301 4
B a s ic  b e n e fits  
GP 23 18<23<28 17.5<23<28.5 4 18.5<23<27.5 1
Public hospital 2.0 0.5<2.0<2.5 0.35<2.0<2.65 2 0.65<2.0<2.35 7
N eg o tia b le  b e n e f its  
Specialist 36 21<36<51 19.5<36<52.5 0 22.5<36<49.S 3
Private hospital 43 23<43<63 21<43<65 1 25<43<61 2
D iscre tionary  b e n e fits  
Dental 17 12<17<22 11.5<17<22.5 0 12.5<17<21.5 1
Optical 11 7<11<15 6.6<11<15.4 0 7.4<11<14.6 5
Paramedical 3.3 1.3<3.3<5.3 1.1<3.3<5.5 1 1.5<3.3<5.1 2
Note: These are the means over all N=833,755 observations and n=325,957 households.
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Table A5-2: Data plan classification into low- and high-risk plans, 1995-98
co2 pubtco tac _2£laae prv J»L
251 4 31.5 31 341.6 237.3 17.7 19.6 10.1 3.744 74l367.( 504 . 116. 18 6
256. 245.2 33.4 50.4 15.4 a.OviUr
652 388.2 60944.1 443.9
53.4 297 3 72.I 305.
77.72553 403 17.8 19.944
0.8357 114.9 34.4 136 179 14 I 15.7 86
234.3 233.4 27.1 40.1 31 2 17.3 8 647.4 19 5 2.3
107 3 183 13.5 14842.9 135.4 57 0 9 I' .-.
233.9 1 *-i 261.1 27.9 16.745.9 59  4 3.4
~U2 31.2 198 23.1 109 6 5 0 843.9 181.4 171.1 low2Q8I 2856 30242.1 o 16.6
309.5 285 5428 3 8
266127. 144.7 14- 19.7 10.9 8.6 0.7 low
16.241.1 347.5 41.5] 306.2 57 9
46.1 293 6 270.5 52. 82
37.5 269 0.6319.3
41.8 289 281 14.6 0.8 49 68 2 0 3
215 29639.6 235. 39 6 8.6 2.2
456 3442.
9 6 122 031Q2| 103. 18.9 8 8 ■ .-
134 1 16.3 13.7 24.9 7928| 28 2] low2iTel 221 2 22.3 506 12 7 2.7283 9
393394 302.9 209 | 2529 18.7 486
48 lf 327.1 17.3 50 8 m . 19.651.3 322.9 84 11.1
4.847.2 293.3 457] 3066 15.4 49 10.4 average
2501 16.3 0.5 41.238 3 206.5 4041 45.41 17.1 13.1 average
283 5 300 5 196 65.1 8.641.5 39.6 47.1 4.1
180.1 29.6 3 5 21.9 323 13.1 8.4146.9 r4~s|
13.8 36.8 39 248 1 216.1 527] 2506 18.6 10.6 5.2
39 4 286 8 17~3| 227.5 0.5 386 207 11.9
269 50 6 1 14.4 46.1 10.9549 17.1 6 9
37.4 yrr la s] 306.9 21.5 0.6 55 7 54.8 29.4 average
44.3 331 51.7 3157 16.5 0.9 61.5 22 3 9.6494
331.3 324 3 18.1 45.6 64.8 193 12.1 7.4
36.8 245 3331 207.7 21.8 33.5 40.3 195 9.7
356.5 66.6 63.6414.
241 166] 220 24.5 388 20.9 10.9
20.8 114.2 204 1.8 7811.9 4.4 0.5
20338.4 147.1 TTe] 1339 15.9 288 5.8 0.9 low
5 6 3439 271.7 56.3 284.4 0 9 40l 18.3 47
468 413.8 355 | 28  9 15.6
204.7 194.7 20.2 338 7.3 3.3 average
25.3 0.945.6 336.: 322. 66.7 13.7 6.3
19.3 32.836.9 201 .; 186] 188.5 2-b 40.341.7 14l6| 260.8 21 2 105
45 f. 304.2 35 5 296.3 18.2 48.4 62.1 226 16.8
286 1.3 low107] 176.4 14.1 10.2
25 6 10.240.6 216.7 1373] 1995 11.1
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Table A S S :  Classification results: low-risk plans and high-risk plans, 1995-98
High risk plans
data 95-98 co2too tac pub dentage 9P opt risk typeprv par
78.4 74 2 116. 186
-50 j 2 high13.6 51 1
42.1 25 8 151 0.5 163
41 .£ 41.£ 306 2 16.2 52.1 4 3 H |
19320.3 74 4
322.£ 1 7 3 5 0 .£
3241 18 1 1 9 2 12.1
5 5rig645. 31.3 14 1
-40 28f22.1
5 3 high45.1 25 3 0.6 52 1 ’ 3 7
Total: 10
Low risk plans
data 95-98 age too co2 tac OP pub spec prv dent opt par 1 risk type 1
43 35.7 114.9 34.4 13C 17.9 0.8 14.8 16.7 86 3 0.3
41 42 0 135.4 18 107.3 18.3 5.7 13.fi 14.8 8 “ 1 o.ol
39 43.9 181 4 14.2 171.1 31.2 1.£ 198 23.1 10.0 65 0.8
36 39.7 127.8 12 144.7 26.6 1 14.4 19.7 10.0 86 n
31 39.6 235.5 36.6 215.11 17.4 0.7 296 39.6 14.4 8.6 2.2!
29 37.5 79.2 16.2 103.1 18.9 1.2 9.8 12.2 8.8 4.1 6.3
28 41.1 96.4 28.2 134 1 16.3 T1 13.7 24.9 7.0 —  r i r i
11 37 104.9 20.8 1145 20 4 1.1 i t 11.0 7.8 4.4 0 5
10 38.4 147 1 11.1 133.9 15.0 1.1 20.3 26 8 8 5.8 0.9
Total 10
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Table A5-4: Data plan classification into low- and high-risk plans with 10% increased mean interval, 1995-98
data 95-98 age tco co2 tac 9P pub spec prv dent opt par risk type
49 41.6 237.3 44.8 251.4 17.7 5 31.5 31.3 19.6 10.6 3.7 average
68 367.6 78.4 504.3 19 3.5 742 116.1 18.6 9.5 34
47 39 256.3 41.9 2452 17.7 1.9 334 504 15.4 13.1 2.4 average
44 1 443 9 852 3882 13.9 0.3 60.9 51.1 27.1 11.1 9.2
53.4 297 3 72.8 305.4 5.3 0.3 49 91.1 22.8 5.4 3.3 average
44 42 2553 45.3 296 17.8 0.3 49.9 777 19.9 8.3 4.7 average
43 35 7 114 9 34.4 136 17.9 0.8 14.8 15.7 8.6 3 0.3 low
47.4 234.3 19.5 233.4 27 1 2.1 40.1 31.2 17.3 8.6 2.3 average
42.9 135.4 18 107.3 18.3 5.7 135 148 5 4 0.9 low
40 45.9 2339 15.6 261.9 27.9 1.4 412 594 16.7 11 3.4 average
39 43.9 181.4 14.2 171.1 31.2 1.6 198 23.1 10.9 6.5 0.8 low
38 42.1 376 25.8 285 6 15.1 0.5 55 44.1 30 2 16.6 6.4 high
428 309.5 60 285.5 14.3 0.7 44.2 56.1 20 7.1 3.8 average
36 39.7 127.8 12 144.7 266 1 14.4 19.7 10.9 86 0 7 low
41.9 347.5 41.5 306.2 16.2 0.6 57.9 52.1 32.9 13 4.3
46.1 2936 42.5 270.5 17.3 0.8 39.3 52.8 17.2 8.2 4.9 averaqe
37.5 319.3 37.1 269 1 18.4 0.6 67 5 59 18.1 7.3 3 average
31 396 235.5 36.9 215.7 17.4 0.7
49.5
296 39.6 14.4
5.3
8.6
1.5
2.2
average
low
30 59 442.3 43.3 456.3 20.3 1.7 76.6 74.4 293 21.3 9.8
29 37.5 79.2 16.2 103.1 18.9 1.2 9.6 12.2 88 4.1 0.3 low
28 41.1 964 28.2 134.1 16.3 1.7 13.7 249 7.9 7.1 1.1 low
26
34.9 283.9 21.8 221.2 22.3 0.4 30 50.6 18 12.7 2.7 average
51.3 322 9 48.5 327.1 17.3 6 50.8 70.1 19.6 8.4 11.1
average
24 47.2 293.3 45.7 306.6 15.4 0.9 49 71 17 10.4 4.8 average
23 383 206.5 40 4 250.1 16.3 0.5 41.2 45.4 17.1 13.1 3.9 average
22 41.5 2835 396 300.5 19.6 2 47.1 65.1 19 8.6 4.1 average
21 39.1 1469 14.5 180.1 29.6 3.3 21.9 32.3 13.1 8.4 2 average
20 48.1 216 1 52.7 250.6 13.8 2.0 368 39.2 186 10.6 5.2 average
19 394 286 8 17.3 227.5 23 0.5 35 386 20.7 11.9 3.2 average
18 47.2 269 50.6 286.3 14.4 1.4 46.1 549 17.9 10.9 6.9 average
17 37.4 3506 28.5 306.9 21.5 0.6 55.7 54.8 29.4 24 5.9 average
443 331 9 51.7 315.7 16.5 0.9 494 61.5 223 9.6 8.7 average
15 47.8 331.3 693 324.3 18.1 1.6 45.6 64.8 19.2 12.1 7.4
36 8 245 232 207.7 21.8 1.3 33.6 40.3 19.5 9.7 2.2 average
44.9 414.8 45.1 356.5 20 0.5 65.6 636 31.3 14.1 5.5
12 40 241.7 16.6 220.1 245 1.4 30.9 38.8 20.9 10.9 3 average
37 1049 20.8 114.2 20.4 1.8 9.1 119 7.8 4.4 0.5 low
10 38.4 147.1 11.8 1339 15.9 1.1 20.3 288 6 5.8 0.9 low
9 439 271 7 563 2844 15 09 40 563 18 3 12.6 4.7 average
46.8 413.8 255 360.6 229 1 59.6 648 289 156 10
40.9 204 7 21 194.7 20.2 1 1 338 40 14 7.3 3.3 average
45.6 336.3 31.4 322.7 25 3 0.9 52.1 66.7 13.7 5.3
36.9 201.7 18.8 188 5 19.3 1.3 32.8 37.4 184 7.2 2.1 average
41.7 261.5 146 2608 29.8 1.5 44 9 40.3 21.2 105 3.6 average
3 456 304 2 355 296.3 18.2 1.2 484 62.9 226 168 5.7 average
40.6 194.1 10.7 176.4 27 1.4 20.2 28.6 14.1 10.2 1.3 low
40.6 216.7 13.3 1995 25.6 3.8 328 37 11.6 10.2 2 average
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Table A5-5: Classification results with 10% increased mean interval: low-risk plans and high-risk plans, 1995-98
High risk plans
co2tco tac pubage dentgp opt risk type•pec prv par
“116^1 34 itgh504 3 74.2 9 5
13 944 1 609 51.1
42 1 285 f 15 1 0.6
4r3' ■ 306.2 16241 £ 0 6 521
442 3 203 17 21.3
322 9 173 N’ a U .  f • 1 1|high
331 347 6 18.1 12 1
31.30.£ 63.6 14.1
4138 25 S 22 9 648
45( 31 4336 3 0 .£ 66 7 23.1 13.7
Total: 10
Low risk plans
data 95-08 age tco Co2 tac gp pub •pec prv dent opt par I risk type I
43 35.7 114.9 344 136 i7.g 0.8 148 15.7 8.6 0.3
41 429 1354 ^ 1 8 107.3 18.3 5 7 13.5 14.8 c 09
39 43.9 181 4 14.2 171.1 31.2 1.8 19 8 23.1 10.9 o.el
36 397 127.8 11 144.7 266 1 14.4 19.7 10.8 0.7]
31 39.6 2365 215.7 17.4 Q.i 29.8 39.6 14.4 2.2
29 37.; 79.2 16.2 103.1 18.9 1.2 '>■ a - -  ■ 12-? 8.8 0.3
28 41.1 964 28 2 134.1 16.3 1.7 13.7 249 7.9 1.1
37 104.9 20.8 114.: 20.4 1.8 9.1 11.9 7.8 o.ej
10 384 147.1 11 8 133.9 15.9 1.1 20.3 28.8 8 09
Total 10
Note: Among the high-risk plans for three plans three mean classifications changed: for plan 38 public hospital benefits rose to average, for plan 13 private hospital benefits fell to average, and 
for plan 6 paramedical services fell to average. None o f these mean classifications changed their overall plan classification as high-risk plans. Among the low-risk plans for three plans three 
mean classifications changed: for plan 43 gp benefits rose to average, for plan 41 contribution rose to average, and for plan 36 claims rose to average. Again, none o f these mean 
classifications changed their overall plan classification as low-risk plans.
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Table AS-6: Data plan classification into low- and high-risk plans with 10% decreased mean interval, 1995-98
data 95-88 age tco co2 tac gp pub spec prv dent opt par risk type
46 41.6 237.3 448 251.4 17.7 5 31.5 31.3 19.6 10.6 3.7 average
68 367 6 78.4 504.3 19 3.5 742 116.1 18 6 9.5 34
47 39 256 3 41.9 245.2 17.7 1.9 33.4 50.4 15.4 13.1 2.4 average
44.1 443.9 85.2 388 2 13.9 0.3 60.9 51.1 27.1 11.1
~ " ~ r
9.2
44 42 255.3 45.3 296
5.3
17.8 0.3 49.9 77.7 19.9 8.3 4.7 average
43 35.7 114.9 34.4 136 17.9 0.8 i7 5 15.7 86 3 0.3 low
47.4 234.3 19.5 233.4 27.1 2.1 40.1 31.2 17.3 8.6 2.3 average
41 42.6 135.4 18 107.3 18.3 5.7 135 14.8 5 4 0.9 low
40 45.9 233.9 15.6 261.9 27.9 1.4 41.2 59.4 16.7 11 3.4 average
36 43.9 181 4 14.2 171.1 31.2 1.6 198 23.1 10.9 6.5 08 low
38 42.1 376 258 285.6 15.1 0.5 55 44.1 30.2 16.6 6.4 high
428 309 5 60 285.6 14.3 0.7 442 56.1 20 7.1 3.8 average
36 39.7 127.8 12 1447 266 1 14.4 19.7 10.9 8.6 0.7 low
41.9 347.5 41 5 306.2 16.2 0.6 579 52.1 329 13 4.3
46 1 293 6 425 270.5 17.3 0.6 393 528 17.2 8.2 4.9 average
37.5 319.3 37.1 269 1 18.4 0.6 57 5 59 18.1 7.3 3 average
41.8 289 4 58.6 2812 14.6 0.8 49.5 684 20.3 5.3 1.5 average
31 38.6 235.5 36.9 215.7 17.4 0.7 29 6 39.6 14.4 8.6 2.2 low
30 59 442.3 43.3 456.3 20.3 1.7 76.6 74.4 29.3 21.3 9.8
26 37.5 79.2 16.2 103.1 18.9 1.2 9.6 12.2 88 4.1 0.3 low
28 41.1 96.4 28.2 134.1 16.3 1.7 13.7 249 7.9 7.1 1.1 low
34.6 283 9 21.8 221.2 22.3 0.4 36 50.6 18 12.7 2.7 average
26 39 4 302.9 25.8 2529 18.7 1.3 393 48.6 24 128 4.6 average
51.3 322.9 485 327.1 17.3 6 50.8 70.1 19.6 8.4 11.1
24 47 2 293.3 45.7 306 6 16.4 0.9 49 71 17 10.4 4.8 average
23 38.3 206.5 404 250.1 16.3 0.5 41.2 45.4 17.1 13.1 3.9 average
22 41.5 283 5 39.6 300.5 19.6 2 47.1 65.1 19 86 4.1 average
21 39.1 1466 14.5 180.1 296 3.3 21 9 32.3 13.1 8.4 2 average
20 48.1 216 1 52.7 250 6 13.8 2.9 368 39.2 18.6 10.6 5.2 average
ta 39.4 286.8 17.3 227 5 23 5!s 36 38.6 20.7 11.6 32 average
18 47 2 269 50.6 2863 14.4 1.4 48.1 54.9 17.9 10.9 6.9 average
17 37.4 350 6 285 306 9 21.5 06 55.7 548 29.4 24 5.9 average
44.3 331.6 61.7 315.7 16.5 09 494 615 223 9.6 8.7 average
15 47.8 331.3 693 324 3 18.1 1.6 45.6 648 10.2 12.1 7.4
36.8 245 23.2 207.7 21.8 1.3 335 40.3 19.5 9.7 2.2 average
44.9 414.8 45.1 356.5 20 0.5 656 636 31.3 14.1 5.5
12 40 241.7 16.6 220.1 246 1.4 309 38.8 20.9 10.9 3 average
37 104.9 208 114.2 204 1.8 9 1 11.9 7.8 4.4 0.5 low
10 38.4 147.1 11.8 133.9 15 9 1.1 20.3 288 t 5.8 0.9 low
6 43.9 271.7 56.3 2844 15 0.9 40 56.3 18.3 12.6 4.7 average
46.8 413.8 25.5 360.6 229
_ . _ _ 1
69.6 64.8 289 15.6 10
40.9 204.7 21 194.7 202 1.1 338 40 14 7.3 33 average
45.6 336 3 31.4 322.7 25.3 0.9 66.7 23.1 13.7 5.3
36.9 201.7 188 188.6 19.3 1.3 328 37.4 184 72 2.1 average
41.7 261 5 146 260 8 1.5 449 40.3 21.2 10.5 3.6 average
3 45.6 304.2 35.6 296.3 18.2 1.2 484 62.9 226 168 5.7 average
40.6 194.1 10.7 176.4 27 1.4 20.2 28.6 14.1 10.2 low
40.6 2167 13.3 199.5 256 3 8 328 37 11.6 10.2 2 average
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Table AS- 7: Classification results with 10% decreased mean interval: low-risk plans and high-risk plans, 1995-98
High risk plans
co2tco pubtecage opt risk typegp spec prv par
36T6 504.3 74.2 116.1 9 5
2T144 1 139 ■' 3 5 1 1
10^42 1 251 285 f 15 1
0 € " '■vn41 9 41.5 306 2
3C 43 3 2 0 3
3 2 2 £ 1 7 3 8 4
331470
31 3"414.1 45. 65 6 14 1
'.5 6413.8 22 9 28.{
5.3 ilgh45 f 3 0 2 52 23.1 13 7
Low risk plans
data 95-88 age tco co2 |
I 130
gp pub spec prv dent opt Par risk type 1
43 35.7 114.8 34.4 17.8 0.8 14.( 15.7 88 3 o.a
42.8 135.4 fl 107.3 18.3 5.7 13.6 14.8 c 4 -  ■ d
39 43.8 1814 14.2 171^ 31-2] 1.8 1981 23.1 10.8 ed o.a
36 36.7 127.6 12 144.7 ^ 2 6 6 14.4 19.7 10.8 88 0.71
3^ 36.6 2355 36.sl 215.7 17.4 07 29 6 368 14.4 8.d 2.2
29 37.5 78.2 16.2 103 1 18.9 1.2 0.6 122 88 4 1■ - d
28 41.1 664 28.2 134.1 16.3 1.7r  ~  '-3 7 24.9 7.8 7.1 1.fl
11 37 104 9 20.8 114.2 20.4 1.8 9 1 11.8 7.8 4.4 .....................d
10 384 147 1 11.8 133.9 15.6 1.1U 20 3 288 ' — ' ' 6 5.8 — ............ d
Total 10
Mote: Among the high-risk plans for four plans five mean classifications changed: for plan 35 claims rose to above average and public hospital benefits fell to below average, for plan 25 
specialist benefits rose to above average, for plan 13 public hospital benefits fell below average, and for plan 6 contributions rose to above average. None o f these mean classification changes 
altered their overall plan classification, on the contrary, some supported their classification as high-risk plans. Among the low-risk plans for three plans five mean classifications changed: for 
plan 39 private hospital benefits fell to below average, for plan 28 private hospital and optical benefits fell to below average, and for plan 10 age and contribution feel to below average. All o f  
these mean classification changes rather supported their overall plan classification as low-risk plans.
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Appendix 6 
Model building process
(1) Variable Inclusion verification with univariate m odel a sse ssm e n t
The results of fitting the univariate logistic regression models to the data are given in table 
A6-1 on the next page. For each listed variable the table displays the following 
information: (1) the estimated slope coefficient for the univariable regression model 
containing only that single variable/ (2) the (semi-robust) estimated standard error of the 
estimated slope coefficient/ (3 & 4) z-value and the Wald statistic probability/ (5) the 95% 
confidence interval for the coefficient (6) the Wald test statistic for the hypothesis that the 
slope coefficient is zero (under the null hypothesis it follows the chi-square distribution 
with one degree of freedom) and (7) the significance level for the Wald test
With the exception of the co-payment variable (co2) in Model A, the variables for 
optical benefits (opt) and co-payment in Model B and some utilisation variables in Model 
C, where the univariate model failed to converge, the evidence in the table shows some 
association with the outcome for each variable. Thus upon completion of the univariate 
analysis, the initial selection of variables for the multivariate analysis could be justified - 
all univariate models that converged showed a significant Wald statistic.
A familiar problem of this type of univariate analysis is, however, the lack of 
support for the inclusion of variables that display a weak association with the outcome 
(see Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000) or, in this case, if univariate models that contain the 
variable do not converge. In these cases, where numerical problems occurred, the 
variables were still included because they are scientifically relevant and the data is 
adequate to support such an analysis. Therefore, on the basis of subject matter 
considerations, the co-payment variable in Model A, the optical benefit and co-payment 
variables in Model B and the non-converging variables of Model C were kept.
The initial selection of variables for the multivariate analysis was slightly changed 
by the transformation of two variables, dependant number and income, into categorical 
dummies that will assure better interpretations of the results. For both variables the mean 
category (income=6 and dependants=2) was chosen as the reference category. Variable 
values below that mean category received a value 1 while those above received a value 2. 
Next, the model variables are checked for linearity in the logit -  one key assumption for 
logistic regression analysis.
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Table A6-1: Univariate logisitc regression for variables o f Model A, B and C
Model A
variables
Jc
Coeff. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% a ] Wald chi2(1) P rob> chi2
age -0.02352** 0.00011 -221.8 0.000 -0.02372 -0.02331 49196.36 0.000
gen -0.37384** 0.00681 -54.93 0.000 •0.38718 -0.36050 3017.22 0.000
dep -0.21781** 0.00134 -162.39 0.000 -0.22044 -0.21518 26371.81 0.000
inc -0.45463** 0.00242 -187.51 0.000 •0.45939 -0.44989 35159.71 0.000
race -0.00025** 1.63E-06 -151.3 0.000 -0.00025 -0.00024 22892.84 0.000
urb -0.79237** 0.00448 -176.79 0.000 -0.80116 -0.78359 31255.17 0.000
tac -0.00303** 3.08E-05 •98.23 0.000 •0.00309 -0.00297 9649.92 0.000
tco -0.00359** 2.07E-05 -173.84 0.000 -0.00363 -0.00355 30220.9 0.000
co2 estim ates diverging
gp -0.03431** 0.00024 -142.73 0.000 -0.03478 -0.03384 20372.21 0.000
pub -0.01824** 0.00187 -9.76 0.000 -0.02190 -0.01458 95.24 0.000
spe -0.00916** 0.00014 -64.56 0.000 -0.00944 -0.00888 4167.83 0.000
prv -0.00302** 8.02E-05 -37.65 0.000 -0.00318 -0.00286 1417.89 0.000
den -0.01454** 0.00021 -68.7 0.000 •0.01495 -0.01412 4719.42 0.000
opt -0.03040** 0.00036 -85.31 0.000 -0.03110 -0.02970 7278.26 0.000
par -0.01760** 0.00092 -19.23 0.000 -0.01940 -0.01581 369.64 0.000
risk -0.37659** 0.00672 -56.08 0.000 -0.38975 -0.36343 3145.4 0.000
N * 663,644
n « 238,561
Model B Coeff. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C l] Wald chi2(1) Prob > chi2
variables
Ic
age -0.01509** 9.38E-05 -160.89 0.000 •0.01527 -0.01491 25886.6 0.000
gen -0.30279** 0.00646 -46.85 0.000 -0.31546 -0.29013 2195.07 0.000
dep -0.13348** 0.00114 -116.65 0.000 -0.13572 -0.13123 13607.59 0.000
inc -0.24723** 0.00203 -122.96 0.000 -0.25370 -0.24574 15117.95 0.000
race -0.00022** 1.88E-06 -116.11 0.000 -0.00022 -0.00021 13481.97 0.000
urb -0.53116** 0.00410 -129.6 0.000 -0.53920 -0.52313 16795.25 0.000
tac -0.00196- 2.72E-05 -71.93 0.000 -0.00201 -0.00190 5173.75 0.000
tco -0.00335- 1.89E-05 -177.26 0.000 •0.00338 -0.00331 31419.51 0.000
co2 estim ates diverging
gp -0.02582- 0.00020 -129.17 0.000 •0.02621 -0.02543 16684.65 0.000
pub -0.00126- 0.00044 -2.87 0.004 -0.00211 -0.00040 8.23 0.000
spe ■0.00626- 0.00013 •48.69 0.000 -0.00651 -0.00601 2370.87 0.000
prv -0.00152— 0.00008 -18.57 0.000 -0.00168 -0.00136 344.77 0.000
den -0.00929— 0.00018 -51.48 0.000 -0.00964 -0.00894 2650.69 0.000
opt estim ates diverging
par -0.00612- 0.00063 -9.7 0.000 -0.00735 -0.00488 94.07 0.000
risk -0.27127- 0.00525 -51.68 0.000 •0.28155 -0.26098 2671.28 0.000
N * 684,939
n « 262.349
Model C Coeff. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C l] Wald chi2(1) Prob > chi2
variables
sc
age ■0.05904- 0.00025 -235.3 0.000 •0.05953 -0.05855 55364.33 0.000
gen -1.99140- 0.02278 -87.430 0.000 •2.03604 -1.94676 7644.620 0.000
dep -0.86936- 0.00463 -187.9 0.000 -0.87843 -0.86029 177981 0.000
inc -1.30313- 0.00650 -200.37 0.000 -1.31588 -1.29039 40147.53 0.000
race -0.00392- 0.00002 -176.5 0.000 -0.00396 -0.00387 31151.58 0.000
urb -2.47540- 0.00890 -276.86 0.000 -2.49294 -2.45790 76653.400 0.000
tac estim ates diverging
tco -0.01084** 0.000068 -160.07 0.000 •0.01097 -0.01071 25621.33 0.000
co2 estim ates diverging
gp -0.12365- 0.00090 -137.87 0.000 -0.12540 -0.12189 19009.34 0.000
pub estim ates diverging
spe estim ates diverging
prv estim ates diverging
den -0.08055** 0.00121 •66.6 0.000 -0.08292 -0.07818 4434.95 0.000
opt -0.13188- 0.00121 -109.14 0.000 -0.13425 -0.12951 11911.25 0.000
par estim ates diverging
risk -5.2E-07** 1.92E-08 -27.18 0.000 -5.59E-07 -4.83E-07 738.83 0.000
N « 532,010
n -177.981
Note: ** significance level of 1%
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(2) Model variable check for linearity in the logit
This modelling process step checks the scale of the continuous model variables or the 
assumption of linearity in the logit. There are three possible methods for exploring the 
scale of a continuous variable: (1) a univariate smoothed scatterplot on the logit scale, (2) 
plots using design variables based on the quartile of distribution, and (3) the method of 
fractional polynomials. The most accessible standard method is the smoothed scatterplot. 
The method using the design variable approach is possible, but often leads to inconclusive 
results because it relies on a limited number of (quartiles) points for the plot (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2000). The fractional polynomials method is very computer intensive and has 
not yet been developed for models with correlated data. Thus the univariate smoothed 
scatterplot of the logit against the variables was used to test all variables that entered the 
models for linearity in the logit.189 As an example the univariate (lowess) smoothed logit 
of Model B versus age is displayed in figure A6-1 below, It shows that the relationship is 
linear in the logit
Figure A6-1: Univariate (lowess) smoothed logit versus age fo r  Model B  
Smoothed lowess logit for age in leaver-control sample model
0 H
-1
-2
-3
10 20 30 40
age
50 60 70 80
189 if  the results in the scatterplot indicate that the logit is not linear in the covariate then grouping and the use 
o f dummy variables is advised (Hosm er and Lemeshow 2000). Alternatively, higher order term s or other 
nonlinear scaling in the covariate can be used. However, even in cases where non-linearity in the logit is 
concluded and variables are transformed into a higher order or used in a nonlinear scaling (ln[xj) they often 
do not produce better models. In such a case, the variable should be treated as a continuous and linear 
variable (H osm er and Lemeshow 2000).
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Upon completion of the check of the linearity in the logit the initial selection of 
variables for the multivariate analysis remains the same. The main effects models are thus 
specified with the variables shown in table A6-2 on the next pages. Table A6-2 displays 
the following information for each main effect (listed in the first column): (1) the estimated 
slope coefficient for the multivariate regression model/ (2) the (semi-robust) estimated 
standard error of the estimated slope coefficient (3 & 4) z-value and the Wald statistic 
probability/ and (5) the 95% confidence interval for the coefficient The Wald test statistic 
and Wald test significance level for the models are shown below each table (under the null 
hypothesis it follows the chi-square distribution with 20 degrees of freedom).
The results of fitting the multivariate main effects models indicate weaker 
associations for some covariates when controlling for other variables. In Model A all 
variables have an association with the output except for the public hospital benefits (pub). 
For Model B several variables are not significant above average dependants number 
(depm_2)/ above average income (icgm_2), contribution (tco), co-payment (co2)/ specialist 
benefits (spe), and private hospital benefits (prv). Model C has five insignificant 
associations - the covariates dependants number (depm), Asian race (race_l), GP benefits/ 
specialist benefits/ and paramedical benefits (par). Strict compliance with the standard 
levels of statistical significance here would require consideration of smaller models for B 
and C and deleting the insignificant covariates.
However/ all variables in the models have important functions. For instance race 
and income are essential control variables. The contribution/ co-payment; and benefit 
variables are of key conceptual value and were carefully selected based on theoretical 
assumptions. They could not be easily dropped or exchanged for different variables 
without changing the whole nature of the investigation. Further/ it would be more 
sensible, in light of the later result interpretation/ to have the same covariates in each 
model. Thus on conceptual grounds all variables should be kept. Also, at this point the 
main effects models are not yet controlled for any interactions between the variables/ 
which could prove several of the insignificant associations in fact significant. This will be 
done next and concerns the assumption of additivity in logistic regression analysis.
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Table A6-2: Multivariate main effects models, Models A, B and C
Model A
variables
Jc
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C 1]
age -0.05905** 0.0004 -139.15 0.000 -0.05989-0.05822
gen 0.58935** 0.0101 58.35 0.000 0.56956 0.60915
_idepm_1 -0.01685** 0.0048 -3.53 0.000 •0.02621 -0.00750
_idepm_2 -0.02710** 0.0047 -5.78 0.000 -0.03629 -0.01791
_icgm_1 0.03018** 0.0040 7.53 0.000 0.02232 0.03803
_icgm_2 -0.01802** 0.0039 -4.58 0.000 •0.02574 -0.01030
_irace_1 -0.82800** 0.0185 •44.65 0.000 -0.86435 -0.79165
_lrace_2 •0.59055** 0.0152 -38.87 0.000 -0.62033 -0.56078
_iraca_3 -1.41969** 0.0135 -105 0.000 -1.44619-1.39319
urb 0.15489** 0.0148 10.47 0.000 0.12591 0.18388
tac -0.00013** 0.0000 -11.52 0.000 -0.00015-0.00011
tco 0.00058** 0.0000 39.02 0.000 0.00055 0.00060
co2 0.00019** 0.0000 12.83 0.000 0.00016 0.00022
OP 0.00024** 0.0000 6.27 0.000 0.00017 0.00032
pub 0.00004 0.0000 1.29 0.197 •0.00002 0.00009
spe 0.00018** 0.0000 11.97 0.000 0.00015 0.00021
prv 0.00014- 0.0000 11.45 0.000 0.00012 0.00016
den 0.00027- 0.0000 14.87 0.000 0.00023 0.00030
opt 0.00038- 0.0000 14.97 0.000 0.00033 0.00043
par 0.00015** 0.0000 6.03 0.000 0.00010 0.00021
_lrisk_1 0.45164** 0.0151 29.91 0.000 0.42205 0.48123
_irisk_2 -0.13188** 0.0172 -7.65 0.000 -0.16568 -0.09808
_cons 1.52849- 0.0239 63.95 0.000 1.48164 1.57534
Wald chi2(20) = 34125.25 N -  663,644
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 n -  238,561
Model B
variables
Ic
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C 1]
age -0.03321** 0.00034 •98.58 0.000 -0.03387 -0.03255
gen 0.20322- 0.00892 22.78 0.000 0.18573 0.22071
_idepm_1 -0.04768** 0.00482 -9.89 0.000 -0.05713 -0.03823
_idepm_2 0.00665 0.00464 1.43 0.153 •0.00246 0.01575
_icgm_1 0.02185- 0.00414 5.27 0.000 0.01373 0.02997
_icgm_2 -0.00726 0.00412 -1.76 0.078 -0.01533 0.00081
_irace_1 -0.69824** 0.01725 •40.49 0.000 •0.73205 -0.66444
_lrace_2 -0.51034** 0.01408 •36.25 0.000 -0.53793 -0.48275
_lrace_3 -0.38247** 0.01078 -35.47 0.000 -0.40360 -0.36133
urb 0.14571- 0.01387 10.5 0.000 0.11852 0.17290
tac 0.00004* 0.00002 2.18 0.029 0.00000 0.00007
tco 0.00002 0.00001 1.55 0.122 •0.00001 0.00005
co2 -0.00001 0.00002 -0.37 0.712 •0.00004 0.00003
gp 0.00097- 0.00005 20.65 0.000 0.00088 0.00107
pub 0.00010** 0.00003 3.12 0.002 0.00004 0.00016
spe •0.00002 0.00002 •0.88 0.377 -0.00006 0.00002
prv -0.00003 0.00002 -1.56 0.119 -0.00006 0.00001
den 0.00037- 0.00002 15.43 0.000 0.00033 0.00042
opt 0.00111- 0.00003 35.23 0.000 0.00105 0.00117
par 0.00008* 0.00003 2.52 0.012 0.00002 0.00015
J risk jl -0.03105* 0.01427 -2.18 0.030 •0.05901 -0.00308
_lrisk_2 0.29832- 0.01406 21.21 0.000 0.27076 0.32589
_cons 0.84594- 0.02137 39.58 0.000 0.80404 0.88783
Wald chi2(20) = 17332.18 N = 684,939
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 n = 262,349
Cont
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Cont.
Model C
variables
sc
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C 1]
age -0.00801** 0.00066 -12.16 0.000 •0.00930 -0.00672
gen 0.01086 0.02053 0.53 0.597 •0.02939 0.05110
Jd ep m jl •0.00406 0.01184 -0.34 0.732 -0.02727 0.01915
_idepm_2 -0.04411** 0.01164 -3.79 0.000 -0.06691 -0.02130
_lcgm_1 0.05577** 0.01093 5.1 0.000 0.03436 0.07719
_icgm_2 -0.09842** 0.01081 -9.11 0.000 -0.11960 -0.07724
_irace_1 -0.04536 0.02952 -1.54 0.124 -0.10322 0.01250
_lrace_2 -0.92967** 0.03812 -24.39 0.000 -1.00438-0.85496
_irace_3 -1.67975** 0.02994 -56.11 0.000 -1.73843 -1.62107
urb 0.28379** 0.03454 8.22 0.000 0.21610 0.35148
tac -0.00005* 0.00002 -2.15 0.032 -0.00009 0.00000
tco 0.00021** 0.00004 5.79 0.000 0.00014 0.00028
co2 0.00030** 0.00003 8.69 0.000 0.00023 0.00036
OP 0.00002 0.00012 0.13 0.894 -0.00021 0.00024
pub -0.00017** 0.00006 -3.01 0.003 •0.00029 -0.00006
spe 0.00005 0.00003 1.48 0.138 -0.00001 0.00011
prv 0.00006* 0.00002 2.48 0.013 0.00001 0.00011
den 0.00021** 0.00005 4.2 0.000 0.00011 0.00030
opt -0.00034** 0.00009 -3.87 0.000 -0.00051 -0.00017
par •0.00012 0.00006 -1.87 0.061 -0.00024 0.00001
J r isk jl 0.64090** 0.03880 16.52 0.000 0.56486 0.71694
_irisk_2 -0.06705** 0.02662 -2.52 0.012 -0.11923 -0.01487
_cons -2.00664** 0.04921 -40.77 0.000 •2.10310 -1.91019
Wald chi2(20) 
Prob > chi2
* 4729.87 
= 0.000
N > 532,010 
n = 177,981
Note: ** significance level o f 1% and * significance level o f 5%
(3) Model check for interactions
This model building step assesses the need to include interactions. Whether or not to 
include an interaction term in the model is mostly dependent on practical considerations, 
and not only on statistical concerns. This is particularly true if interactions can lead to 
practical, relevant interpretations. First a list that covers all possible interaction terms for 
a model should be prepared. Of this list of possible interactions, scientifically plausible 
interactions should be selected and then each interaction is added one at a time to the 
model to be tested for significance. It is important to note that not all possible interactions 
have to be included in this step but only scientifically plausible interactions (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2000).
The list of scientifically plausible interaction terms for the three Models A, B, and C 
is displayed in the first columns of tables A6-4 to A6-6 at the end of this section. The main 
effects models contain 17 variables and there are 136 possible pairwise interactions. All 
interaction terms for Models A, B, and C thought to offer a scientifically plausible 
modification of the covariate effects. They were added one at a time to the main effects
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models and tested with the Wald test (presented in tables A6-4 to A6-6).190 The results 
show that several interactions are significant at the 1% level, 54 for Model A, 60 for Model 
B, and 44 for Model C.
Finally, models with all significantly tested interaction terms are estimated and the 
final model is selected according to the improvement in fit and results interpretation. If an 
interaction term is not significant or does not increase the model's significance it should 
not be included (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).191 Interaction terms that were significant 
for Model A, B, and C were added to the main effects models. However, these models did 
not converge. Next, step-by-step significant interaction terms were excluded depending 
on whether they either did not improve the fit of the model (i.e. the Wald statistic did not 
increase) or prevented the model from converging to a solution.192 This complicated 
process yielded the preliminary final models.
Table A6-3 on the next page represents the fitted models containing the main 
effects and the significant interaction terms. The table displays the following information 
for each main effect and interaction listed: (1) the estimated slope coefficient for the 
multivariate regression model, (2) the (semi-robust) estimated standard error of the 
estimated slope coefficient, (3 & 4) z-value and the Wald statistic probability, and (5) the 
95% confidence interval for the coefficient The Wald test statistic and Wald test 
significance level for the models are shown below each table (under the null hypothesis it 
follows the chi-square distribution with 37 degrees of freedom). For all three models the 
Wald statistic increased with the inclusion of the interaction terms. All three preliminary 
final models A, B, and C have 17 main variables and 15 interactions.
In preliminary final Model A and B all variables and interactions are significant 
However, Model C still contains three insignificant variables: above average dependant 
number, above average income and paramedical benefits and one insignificant interaction 
race*special benefits. These variables were retained because they function as important 
control variables (and the below average dependant and income variables are significant).
190 Usually not all possible interaction terms are scientifically plausible, however, in this case all 136 were 
practically likely and thus had to be tested for significance.
91 An interaction term can only alter point and interval estimates if its estimated coefficient is statistically 
significant.
The results for each step of this stepwise approach are not presented here, however, the results are 
available from the author upon request. Best fitted converging models (also not presented here) that included 
the maximum of the significant interaction terms was the result of this stepwise elimination approach. 
However, these models revealed Wald statistics for some of the included interaction terms that were not 
significant and they were dropped subsequently. Also, for each model three interaction terms (age*income, 
race*income, gender*income, and urban*income) that were first eliminated by the stepwise approach were 
reinstated in the final model for conceptual reasons, if they yielded significant Wald statistics.
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The interaction race*special benefit ensured the significance of the special benefit covariate 
and was therefore not excluded. Finally, the insignificant coefficient for the paramedical 
benefits variable has interpretational value as a result.
Table A6-3: Preliminary final models with main effects and interaction, Models A, B and C
Modal A
variables
Jc
Coef. Std. Err. I P>|z| [95% C 1]
age -0.06188** .0005983 -103.44 0.000 -0.06305 -0.06071
gen 0.13556** 0.03254 4.17 0.000 0.07179 0.19933
Jdepm _1 -0.02544** 0.00532 -4.78 0.000 -0.03587 -0.01501
_idepm_2 -0.03039** 0.00621 -4.89 0.000 -0.04256-0.01822
_icgm_1 0.11218** 0.01209 9.28 0.000 0.08848 0.13589
Jcgm _2 0.13465** 0.02300 5.86 0.000 0.08958 0.17972
_irace_1 -0.82924** 0.01863 •44.52 0.000 -0.86575 -0.79273
_irace_2 -0.61434** 0.01670 •36.78 0.000 -0.64707 -0.58160
_irace_3 -1.42872** .0138872 -102.88 0.000 -1.45594 -1.40150
urb 0.22973** 0.01882 12.21 0.000 0.19284 0.26662
tac -0.00013** 0.00001 -11.37 0.000 •0.00015 -0.00011
tco 0.00054** 0.00002 31.62 0.000 0.00051 0.00058
co2 0.00019** 0.00001 12.63 0.000 0.00016 0.00021
SP 0.00045** 0.00013 3.48 0.001 0.00020 0.00070
pub -0.00017* 0.00007 -2.35 0.019 •0.00031 -0.00003
spe 0.00018** 0.00001 11.84 0.000 0.00015 0.00021
prv 0.00013** 0.00001 11.12 0.000 0.00011 0.00016
den 0.00060** 0.00006 9.34 0.000 0.00047 0.00073
opt 0.00086** 0.00007 12.15 0.000 0.00072 0.00100
par 0.00016** 0.00003 5.75 0.000 0.00010 0.00021
Jrisk_1 0.31103** 0.02147 14.49 0.000 0.26895 0.35311
Jrlsk_2 -0.33860** 0.02411 -14.05 0.000 -0.38584 -0.29135
age*gen 0.01026** 0.00082 12.59 0.000 0.00866 0.01186
age*icgm -0.00079** 0.00021 -3.82 0.000 •0.00120 -0.00039
age*depm -0.00001** 0.00000 -4.77 0.000 •0.00001 0.00000
age*opt -0.00001** 0.00000 -7.45 0.000 •0.00002 -0.00001
age*pub 0.00001** 0.00000 3.22 0.001 0.00000 0.00001
depm*gen 0.04221** 0.00510 8.28 0.000 0.03221 0.05221
depm*gp -0.00037** 0.00006 -6.14 0.000 •0.00048 -0.00025
icgm*race -0.06063** 0.00869 -6.98 0.000 •0.07766 -0.04360
icgm*den -0.00015** 0.00002 -6.05 0.000 •0.00020 -0.00010
race*gen -0.00024** 0.00003 -7.77 0.000 •0.00029 -0.00018
race*den 0.00013** 0.00001 9.52 0.000 0.00010 0.00015
gp*tco 0.00000** 0.00000 6.1 0.000 0.00000 0.00000
risk*gen 0.06285** 0.01559 4.03 0.000 0.03229 0.09341
risk*icgm 0.04410** 0.00352 12.54 0.000 0.03721 0.05100
riskVace 0.04174** 0.00913 4.57 0.000 0.02385 0.05963
_cons 1.60846** 0.03091 52.04 0.000 1.54788 1.66904
Wald chi2(37) 
Prob > chi2
= 35821.34 
= 0.000
N « 663,644 
n > 238,561
ConL
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Cont.
Model B
variables
Ic
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C 1]
age -0.03612** 0.00064 -56.08 0.000 -0.03738 -0.03485
gen 0.68371** 0.02963 23.07 0.000 0.62563 0.74179
_idepm_1 -0.06332** 0.00948 -6.68 0.000 •0.08191 -0.04473
_klepm_2 -0.05722** 0.01702 -3.36 0.001 -0.09057 -0.02386
_icgm_1 0.16825** 0.01195 14.07 0.000 0.14482 0.19168
_lcgm_2 0.22438** 0.02366 9.48 0.000 0.17800 0.27076
_irace_1 -0.99478** 0.02053 -48.45 0.000 •1.03503 -0.95454
_irace_2 -1.10995** 0.02573 -43.14 0.000 -1.16038 -1.05952
_irace_3 -1.27728** 0.03342 -38.22 0.000 -1.34278-1.21178
urb 0.21248** 0.01809 11.75 0.000 0.17702 0.24793
tac 0.00005** 0.00001 3.9 0.000 0.00003 0.00008
tco 0.00024** 0.00002 10 0.000 0.00019 0.00029
co2 0.00027** 0.00005 5.59 0.000 0.00018 0.00036
OP 0.00093** 0.00004 22.22 0.000 0.00085 0.00101
pub -0.00015* 0.00007 -2.01 0.045 -0.00029 0.00000
spe -0.00006** 0.00002 -3.73 0.000 -0.00010 -0.00003
prv -0.00008** 0.00001 -5.95 0.000 -0.00010 -0.00005
den 0.00111** 0.00006 19.75 0.000 0.00100 0.00122
opt 0.00198** 0.00008 23.86 0.000 0.00182 0.00214
par 0.00008* 0.00004 2.23 0.026 0.00001 0.00015
_irisk_1 -0.08470** 0.01501 •5.64 0.000 -0.11412-0.05528
_irisk_2 0.21934** 0.01864 11.77 0.000 0.18281 0.25587
age*gen -0.01187** 0.00071 -16.83 0.000 -0.01325 -0.01049
age*depm 0.00067** 0.00021 3.21 0.001 0.00026 0.00107
age*icgm -0.00250** 0.00019 -13.22 0.000 -0.00287 -0.00213
age’race 0.00759** 0.00026 29.63 0.000 0.00709 0.00810
age*den -0.00002** 0.00000 -14.67 0.000 -0.00002 -0.00002
age*opt -0.00002** 0.00000 -11.91 0.000 •0.00002 -0.00002
age*co2 -0.00001** 0.00000 -6.19 0.000 -0.00001 0.00000
age*pub 0.00000* 0.00000 2.5 0.012 0.00000 0.00001
age*tac 0.00000** 0.00000 2.88 0.004 0.00000 0.00000
gen*icgm -0.01372** 0.00471 •2.91 0.004 -0.02294 -0.00449
race*tco -0.00019** 0.00001 -17.63 0.000 -0.00021 -0.00017
icgm*race 0.02922** 0.00206 14.17 0.000 0.02518 0.03326
icgm*urb -0.05555** 0.00889 -6.25 0.000 -0.07298 -0.03812
opt*tac 0.00000** 0.00000 -2.85 0.004 0.00000 0.00000
risk*icgm 0.03389** 0.00372 9.11 0.000 0.02659 0.04118
_cons 0.87973** 0.03334 26.38 0.000 0.81438 0.94508
Wald chi2(37) 
Prob > chi2
= 20066.5 
= 0.000
N « 684,939 
n -  262,349
Cont.
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Cont.
Model C
variables
sc
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C 1]
age -0.00671** 0.00101 -6.66 0.000 •0.00869 -0.00474
gen 0.24360** 0.06394 3.81 0.000 0.11828 0.36891
_ldepm_1 0.01540 0.01187 1.3 0.195 •0.00787 0.03866
_idepm_2 -0.05222** 0.01166 -4.48 0.000 •0.07508 -0.02936
_icgm_1 0.08251** 0.01188 6.94 0.000 0.05922 0.10580
_icgm_2 0.00203 0.01718 0.12 0.906 -0.03165 0.03570
_irace_1 0.13200** 0.03299 4 0.000 0.06735 0.19665
_irace_2 -0.65239** 0.04349 -15 0.000 -0.73763 -0.56715
_irace_3 -1.27134** 0.04804 -26.46 0.000 -1.36550 -1.17719
urb 0.11245* 0.04903 2.29 0.022 0.01636 0.20854
tac -0.00007** 0.00002 -2.93 0.003 -0.00012 -0.00002
tco -0.00063** 0.00013 -4.96 0.000 -0.00088 -0.00038
co2 0.00031** 0.00003 8.83 0.000 0.00024 0.00037
gp 0.00103** 0.00027 3.8 0.000 0.00050 0.00157
pub -0.00085** 0.00017 •4.85 0.000 •0.00119 -0.00050
spe 0.00008* 0.00003 2.28 0.022 0.00001 0.00014
prv 0.00008* 0.00003 3.21 0.001 0.00003 0.00013
den 0.00022** 0.00005 4.36 0.000 0.00012 0.00032
opt -0.00077** 0.00011 -6.98 0.000 -0.00098 -0.00055
par •0.00008 0.00006 -1.28 0.200 •0.00021 0.00004
_irisk_1 0.42828** 0.08650 4.95 0.000 0.25875 0.59782
_irisk_2 -0.56429** 0.17065 -3.31 0.001 •0.89875 -0.22983
age*gen -0.00987** 0.00139 -7.12 0.000 •0.01258 -0.00715
age*tco 0.00002** 0.00000 6.14 0.000 0.00001 0.00002
gen*icgm 0.04919** 0.01299 3.79 0.000 0.02372 0.07466
gen'gp 0.00093** 0.00022 4.22 0.000 0.00050 0.00137
icgm*race -0.08189** 0.00586 •13.98 0.000 -0.09337 -0.07041
icgm'gp •0.00085** 0.00017 -5.05 0.000 •0.00118 -0.00052
race'spe -0.00004 0.00002 -1.81 0.071 •0.00009 0.00000
race*tco -0.00015** 0.00003 -4.38 0.000 •0.00022 -0.00008
urb*pub 0.00069** 0.00018 3.78 0.000 0.00033 0.00104
risk*age -0.00601** 0.00086 -6.97 0.000 -0.00770 -0.00432
risk*gen 0.25842** 0.02626 9.84 0.000 0.20697 0.30988
risk*icgm 0.02203* 0.00894 2.46 0.014 0.00451 0.03955
risk*urb 0.31010** 0.07107 4.36 0.000 0.17080 0.44940
risk*opt 0.00079** 0.00010 7.73 0.000 0.00059 0.00099
risk*teo 0.00031** 0.00005 6.81 0.000 0.00022 0.00041
_cons -1.88824** 0.07114 -26.54 0.000 -2.02767 -1.74882
Wald chi2(37) 
Prob > chi2
8 5431.19 
= 0.000
N 8 532.010 
n 8 177,981
Note: ** significance level o f 1% and * significance level o f 5%
The models in table A6-3 are referred to as preliminary final models because they are not 
yet checked for model adequacy. The next and final step in the model building process 
will assess the model fit This step is presented after the result interpretation in chapter 
five.
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Table A6-4: List ofplausible interaction terms fo r  Model A with p-value and Wald test statistic when added to the main effects model
age age
depm 0.000 depm
32914.21
gen 0.000 0.000 gen
33190.5 33023.61
icgm 0.000 0.640 0 000 icgm
32915.0 32915.65 32935.71
race 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.087 race
33189.0 32944.4 32892.8 32990.9|
urb 0.444 0.067 0.177 0.000 0.000 urb
32917.92 32916.25 32918.0 32956.1 32929.81
gp 0.461 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.003 gp
32952.85 33074.81 32995.92 32928.71 33093.35 32933.71
spe 0.069 0.751 0.000 0.000 0.845 0.000 0 022 spe
32922.34 32915.47 32936.74 32930.21 32914.21 32923.1 32927.921
prv 0.743 0.220 0.023 0.646 0.063 0.838 0.012 diverging prv
32913.09 32917.09 32910.14 32918.72 32918.88 32914.13 32933.49 diverging
pub 0.000 0.537 0.872 0.443 0.332 0.464 0.030 0.001 0124 pub
32934 32915.53 32914.65 32915.54 32913.87 32917.36 32916.55 32915.07 32915.3|
den 0.000 0.382 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.405 0.095 0 349 den
33019.14 32914.59 32930.5 32970.13 33017.77 32916.98 32954.5 32915.6 32923.27 32918.02|
opt 0.000 0.635 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.259 0.005 0081 0.044 0 062 opt
32992.19 32914.87 32917.52 32924.64 32925.85 32915.56 32921.8 32917.15 32915.81 32915.29 32948.261
par 0.621 0.077 0.004 0.027 0.122 0.145 0.005 0.317 diverging 0.289 diverging 0.000 par
32917.37 32919.44 32922.84 32942.25 32915.94 32916.41 32931.34 32929.45 diverging 32920.87 diverging 32924.021
tac 0.300 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.982 0.222 0.000 diverging diverging 0.000 0.000 0.095 diverging tac
32921.06 32917.64 32932.84 32932.19 32915.81 32917.63 32942.41 diverging diverging 32910.77 32933.19 32903.97 diverging I
tco 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.732 0.735 0.282 0.000 0.028 0.451 0.229
32950.48 32919.87 32927.53 32911.8 32848.88 32921.97 33148.39 32929.14 32918.97 32913.55 32914.36 32947.38 32919.06 32937.631
co2 0.000 0.066 0.447 0.825 0.000 0.535 0.234 diverging diverging 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.986
32951.09 32930.8 32924.15 32914.46 32883.01 32918.82 32915.05 diverging diverging 32913.1 32922.46 32887.57 32945.55 32972.5
risk 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.265 0.442 0.558 0.000 0.965 0.137
33900.52 34141.47 34171.7 34367.58 34230.72 34146.59 34139.22 34126.78 34127.95 34126.31 34125.66 34139.42 34126.45 34128.22
0.623 co2 
32911.21j
0.171 0.000 risk
34124.89 34119.561
Note: Each cell contains two values, first the p-value o f  the significance test when added alone to the main effects model and below the Wald statistic o f  the new model as a 
measure offit. The Wald statistic fo r  the main effects model was 32914.37.
296
Birgit Hansl Chapter 4: Data & empirical strategy
Table A6-5: List o f  plausible interaction terms fo r  Model B  with p-value and Wald test statistic when added to the main effects model
age age
depm 0.000 depm
16830.5|
gen 0.000 0.129 gen
17073.21 16786.58|
icgm 0.000 0.000 0.000 icgm
16956.95 16794.71 16807.061
race 0.000 0.001 0.727 0 000 race
17291.18 16788.11 16784.87 16891.98|
urb 0.004 0.932 0.000 0.000 0.112 urb
16799.93 16784.07 16812.73 16841.11 16795.091
9P 0.014 0.150 0.024 0.015 0.000 0.000 gp
16749.33 16795.82 16787.53 16781.05 16795.34 16795.841
spe 0.000 0.152 0.741 0.000 0.205 0.001 0.979
16866.41 16790.14 16783.53 16792.25 16779.76 16795.96 16815.36|
prv 0.095 0.689 0.194 0.342 0.035 0.272 0.535
16777.95 16785.58 16785.03 16785.26 16776.16 16789.12 16798.88
pub 0.003 0.447 0.148 0.791 0.045 0.817 0.254
16769.65 16784.69 16790.27 16794.8 16789.65 16787.29 16791.87
den 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.166 0.000
17177.04 16815.79 16791.95 16768.58 16774.53 16784.77 16812.67
opt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.306 0.011 0.285 0.000
17058.83 16819.51 16749.71 16793.53 16783.63 16784.36 16845.21
par 0.113 0.118 0.556 0.003 0.061 0.259 0.643
16774.22 16787.19 16788.41 16771.74 16785 16784.44 16825.69
tac 0.000 0.115 0.209 0.056 0.250 0.012 0.895
16935.28 16784.78 16786.05 16784.65 16784.55 16792.98 16818.43
tco 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.892 0.001
15757.27 16789.81 16902.52 16784.43 17780.38 16784.95 16799.65
co2 0.000 0.008 0.857 0.135 0.634 0.001 0.189
16919.26 16793.23 16784.06 16809.31 16792.78 16808.88 16817.43
risk 0.000 0.058 0.786 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
17379.43 17335.43 17335.45 17426.84 17350.05 17407.69 17343.06
spe
diverging
diverging
0.183
16784.25 
0.000
16795.25 
0.000
16789.58
0.116
16819.38 
0.000
16917.39 
0.445
16786.69
0.005
16821.1
0.319
17333.06
0.452 pub 
16786.08 
0.003 
16786.06 
0.002 
16790.43 
diverging 
diverging 
diverging 
diverging 
0.150 
16785.4 
0.000 
16814.51 
0.854 
17334.32
0.001 den 
16783.32 
0.246 
16786.41 
0.926 
16784.83 
0.083 
16825.86 
0.423 
16792.46 
0.000 
16825.44 
0.004 
17328.61
0.000 opt 
16990.89|
0.146 0.695 par
16783.88 16784.08|
0.460 0.002 diverging
16781.8 16981.71 diverging
0.000 0.000 0.059
16808 16851.65 16775.73 
0.063 0.870 diverging
16768.35 16800.9 diverging
0.000 0.000 0.119
17319.11 17341.68 17328.86
0.013 tco 
16796.47 
0.000 
16847.75 
0.501 
17332.18
0.010 co2
16780.42j_________
0.001 0.453 risk
17335.83 17332.861
Note: Each cell contains two values, first the p-value o f  the significance test when added alone to the main effects model and below the Wald statistic o f  the new model as a 
measure o f  fit. The Wald statistic fo r  the main effects model was 16784.07.
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Table A6-6: List o f plausible interaction terms for Model C with p-value and Wald test statistic when added to the main effects model
age
depm 0 754 depm
4211.86|
gen 0.000 0.117 gen
4263.5 4221.71
icgm 0.005 0.000 0.000 icgm
4240.18 4227.57 4214.92|
race 0.087 0.000 0.138 0.000 race
4205.82 4239.19 4218.74 4273.751
urb 0.130 0.000 0.224 0.416 0.007 urb
4217.94 4230.18 4212.79 4215.62 4186.68|
gp 0.043 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.356 0 133 gp
4214.19 4216.98 4245.83 4250.56 4214.32 4220.29|
spe 0.645 0.140 0.72 0.885 0.009 0.037 0.481
4221.34 4216.84 4213.13 4213.93 4217.79 4216.58 4213.411
prv 0.385 0.375 0.373 0.645 0.043 0.162 0.908 0 188 prv
4217.82 4212.49 4213.68 4214.36 4213.77 4212.07 4212.88 4212.22|
pub 0.147 0.264 0.4 0.306 0.000 0.001 0.060 0.340 0.032 pub
4214.71 4212.82 4216.46 4213.67 4238.29 4236.8 4213.52 4279.09 4232.36|
den 0.000 0.380 0.525 0.685 0.023 0.297 0.105 0.468 0.952 0 242 den
4217.31 4212.97 4212.82 4220.04 4214.25 4214.12 4210.71 4213.16 4212.35 4228.371
opt 0.000 0.526 0.207 0.557 0.225 0.023 0.173 0.440 0.986 0.150 0.118 opt
4236.9 4211.84 4214.78 4212.61 4216.9 4217.23 4212.4 4212.13 4211.92 4212.52 4214.09|
par 0.890 0.000 0.405 0.425 0.646 0.513 0.739 0.917 0 559 0.004 0.612 0.487 par
4212.36 4224.69 4224.58 4211.68 4210.92 4215.13 4220.2 4214.68 4218.08 4213.03 4212.53 4215.371
tac 0.127 0.032 0.393 0.742 0.051 0.414 0.816 0.155 0.431 0.081 0.010 0.000 0.056 tac
4205.73 4213 4216.27 4215.01 4209.49 4214.54 4214.23 4211.48 4201.6 4211.78 4213.71 4208.19 4249.99|
tco 0.000 0.026 0.513 0.000 0.000 0.977 0.310 0.000 0.000 0.139 0.202 0.000 0.007 0.000
4336.75 4235.9 4212.89 4457.96 4364.08 4212.11 4218.63 4258.21 4223.07 4216.49 4217.75 4261.54 4220.21 4267.09|
co2 0.024 0.005 0081 0.089 0.001 0.332 0 006 0.241 0.000 0.310 0.211 0.117 0.000 0.133
4201.64 4226.31 4217.4 4226.25 4215.95 4219.42 4197.41 4215 3974.85 4214.91 4215.51 4192.12 4287.92 4241.76
risk 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.027 diverging 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.643 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.000
4792.64 4753.14 5053.08 4727.55 diverging 4781.71 4782.67 4742.51 4730.08 4736.22 4737.23 4811.36 4739.73 4753.33
0.312 co2 
4227.971
0.000 0.072 risk
4800.79 4743.281
Note: Each cell contains two values, first the p-value of the significance test when added alone to the main effects model and below the Wald statistic o f the new model as a 
measure of fit. The Wald statistic for the main effects model was 4211.93
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Appendix 7
Calculated odds ratios for models’ interactions
Table A 7-1: Estimated odds ratios for gender for Model A, controlling for dependants
gender* dep1 dep2 dep3 dep4 dep5 dep6 dep7 dep8
OR
(gen = 1)
1.10 1.25 1.30 1.36 1.41 1.48 1.54 1.61
Note: * Reference category for gender is male.
Table A 7-2: Estimated odds ratios for income for Model A, controlling for risk
risk* income** Odds ratio
risk = 1
(below) income s  1 (below) 1.17
income = 2 (above) 1.20
risk = 2
(above) income = 1 (below) 1.22
income = 2 (above) 1.25
Note: * Reference category for risk (plan) is average-risk plan, 
** Reference category for income is average income group.
Table A 7-3: Estimated odds ratios for risk for Model A, controlling for income
income* risk** O dds ratio
income = 1
(below) risk = 1 (below) 1.43
risk = 2 (above) 0.75
income = 2
(above) risk = 1 (below) 1.49
risk = 1 (above) 0.78
Note: * Reference category for income is average income group, 
** Reference category for risk (plan) is average-risk plan.
Table A 7-4: Estimated odds ratios for gender for Model B, controlling for age
gender* age20 age30 age40 age50 age60 age70 age80
OR
(gen = 1)
1.56 1.38 1.23 1.09 0.97 0.86 0.77
Note: * Reference category for gender is male.
Table A 7-5: Estimated odds ratios for dependants for Model B, controlling for age
dependants* age20 age40 age60 age80
OR
dependants (below = 1) 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.99
(above = 2) 0.96 0.97 0.98 1.00
Note: * Reference category for dependants is average dependants number.
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Table A 7-6: Estimated odds ratios for income for Model B, controlling for age
income* age20 age40 age60 age80
OR income (below = 1) 1.13 1.07 1.02 0.97
(above = 2) 1.19 1.13 1.08 1.03
Note: * Reference category for income is average income group.
Table A 7-7: Estimated odds ratios for income for Model B, controlling for risk
risk* income** Odds ratio
risk = 1
(below) income = 1 (below) 1.22
income = 2 (above) 1.30
risk = 2
(above) income = 1 (below) 1.27
income = 2 (above) 1.34
Note: * Reference category for risk (plan) is average-risk plan, 
** Reference category for income is average income group.
Table A 7-8: Estimated odds ratios for urban for Model B, controlling for income
income* urban** O dds ratio
income = 1 urban = 1 1.17
(below)
income = 2 urban = 1 1.11
(above)
Note: * Reference category for income is average income group, 
** Reference category for urban is rural residency.
Table A 7-9: Estimated odds ratios for risk for Model B, controlling for income
income* risk** O dds ratio
income = 1
(below) risk = 1 (below) 0.95
risk = 2 (above) 1.29
income = 2
(above) risk = 1 (below) 0.98
risk = 1 (above) 1.33
Note: * Reference category for income is average income group, 
** Reference category for risk (plan) is average-risk plan.
Table A 7-10: Estimated odds ratios for gender for Model C, controlling for age
gender* age20 age30 age40 age50 age60 age70 age80
OR
(gen = 1)
1.05 0.95 0.86 0.78 0.71 0.64 0.58
Note: * Reference category for gender is male.
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Table A 7-11: Estimated odds ratios for gender for Model C, controlling for risk
risk* gender** O dds ratio
risk = 1 gender = 1 (female) 1.65
(below)
risks 2 gender = 1 (female) 2.14
(above)
Note: * Reference category for risk (plan) is average-risk plan, 
** Reference category for gender is male.
Table A 7-12: Estimated odds ratios for race for Model C, controlling for income
income* race** O dds ratio
income = 1
(below) race = 1 (Asian) 1.05
race = 2 (Black) 0.48
race = 3 (Coloured) 0.26
income = 2
(above) race = 1 (Asian) n.s.
race = 2 (Black) n.s.
race = 3 (Coloured) n.s.
Note: * Reference category for income is average income group, 
** Reference category for race is White.
Table A 7-13: Estimated odds ratios for urban for Model C, controlling for risk
risk* urban** O dds ratio
risk = 1 urban = 1 1.53
(below)
risk = 2 urban * 1 2.08
(above)
Note: * Reference category for risk is average-risk plan, 
** Reference category for urban is rural residency
Table A 7-14: Estimated odds ratios for risk for Model C, controlling for age
risk* age20 age40 age60 age80
OR risk (below = 1) 1.36 1.21 1.07 0.95
(above = 2) 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35
Note: * Reference category for risk (plan) is average-risk plan.
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Appendix 8 
A ssessm en t of model fit
Summary measures of goodness-of-fit. In most software packages the logistic R-squared 
measure or Pseudo-R-Square is available.193 Two other goodness-of-fit tests for logistic 
regression models offered in most software packages are the Pearson goodness-of-fit chi- 
square statistic and the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test.194 As mentioned, in order 
to obtain the pseudo R2, the Pearson goodness-of-fit chi-square statistic and the Hosmer- 
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test, the models were run as models for uncorrelated data. On 
die next page table A8-1 describes the results for each models' summary measures of the 
goodness-of-fit which were obtained after estimating the proxy Models A, B, and C. It 
shows the log-likelihood, Wald test, Pearson chi-square goodness-of-fit test, Hosmer- 
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test and the Pseudo R.
For proxy Model A the value for the log-likelihood is L=-315694. The value for the 
Wald test is 29306 producing p-values for the test for both models which are significant at 
the a=0.01 level (P(x2 (37)> 29306)=0.000). The null hypothesis that at least one and 
perhaps all coefficients are different from zero is rejected. The log-likelihood based pseudo 
R values are, as expected, very low (but comparable to any other logit model). For the fit 
of a saturated model, R would be equal to one. Here the pseudo R for proxy Model A is 
pretty good with 0.12.
The Pearson chi-square goodness-of-fit test tests the observed against expected 
number of responses using cells defined by the covariate patterns. Since the p-values are 
small for both models, below 0.01, the proxy models do not seem to be fitting very well.
193 It is a coefficient analogue to the squared contingency coefficient, with an interpretation like R-square. It’s 
maximum is less than 1, but extremely low R2 values in logistic regression models are the norm - typically 
below. 1 rather than 1 - especially when compared to R2 values encountered in good linear regression models 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).
194 The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit chi-square statistic is calculated similarly to the Pearson chi- 
square goodness-of-fit statistic. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test divides subjects into deciles 
based on predicted probabilities and computes a chi-square from observed and expected frequencies. Then a 
probability (p) value is computed from the chi-square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom to test the fit of 
the logistic model. If the test statistic is .05 or less, the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the 
observed and model-predicted values of the dependent is rejected. This means the model predicts values 
significantly different from what they ought to be, i.e. the observed values. If the test statistic is greater than 
.05, as desired, the null hypothesis that there is no difference cannot be rejected, implying that the model's 
estimates fit the data at an acceptable level (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). For a more detailed mathematical 
description of the pseudo R-squared measure and the two goodness-of-fit test statistics see Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (2000) and STATA Manual (1999) Vol2.
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However, the number of covariate patterns is dose to the number of observations, making 
the application of the Pearson chi-square test questionable (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000, 
STATA1999).
Table A8-1: Summary goodness-of-fit measures for proxy Models A, B, and C
Logistic proxy Model A
Wald test Pseudo R2 Pearson test Hosmer-Lemeshow test
Number of obs * 663,644
Wald chi2(37) = 29306.07 
Prob > chi2 * 0.000 
Log likelihood = >315694
Pseudo R2 = 0.1453 Number of obs * 663,644 
Number of covariate patterns > 663,636 
Pearson chi2(663,598) * 681206.5 
Prob > chi2 > 0.000
Number of obs * 663,644 
Number of groups * 10 
H-L chi2(8)« 181.19 
Prob > chi2 -  0.000
Logistic proxy Model B
Number of obs * 684,939
Wald chi2(37) * 17559.85 
Prob > chi2 * 0.000 
Log likelihood = >375510
Pseudo R2 * 0.0573 Number of obs * 684,939 
Number of covariate patterns > 684,932 
Pearson chi2(684.894)> 701712.5 
Prob > chi2 * 0.000
Number of obs * 684,939 
Number of groups > 10 
H-L chi2(8) * 195.85 
Prob > chi2 3 0.000
Logistic proxy Model C
Number of obs * 532,010
Wald chi2(20) * 5340.45 
Prob > chi2 > 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -109592
Pseudo R2 = 0.0696 Number of obs > 532,010 
Number of covariate patterns * 532,005 
Pearson chi2(531,967) -  541495.6 
Prob > chi2 * 0.000
Number of obs > 532,010 
Number of groups >10 
H-L chi2(8)» 846.03 
Prob >chi2» 0.000
The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test is more appropriate when the number of 
covariate patterns is dose to the number of observations, as is the case in this data. This 
test groups the data by ordering the predicted probabilities and then forming 10 nearly 
equal-size groups. The value of the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistic for proxy 
Modd A is 181. The corresponding p-values from the chi-square distribution with 8 
degrees of freedom are all 0.000. This indicates that the proxy models are not such a good 
fit. However, the comparison of the observed and expected frequendes in each of the 20 
cells in table A8-2 on the next page shows close agreement within each decile of risk.
Altogether, the goodness-of-fit results in table A8-1 are mixed. However, this is of 
no big concerns for two reasons. First, these goodness-of-fit results were obtained from the 
proxy models that would otherwise not be deemed adequate for panel data. Second, 
models are usually not entirely based on these summary measures of statistical 
significance.
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Table A8-2: Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test quantiles o f estimated probabilities
Group Prob. Obs 1 Exp_1 Obs 0 Exp_0 Total
Proxy
Model A
1 0.0576 2.815 2,379 63,550 63,986 66,365
2 0.0927 5,115 5,001 61,249 61,363 66,364
3 0.1273 7,064 7,297 59,301 59,068 66,365
4 0.1636 9,135 9,633 57,229 56,732 66,364
5 0.2041 11,802 12,167 54,562 54,197 66,364
6 0.251 14,724 15,059 51,641 51,306 66,365
7 0.3078 18,581 18,471 47,783 47,894 66,364
8 0.3839 22,776 22,806 43,589 43,559 66,365
9 0.4997 29,731 28,998 36,633 37,366 66,364
10 1 40,743 40,676 25.621 25.688 66.364
Proxy
Model B
1 0.1465 8,445 7,667 60,049 60,827 68.494
2 0.1809 11,247 11,304 57,247 57,190 68,494
3 0.2059 12,576 13,272 55,918 55,222 68,494
4 0.2287 14,609 14,890 53,885 53,604 68,494
5 0.2509 16,338 16,423 52,156 52,071 68,494
6 0.2732 17,646 17,943 50,848 50,551 68,494
7 0.2993 19,118 19,572 49.376 48,922 68,494
8 0.3377 21,770 21,711 46.724 46,783 68.494
9 0.4097 25,743 25,260 42,751 43,234 68,494
10 1 36.289 35.740 32.204 32.754 68.493
Proxy
Model C
1 0.0115 451 492 52,750 52,710 53,201
2 0.0203 963 916 52,238 52,285 53,201
3 0.0239 855 1,175 52,346 52,027 53,201
4 0.0348 2,062 1,509 51,139 51,692 53,201
5 0.0558 2,936 2,304 50,265 50,897 53,201
6 0.0716 3,073 3,454 50,128 49,747 53,201
7 0.0808 3,223 4,068 49,978 49,133 53,201
8 0.0897 4,074 4,527 49,127 48,674 53,201
9 0.1028 5.204 5,079 47,997 48,122 53,201
10 1 8.011 7.329 45.190 45.872 53.201
Often it is desirable to examine individual components of the summary statistic for 
example with classification tables. Classification tables tally correct and incorrect 
estimates. They cross-classify the outcome variable with a dichotomous variable whose 
values are derived from the estimated logistic probabilities. A cut-point is defined (most 
commonly 0.5) in order to compare each estimated probability to i t  Table A8-3 shows the 
results for classifying the observations with proxy Models A, B, and C. The common cut­
off point 0.5 was used here. The columns of the table contain the two predicted values of 
the dependent variable, while the rows are the two observed (actual) values of die 
dependent variable. In a perfect model, all cases would be on the diagonal and the overall 
percent correct will be 100%. If the logistic model has homoscedastidty, the percent
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correct will be approximately the same for both rows. Sensitivity is the fraction of the 
outcome of y, =1 observations that are correctly classified. Specificity is the percent of 
y, =0 observations that are correctly classified.
For proxy Model A the overall rate of correct classification is estimated as 78%. The 
specificity is 95% (475,599/501,158), meaning 95% of the joiner group being correctly 
classified. The sensitivity is 25% (40,672/162,486), meaning only 25% of the control group 
being correctly classified. For proxy Model B the overall correct classification rate is 74% 
and for proxy Model B 94%. Since the specificity in proxy Models B and C are even higher 
at the 0.5 cut-point, the sensitivity must be lower.
Table A8-3: Classification table and classification statistics for proxy Models A, B, and C
Proxy 
Model A
Proxy 
Model B
Proxy 
Model C
Classified
True
0 -D Total
True
D -D Total
True
D -D Total
+ 40,672 25,559 66,231 19,305 12,123 31,428 6 28 34
. 121,814 475,599 597,413 164,476 489,035 653,511 30,846 501,130 531,976
Total 162,486 501,158 663,644 183,781 501,158 684,939 30.852 501,158 532,010
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5
True D defined jc 0___________________ Ic -= 0_____________________sc -■ 0
Sensitivity Pr(+|D) 25.03% Pr(+|D) 10.50% P rM  D) 0.02%
Specificity Pr( *|~D) 94.90% Pr(-bD) 97.58% PrH -D ) 99.99%
Positive predictive Pr(D| +) 61.41% Pr(D| +) 61.43% Pr(D| +) 17.65%
value
Negative predictive Pr(-D| -) 79.61% Pr(-D| -) 74.83% Pr(~D| -) 94.20%
value
False + rate for true Pr( +|-D) 5.10% Pr(+|-D) 2.42% Pr(+hD) 0.01%
~D
False - rate for true 
n
Pr(-|D) 74.97% Pr(-|D) 89.50% Pr<-| D) 99.98%
u
False + rate for Pr(~D| +) 38.59% Pr(-D| +) 38.57% Pr('D | +) 82.35%
classified +
False - rate for Pr( D| -) 20.39% Pr( D| -) 25.17% Pr(D |.) 5.80%
classified -
Correctly classified 77.79% 74.22% 94.20%
Table A8-3 also demonstrates that for proxy Model A 475,599 of the 597,413 households 
predicted to be in the control group were classified correctly, while 25,559 of the 66,231 
households predicted to be joiners were misclassified. Of the total number of 162,486 
households who were actually joiners, only 40,672 were correctly predicted. This 
considerable amount of misclassification suggests that many households in the data have 
probabilities close to the cut-point (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). If these proxy models
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would have been actually fit to cross-sectional data (and not this thesis' panel data) they 
would point towards a high level of homogeneity in the described insured population.
However, classification table results generally do not have a lot of interpretation 
value for the goodness-of-fit of a model, because they do not assess the calibration, i.e. if 
probabilities reflect the true outcome experience in the data (Hosmer and Lemeshow 
2000). But often it is the objective to choose an optimal cut-point for the purposes of 
classification. This optimal cut-point is where sensitivity and specificity are both 
maximised. First, one can chose a range of different possible probability cut-off points for 
the previously discussed classification tables, then obtain their respective sensitivity and 
specificity values and finally plot sensitivity and specificity versus all possible cut-points, 
as in figure A8-1. The intersection of both curves then displays the optimal cut-point for 
the purpose of classification. In the plot under figure A8-1 sensitivity and specificity were 
plotted against all possible probability cut-off points of Model A. For proxy Model A the 
plot indicates that the optimal cut-off point would be 0.25.195
Figure A8-1: Plot o f sensitivity and specificity versus all possible cut-points in proxy Model A
Sensitivity-specificity plot for joiner-control model
1.00
0.75
0 .50
0 .25
0.00
0.00 1.000 .25 0.50 0.75
Probability cutoff
I r
195 For proxy M odels B and C the optimal cut-off point would be 0.26 and 0.075 respectively.
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A more comprehensive description of the classification accuracy than the single cut-point, 
which sensitivity and specificity rely upon, is the area under the so-called ROC (Receiver 
Operating Characteristics) curve. The ROC curve is generated by plotting the sensitivity 
(or fraction of observed positive-outcome cases that are correctly classified) versus 1- 
specificity (or fraction of observed negative-oubcome cases that are correctly classified) 
over the entire range of possible cut-points. Values under the curve .6 £ ROC £ .9 are most 
common, indicating acceptable to excellent discrimination. Proxy Model A has an area 
under the ROC curve of 0.76, proxy Model B 0.66, and proxy Model C 0.71, respectively. 
This area under the curve provides as a measure of discrimination: the likelihood that a 
household who joins/leaves/switchers will have a higher probability y=l than a 
household who is in the control group. The plot in figure A8-2 displays the ROC curve for 
proxy Model A with areas under the ROC curve that indicate a good discrimination.
Figure A8-2: ROC-curve fo r  proxy Model A
ROC curve for joiner-control model 
Area under ROC curve = 0.7575
1.00
0.75
0.50 ;
0.25
0.00
0.00 0.25 0 .50 1.000.75
1 - Specificity
Logistic regression diagnostics. If the independent variables of two observations are 
identical these two observations share the same covariate pattern. Then, despite having 
individual observations, the statistical information of the data can be summarised by the 
covariate patterns (i.e., the number of observations with that covariate pattern and the
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number of positive outcomes within the pattern) (STATA 1999).196 Proxy Model A, for 
example, was estimated over n=663,644 household observations with 7=663,636 covariate 
patterns.197
STATA™ calculates all residuals and diagnostics statistics in terms of covariance 
patterns, not observations. Observations with die same covariate pattern are given the 
same residual and diagnostic statistics. The Pearson chi-square statistic, introduced under 
the summary measures of goodness-of-fit, can be then computed based on all observations 
with this covariate pattern.198 As an example, table A8-4 describes the Pearson residuals 
for proxy Model A based on all observations with a specific covariate pattern. Prevalence 
of a few, large positive residuals is noticeable.
Table A8-4: Pearson residual based on observations with similar covariate pattern fo r  proxy Model A
Proxy 
Model A
Pearson residual
Percentiles Sm allest
1% -1.350 -71.514
5% -0.938 -24.741
10% -0.774 -14.638 Obs. 663,643
25% -0.560 -14.174 SumofWgL 663,643
50% -0.367 Mean 0.001
Largest Std. Dev. 1.013
75% -0.110 14.421
90% 1.532 14.699 Variance 1.026
95% 2.033 18.606 Skew ness 1.267
99% 3.275 20.074 K urtosls 46.169
Pearson residuals do not have standard deviation equal to one unless they are further 
standardised (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000, STATA 1999). However, generated Pearson 
residuals, normalised to have expected standard deviation equal to one, do not differ for 
this thesis' data, as is demonstrated in table A8-5. Thus the question of whether to use 
standardised or unstandardised residuals does not matter here.
196 It can be assumed that a fitted model contains p  covariates that form J  covariate patterns. Depending on 
the model the number of covariate patterns can be less or be equal to n, the number of observations. The fitted 
models in this thesis contained several continuous covariates; hence the number of covariate patterns J  is of 
the same order as n.
197 Models B was estimated over «=684,939 and .7=684,932 covariate patterns, Model C had n=532,010 and 
.7=532,005.
198 The residual is defined as the square root of the contribution of the covariate pattern to the Pearson chi- 
square goodness-of-fit statistic and signed according to whether the observed number of positive responses 
within the covariate pattern is less or greater than expected.
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Table A8-5: Summary o f  unstandardised and standardised residuals fo r  proxy Model A
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
r -  unstandardised 663,643 0.001 1.013 -71.514 20.074
rs -  standardised 663,643 0.001 1.013 -71.516 20.076
Figure A8-3 presents the plot of the leverage values versus the Pearson residuals for proxy 
Model A.199 The leverage values are the diagonal elements of the hat matrix and this 
calculated leverage of a covariate pattern is a scaled measure of distance in terms of the 
independent variables.200 Large values indicate covariate patterns deviating strongly from 
the average covariate pattern that can have a large effect on the fit of an estimated model 
(STATA 1999). This thesis' data contains almost as many covariate patterns as 
observations, thus displaying many unique covariate patterns (in figure A8-3). In such 
unique patterns one observes either zero or one success and expects p, thus forcing the 
sign of the residuals (STATA 1999). Covariate patterns that are not fitted well by the 
model are represented by large residuals and appear on the left and right edges of figure 
A8-3.
Figure A 8-3: Plot o f  leverage versus the Pearson residual fo r  proxy Model A
Pearson residual for joiner-control model
I I I l . 1 1 ...I_ _ _ _ _  L
.3
.2 !
18 20
199 The plots for proxy Models B and C were similar and are not displayed here.
200 For a more detailed mathematical development see Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) p 167ff.
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Covariate patterns that appear on the top of figure A8-3 have a high leverage. 
Points on the extreme right and left represent large residuals. Covariate patterns with high 
leverage and small residuals are of most interest because they are hard to spot with the 
previous diagnostics. Overall, however, figure A8-3 shows only a very small number of 
deviating covariate patterns, indicating a good model fit.
Figure A8-4 presents the plot of the Pearson chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic 
Ax2 against the estimated logistic probability residuals for proxy Model A.201 The shape 
of the plots show quadratic curves, the points on the curve from top left to bottom right 
correspond to covariate patterns with y = 1 and the points on the other curve from the
bottom left to top right correspond to covariate patterns with y . =0.202 Points that fall into
some distance from the data plot, on the top left or top right, represent some covariate 
patterns that are poorly fit. However, they are generally few poorly fit covariate patterns 
and most values fall under or around 4. This means most values of Ax2 fall under or 
around 4 (these quantities would be distributed approximately as chi-square with one 
degree of freedom with \ 2 . 95(1) = 3.84) and thus the plot indicates a reasonable model fit
Figure A8-4: Plot o f  A x '  versus the estimated logistic probability from  proxy Model A
6X2  v e r su s  probability for joiner-control m odel
20
5
10
5
0
r;
1.6 .8.40 .2
PrO'c)
__________________________
201 The plots for proxy M odels B and C were similar and are not displayed here.
202 In the data m ost covariate patterns are unique and points tend to lie along one or the other curve w hile  
points o f f  the curves correspond to the few repeated covariate patterns that contain different outcom es.
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In figure A8-5 the influence diagnostic A (3 is plotted against the estimated logistic
probability for the proxy Model A.203 In general the influence of diagnostics A p  has to be 
larger than one to affect the estimated coefficients (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). There 
are only a few points that lie away from the data, indicating a good model fit.
Figure A 8-5: Plot o f  A (3 versus the estimated logistic probability from  proxy M odel A 
dBeta versus probability for joiner-control model
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Large values of A /? most likely occur when both A y 2 and leverage, or either of the two, 
are comparably large. This can be assessed by plotting Ax2 against the estimated logistic
probability with the size of the symbol proportional to A/0, shown in figure A8-6 on the
next page (for proxy Model A). A larger circle on the upper left indicates large Ax2 values, 
larger circles for the estimated probabilities around 0.2 indicate the region of high leverage 
values. Overall, however, figure A8-6 indicates a very good model fit.204
203 The plots for proxy M odels B and C are similar and are not displayed here.
204 Similar plots were generated for proxy Models B and C, however, they are not displayed here.
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Figure A 8- 6: Plot o f  A x 2 versus the estimated logistic probability (symbol proportional to A (3 ) from  
proxy Model A
dX2 versus probability with dBeta forjoiner-control model
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Symbol size proportional to dBeta
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